



## Planning for the 2025-2026 UNCCD budget

### Questions and answers – May 2024

On 13 March 2024, the UNCCD secretariat organized an online consultation on the status of the 2022-2024 core budget and the elements and challenges concerning the preparation of the 2025-2026 core budget. All Parties were invited to send their comments and questions after the consultation, with the aim to further prepare for the next core budget. Four inputs were received<sup>1</sup>. This document provides a compilation of the comments and questions received and the answers to the questions. For easy reading, the secretariat combined similar questions in different inputs into one, and some comments were modified into a question format, so that addressing them was clearer.

#### General questions about the budget

Question	Answer
<i>1. How does the UNCCD budget consider the special needs, contexts, and vulnerabilities of developing countries? Does it avoid implying greater burdens for the existing limited resources that some developing countries have?</i>	Each COP decides the level of the UNCCD core budget, which is covered mainly by contributions of Parties. The share of each country is defined in an indicative scale of contributions that derives from the scale contributions used by the UN, which allocates payments among countries on the basis of their relative size and financial situation. Currently the smallest annual contribution is 77 euros, while the largest is close to 1.7 million per year. Most of the actions taken under the UNCCD -especially under, but not limited to, the Global Mechanism- are geared toward assisting developing countries to protect their land and to mitigate the effects of drought. These are the priorities that guide the budget proposal. Successful implementation of the UNCCD is expected to improve the health and productivity of land and improve the resilience of people, both of which are critically important for building wealth, prosperity and well-being in long-term. The investments made to the UNCCD budget are expected to bring a significant return particularly in the poorest countries of the world.
<i>2. How does the UNCCD budget support the representativeness of different countries and regions in the Convention activities? Regional representativeness is crucial for</i>	UNCCD activities are either global in nature (mainly policy advice and through COP decisions) or targeting the countries under the five Regional Implementation Annexes (Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Northern Mediterranean, and Central and Eastern Europe). The UNCCD has a unique structure in the Global Mechanism whose objective is to support developing countries in their quest to mobilize international support on

<sup>1</sup> From Argentina, China, the European Union and its member states, and Japan.

<p><i>ensuring effective functioning and implementation of the Convention.</i></p>	<p>Land Restoration and Drought resilience. The bodies established in the process (Bureaus, working groups...) always have representation from all regions.</p> <p>To support participation in the UNCCD official meetings, a special fund was established in the UNCCD Financial Rules to support the representatives of developing, and in particular least developed, country Parties. Each programme budget submission includes estimated resource requirements for this purpose. So far, the COP has opted to invite Parties to make voluntary contributions to this fund.</p>
<p><i>3. In other UN agencies, Programme Budget Implications (PBI) are presented when taking a decision or voting. However, it is not the case for the UNCCD where decisions are made without fully considering the implications on the budget. Could this practice be improved, so that in the negotiations of each decision, the resulting burden on the secretariat would be recognized?</i></p>	<p>In the UNCCD process, the secretariat is requested to prepare the background documentation and also the draft decisions. When preparing these documents, the secretariat has in most cases limited its proposals on the actions to be taken to those for which it has already secured at least some resources. During the COP budget negotiations, the secretariat has then checked the approved decision against the original proposal and informed the budget negotiators of any newly introduced elements that have financial implications.</p> <p>The secretariat will seek to further improve the practice of identifying and making known to the COP the budgetary implications of each decision.</p>
<p><i>4. How could the budget mechanism be further reformed and innovated so as to address matters that cannot be duly planned for in advance, such as salary scale changes and inflation?</i></p>	<p>The UNCCD has a working capital reserve of 12% of annual total expenditure, representing one and a half months of operating requirements under the core budget. The working capital reserve ensures continuity of operations in the event of a temporary shortfall of cash, guaranteeing the financial liquidity and integrity of the secretariat to compensate for uneven cash flows, taking into account the estimated income and expenditures for the following financial period. However, this reserve is not meant for covering issues such as those concerning inflation, which may last longer term over many financial periods.</p> <p>In addition, the COP has on a few occasions discussed whether there would be a need for a mechanism that could rapidly address unexpected budget matters in the intersessional period between the COPs. In these discussions, assigning this role to the COP Bureau has been mostly considered, but so far Parties have decided not to provide the Bureau with this authority.</p>
<p><i>5. Why is the total budget in background document provided for the March consultations different from the total budget in the COP budget decision?</i></p>	<p>There are several key amounts in the core budget: the net and the gross total budget, and also the amounts to be paid as contributions. The March consultation presentation was mostly looking at a one-year net amount of the budget amounting to 7,270,311 euros. The grand total (approved budget with programme support costs and any adjustments to the working capital reserve) amounting to 8,215,451 euros was also used a few times. These are identical to the amounts shown in table 1 of the COP 15 budget decision.</p>

## About the increase scenario

Question	Answer
<p>6. Why is the secretariat proposing two scenarios? Wasn't the previous COP asking for a zero nominal growth scenario?</p>	<p>The COP, by its decision 10/COP.15, requested the Executive Secretary to present “[...] two budget scenarios and a work programme based on the projected needs for the biennium in (a) a zero nominal growth scenario; and (b) a scenario based on further recommended adjustments to the first scenario and the added costs or savings related to them”.</p>
<p>7. Why is the secretariat presenting a long-term trend from 2013 to 2023 as the basis of its budget analysis in the background document provided for the March consultations? Shouldn't the discussion be based on the previous 2022-2024 budget and how it was executed?</p>	<p>Indeed the budget consideration will be built on the latest (2022-2024) budget. However, the current budget context is very challenging for the functioning of the secretariat and the GM, and the proposal for a high increase is exceptional in this Convention process. By showing a longer perspective, the secretariat wanted to underline the specific setting for the considerations of the 2025-2026 budget.</p>
<p>8. Please present the overall operational costs and all budget items, not only the staff costs, as elements for the new budget, for the Parties to consider the whole picture and all potential adjustments.</p>	<p>The secretariat is further developing the presentation on the proposed budget and will share this well in advance to the 22 May consultations.</p>
<p>9. Please provide the information on the next budget in the usual form of budgetary tables describing the projected expenditure and the number of staff with two scenarios; one is the zero nominal growth scenario, and the other is to include adjustments that are critically necessary for the implementation of the mandates.</p>	<p>The secretariat is further developing the presentation on the proposed budget and will share this well in advance to the 22 May consultations.</p>
<p>10. Please provide previous budget expenditure breakdown table (especially staff costs).</p>	<p>Below is a table showing a breakdown per budget line (UNCCD unit), as defined in the COP 15 budget decision. The “staff” column shows how many people funded from the core budget, and at which level, are for each unit. It may be noted that the three regional officers are under the “External Relations, Policy and Advocacy” unit. The five frozen positions are marked as “vacant”.</p>

Object of expenditure – status as at 31 December 2023 (in euros)								
Budget line	Staff	Personnel costs	Contractual services	Travel	Operating and other direct costs	Supplies, commodities and materials	Equipment, vehicles and furniture	Total
<b>Executive Office</b>	USG, D2, P4, GS (1)	1,327,540	78,384	258,387	12,363	-	294	<b>1,676,967</b>
<b>Governing Bodies and Legal Affairs</b>	P5 (vacant), P3	652,930	48,659	-	34	-	-	<b>701,622</b>
<b>Communications</b>	P5, P3 (vacant), GS (4)	1,179,990	62,045	20,702	8,896	26,708	3,409	<b>1,301,751</b>
<b>External Relations, Policy and Advocacy</b>	P4 (4), P3 (2), GS (2)	2,222,795	65,590	112,891	1,263	464	-	<b>2,403,003</b>
<b>Science, Technology and Innovation</b>	P5 (2), P4 (2, one vacant), P3 (2), P2 (2), GS (2)	3,152,328	46,244	186,414	14,241	-	2,020	<b>3,401,246</b>
<b>Administrative Services</b>	GS (1)	422,423	350,434	22,787	1,447,663	16,001	43,853	<b>2,303,162</b>
<b>Global Mechanism</b>	D1, P5 (vacant), P4 (2), P3 (4), P2 (2, one vacant), GS (4)	2,858,156	120,712	33,612	6,511	-	340	<b>3,019,331</b>
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>11,816,163</b>	<b>772,066</b>	<b>634,793</b>	<b>1,490,972</b>	<b>43,174</b>	<b>49,915</b>	<b>14,807,083</b>

*To be noted: Some positions of the secretariat are filled below the approved level, as cost-saving measures, in line with the flexibility granted by the COP.*

<p><i>11. In the aftermath of the COVID pandemic, virtual meetings and home offices have become routine, resulting in a significant reduction in the costs and workload concerning travel. How is the secretariat identifying such savings, and are they incorporated into the budget scenarios?</i></p>	<p>In the aftermath of the pandemic, the secretariat continues to participate in many meetings virtually, and also organize online many of the meetings that it hosts. However, meeting online is not always possible or useful, particularly in complex discussions that require frequent interactions with several participants to achieve the overall aims of events. For example, for the current working groups on drought and midterm evaluation, online meetings work well for information exchange but any decision-making among the members requires in-person meetings.</p> <p>It may be noted that as the online meetings have become a routine channel for communication, they are more and more frequently used. While this has significantly improved information-sharing between the secretariat, Parties and partners, it has also often increased the workload of the secretariat staff.</p>
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<p><i>12. Please present a breakdown of the calculations concerning the savings from operating and other direct costs, which are estimated to amount to at least half a million euros. What are the projections of similar savings in the future and how are they considered in the budget scenarios?</i></p>	<p>The operating and other direct costs cover a variety of expenditures that necessary for the running of the secretariat and the Global Mechanism. Almost two-thirds of them are about common services, which include the local costs shared with the UN entities in Bonn, services of the UN Office in Geneva, fees for UNDP (various services of organizing meetings outside Bonn) and costs relating to the Umoja and IPSAS systems. Other larger costs are those of staff training and costs of meetings and conferences (for example, the SPI meeting facilities).</p> <p>The below table shows where savings have been made in the last years, and their expected extent by the end of the triennium. The secretariat aims to maintain the level of most of the listed savings, while considering that staff training is necessary for continuing quality services and that allocation should be maintained for the coming years. Therefore the projection of future savings in operational costs are estimated at 500,000 euros in the upcoming biennium.</p>
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<b>Operating and other direct costs: budgeted, expenditure, and estimated savings</b>				
<b>Object of expenditure</b>	<b>Budget 2022-2024</b>	<b>Expenditure 2022-2023</b>	<b>Estimated expenditure 2024</b>	<b>Estimated savings</b>
<b>Telecommunication</b>	105,000	68,182	34,091	2,727
<b>Courier services</b>	56,000	33,843	16,921	5,236
<b>Hospitality</b>	17,800	11,865	5,932	3
<b>Information materials</b>	105,000	69,881	34,941	178
<b>Insurance</b>	10,000	2,221	1,111	6,668
<b>IT support</b>	75,000	30,297	15,149	29,554
<b>Common services</b>	1,800,000	1,021,007	510,503	268,490
<b>Rental of premises and equipment</b>	333,500	222,303	111,151	46
<b>Training</b>	400,000	9,386	4,693	385,921
<b>Other expenses</b>	198,539	21,987	10,994	165,558
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>3,100,839</b>	<b>1,490,972</b>	<b>745,486</b>	<b>864,381</b>

## Method of calculating the increase

Question	Answer
<p>13. Why was the inflation rate mixed with the standard salary cost increase? What was the method of calculating the inflation rate estimated at 11%? Which year was taken as the baseline? How were the cost increases disaggregated by year?</p>	<p>For the March budget consultations, the secretariat used mostly the changes in staff costs as the basis for inflation, as those costs are easily verifiable and they represent around 75% of the entire UNCCD core budget. Changes to the UN salary scales<sup>2</sup> on a yearly basis were calculated, and as that is only one component of the staff costs, the secretariat also made some sample-based checks on changes in the monthly payroll, to ensure that the actual cost changes are in line with what the salary scale changes indicate. The annual inflation rate of Germany was monitored and also that information was compared to the staff cost changes. The secretariat did not use any precise method for calculating the inflation increase to non-staff costs, as coming up with a reliable number would be very difficult and as these costs are only one quarter of the approved budget. The resulting estimate of “10-12%” is indeed an estimate but based on an actual increase in staff costs.</p>
<p>14. How come the secretariat has been able to effectively fulfill its missions with zero nominal increase?</p>	<p>The secretariat has been able to “stretch” its core budget resources despite increasing costs in all areas of the budget by strict control over expenditures for staff travel and consultancy, and occasionally prolonging recruitment for vacant positions. However, the core budget has still not been adequate for covering the intended expenses, and the core work under the UNCCD has increasingly relied on the availability of voluntary contributions. In the last years, the share of voluntary contributions exceeded 50% of the total expenditure, and any change in their availability poses a high risk for the continuity of those core activities that are covered solely from voluntary contributions,</p>

## Proposed staff increases

Question	Answer
<p>15. Why was the UNCCD budget presentation in March largely about staff-related matters? Shouldn't the convention's general functioning be the focus?</p>	<p>The UNCCD secretariat and the GM have 45 staff positions under the core budget (31 professional level staff and 14 general services level staff); they execute their mandate based on the text of the Convention and guidance by Parties. Nevertheless, staff costs represent a significant portion of the UNCCD core budget (75% in the approved budget for 2022–2024) – for the functioning of the Convention, this means that the tasks mandated by the COP are expected to be assignments that can be done by staff members. The UNCCD core budget does not include funding for the organization of meetings or workshops, implementing pilot projects or other similar purposes, with just a</p>

<sup>2</sup> <https://icsc.un.org/Home/DataSalaryScales?r=006152225>

	<p>few exceptions: the costs of the COP, CRIC and CST Bureau meetings are covered, and a small allocation (close to 60,000 euros per year) is made for the SPI meetings costs. In short, the UNCCD core budget is mostly to cover the costs of 45 people that are to carry out the tasks mandated by the COP. The rest of the budget is to cover the daily running costs (UNOG fees, office maintenance, software licenses etc...- 15% of the budget), as well as some consultancies and staff travel (10% of the budget). Thus, staff costs are actually the convention functioning costs, when it comes to delivering the core mandates of the secretariat and the GM.</p> <p>As staff costs have such a big share of the core budget, any change to these costs has a major impact to the rest of the core budget. In the March consultations it was noted that had the secretariat continued in 2023 its operations without saving measures and kept the approved staff positions filled, the staff costs would have taken around 90% of the budget. With this, the secretariat would have been unable to pay its running costs.</p>
<p><i>16. Please provide more detailed information about the specific tasks of the additional core budget positions. What activities have actually increased since 2021, with as much quantitative comparison as possible, and why this workload cannot be covered by the current staff members?</i></p>	<p>The secretariat is working on this matter and will share the information well in advance to the 22 May consultations.</p>
<p><i>17. Are the proposed positions new, or are they already existing but covered from other sources of funding? Why are some positions suggested to be shifted to core budget from other sources of funding?</i></p>	<p>The secretariat is working on this matter and will share the information well in advance to the 22 May consultations.</p>
<p><i>18. Does the secretariat depend on consultants to carry out agreed mandates?</i></p>	<p>The secretariat uses consultants for temporary assistance in order to respond quickly, flexibly and effectively to organizational priorities for specialized activities that require skills or knowledge not normally possessed by the regular staff. Although consultants cannot perform the functions of staff members, their role has become increasingly important in ensuring the delivery of mandated activities in the expected quality.</p>
<p><i>19. Which positions have been vacant since 2022? Which have become vacant in the course of 2023? How have the un-filling of these posts concretely impacted the work carried out under the Convention? Which specific areas have been most impacted by the positions that have become vacant?</i></p>	<p>Below are the positions that are currently frozen and information of the impact:</p> <p><u>P5 Head of the unit for Governing Bodies and Legal Affairs</u>: This position has been vacant since 1 September 2023. Its holder is the head of UNCCD conference services, in charge of negotiations with the host country and overseeing all aspects of the conference organization. This position also covers the duties of a Chief of Staff, with numerous internal coordination and overseeing duties, as well as tasks in the joint UN bodies in Bonn. At the moment, the duties are assigned to the Director of the UNCCD New York Liaison Office, in addition to his regular work. Keeping this position vacant would seriously reduce the ability of the secretariat to organize the meetings of</p>

	<p>the COP and its subsidiary bodies. It would also affect internal coordination and coherence, and cooperation among the Bonn-based UN entities.</p> <p><u>P5 Senior Resource Mobilization Officer/GM</u>: This position has been vacant since 2022, although it was used for a temporary contract in 2023. Its workload has fallen on other team members leading to overall decreased productivity as they have covered the responsibilities of the vacant role along with their own. The GM has missed opportunities for financing and innovation, as the reduced staff pool cannot identify and pursue new initiatives or address emerging challenges while maintaining and nurturing the network of contacts. This has in turn led to delays or lapses in “customer service” frustrating partners and potential partners and leading to dissatisfaction among Parties who are keen to explore and integrate private and innovative financing into their financing strategy for implementation of the Convention.</p> <p><u>P-4 Capacity Building Officer</u>: This position has been vacant since December 2023. Its holder is in charge of the UNCCD Capacity Building Marketplace and various internal coordination tasks concerning capacity building and innovations. These duties are not carried out while the position is vacant.</p> <p><u>P-3 Communications Officer</u>: This position on media/press relations has been vacant since the beginning of 2023. Some of the duties have been added to the workload of other staff in the same unit, but that has not been adequate to deliver the expected tasks. With COP 16 approaching, the secretariat could no longer afford to lower the level of its media relations; therefore this position has now been filled. Respective savings have been acquired through other measures.</p> <p><u>P-2 knowledge management officer/GM</u>: This position has been vacant since 2022. Its holder is to guide and carry out the organization and availing of the information and data concerning the work of the GM, such as those on the LDN target setting and implementation and the project preparation partnership. Other staff in the GM are doing some of this work, but without a dedicated officer it will not be possible to provide these services at the expected scope.</p>
<p>20. Are these costs of these positions included in the second budget scenario?</p>	<p>Yes, all positions in the approved post table are included in the second budget scenario.</p>
<p>21. Is the secretariat planning to fill the vacant positions? How long would it take for the secretariat to restart the recruitment and by when these positions could be filled in?</p>	<p>The vacant posts would be filled as soon as the needed resources are secured. As these positions are crucial for the functioning and the efficiency of the work of the secretariat, the plan is to initiate the recruitment process for all vacant positions in the coming months, so that the applications can be processed in good time for the positions to be filled at the beginning of 2025, if funding becomes available.</p>
<p>22. Are there any posts that are approved but not needed?</p>	<p>No</p>



<p>23. <i>What are possible options to absorb the increased cost by enhancing effectiveness and efficiency?</i></p>	<p>We have identified significant saving potential under the operational costs, which can be used to compensate for the increased staff costs. Other than that, the options are very limited, if any. Were the secretariat to cut five positions from its 31 professional staff positions, over 15% of its core staff would be lost. Sharing that workload among the remaining staff would entail a major reduction in the number or scope of activities that were formerly carried out.</p>
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### After-service health insurance

Question	Answer
<p>24. <i>How the secretariat intends to cover the ASHI costs for the existing staff? Would that entail asking Parties to partly use savings to cover these costs?</i></p>	<p>At COP 15, the secretariat set aside for ASHI payments 500,000 euros from uncommitted balances. This amount remains available, and at COP 16, the secretariat will seek Parties' authorization to start using it. Currently, annual ASHI charges are around 100,000 euros per year, thus this set-aside will cover the payments for at least some years to come. While the secretariat continues to follow related exchanges at the UN headquarters level, it also notes the high risk of accumulated liability and recommends that Parties take measures to mitigate that risk.</p>
<p>25. <i>What would be the estimated ASHI costs for the new positions to be funded from the core budget? How would they be covered?</i></p>	<p>The secretariat is working on this matter and will share the information well in advance to the 22 May consultations.</p>

### Extrabudgetary resources

Question	Answer
<p>26. <i>What is the total budget trend of the UNCCD, including both core and extrabudgetary resources? What is the total number of posts (planned and actual)? Please present also the carry-over for the past ten years.</i></p>	<p>The secretariat is working on this matter and will share the information well in advance to the 22 May consultations.</p>
<p>27. <i>What are the main risks at the moment concerning the activities funded from voluntary contributions? Are there activities that would be</i></p>	<p>All activities concerning gender equality and land tenure are covered from voluntary contributions. Funding for the contract of one officer for land tenure ends in September 2024, and funding for the gender officer will terminate in December 2024. The secretariat will still have voluntary funding for a junior officer for gender and</p>

<p><i>scaled down because voluntary funding will end? Until when have the secretariat and the GM funding to cover land governance and gender equality position?</i></p>	<p>tenure until the end of 2025. All current funding for activities (i.e. costs other than staff) concerning gender and tenure expires in December 2024.</p> <p>For drought matters, the secretariat has one officer under the core budget. He is currently supported by a junior officer from extrabudgetary resources until the end of 2024. In 2025, the secretariat will have some voluntary funding left for activities (non-staff) on drought.</p> <p>Although a key topic for the UNCCD, no core staff is funded to cover sand and dust storms.</p> <p>For the topics of linking land with migration and security, and urban-rural linkages, the secretariat has no more funding for activities and staff, and any activities in these fields will either ended or significantly scaled down.</p> <p>The science-policy interface (SPI) has approximately 60,000 euros per year under the core budget, which is primarily for its meeting costs. Other costs related to the preparation of its reports and coordination functions have been covered from voluntary contributions. However, these contributions have declined year by year, and if this trend continues, the lack of resources is likely to influence the scope of the SPI work.</p>
<p><i>28. Are there examples of misalignment between the UNCCD priorities and activities funded by voluntary contributions?</i></p>	<p>Some COP decision requests are not receiving funding that would allow their implementation. For example, there are decisions highlighting the importance of science and technology correspondents participation at the COPs, but the only funding source for that for many years has been the COP host country.</p>
<p><i>29. If Parties agree on an increase of the core budget, also the programme support costs (PSC) will grow. What are the risks of not having enough PSC to cover administrative costs and other relevant staff?</i></p>	<p>In accordance with the Financial Rules of the COP and standard practice of the United Nations, generally a rate of 13 per cent is charged to all trust funds for programme support services, or overheads. These support services are mostly used to cover the costs of administrative support staff and secretariat staff costs at the United Nations liaison office in New York. PSC also covers the UN disclosure system and some other expenses such as, in some cases, project audits. Without sufficient PSC, staff tasked with providing administrative services and reporting would be greatly affected in fulfilling their duties, especially if a reduction in force were necessary, impacting the scope of such services that would be potentially reduced and lead to impairment in fulfilling the secretariat's mandates.</p>
<p><i>30. How will the uncommitted balance (carry-over, estimated at approximately 2,4 million at the end of 2023) be taken into account in the next budget projection? Can it be used to cover the shortfall?</i></p>	<p>Parties will be informed of the exact status of the uncommitted balance by the time of the COP. If they so wish, they may authorize the use of that to offset contributions to the core budget or to cover other funding needs under the Convention.</p>

## The indicative scale of contributions

Question	Answer
<i>31. How the basis for indicative scale of assessment of each country is defined, as it differs from the United Nations scale of assessment and the proportion of each country's GDP to the world?</i>	The core budget and the indicative scale of contributions from all Parties are approved by the COP. The indicative scale of contributions is based on the scale of assessment of the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations adopted by the General Assembly (UNGA) once every three years. For the triennium 2022–2024, the indicative scale of contributions was established using decision 1/COP.ES-2 for the year 2022 and UNGA resolution 76/238, adopted by the UNGA on 24 December 2021, for the year 2023 and 2024. The secretariat will present a draft of the indicative scale of contributions for the biennium 2025–2026 using UNGA resolution 76/238, which may be adjusted, subject to the approval by the COP, for the contributions for 2025 following an updated resolution by the UNGA.
<i>32. How each scenario would impact the countries' annual contributions? Please show the budget increase of each country's indicative contributions.</i>	Annex 1 shows the United Nations scale of assessment and the consequent UNCCD indicative scale for 2024–2025. The contributions, as per the indicative scale, are shown for 2024, and should Parties decide on a zero nominal budget increase, these amounts would be valid also for 2025. The last column shows what the contributions would be in case Parties decide on a 40% increase (meeting all the gaps that the secretariat presented at the 13 March consultations). This column assumes the usual voluntary contribution of the host country Germany to the core budget (approximately 511,000 euros per year) but does not include any other possible offsetting of contributions, such as using the uncommitted balance that is currently around 2.4 million euros.

## Annex

### Indicative scale of assessment for the core budget of the Convention for 2024 and 2025

<i>Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessment<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Indicative scale of assessment for 2024 and 2025</i>	<i>2024 indicative contributions (euros)</i>	<i>2025 indicative contributions (euros) with 40% increase to core budget</i>
Afghanistan	0.006	0.006	451	644
Albania	0.008	0.008	601	859
Algeria	0.109	0.106	8,186	11,698
Andorra	0.005	0.005	376	537
Angola	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	0.002	150	215
Argentina	0.719	0.701	54,001	77,162
Armenia	0.007	0.007	526	751
Australia	2.111	2.058	158,547	226,549
Austria	0.679	0.662	50,996	72,869
Azerbaijan	0.030	0.029	2,253	3,220
Bahamas	0.019	0.019	1,427	2,039
Bahrain	0.054	0.053	4,056	5,795
Bangladesh	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Barbados	0.008	0.008	601	859
Belarus	0.041	0.040	3,079	4,400
Belgium	0.828	0.807	62,187	88,859
Belize	0.001	0.001	77	110
Benin	0.005	0.005	376	537
Bhutan	0.001	0.001	77	110
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.019	0.019	1,427	2,039
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.012	0.012	901	1,288
Botswana	0.015	0.015	1,127	1,610
Brazil	2.013	1.962	151,187	216,031
Brunei Darussalam	0.021	0.020	1,577	2,254
Bulgaria	0.056	0.055	4,206	6,010
Burkina Faso	0.004	0.004	300	429
Burundi	0.001	0.001	77	110
Cabo Verde	0.001	0.001	77	110
Cambodia	0.007	0.007	526	751
Cameroon	0.013	0.013	976	1,395
Canada	2.628	2.562	197,377	282,032
Central African Republic	0.001	0.001	77	110
Chad	0.003	0.003	225	322
Chile	0.420	0.409	31,544	45,074
China	15.254	14.871	1,145,655	1,637,030
Colombia	0.246	0.240	18,476	26,400
Comoros	0.001	0.001	77	110
Congo	0.005	0.005	376	537

<i>Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessment<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Indicative scale of assessment for 2024 and 2025</i>	<i>2024 indicative contributions (euros)</i>	<i>2025 indicative contributions (euros) with 40% increase to core budget</i>
Cook Islands	0.001	0.001	77	110
Costa Rica	0.069	0.067	5,182	7,405
Côte d'Ivoire	0.022	0.021	1,652	2,361
Croatia	0.091	0.089	6,835	9,766
Cuba	0.095	0.093	7,135	10,195
Cyprus	0.036	0.035	2,704	3,863
Czechia	0.340	0.331	25,536	36,488
Democratic People's Republic of Korea	0.005	0.005	376	537
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Denmark	0.553	0.539	41,533	59,347
Djibouti	0.001	0.001	77	110
Dominica	0.001	0.001	77	110
Dominican Republic	0.067	0.065	5,032	7,190
Ecuador	0.077	0.075	5,783	8,263
Egypt	0.139	0.136	10,440	14,917
El Salvador	0.013	0.013	976	1,395
Equatorial Guinea	0.012	0.012	901	1,288
Eritrea	0.001	0.001	77	110
Estonia	0.044	0.043	3,305	4,722
Eswatini	0.002	0.002	150	215
Ethiopia	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
European Union	2.500	2.500	192,604	275,213
Fiji	0.004	0.004	300	429
Finland	0.417	0.407	31,319	44,752
France	4.318	4.209	324,304	463,400
Gabon	0.013	0.013	976	1,395
Gambia	0.001	0.001	77	110
Georgia	0.008	0.008	601	859
Germany	6.111	5.957	458,968	655,821
Ghana	0.024	0.023	1,803	2,576
Greece	0.325	0.317	24,409	34,878
Grenada	0.001	0.001	77	110
Guatemala	0.041	0.040	3,079	4,400
Guinea	0.003	0.003	225	322
Guinea-Bissau	0.001	0.001	77	110
Guyana	0.004	0.004	300	429
Haiti	0.006	0.006	451	644
Honduras	0.009	0.009	676	966
Hungary	0.228	0.222	17,124	24,469
Iceland	0.036	0.035	2,704	3,863
India	1.044	1.018	78,410	112,040
Indonesia	0.549	0.535	41,233	58,918
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.371	0.362	27,864	39,815
Iraq	0.128	0.125	9,613	13,737

<i>Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessment<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Indicative scale of assessment for 2024 and 2025</i>	<i>2024 indicative contributions (euros)</i>	<i>2025 indicative contributions (euros) with 40% increase to core budget</i>
Ireland	0.439	0.428	32,971	47,113
Israel	0.561	0.547	42,134	60,205
Italy	3.189	3.109	239,511	342,237
Jamaica	0.008	0.008	601	859
Japan	8.033	7.831	603,320	862,086
Jordan	0.022	0.021	1,652	2,361
Kazakhstan	0.133	0.130	9,989	14,273
Kenya	0.030	0.029	2,253	3,220
Kiribati	0.001	0.001	77	110
Kuwait	0.234	0.228	17,575	25,112
Kyrgyzstan	0.002	0.002	150	215
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.007	0.007	526	751
Latvia	0.050	0.049	3,755	5,366
Lebanon	0.036	0.035	2,704	3,863
Lesotho	0.001	0.001	77	110
Liberia	0.001	0.001	77	110
Libya	0.018	0.018	1,352	1,932
Liechtenstein	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Lithuania	0.077	0.075	5,783	8,263
Luxembourg	0.068	0.066	5,107	7,298
Madagascar	0.004	0.004	300	429
Malawi	0.002	0.002	150	215
Malaysia	0.348	0.339	26,137	37,347
Maldives	0.004	0.004	300	429
Mali	0.005	0.005	376	537
Malta	0.019	0.019	1,427	2,039
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	77	110
Mauritania	0.002	0.002	150	215
Mauritius	0.019	0.019	1,427	2,039
Mexico	1.221	1.190	91,703	131,035
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.001	0.001	77	110
Monaco	0.011	0.011	826	1,180
Mongolia	0.004	0.004	300	429
Montenegro	0.004	0.004	300	429
Morocco	0.055	0.054	4,131	5,902
Mozambique	0.004	0.004	300	429
Myanmar	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Namibia	0.009	0.009	676	966
Nauru	0.001	0.001	77	110
Nepal	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Netherlands	1.377	1.342	103,420	147,777
New Zealand	0.309	0.301	23,208	33,161
Nicaragua	0.005	0.005	376	537
Niger	0.003	0.003	225	322

<i>Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessment<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Indicative scale of assessment for 2024 and 2025</i>	<i>2024 indicative contributions (euros)</i>	<i>2025 indicative contributions (euros) with 40% increase to core budget</i>
Nigeria	0.182	0.177	13,669	19,532
Niue	0.001	0.001	77	110
North Macedonia	0.007	0.007	526	751
Norway	0.679	0.662	50,996	72,869
Oman	0.111	0.108	8,337	11,912
Pakistan	0.114	0.111	8,562	12,234
Palau	0.001	0.001	77	110
Panama	0.090	0.088	6,759	9,659
Papua New Guinea	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Paraguay	0.026	0.025	1,953	2,790
Peru	0.163	0.159	12,242	17,493
Philippines	0.212	0.207	15,922	22,751
Poland	0.837	0.816	62,863	89,825
Portugal	0.353	0.344	26,512	37,883
Qatar	0.269	0.262	20,203	28,869
Republic of Korea	2.574	2.509	193,321	276,237
Republic of Moldova	0.005	0.005	376	537
Romania	0.312	0.304	23,433	33,483
Russian Federation	1.866	1.819	140,146	200,256
Rwanda	0.003	0.003	225	322
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.002	0.002	150	215
Saint Lucia	0.002	0.002	150	215
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001	0.001	77	110
Samoa	0.001	0.001	77	110
San Marino	0.002	0.002	150	215
Sao Tome and Principe	0.001	0.001	77	110
Saudi Arabia	1.184	1.154	88,925	127,065
Senegal	0.007	0.007	526	751
Serbia	0.032	0.031	2,403	3,434
Seychelles	0.002	0.002	150	215
Sierra Leone	0.001	0.001	77	110
Singapore	0.504	0.491	37,853	54,088
Slovakia	0.155	0.151	11,641	16,634
Slovenia	0.079	0.077	5,933	8,478
Solomon Islands	0.001	0.001	77	110
Somalia	0.001	0.001	77	110
South Africa	0.244	0.238	18,326	26,186
South Sudan	0.002	0.002	150	215
Spain	2.134	2.080	160,275	229,017
Sri Lanka	0.045	0.044	3,380	4,829
State of Palestine	0.011	0.011	826	1,180
Sudan	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Suriname	0.003	0.003	225	322
Sweden	0.871	0.849	65,417	93,474
Switzerland	1.134	1.105	85,169	121,699

<i>Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>United Nations scale of assessment<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Indicative scale of assessment for 2024 and 2025</i>	<i>2024 indicative contributions (euros)</i>	<i>2025 indicative contributions (euros) with 40% increase to core budget</i>
Syrian Arab Republic	0.009	0.009	676	966
Tajikistan	0.003	0.003	225	322
Thailand	0.368	0.359	27,639	39,493
Timor-Leste	0.001	0.001	77	110
Togo	0.002	0.002	150	215
Tonga	0.001	0.001	77	110
Trinidad and Tobago	0.037	0.036	2,779	3,971
Tunisia	0.019	0.019	1,427	2,039
Turkey	0.845	0.824	63,464	90,684
Turkmenistan	0.034	0.033	2,554	3,649
Tuvalu	0.001	0.001	77	110
Uganda	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
Ukraine	0.056	0.055	4,206	6,010
United Arab Emirates	0.635	0.619	47,692	68,147
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island	4.375	4.265	328,585	469,517
United Republic of Tanzania	0.010	0.010	751	1,073
United States of America	22.000	21.447	1,652,315	2,360,998
Uruguay	0.092	0.090	6,910	9,873
Uzbekistan	0.027	0.026	2,028	2,898
Vanuatu	0.001	0.001	77	110
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.175	0.171	13,143	18,781
Viet Nam	0.093	0.091	6,985	9,981
Yemen	0.008	0.008	601	859
Zambia	0.008	0.008	601	859
Zimbabwe	0.007	0.007	526	751
<b>Total</b>	<b>102.513</b>	<b>100.000</b>	<b>7,704,159</b>	<b>11,008,505</b>

<sup>a</sup> Parties include States and regional economic integration organizations that are Parties as of 31 December 2021.

<sup>b</sup> In accordance with General Assembly resolution 76/238.

*Note:* The United States of America views its funding to the core budget of the Convention as a voluntary contribution.