Arab Human Development Report 2016

Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality

Empowered lives.
Resilient nations.

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Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality

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for Arab States

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Foreword by the Administrator, UNDP

Last year, world leaders adopted *the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development* as a vision for transforming global development over the next fifteen years to build a more peaceful, prosperous, sustainable, and inclusive future. The Agenda asserts that young women and men are critical agents of change, and are central to achieving sustainable development.

Published at a time when countries are developing in earnest their plans to implement *the 2030 Agenda, the "Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality"* strongly echoes this assertion. It calls on Arab States to invest in their youth, and to empower them to engage in development processes. This is a critical and urgent priority in its own right, and it is a prerequisite for achieving tangible and sustainable progress on development and stability for the entire region. The report makes two key arguments for investing in young people in the region:

First, that while young people between the ages of fifteen and 29 make up nearly a third of the region›s population, another third are below the age of fifteen. This "demographic momentum" will last for at least the next two decades, and offers an historic opportunity which Arab countries must seize.

Second, the report underlines that the wave of protests which has swept through a number of Arab countries since 2011 with youth at the forefront has led to fundamental transformations across the entire region. Some countries have seen new national constitutions, free and fair elections, and a widening of the public participation sphere for previously excluded groups. Elsewhere, however, systems which had maintained stability came under serious challenge, with protracted conflict ensuing. This report emphasizes that empowerment and engagement of youth at this important juncture in the history of the region is essential for laying new and more durable foundations for stability.

The report explores the many challenges which youth in the Arab region continue to face. Many continue to receive an education which does not reflect the needs of labour markets. High numbers of young people, particularly young women, are unemployed and excluded from the formal economy. Young people without livelihoods find it difficult to establish an independent home and form their own family units. The risk for these young people is that instead of exploring opportunities and discovering future prospects, they experience frustration, helplessness, alienation, and dependency.

It goes without saying that young people across the Arab States have been severely affected by the recent crises. Large numbers of them were swept onto the frontlines of conflicts they did not start. Many died, and many more have lost family members and friends, livelihoods and prospects, and hope in the future. In the face of such challenges, some have joined extremist groups.

In response to these challenges, the report argues for youth empowerment from a human development perspective. This defines the goal of development as the expansion of the choices and freedoms available to people to live in ways they want and value.

Youth empowerment requires enhancing the capabilities of young people. Delivery systems for basic services, particularly in education and health, must be improved. The opportunities available to youth must be expanded – through economies which generate decent work and encourage entrepreneurship, political environments which encourage freedom of expression and active participation, and social systems which promote equality and act against all forms of discrimination.

In 2030, the Arab States will look back to assess what they have achieved over the fifteen years of the SDGs to fulfill the promise of peace, prosperity, and sustainable development for future generations.

We hope that this report will galvanize decision makers, other key stakeholders, and young people themselves across the Arab States' region to ensure greater participation of youth in development. Without such participation, it will be difficult to secure progress and ensure sustainable development.

The United Nations Development Programme is committed to supporting and facilitating progress in the Arab States' region towards a more prosperous and stable future. We will continue to work closely with our partners in all Arab States, the regional and sub-regional institutions, and sister United Nations agencies and other international partners. We look forward to the discussions which we hope this report will stimulate, and to supporting innovative and practical recommendations which come from those.

Helen Clark
Administrator
United Nations Development Programme

Foreword by the Regional Director, a.i., UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States

Coming five years after the events of 2011, widely referred to as "the Arab Spring," the publication of this report follows a period of extensive debate over the transformations that had occurred since in many Arab countries and in particular over the part that young people may have played in those transformations. Some considered the contribution of young people as a glimmer of hope for a new renaissance that would lead the region towards a better future, whereas others considered it a seditious influence dragging the region into chaos and jeopardizing its future.

Events of 2011 inspired the thematic focus of this report on youth in the Arab region. Yet, publishing it five years after has spared the report's research outlook and its analyses from falling prey to the intellectual clamour and reactive posturing that usually accompany the examination of defining moments of change, such as the ones that have swept the region since 2011. This temporal distance has allowed us a calm and reflective approach to evaluating the pulse on the street, monitoring developments and analysing premises and effects, particularly regarding the reaction of official circles to the wave of change, amidst continuing popular efforts to expand opportunities for change and to shape a better future.

The events of 2011 in the Arab region have refocused attention on the pivotal role of youth (by which we mean young women and young men) in society. Numerous analysts have linked the wave of protests, spearheaded by young people with many significant transformations that have changed and are continuing to change political, economic and social foundations in several countries in the Arab region.

The *"Arab Human Development Report 2016: Youth and the Prospects for Human Development in a Changing Reality"* seeks to make a balanced contribution to a renewed and broad debate involving key relevant stakeholders about the best means of engaging youth in development in the region. It seeks to engage young people themselves in that debate with all other stakeholders over the issues it presents.

Youth empowerment key to future development in Arab countries

The report argues that young people are not a problem or a burden on development; they are rather a key resource for resolving the problems of development in the region. It concludes that Arab states can achieve a huge developmental leap and ensure durable stability if they put the empowerment of their youth at the top of their urgent priorities and harness their energy to advance development processes.

From that perspective, the report calls on Arab states to adopt a new development model that focuses on enhancing the capabilities of young people, unleashing their energy and expanding the opportunities available to them, thus allowing them more freedom to shape their futures, and contributing actively to development in their societies and countries.

Numbers matter

Most recent statistics indicate that two-thirds of the Arab region's population is below thirty years of age, half of which falling within the 15 - 29-year age bracket. This age category defines "youth" according to the report, which estimates the number of young people in the region at over one hundred million.

This unprecedented demographic mass of young people at the prime of their working and productive abilities constitutes a huge potential for advancing economic and social development if given the

opportunity. The report points out that this demographic window provides a genuine opportunity over the coming two decades that the region must urgently seize.

Disempowerment of youth sows the seeds of instability

The report asserts that today's generation of young people is more educated, active and connected to the outside world, and hence have a greater awareness of their realities and higher aspirations for a better future. However, young people's awareness of their capabilities and rights collides with a reality that marginalises them and blocks their pathways to express their opinions, actively participate or earn a living. As a result, instead of being a massive potential for building the future, youth can become an overwhelming power for destruction.

Events in the region since 2011 have demonstrated the ability of young people to initiate action and catalyse change. They demonstrated young people's awareness of the serious challenges to development posed by current conditions, and their ability to express the dissatisfaction of society as a whole with those conditions and its demands for change. These events also revealed the depth of the marginalisation that young people suffer and their inability to master the instruments of organised political action that could guarantee the peacefulness and sustainability of such change.

Events since 2011 have proved also that employing a predominantly security-based approach to responding to demands for change without addressing the root causes of discontent may achieve temporary stability and ward off cycles of protest, but does not reduce the possibilities of their recurrence—it may lead to the accumulation of these demands and their re-emergence more violently.

Enhancing capabilities and expanding opportunities: the duality of youth empowerment

In practice, empowering youth requires, on the one hand, introducing changes to the political, economic and social environment that causes their exclusion. Such changes must increase opportunities for young people to engage in the spheres of official politics; stimulate a macro-economy capable of producing decent work for young people and enhancing their entrepreneurship; and entrench the principles of justice, equality and equal opportunity in society, challenging all discriminatory practices based on identity, belief, ethnicity or gender.
On the other hand, youth empowerment requires serious investments in improving the basic services necessary for enhancing young people's capabilities, particularly in education, health and other social services.

In our Arab region, which is experiencing an unprecedented escalation of conflicts that undermine gains of development, and in some instances reverse progress, the pursuit of empowerment must be rooted in serious and rapid efforts to establish security, peace and social stability, ensuring the full and active participation of young people in such efforts.

Three levels of reform

The empowerment of the youth requires reforms at three levels. The first pertains to redirecting macro-policies that regulate the social contract between the state and its citizens and the macro-economic structure to ensure inclusiveness and widen opportunities for all, including young people, in a fair and non-discriminatory manner.

The second level focuses on sector-specific policies, particularly in the fields of education, health and employment, and aims to ensure the availability and quality of the services that will enhance young people's capabilities, hence widening their freedom of choice.

Finally, the third level relates to national youth policies, which must transcend partial and short-term approaches attempting to "find solutions to the problems of young people," which are at time superficial and ineffective. Instead, youth policies must interact effectively with the first and second levels of suggested reform and enhance coordination amongst all stakeholders to ensure a greater role and wider participation of young people in formulating public policies, scrutinizing budgetary allocations, and monitoring accountability for the implementation and progress towards achievement of national priorities.

A new generation of Arab Human Development Reports

In this iteration of the Arab Human Development Reports series, we seek to test new methods to widen the debate over human development in the Arab region, especially with two key audience categories of the report—government stakeholders including decision makers dealing with youth issues, and young people themselves.

With decision makers in mind, we have decided to limit the publication of the hard copy of this report to its executive summary, in which we have included the most important propositions and messages derived from the rich information and analyses in the report's chapters. We present this executive summary as a "policy paper" that goes beyond a mere descriptive presentation summarizing the report's chapters to focus on the most significant policy options and avenues for action. Our hope is that the impact of the report will not be limited to serious debates amongst officials concerned with youth issues, but that its proposals will motivate practical action and concrete measures.

In keeping with new patterns of knowledge consumption, particularly amongst young people – the other key audience of the report – we are publishing the full report only in a digital version posted on our website on the internet. In addition to making the digital version of the full chapters of the report available for downloading as customary, we were keen to support their content with interactive and data visualization tools, to allow for a wider dialogue and sharing of ideas, particularly those contributed by young people. To increase circulation and engagement, we are also making the digital version of the report mobile-friendly through an interactive application. We hope that this will contribute to widening the active participation of young people alongside all other concerned stakeholders in discussing the issues raised in the report, expounding its ideas and engaging in implementing them.

I express my gratitude to Sima Bahous, Assistant Secretary-General, Assistant Administrator and Director of the United Nations Development Programme Regional Bureau for Arab States through August, 2016, under whose leadership this report was undertaken. I also thank the researchers who have put together this important analysis, which will remain a touchstone for years to come.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

ACRPS	Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies
ACTC	Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation
AHDR	Arab Human Development Report
ALMPs	Active Labor Market Policies
ALO	Arab Labor Organization
AMPF	Association Marocaine de Planification Familiale
ANAPEC	National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASCO	Arab Standard Classification of Occupations
ASTA	Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad
AYFHS	Adolescent and Youth Friendly Health Services
BMI	Body Mass Index
CCME	Council of the Moroccan Community Residing Abroad
CEDAW	Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CEDPA	Center for Development and Population Activities
CSDH	Social Determinants of Health
CSOs	Civil Society Organization
DALY	Disability Adjusted Life Year
DHS	Demographic and Health Surveys
EIU	Economist Intelligence Unit
EMR	Eastern Mediterranean Region
ERF	Economic Research Forum
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
ETF	European Training Foundation
FCTC	Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GATS	Global Adult Tobacco Survey
GBV	Gender Based Violence
GCC	Gulf Corporation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GII	Gender Inequality Index
GSHS	Global School-Based Student Health Survey
GYTS	Global Youth Tobacco Survey
HALE	Health Adjusted Life Expectancy
HBSC	Health Behavior in School Children Survey
HDI	Human Development Indicators
HDR	Human Development Report
HiAP	Health in All Policies
HIC	High Income Countries
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
HPV	Human Papillomavirus
ICPD	International Conference on Population and Development
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Center
IDPs	Internally Displaced People
IHME	Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMHS	Iraq Mental Health Survey

Acronyms and abbreviations

IMR	Infant Mortality Rates
IoM	International Organization for Migration
Iop	Inequality of Opportunity
IPU	Inter-Parliamentary Union
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and Levant
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
KAB	Know About Business
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LDC	Least Developed Countries
LEB	Life Expectancy at Birth
LIC	Low Income Countries
LMIC	Lower Middle Income Countries
MARS	Moroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
MEYI	Middle East Youth Initiative
MFIs	Microfinance Institutions
MIC	Middle Income Countries
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MRE	Moroccans Resident Abroad
NCD	Non Communicable Diseases
NES	National Employment Strategies
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPL	Non-Performing Loan
NQF	National Qualification Frameworks
NTD	Neglected Tropical Disease
NYP	National Youth Policies
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares
PEW	Pew Research Center
PHC	Primary Health Care
PI	Political Islam
PIRLS	Progress in International Reading Literacy Study
PISA	Program for International Student Assessment
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRB	Population Reference Bureau
PSCs	Personal Status Codes
PTSD	Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
PYD	Positive Youth Development
QA	Quality Assurance
RBAS	Regional Bureau for Arab States
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SRH	Sexual and Reproductive Health
SSA	Sub Saharan Africa
STI	Sexual Transmitted Infections
SWTS	School to Work Transition Survey
TFP	Total Factor Productivity
TIMSS	Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study
TSC	Tunisian Scientific Consortium

Acronyms and abbreviations

UAE	United Arab Emirates
UMIC	Upper Middle Income Countries
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VCCT	Voluntary Confidential Counselling and Testing
VT	Vocational Training
WDI	World Development Indicators
WEF	World Economic Forum
WEOI	Women's Economic Opportunity Index
WHO	World Health Organization
WPAY	World Programme of Action for Youth
WTS	Water Pipe Tobacco Smoking
WVS	World Values Survey
YASA	Youth Association for Social Awareness
YEI	Youth Employment Inventory
YSO	Youth-Serving organizations
YWC	Young Women's Caucus

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Chapter 1

Youth and human development in Arab countries: the challenges of transitions

The central theme of this report is young people in the Arab region. Never before has the region had this high share of young people. Although age distribution is only one demographic variable in the complexities of social and political life, the large presence of youth in Arab countries is a crucial reality conditioning the region's political, economic, social and cultural development.

Over the past five years, more and more young people in the Arab region have been raising their voices against their economic, social and political exclusion. This was made evident by the youth-led uprisings that brought to the fore the urgent need for reform. Youth have emerged as a catalyzing force for change in societies. In several countries, their movements and protests have put pressure on traditional power structures.

This report offers a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the challenges youth face in terms of the human development process. It calls for bringing youth in the Arab region back into the centre – politically, economically and socially – by giving them a stake in their societies.

This chapter argues for a renewed policy focus on youth development in the region from the perspectives of demography and human development in the context of an inauspicious economic outlook. Youth in Arab countries could be effective agents of positive change provided their capabilities are recognized, developed and called upon.

1.1 Introduction

Since 2011, uprisings and social unrest have affected several Arab countries, and a number have fallen into protracted conflict. The year 2011 was a tipping point: since then, the momentum for change has been unstoppable, and a new epoch began unfolding in the region. This represents an opportunity to reassess the development paths of Arab countries and to identify patterns of change that have been forming.

The incidents that triggered the uprisings highlighted the reality among large segments of the populations who find themselves increasingly facing limited opportunities and significant challenges in advancing their lives and bettering their future. In light of the development paths adopted by many Arab countries, this reality is bound to become worse in a region in which 60 percent of the population have not yet reached the age of 30.

The protests that took place across several countries and began spreading in 2011 underline the significance of the Arab region's youthful demographic profile. Never before has the region had such a large share of youth; youth of ages 15–29 make up around 30 percent of the population, or some 105 million people (box 1.1; figure 1.1). Rapid population growth has placed massive pressures on societies and the entire infrastructure of Arab States. It is youth who often translate broader social problems into an explosive and radicalizing mixture.

The Arab uprisings have also underlined the economic and political exclusion of many youth who have been denied influence over the public policies affecting their lives. Citizens of the Arab region in general and the youth in particular are thinly represented in the public space. As a result, youth development policies have not found their way onto the agendas of Arab governments and policymakers. The recent youth-inspired protests and revolutionary movements represented an expression of the frustration and alienation of the current generation of youth.

Disenchanted with the narrow choices society offers and stifled in a restrictive public sphere, youth in Arab countries are looking elsewhere for room to breathe. Their eyes are on the seemingly free streets beyond the family and nation, on the camps of those who seek to become militant heroes, and on the enticing social activism of faith-based movements, including some concealing political ambitions in religious causes.

Social attitudes that treat young Arabs as passive dependants or merely as a generation-in-waiting will have to change. As the uprisings of 2011 have shown, these youth are anything but that. Social change is not engineered by youth, but it is most manifest among youth, who must be at the centre of any movement forward in the Arab countries. The future not only belongs to them, but will be shaped by them. It is therefore urgent to focus on youth as subjects and agents of human development in the region because no account can be complete without considering how those who mediate such tensions in their daily lives perceive and respond to their situations. This is not a matter of sentiment. Rather, it speaks directly to questions of representation and relevance.

Box 1.1 Who counts as youth?

Youth can be broadly described as the stage during which a person moves out of dependence (childhood) and into independence (adulthood). For statistical purposes, the United Nations (UN) defines youth as individuals of ages 15–24 years. This range encompasses people who are officially recognized as youth in the UN Millennium Development Goals and people whom many would classify as adolescents.

Using another classification, the Middle East Youth Initiative defines youth as people of ages 15–29 years. This range has been adopted here to reflect the prolonged transitions to adulthood faced by many in the region.

Youth do not constitute a homogeneous group. Their socioeconomic, demographic and geographical situations vary widely within and across countries. Yet, despite the differences, regional analysis can provide a broad understanding of the development profile of youth.

Source: The Report team.

Figure 1.1 **The changing share of youth, ages 15–29 years (as a % of total population)**



Source: UN DESA 2013c.

1.2 Progress in human development in Arab countries

Over its 35-year history, the human development index (HDI) has remained the most salient tool in the human development approach to measuring human well-being. The HDI tracks improvements in key aspects of people's lives, capturing progress in three basic human capabilities: to live a long and healthy life, to be educated and knowledgeable, and to enjoy a decent standard of living. It stands as an alternative to the purely economic gross domestic product (GDP) indicator and is helpful in monitoring and understanding change in societies because it allows progress to be assessed more broadly.

Measured in terms of the HDI, all Arab countries increased their level of achievement between 1980 and 2010, driven mostly by gains in education and health, while income fell behind in comparison. Although it is difficult to place the Arab countries into one Arab basket, the region still scores lower than the world average on the HDI and already lags three of the world's six regions, namely, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. By the year 2050, the region is projected to rank fifth, only a little ahead of sub-Saharan Africa.[1]

The HDI has been following a plateau-like behaviour since 2010. Average annual growth in the indicator dropped by more than half between 2010 and 2014 relative to the growth between 2000 and 2010. The global financial and economic crisis in 2008–2009, coupled with political instability, appears to have had a widespread impact on HDI growth thereafter because average annual HDI growth then followed a stagnant or consistently downward trajectory (figure 1.2).

A disaggregated analysis of human development seems to indicate that inequality is rising in Arab countries. The region suffers an average loss of 24.9 percent when the HDI is adjusted for inequalities, which is above the world average loss of 22.9 percent. Inequality is widest in the education component of the inequality-adjusted HDI (about 38.0 percent). This may reflect the inequalities in

Figure 1.2 **Average annual HDI growth**



Source: UNDP 2014a.

education systems that properly prepare only a small minority of youth with the adequate skills to meet the demand of labour markets, where most new entrants face a lack of opportunity (see below).[2]

Inequality in the income component may seem less severe (17 percent), especially if compared with the corresponding component in other regions such as South Asia (18 percent), East Asia and the Pacific (27 percent), sub-Saharan Africa (28 percent) and Latin American and the Caribbean (36 percent).[3] However, the hard core of poverty is definitely captured in the non-income space, best highlighted through the multidimensional poverty index (MPI), which reveals significant social deprivation. More specifically, the MPI shows that the Arab region has the highest ratio of rural to urban poverty (3.5) among all developing regions except Latin America and the Caribbean.[4]

The progress achieved in some areas of human development over the years has tended to elevate the expectations of people in Arab countries, and this has taken on even more importance because many people have become more well educated, are living longer lives and are more connected to the outside world. Yet, enhancing human development is only meaningful if people have the opportunity to make choices and if they are free to exercise these choices. In this sense, any improvement in the HDI is incomplete unless it also measures positively the ability of people to act.

1.3 Conceptualizing youth in human development

Since their launch in 2002, the Arab Human Development Reports (AHDRs) have offered an intellectual framework for clarifying the changing dynamics of human development in the Arab region and identifying choices for the future. The reports have unearthed rooted obstacles to the well-being of people in the Arab region and have provided strategic analyses of the region's social, political and economic trends. They are founded on the concept that the purpose of development is to expand people's choice and advance the quality of human life. The expansion in choice requires the enlargement of human capabilities and opportunities.

The defining vision of the AHDR series is that the Arab countries must undergo comprehensive reform to create greater opportunities for people to use their decision-enhanced capabilities. The reform must be political, to establish systems of good governance and release the creative energies of the region's people; social, to build and liberate their capabilities; and economic, to become centred on greater regional and global integration. The ultimate objective is to rebuild societies with full respect for freedom and human rights, the empowerment of women, the consolidation of knowledge activities, and responsible stewardship of the natural environment.

Like its predecessors, this sixth AHDR is grounded in a concept of human development that embraces human freedom as a core value. The AHDRs thus underscore the close link between human development and human rights. By enhancing human capabilities, progress in human development empowers people to exercise their freedoms. Human rights, by guaranteeing people's individual and collective entitlements, create the opportunities for this exercise of freedoms.

A central cross-cutting concept in the AHDR 2016 is youth empowerment. This entails, as Naila Kabeer observes, "The expansion in people's ability to make strategic life choices in a context where this ability was previously denied to them."[5] Key to this concept is a sense of agency, whereby Youth themselves become resolute actors in the process of change. The concept is embedded in self-reliance and based on the realization that young people can take charge of their own lives and become effective agents of change. Thus, for example, indicators of university enrollment could improve, but, unless the intervening processes involve youth as agents of change rather than merely recipients of change, youth will not become empowered through the improvement (box 1.2).

Evidence shows that the prospects of young people in the region are, now more than ever, jeopardized by poverty, economic stagnation,

Box 1.2 Youth and vulnerability: The human development perspective

The AHDR 2016 examines the status and determinants of youth empowerment in the region. There are important reasons for focusing on youth. First, susceptibility to adversity is heightened during this critical period in the human life cycle. Young people confront specific life phase challenges. Beginning with adolescence and continuing into youth, this is a period of accelerated maturation and social transition, when individuals shift from a position of relative powerlessness and dependency that characterizes childhood to the responsibilities and autonomy expected of adults. This transition can be difficult, and the deficits, deprivations and other risks experienced during youth can have debilitating emotional, political, economic and social consequences on these youth when they become adults and on their families and communities.

Second, if young people fail to realize their full potential, this undermines their future capabilities as adults, thereby weakening whole communities and economies. In the many low- and middle-income countries with exceptionally youthful populations, this results in a substantial loss in the momentum of national development. Youth should represent a demographic dividend to society. Ensuring the well-being, self-determination, productivity and good citizenship of youth is the best way to reap this dividend.

Third, the world has undergone significant changes during the life course of this generation of young people. While some of these changes have opened up important new opportunities for the young, there is also much uncertainty, as well as untold privation and suffering. Young people everywhere are negotiating the implications of economic transition, climate change, the depletion of natural resources, the rapid advance of communication and information technologies, and new forms of surveillance and control. Though all age groups and generations are affected, young people experience some of the most profound hardships associated with these phenomena.

Finally, the consideration of the vulnerabilities of youth is timely because there is a growing political will in the international community and among many national governments and civil society groups to develop more effective policies focused on the young.

Source: UNDP 2014b.

Table 1.1 What are the most important challenges your country is facing today (%)?

	The economic situation (poverty, unemployment and price increases)	Financial and administrative corruption	Enhancing (strengthening) democracy	Achieving stability and internal security	Other
Algeria	76.9	14.9	2.7	3.3	2.2
Egypt	87.6	6.5	1.4	1.3	3.1
Iraq	52.5	32.5	3.5	9.7	1.7
Jordan	81.0	14.0	1.1	0.7	3.3
Kuwait	56.5	25.3	9.4	0.9	8.0
Lebanon	60.6	24.4	3.5	7.1	4.3
Libya	23.1	32.3	2.3	0.7	41.6
Morocco	83.9	9.6	2.1	0.8	3.6
Palestine	50.3	8.7	1.3	3.0	36.6
Sudan	74.2	17.2	2.3	3.4	2.8
Tunisia	88.4	8.6	0.7	0.9	1.6
Yemen	74.6	17.1	3.9	2.8	1.6

Source: Arab Barometer 2014.

governance failure and exclusion, all compounded by the violence and fragility of the body politic (table 1.1). Empowerment can break this cycle and drive transformational change by altering the power relationships in society. Hence, this AHDR attempts to elucidate the ways in which youth in Arab countries are socially excluded and how an enabling environment might be created for them. Youth are not the only population group to bear the brunt of failed policies; nor do they alone suffer the effects of war and conflict. However, unless current trends are shifted, youth in Arab countries stand to inherit stagnant, violent, or otherwise failed societies that few of their number had a hand in making, and they are the ones who will have to rebuild these societies. This is their claim on our attention today.

Recent research on youth development in the region

Youth development in the Arab region has received considerable attention in the last decade. Through the World Programme of Action for Youth, major research and advocacy initiatives to promote the welfare of youth have been undertaken by UN agencies, including the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), the International Labour Organization (ILO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO). Worldwide, UNDP has published 24 national human development reports with a focus on youth development issues, of which five were on Arab countries. Most of the research and public policy work of the UN system have centred on analysis of the situation of youth in education, employment, health care and participation in public life, encouraging governments in the region to formulate national youth policies and monitoring the progress of Arab countries towards achieving goals and targets in youth development.[6]

The World Bank's Middle East and North Africa regional vice presidency has shown great interest in youth development issues, inspired by *World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next Generation*, which concentrated on youth transitions.[7] The League of Arab States has also placed youth issues at the top of development priorities, conducting numerous regional studies and organizing, in Cairo in 2013, the Youth Arab Summit.[8]

The Middle East Youth Initiative, launched in 2006 by the Wolfensohn Center for Development at the Brookings Institution and the Dubai School of Government (the Mohammed Bin Rashid School of Government), also conducts research on youth issues, including exclusion, education, employment, marriage, housing and credit, and on how all of these elements are linked during young people's experience of 'waithood'. The initiative's research shows that the poor labour market outcomes among the region's youth are

made more acute by the institutional rigidities, formal and informal, that govern the region's education and employment markets.[9] It also shows that similar institutional barriers obtain in the marriage and housing markets, perpetuating social and economic exclusion among youth.

Opinion polls on the situation of youth in Arab countries and their self-perceived welfare outcomes are also proliferating. Since 2009, Gallup and Silatech have published the Silatech Index, a representative yearly survey that reveals how youth themselves look at job creation, access to the resources they need to find a job and policies they see as blocking their path.

Yet, few recommendations from this work have found their way into government policy. Official responses to youth development issues and to the World Programme of Action for Youth, in particular, are still weak. In most countries, they are restricted to scattered sectoral programmes that are only partly designed to meet the younger generations' needs. Moreover, laws and political decisions on youth development are absent, and coordination is almost non-existent among the institutions that affect young people's livelihoods (education, labour, health care, and other ministries and institutions).

1.4 Youth in Arab countries-post-2011: Defining the factors behind the changing reality

The literature on identity and social values indicates that the values and aspirations of youth in the region are deeply shaped by the socio-political circumstances in which they have grown up. Though youth in the Arab countries have great difficulty voicing their expectations and effectively engaging in the political sphere, they tend to be more well educated and more networked and connected to global knowledge and information relative to older citizens, and they live in urban areas where the population exceeds 57 percent of the total population of the Arab states.[10]

A review of opinion surveys reveals that the opinions of the public in Arab countries, especially youth, are diverse and dynamic. Youth tend to develop values and even a sense of identity that are different from the corresponding values and sense of identity of their older fellow citizens. Through their access to information and communication technology, youth are increasingly connected to the world. For young people living in an inhibiting environment, this exposure to information and communication has been a liberating portal and a virtual space to express themselves, raise objections, voice their opinions and challenge power structures, thus transforming them from passive members of society into active, self-aware and reform-driven individuals. This was manifested in the 2011 uprisings when social media were used to organize and mobilize public rallies against governments. Social media outlets have become a major part of the daily lives of youth in Arab countries. On average, these youth are more well connected to means of information than their peers in other middle-income countries and more well connected than their parents. This connectivity also expands dramatically with education.

The vast majority of youth in the Arab countries still adhere to conservative traditions. According to recent opinion survey data, more than three quarters of youth in the region believe tradition is important in their lives. The findings of values surveys likewise indicate considerable support for political Islam, though this tends to rise with age and fall with education. Younger and more well educated individuals show a greater preference for democratic forms of governance.

The Arab region is one of the most urbanized in the world. More youth are living in urban areas (for instance, 81.9 percent in Jordan, 67.4 percent in Tunisia and 41.5 percent in Egypt), mostly in slums and informal settlements.[11] In the least developed countries of the region, almost two thirds of urban residents live in slums, and 28

percent of all urban residents in the region are living in slums or informal settlements.[12] Youth growing up in these slums are increasingly subjected to social exclusion, violence and pervasive poverty. This fuels social tension and polarization, as noted by Marilyn Booth: "Many Arab adolescents grow up in cities where rapid expansion far exceeds capabilities of city services and existing housing, and where extreme poverty is juxtaposed with new, conspicuously displayed, wealth."

The absence of decent job opportunities, declines in wages, the rise of conflict, and the political instability in the region have led many youth from Arab countries to immigrate temporarily or permanently in search of better opportunities. Immigration is often a reaction to the lack of opportunities, including opportunities in education and vocational training. By selecting immigration as a means to disengage from their difficulties, these young immigrants contribute to the reproduction of social and political exclusion.

Young women are still suffering in even more complex conditions in the Arab countries. They are now facing repercussions from their political activism in mobilizing on social and political issues during the protests across the region in 2011, although the notable benefits of this activism included an opening-up of the public space for participation and the expression of opinion. Several Arab countries have witnessed the striving among conservative social forces to restrict the rights and freedoms of young women and raise the potential for the exercise of legal, political and social injustice towards them. Specific characteristics of the political, legal and economic contexts in various countries affect the situation of young women substantially. In addition to differences across countries, there are significant differences in the experiences of young women within each country.

As conservative factions gain more power, the movements, behaviour and dress of young women are more likely to become constrained, including by law enforcement authorities, while the freedom of choice among women about their lives tend to narrow. Especially in poorer and more rural areas, the age of marriage has not risen dramatically, and, in many places, the legal age of marriage is still below 18. Nonetheless, the family in Arab countries is undergoing significant change. Thus, the model of the extended family living together in one household or in close proximity is no longer the norm everywhere, and, ultimately, rising rates of education among women, especially in urban areas, will have a positive correlate by raising the age of marriage among women.

The rise of the largest, most well educated, and most highly urbanized generation of young people in the region's history may also constitute a destabilizing force. It is imperative to examine the prevailing trends and factors affecting the environment in which these people are living.

The momentous popular uprisings that began in 2011 and in which young protesters figured prominently have ended one era in the region and launched another, one that is still unfolding.[13] In this new era, the trend towards the escalation of conflict has drastically disrupted stability and development and may exert a harsh influence on the future. A grave new development has been the emergence of militant non-state actors, notably in Iraq and the Syrian Arab Republic, carving out large swathes of land and proclaiming a state.

The longer-term impacts remain unclear, but, while a few extremists have succumbed to the allure of the self-styled defenders of the faith who espouse violence, youth more generally have come to see the conflicts as an almost inevitable disfigurement of their formative years. Distinct from the intergenerational tensions that many of them must already mediate within their families and personal lives, the estrangement of youth because of coercive states that lack legitimacy, strife-torn societies destabilized by violent conflict, or states that fail to meet the notions of entitlement of the young has arisen from certain ingrained features of the region.

There is no disputing that the uprisings and conflicts have called into doubt many policies and practices that have prevailed since the Arab countries became nation-states. Putting this larger background back into the picture is important for reaching an understanding of the significance of the protests among youth against the perceived failures of their leaders.

1.4.1
The failure of the Arab development model

Countries in the Arab region share much more than a common language and social and cultural traditions. They have long pursued a model of development that is dominated by the public sector and turns governments into providers of first and last resort (figure 1.3). This flawed Arab model of development depends on inefficient forms of intervention and redistribution that, for financing, count heavily on external windfalls, including aid, remittances and rents from oil revenues. The reliance on unearned income is sometimes dubbed the original sin of Arab economies.[14]

Since independence, most countries have seen little change in economic structure. Manufacturing—the primary vehicle for job creation in emerging economies—has registered painfully slow and sometimes negative growth. The public sector has either crowded out and manipulated the private sector or forged uncompetitive and monopolistic alliances, while inhibiting the development of viable systems of public finance. With few exceptions, the private sector is weak and dependent on state patronage, and the business environment hampers the rise of young and independent entrepreneurs. Because of their limited size and scope, the investments of the private sector have not been able to pick up the slack created by the more recent rollback in state employment. The sustainability of this system has been increasingly eroded by the rising costs of repression and redistribution.[15]

The state-led development model has created contradictions. It has expanded access to key entitlements, whether public employment or food subsidies, thereby raising some levels of human development. Thus, partly because of the entitlements, societies have been able to lower the incidence of poverty and income inequality, shielding disadvantaged groups from some of the worst economic pressures of our times.

However, these ostensibly favourable outcomes have entailed a deeper trade-off in the long run. The gains in human development have rarely translated into gains in productivity and growth, first because the model traps human capital in unproductive public sector jobs, and, second, because it builds a pyramid of privilege whereby economic advantage is restricted to firms and individuals connected to the state and its ruling elites.

Arab countries have long preserved social order by distributing unproductive rents (box 1.3). These rents are not merely revenues generated outside the economy in the form of oil and aid, but politically mediated rents created through economic

Figure 1.3 Average employment shares in the public sector in selected Arab countries and selected comparator countries in the 2000s



Source: AMF 2015.

controls, licences and monopolies. The region is one of the most protected in the world. The movement of goods, people and capital is subject to tight restrictions.[16] The behind-the-border barriers that generate trade frictions are more pervasive in the Arab region than elsewhere. The trade regime is even more restrictive in the resource-rich, labour-abundant economies of the region, precisely where private sector employment generation is most required.

While the model has created an adverse legacy of entitlement that aims to sustain some individuals from conception to coffin, it has also fostered political marginalization, economic deprivation and social exclusion. Thus, the associated trade frictions push firms without political or social connections to the margins of the economy, and opportunities for absorbing young entrants to the workforce are lost. The model thereby hobbles promising enterprises, discourages economic efficiency and deters young talents because its goal is not to promote innovation or competition, but solely to preserve access to wealth and power among a few. The result is a top-down model that is based on hand-outs, undermines individual agency and encourages short-term consumption at the expense of long-term investment in human capabilities and competitive production.[17]

The contribution of private investment to growth in the region is among the lowest in the world. This is especially the case because entrepreneurs consistently face anticompetitive and discretionary practices that favour incumbent or large firms at the expense of new entrants, small businesses and young entrepreneurs. These practices go beyond opportunistic corruption; they reflect a deep structural alliance between political and economic elites to secure economic interests. Recent data reveal how firms linked to former regimes in Egypt and Tunisia were given privileges or business advantages. In Egypt, for example, 71 percent of politically connected firms were operating in sectors protected by at least three import barriers.[18] This was so among only 4 percent of unconnected firms. Likewise, in Tunisia, 64 percent of connected firms, but only 36 percent of unconnected firms were operating in sectors in which foreign direct investment (FDI) was restricted.[19]

Resource rents in the region have been channelled into lavish and conspicuous real estate

Box 1.3 Omar Razzaz: The rentier State

It is difficult to understand the course of economic development of Arab states without grasping the role of rentierism. According to the traditional definition, a rentier state is one that relies for a major part of its revenues on oil and other natural resources. The relative importance of such resources and of foreign aid and remittances places most Arab countries along a continuum of rentier to semi-rentier economies.

Foreign rents offer the state considerable autonomy and relieve it from the need to acquire legitimacy through the ballot box. The state establishes its legitimacy by allocating rent through various forms of privilege to groups and individuals. Income and wealth are not derived from work, innovation or risk-taking, but from the position of individuals in the pecking order of allocation channels (public sector jobs, public largesse, private sector cronyism and the like). In this way, the rentier system casts a shadow over the private sector because competition does not arise from the production of goods and services or from innovation, but from the quality of client relationships with state patrons.

Not all resource-rich states suffer the same symptoms because the issue revolves around not so much the sources of national income and their shares, but public institutions, namely, the laws, regulations and policies governing the extraction of resources and the distribution of the resulting benefits. In this sense, a rentier state is one that extracts resources and allocates the income from such resources so as to maximize the short-term political and economic gains at the expense of long-term sustainable development and the accumulation of national wealth, thereby shifting the basis for classifying the state as rentier (or not) primarily onto whether institutions with adequate checks and balances have been built to realize the full, long-term potential of resources to maximize national wealth.

Source: Razzaz 2013.

Note: Omar Razzaz is chairman of Jordan Ahli Bank and winner of the Arab Prize for the Social Sciences and Humanities in 2012.

projects, unproductive public sector spending and military expenditures, but the spending benefits a tiny slice of society. In Egypt, inequality is strongly influenced by richer households according to recent World Bank estimates.[20] The top 1 percent of richer households contributes to inequality more than any other percentile in the distribution and accounts for up to 4 percentage points of the Gini coefficient.[21]

The average annual household income among the poorest households in the Arab region declined from $4,600 a year (adjusted for purchasing power parity [PPP]) in 2008 to $4,100 in 2012. Over the same period, the corresponding indicator among the richest families increased from $29,900 to $33,600. The richest families seem to earn more than 25 percent higher than the richest households in other middle-income countries. The trend over 2008–2012 also shows that the income gap between the richest and poorest households is similar in Arab countries to that in middle-income countries; yet, inequality is growing more rapidly in the Arab region. Over the five years, the ratio of the average income of the richest households to that of the poorest households grew from 6.5 to 8.2 in Arab countries, but from 9.2 to 11.4 in middle-income countries (annex 2 figure A.5).

As job havens in the make-work bureaucracies once financed by the rents disappear, more doors to the employment of young people—however unproductive that employment may be—are closed. As a consequence, youth are reaching their adult years in a context of rising income inequality, widening inequality of opportunity, and slow growth, alongside weak job creation. Wide access to media and information creates more awareness, especially among young people, of the miasma of elite alliances embedded in society, and this is heightening the perceptions of inequality on the street, driving a wedge more deeply between the haves and the have nots and helping fuel the uprisings and conflicts in the region.

1.4.2 *Facets of youth disempowerment*

Beginning with education: more is required than new places in schools

In recent decades, Arab countries recorded progress in indicators of human development. In 2010, five of the top 10 countries with the highest rates of improvement were Arab: Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco.[22] Net enrollment rates in primary education, for instance, rose from 78.8 percent in 1999 to 88.4 percent in 2012, and the latter rate was slightly above the developing-region average of 88.3 percent and close to the world average of 89.1 percent. Many countries in the region are close to achieving universal primary enrollment.[23] And gains have also been made at the higher levels of education: secondary and tertiary enrollment increased almost threefold between 1970 and 2003.[24]

But, by 2008, the average gross tertiary enrollment ratio in the region was only 23.7 percent, a modest rise from the 20.0 percent in 2002.[25] That colleges and universities have not significantly boosted their intake rates partly reflects the growing disenchantment of youth with the value of higher education amid the glut of unemployed graduates on the job market.

Overall, the quality of education is poor. Standardized international tests in education such as the Trends in Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) and the Programme for International Student Assessment show Arab countries scoring well below the average even if results are adjusted for per capita income, particularly in the rich Gulf countries.[26] The limited skills among the workforce are another indicator of poor human capital endowments and highlight a mismatch between supply and demand. More than a third of employers in the Middle East and North Africa region have zeroed in on inadequate skills as a major impediment to business growth, the highest such share worldwide.[27]

The public has become increasingly dissatisfied with living standards, especially in Egypt and Tunisia (annex 2 table A.2). Dissatisfaction rates are lower in the Arab region overall than in other developing regions, but show pronounced sub-regional differences: the Mashreq and least developed countries show rising rates of dissatisfaction, reaching almost 55 percent in 2012, much higher than the rates in the Maghreb or the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (12 percent). Dissatisfaction thus seems driven by poverty, conflict, or unrealized political hopes.

Financial independence is difficult in the face of high unemployment and precarious jobs

Unemployment among youth in Arab countries is the highest in the world, 29 percent in 2013, versus 13 percent worldwide.[28] First-time job seekers account for around half the unemployed, also the highest

Box 1.4 The struggle for women's inclusion

"True, no Arab citizen, male or female, enjoys the full exercise of civil and political rights, but where men stumble, women fall, and the helping hand of society is fleeting and weak. Real gains secured in women's education at all levels may ultimately prove a source of social frustration, so long as family structures continue to be rigid, jobs for women prove elusive, and social attitudes towards their personal and social advance remain restrictive."

Source: UNDP 2012c.

rate in the world.[29] Youth unemployment is hugely costly to the region's societies and requires a major turnaround in policy thinking about jobs. The region needs to create more than 60 million new jobs in the next decade to absorb the large number of workforce entrants and stabilize youth unemployment.[30]

Important Arab labour markets, such as textiles and agricultural processing, have been affected by declining exports to Europe and other markets. Jobs have also been hit by declines in FDI and tourism. Meanwhile, many European countries have reduced migration quotas or made obtaining work permits more difficult, ultimately cutting into skilled Arab migration and putting more pressure on young graduates. Arab countries need to look inwards—not abroad—to address youth unemployment. The outlines of a response would entail strengthening inter-Arab trade in goods and services, enhancing regional cooperation in policy, and looking into new economic growth models with proven complementarities on a regional scale to create decent and sustainable jobs.

Employment among youth is often precarious and informal. Owing to harsh labour market conditions, many youth transitioning from school to work struggle to find a job in the formal sector, as the state has ceased being the employer of first or last resort. Many settle for insecure informal work at low wages and under poor conditions.[31] Between 2000 and 2005, for example, three fourths of new labour-market entrants in Egypt were employed in the informal sector; this compares with one fifth in the early 1970s. Similarly, over 2001–2007, 69 percent of the new jobs in Syria were informal.[32] Vulnerable jobs accounted for almost 30 percent of the region's employment in 2011.[33] The problem is even more acute among low-income youth, who are at a higher risk of settling for informal or unpaid family work.[34]

The Arab region is not alone in facing this scourge: Greece and Spain, hit by economic crises, saw youth unemployment rise to more than 50 percent in 2013.[35] Poverty and social exclusion affect all social strata in the region's societies, but the young and elderly are often the most vulnerable. Yet, youth are formally excluded politically by middle-aged and elderly men, who dominate society because of traditional norms and deeply entrenched state-sponsored economic practices. Youth also face large entry barriers to jobs, marriage and housing, where older groups enjoy privileges, largely acquired under public programmes during the oil booms.

The ongoing exclusion of young women

No society can progress by restricting the capabilities and opportunities of half its people. Women in Arab countries can show important development results, but they still face a life of discrimination. Their ordeal starts in traditional early childhood and runs through male-oriented family environments and education systems to confining marriages or underpaid work (box 1.4). Society's support for the better treatment of women has increased notably over the last five decades and certainly since the start of the 20th century, but the definitive elimination of all forms of discrimination against women is a struggle against a rooted historical injustice that will take more years to complete.

The rise of women in Arab countries is inseparably and causally linked to the future human development of the Arab region. The pervasive disempowerment of women in Arab countries is grounded in cultural, social, economic and political factors. As the 2005 and 2009 AHDRs observed, the seeds of discrimination are embedded in cultural beliefs and traditions in childraising, education, religious structures, the media and family relations.[36] Along with a plethora of legal obstacles, they prevent women from acquiring and using their capabilities to the fullest.

A basic principle of Islam is equality among men and women. However, highly conservative jurisprudential interpretations have accorded women lower status. Patriarchal family traditions have long undervalued the education of women

and kept women subordinated at home, while male-oriented marriage laws derived from those traditions have extended men's power over women in marriage. Beyond the family, discrimination by employers against women is commonplace.

In most countries of the region, constitutions provide for equality among citizens and usually refer in this regard to characteristics such as race, religion, ethnicity and gender. The constitutions in most Arab countries recognize equality between men and women. Yet, few countries have laws directly banning discrimination. Under personal status laws and codes, men and women have unequal rights in marriage and unequal rights in divorce. In societies where women are still bound by patriarchal patterns of kinship, legalized discrimination, social subordination and ingrained male dominance, women are exposed to domestic and institutionalized violence. Indeed, in some Arab countries, the penalties for assaults against women, even lethal assaults, are reduced if it can be established that the perpetrator committed a 'crime of honour' and the penal code discriminates against women in cases of adultery (so-called honour killings).[37]

By most assessments, gender equality and women's empowerment are more restricted in Arab countries than in other regions. The region registered the world's widest gap in the global gender gap index of 2012, which takes account of political empowerment and economic participation and opportunity. Female labour force participation is slightly less than 24 percent, and, among young women, it is less than 18 percent, the lowest rate among all regions. The share of women in GDP in the Arab region is only about 29 percent, against 50 percent in all developing countries. The poverty rate is 31.6 percent among women, but 19.0 percent among men. While the support for equality and women's empowerment has grown, albeit slowly, legislative and institutional structures still discriminate heavily against women, and the share of women in lower and upper houses of parliament in Arab countries is the smallest in the world, at a mere 16 percent.[38] The exclusion of women is reflected in the high gender gap in human development achievements (annex 2 figure A.6).

Young women in Arab countries are at a particular disadvantage in access to jobs and health services. They face a high risk of reproductive health issues through a high prevalence of inequalities, early pregnancies, and other health risks. For instance, in the region's least developed countries, only 34 percent of births are attended by skilled health personnel, against 83 percent in Maghreb and 99 percent in GCC countries.[39] Within countries, the poorest women are at a huge disadvantage: only 55 percent, 27 percent and 17 percent of births in the poorest households in Egypt, Sudan and Yemen are attended by skilled personnel, versus 97 percent, 88 percent and 74 percent in the richest households in those same countries. Similarly, early pregnancies measured by birth rates among women aged 15–19 remain high in the least developed countries and in Mashreq countries.[40] All these problems lead to adverse maternal conditions that are the major cause of young female mortality and the third major cause among women of years lost to disability.[41]

Family formation increasingly delayed

Marriage and family formation – key rites of passage to adulthood in conservative environments – are occurring later among young people. Almost half the men aged 25–29 in the region are still unmarried, up from 37 percent a generation ago and the highest proportion among developing regions. In Asia, only 23 percent of young men are unmarried; in Latin America, 31 percent; and, in Africa, 34 percent.[42] In Lebanon, for instance, the average age at first marriage among women climbed from 21 in 1970 to 32 in 2008.[43]

These delays arise partly because unemployment is a poor condition for undertaking family responsibilities and partly because a Middle Eastern marriage can represent a large financial burden. The latter is a result of persistent cultural norms and traditions such as the dowry, which is normally costly and borne by the groom and his father.[44] Further contributing to the delay in marriage is the high price of home ownership: a modest house now costs the poorest worker the equivalent of 12 years of wages (figure 1.4).[45]

Substantial health challenges persist

Youth in Arab countries still suffer from health challenges, inadequate health care provision and poor access to health care facilities, even if the region is the world's least affected by HIV/AIDS (which is, however, on the rise). Many are prone to risky behaviour, notably smoking, substance abuse and reckless driving, which raise the region's morbidity and mortality rates, especially in the least developed countries and rural areas generally.

Youth are also becoming increasingly vulnerable to problems in mental and sexual health.

Figure 1.4 **Ratios of house price to income, 2011**



Source: Chaaban 2013.

Mental illness and, specifically, neuropsychiatric conditions are believed to be leading causes of years lost to disability.[46] Young men and women lack knowledge about sexual health; 87 percent in Algeria and Jordan, 93 percent in Syria, 97 percent in Iraq and 98 percent in Yemen are uninformed. Youth are also at greater risk of contracting HIV: around 66 percent of HIV cases in Egypt are among young single adults.[47] Contraceptive prevalence was only 45 percent in 2005–2012, around two thirds of the world average of 63 percent and only ahead of Africa's 25 percent.[48]

1.4.3 *Religion, identity and the prospects for human development*

Religion plays a major role in the lives of citizens in Arab countries, including the young (table 1.2). It affects people's sense of identity and their ideological and intellectual orientations. It influences their values and shapes their attitudes towards society and the family. UNDP's *Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World*, stressed the "Profound importance of religion to people's identities."[49] The 2005 AHDR went on to state, "No political power can ignore the fact that religion, and especially Islam, is a crucial element in the cultural and spiritual make-up of the Arab people."[50]

Arab countries have entered the modern world, assimilating much of its economy and culture, while maintaining the role of religion in the public and private spheres. Religion is important in how states formulate their concept of governance and ensure continued legitimacy, and it is active in the public sphere as a key source of social capital and a strong stimulus for development outreach among the disadvantaged, among other issues.

The mantle of religion can be attractive to politicians. Political parties that use religious interpretation to support their platforms and political agendas are common in the region. Such parties run the gamut of ideology from moderate to extreme and tolerant to dogmatic, where the extent of religiosity, the manner in which religious texts are used and the type of ideology shape a party's relationship with the state and other social and ethnic groups. Many are in conflict to some degree or other with the (secular) political order.

In this politico-religious spectrum, political Islam has become more popular in the shadow of oppression for three main reasons: its moral critique of the ruling system is attractive to many; mosques and the informal sector are difficult for states to control; and, historically, the regimes that now fear political Islam allowed it scope for expression initially in an effort to dampen revolutionary tendencies.

The uprisings of 2011 prompted the collapse of several Arab regimes, creating a political void without a clear political alternative, which invited many Islamist parties to step in. Several quickly became politically active, aided by their strong internal organization and networks. Some common features can be gleaned: Islamists did not beget the revolutions, but they fought and won elections through strong organization and inspiring campaigns.

The rise of Islamist political movements has sparked a sharp, sometimes contentious and, more recently, divisive debate over core societal issues: relations between religion and politics, whether Islamist movements are capable of governing effectively, the nexus between religious and civil forces, and the prospects (or desirability) of establishing a religious state. This debate is becoming polarized, as extremist groups move in, adopting exclusionary positions against the other side, which encompasses all who disagree with them. These extreme ideologues maintain the recourse to armed conflict as a simmering option. In situations perceived to threaten Islamic identity, they may seek to shatter and fragment Arab societies even more.

Two types of conflict have emerged around political Islam. The first is 'conflict with'. This involves a deep struggle between secular interests and political Islam fuelled by different views about the state, legislation, constitutions, civil rights, laws, culture and education.[51] The second is 'conflict within'. Here, smaller groups across the ideological spectrum compete with one another for political influence under the umbrella of political Islam.[52] The greatest challenge encountered by Islamist organizations and their political affiliates has not been how to act in opposition to regimes, but rather how to exercise power. Although strong in grassroots organization, they have been unable to convert this credential into a long-term vision, sound policy planning, or coherent development programmes.[53]

1.4.4 *The challenge of violent radicalization*

Radicalization is a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political,

Table 1.2 Religion is an important part of your daily life (% responding 'yes')

	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Algeria	...	...	...	...	94	93	92	...	...	...
Bahrain	...	...	...	96	96	94	...	...	...	...
Comoros	...	...	...	96	99	99	97	...	...	...
Djibouti	...	...	98	98	97	91	...	...	...	...
Egypt	98	98	100	98	97	98	98	97	98	...
Iraq	...	...	81	86	85	79	84	87	90	...
Jordan	92	96	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Kuwait	84	...	...	93	97	...	...	...	...	...
Lebanon	88	88	86	89	87	84	85	80	84	...
Mauritania	...	95	97	98	99	99	99	98	92	99
Morocco	...	...	...	...	93	94	99	96	...	...
Palestine	88	90	89	93	95	94	95	93	98	...
Qatar	...	...	92	95	...	98	...	...	...	...
Saudi Arabia	98	98	96	94	...	...	...	...	...	...
Somalia	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	95	...
Sudan	...	...	...	95	97	92	95	...	...	...
Syria	...	...	84	88	83	78	82	75	...	...
Tunisia	...	...	...	95	93	93	96	89	88	91
UAE	98	...	...	91	95	...	...	...	...	...
Yemen	96	...	...	96	96	98	98	100	99	...

Source: Gallup 2015.

Note: "..." not available

social, or religious ideas or aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo or prevailing ideas, expressions, or institutions. Radicalization can be violent or nonviolent, although the most urgent sort of radicalization is that which leads to or is associated with violent extremism.[54]

Radicalization is not new, and it is not isolated to any particular region or culture of the world. Scholars generally agree that radicalization has been present across the entire span of human history and surfaced among individuals and groups of every stripe and been affiliated with the full range of humanity's faiths, ideologies and lifestyles.[55]

It is true that violent radicalization has become a particular concern – indeed, a defining feature – across the Arab region, particularly among youth, the subject and focus of this report. It has revealed itself in terrible ways and caused grave damage to societies across the region and around the world. Despite its importance, however, there is little scholarship on the issue and much discussion on the subject is clouded by divergent perspectives.

While radicalization can be an amorphous concept, and definitions and perspectives can justifiably differ, one ought to trace the basic contours of the process in the region as a starting point for crafting strategies to address it and mitigate against it.

A basic starting point is the recognition that there are multiple pathways that can constitute the process of radicalization in the region.[56] These pathways can be independent one from another, but are often mutually reinforcing. This radicalization that is driven by several mutually dependent pathways appears to be the most ingrained and, when associated with violent extremism, the most lethal and damaging to society (box 1.5).

In a general sense, violent radicalization among youth can be rendered more likely by specific demographic factors. The Arab region today is more populous and has a younger median age than ever before, meaning simply that there is a larger stock of young people to be recruited. However, demography is not destiny, and several other factors are shaping the outlook of young people across the region and the apparent growth of violent radicalism and extremist movements.

One key factor is an overall sense of exclusion and lack of opportunity that pervades much of the region. As this Report documents, young people across the Arab world are facing tremendous obstacles in their personal development across the broadest range of institutions, from cultural to social to economic to political (figure 1.5). Too often, the lives of young people are marked by frustration, marginalization and alienation from institutions and the transitions that are necessary to begin adult life in a fulfilling manner.

A second factor is rapid change. Urbanization, globalization and technological development are inducing major changes across societies and creating major cleavages between the past and the present, across generations and between governments and peoples. These changes are inducing severe stresses across societies that require major adaptations. If institutions are brittle and unresponsive, the result can be viewed in a significant and widespread sense of dislocation and disorientation.[57]

A third factor is ideology. As the region has struggled to find its way in a changing world, many ideologues have sought to propose new visions that, however unviable they are, are persuasive among people who are dissatisfied with the status quo. In the Arab region for decades, it has been common practice across many parts of society to suggest that Arab societies are somehow better, stronger, more vibrant, more just and more proud of their past. At the same time, the 'us versus them' ideal has been promoted in an effort to create a distance between the people of the Arab region and the rest of humanity. Similarly, ideologues have sought to entice potential recruits to violent radicalism through new visions of imagined futures based on imagined pasts, often using religious networks and ideals as sources of recruits and platforms for spreading ideology.[58]

A fourth factor is organizational. As extremist networks have grown and become more well funded, they have increased their capability to attract and retain recruits. Online recruitment has proven especially effective as have the efforts of well-financed recruiters to recruit in the field.[59]

In this context, violent radicalization has expanded. The overwhelming majority of young people in the Arab region have no desire to become radical or to participate in extremist or violent groups or activities. The overwhelming majority also see religion as distinct from ideology and do not wish for the latter to encroach on the former. The overwhelming majority likewise reject violence and regard extremist groups as terrorists. However, the minority that accepts violence and is open to participating in violent groups that claim to struggle for change continue to be active (figure 1.6). And, because of the increasing convergence of the pathways through which the dissatisfied can become radicalized and the radicalized can become violent, violent radicalization and violent extremism grow and are accelerating the tremendous damage they wreak on Arab society.

Box 1.5 Youth: The need to belong

Let us for a moment put ourselves in the place of a young man of 19 who has just entered a university in the Arab world. In the past he might have been attracted by an organization with Marxist tendencies that would have been sympathetic to his existential difficulties and initiated him, in its own way, into the debate about ideas. Or else he might have joined some nationalist group that would have flattered his need for identity and perhaps spoken to him of renaissance and modernization. But now Marxism has lost its attraction and Arab nationalism, annexed by regimes that are authoritarian, incompetent and corrupt, has lost much of its credibility. So it is not impossible that the young man we are thinking of will be fascinated by the West, by its way of life and its scientific and technological achievements. But that fascination would probably have little impact on his actions, since there is no political organization of any consequence that embodies the model he admires. Those who aspire to the "Western Paradise" often have no alternative but emigration. Unless they belong to the privileged "castes" who do their best to reproduce aspects of the coveted model in their own homes. But all those who are not born with a limousine at their disposal, all those who want to shake up the established order or are revolted by corruption, state despotism, inequality, unemployment and lack of opportunity, all who have difficulty finding a place in a fast-changing world – all these are tempted by Islamism. In it they find satisfaction for their need for identity, for affiliation to a group, for spirituality, for a simple interpretation of too-complex realities and for action and revolt.

I can't help feeling deeply uneasy as I point out the circumstances that lead young people in the Muslim world to enroll in religious movements. This is because, in the conflict between the Islamists and the rulers who oppose them, I find myself unable to identify with either side. I am unmoved by the utterances of radical Islamists not only because as a Christian I feel excluded, but also because I cannot accept that any religious faction, even if it is in the majority, has the right to lay down the law for the population as a whole. In my view the tyranny of a majority is no better morally than the tyranny of a minority. Moreover, I believe profoundly not just in equality, between men and women alike, but also in liberty in matters of faith and in the freedom of every individual to live as he chooses, and I distrust any doctrine that tries to challenge such fundamental values.

That said, I must add that I disapprove just as strongly of the despotic powers against which the Islamists are fighting, and I decline to applaud the outrages such regimes perpetrate on the pretext that they constitute a lesser evil. The people themselves deserve something better than a lesser evil or any sort of makeshift. What they need are genuine solutions, which can only be those of genuine democracy and modernity – by which I mean a complete modernity freely granted, not an eviscerated one imposed by force. And it seems to me that by taking a fresh look at the idea of identity we might help find a way that leads out of the present impasse and towards human liberty.

Amin Maalouf, In The Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong (Arcade Publishing, New York, 2011), pp. 90–91.

1.4.5 *Human development in reverse: the toll of spreading conflict*

For well over a decade, the Arab region has been witnessing interstate wars, civil wars and terrorist attacks. Between 2000–2003 and 2010–2015, the number of armed conflicts and violent crises have risen from 4 to 11 (table 1.3; figure 1.7; annex 2 figures A.1 and A.2). The uprisings and wars have led to regime change in some countries, often after much bloodshed. In others, there has been no change, but terrible carnage. In Syria, initially peaceful protests against the government turned into one of the region's ugliest conflicts in modern Arab history.

The Israeli occupation of Palestine is one of the longest lasting territorial occupations in modern history. It is also one of the most prolonged denials of self-determination to a people that has formulated its own nationhood against all odds. The freedom to live in dignity is palpably absent. Seven decades of occupation have exposed people in Palestine to deep insecurity, loss of opportunities, desperation and profound political frustration. Under occupation,

Figure 1.5 **Perceptions of youth (15–29 years), economy and security (% of those who believe it will worsen), selected Arab countries, 2012**



Source: Gallup 2013.

Figure 1.6 **Positive / negative view of Da'esh**



Source: Doha institute 2015.

generations of Palestinians have lived suspended in a state of frozen transition to sovereignty and self-determination and denied progress and their most basic human rights. The question of Palestine occupies a central stage in Arab public opinion. According to the Arab Opinion Index issued by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 84 percent of Arabs believe the Palestinian cause is not solely a Palestinian issue, but also an Arab cause, and 84 percent oppose diplomatic recognition of

Israel by their countries. Only 21 percent expressed support for peace agreements signed with Israel by Egypt, Jordan and Palestine. The Israeli occupation has had an impact on the whole region, particularly neighbouring countries that host more than five million refugees.[60]

Armed conflict is destroying the social fabric of the Arab region, causing massive loss of life not only among combatants, but also and increasingly among civilians. Conflicts today are considerably less well defined, and civilians, including children, are paying the price, as many more fatalities occur away from battle zones. For every person killed directly by armed violence, between 3 and 15 others die indirectly from diseases, medical complications and malnutrition (see chapter 6). Conflicts also interfere with economic development by destroying productive economic resources, capital and labour, especially within the territory of the nations where they are fought.

Conflicts divert resources primarily through high military spending, which reflects the multiple conflicts in the region, the legacy of cold war rivalries and the nervousness of political systems on the defensive. Several Arab countries are among the most militarized in the world and are characterized by huge military outlays and high proportions of the population under arms (table 1.4). However, while arms-producing countries may reap economic dividends from the arms trade, this spending represents only missed opportunities to invest in broader economic and social progress among Arab countries. The five biggest global importers of arms during 2009–2013 were India, China, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, the latter two Arab countries importing 32 percent of the global total.

If faced with real military threats, Arab countries, including those with large defence budgets, almost invariably call on foreign troops for protection and pay the major share of the cost. This was the case, for example, of the second Gulf War (1990–1991). "Such dependence mocks the vast sums invested in Arab arsenals", a recent ESCWA report dryly observes.[61] Rising military expenses curtail spending in more effective areas such as education, health care, poverty reduction or infrastructure. They are also linked to the mounting cost of maintaining armed forces, which makes these expenditures even more exorbitant.

Conflict and destruction trigger massive displacement. In 2014, almost 41 percent of the world's forcibly displaced population were represented by the Arab region, which has only 5 percent of the world's population (annex 2 figure A.3). The share – more than 22 million people –was almost five times higher in 2014 than 14 years earlier. This increase was first driven by the aftermath of the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the civil war in Darfur around 2003 and then by the Syrian crisis in 2011.[62] Some 98 percent of forcibly displaced individuals from the region originate from the conflict-ridden countries of Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen. A sizeable share of these vulnerable groups are children.[63]

Besides displacing hundreds of thousands of refugees outside their borders, some Arab countries are also heavily burdened internally by war-related displacement. One person in five in Lebanon is a refugee, and one in three in Syria is either a refugee (most from Iraq) or has been

Table 1.3 Arab countries affected by political violence or conflict, 2000–2003 and 2010–2015

2000–2003	2010–2015
Iraq	Bahrain
Palestine	Egypt
Somalia	Iraq
Sudan	Lebanon
	Libya
	Mauritania
	Palestine
	Somalia
	Sudan
	Syria
	Yemen

Source: The Report team.

Figure 1.7 **Terrorist attacks and their victims in the Arab region versus the rest of the world, 2000–2014**



Source: START 2015.

internally displaced. Somalia's ratio of internally displaced persons exceeded 10 percent of the population in 2014. Syrians are the single largest group of internally displaced persons, with 6.5 million displaced in the country in 2013.[64]

1.5 Youth in the Arab region as possible agents of change

Arab population growth rates in the past 50 years were among the highest in the world, the result of a combination of high fertility and declining infant mortality. The high population growth rates of the 1960s and 1970s resulted in a large demographic wave that has been moving through the population. Although the growth rates subsequently declined, the demographic wave they created is now passing through the young adult years, swelling into a youth 'bulge' experienced to varying degrees across the region.

Never before has the region had such a high share of young people, and although age distribution is only one demographic variable in the complexities of social and political life, the large presence of youth in Arab countries is a crucial reality conditioning the region's political, economic, social and cultural development.

Historically and in periods of rapid demographic growth, it is the young people who become conspicuous in public life.[65] For the past five years, more and more young people in the region have been raising their voices against those responsible for their economic, social and political exclusion. This was made evident by the youth-led uprisings that brought to the fore the urgent need for change in the Arab region. Youth have emerged as a catalyzing force for change in societies. In several countries, their movements and protests have put pressure on traditional power structures.

What is certain is that these developments have amplified the voices of youth and put young people at the center of debate. A region experiencing

Table 1.4 Military spending, selected Arab countries, 2014, in constant 2011 prices

	Military spending 2014 (million USD)	Military spending 2014 (% GDP)	Growth since 2004 (%)
Qatar [a]	1,913	1.5	64
Bahrain	1,319	4.2	112
Iraq	8,381	4.2	344
UAE	21,877	5.1	114
Algeria	11,295	5.4	215
Saudi Arabia	73,717	10.4	156
Oman	8,985	11.6	117

Source: SIPRI 2015.

Note: GDP = gross domestic product. a. Latest available, 2010.

this type of demographic change must offer the new generation a platform to express concerns and debate views – about the future, society, the economy and the region.

This chapter provides a broad spectrum of the factors affecting youth in Arab countries, either directly or indirectly, yet negatively impacting their environment and development into adulthood. Some of these factors are crucial indicators of the state of human development, such as access to decent and satisfying employment, educational attainment, and access to professional health care, for both men and women. Other factors defining the reality of youth in the Arab countries relate to social interactions that characterize the Arab region today, particularly conflict and migration.

After the uprisings of 2011, it became increasingly evident that the younger generations in Arab countries reject the meagre choices offered by sterile political, economic and social arenas. These young individuals have on their shoulders the burden to navigate for their own survival, but also, by their doings, they are charting the future for their generation as well as the coming ones.

Empowering youth in Arab countries is not a call, in this context, for providing support to the young generation. It is a call for empowerment to rebuild Arab societies and head for a better future. The 2011 'dam breaking' has revealed the existence of three interrelated crises: of the state, of economic models, and of politics. While the focus on the ground is on the last, progress over the next 10 years will depend on moves along all three dimensions. The solutions for each crisis are well known; the problem is more with the process and sequence, and the role of the youth in affecting change (box 1.6).

The opening is available to ensure that youth in Arab countries enter a dynamic, healthy and economically active workforce, with lower dependency ratios (that diminish the economic burden imposed by non-working segments of society) and the capacity to generate income, savings and investment. This opening is a real – but finite – demographic window of opportunity. In most Arab countries, the window will remain open for, at best, the next two or three decades: a blink of an eye in the history of the Arab world.[66]

Seven years before the uprisings, the AHDRs foresaw that "*...If the developmental inability accompanied by a repressive situation on the internal scene and desecration on the foreign scene today continues, intensified societal conflict in the Arab countries is likely to follow. In the absence of peaceful and effective mechanisms to address injustice that the current Arab reality is bringing about, the possibilities of internal strife in the Arab countries increase; and this is the worst fate the current era in modern Arab history could result in*".

This report offers a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the most pressing challenges facing youth in the Arab region in terms of the human development process. It uses the pillars of human development as a gateway to go much beyond the three dimensions of the HDI. It analyses civic participation among young people; the effects of war and conflict on youth, mobility and migration; and the inclusion and empowerment of young women. To build a more reflective understanding of the different layers that affect youth and human development in Arab countries, it bases the analysis on a wealth of data and surveys. The perspectives of youth have also played a central role in shaping this report, as a series of regional consultations were held to examine key development challenges youth face in their respective countries.

Box 1.6 Ban Ki-Moon: Youth and peace building

The role of youth lies at the heart of international peace and security. We have to encourage young people to take up the causes of peace, diversity and mutual respect.

Youth represent promise – not peril. While some young people do commit heinous acts of violence, the overwhelming majority yearn for peace, especially in conflict situations. Many of those who commit violence are victimized by depraved adults who abuse youthful innocence. Over and over we see young people bearing the brunt of violent extremism. Violent extremists deliberately target youth for exercising their human rights.

I am impressed by young people who survive war and champion peace. I met a Syrian girl in a refugee camp who dreams of becoming a doctor so she can help others. Young people drive change but they are not in the driver's seat. I agree – and I call for giving them the "licence" to steer our future. They have idealism, creativity and unprecedented powers to network. They often understand the complexities of war and the requirements for peace.

There are countless youth groups that want to wage peace, not war. They want to fight injustice, not people. I applaud these heroes – and especially the heroines. Gender equality is fundamental to combating violent extremism.

Youth suffer on the frontlines of war – but they are rarely in the backrooms where peace talks are held.

I call for giving young people a seat at the negotiating table. They pay a price for the fighting – and they deserve to help structure the healing. This is essential to lasting stability. Youth organizations can help in peacebuilding – if we scale up their activities and invest in their ideas.

Education is critical. I call for deploying "weapons of mass instruction" to foster a culture of peace – "weapons of mass instruction" instead of "destruction". This is more than a clever slogan – it is an effective strategy. Youth peace groups, especially in conflict-torn areas, deserve our unstinting support. Young people are inheriting the world. With more resources, they can be a force for peace, reconciliation and democratic governance. The United Nations is working to listen to youth and respond to their concerns. Let us see young people as the solution to our most vexing problems. They yearn for a more just and peaceful world – and with our help, they can create it.

Note: UN Secretary-General's Statement at the Security Council debate on the role of youth in countering violent extremism and promoting peace, April 2015.

The youth themselves must be significant actors in the process of change that is being described or measured. Youth empowerment emphasizes the importance of participation and social inclusion. This can be achieved provided society is instilled with principles and rules of citizenship that respect all groups and their legitimate differences. The more youth are granted equitable access to education, matched with proper standards of educational attainment and achievement, hold satisfying employment and are in control of their lives, the more well equipped they will be to 'reclaim' reason, assert themselves as powerful agents of change, and own the necessary debates around tomorrow's society.

These debates should address questions about how to achieve peace and preserve it, create an attractive and moral economic system, how to re-invent an effective and inclusive state, and how to devise rules that can aggregate preferences that respect citizens and their legitimate differences. The debate should also include questions about how to end women's struggles against injustice. Equality of opportunity allows women to make the choices that are best for them, their families and their communities. However, the opportunities for women are not equal where legal gender differences are prevalent.[67]

This Report will serve its purpose if it helps stimulate such a debate, frame the terms of the discussion and encourage youth in Arab countries to participate with the general public in answering questions directly touching their lives. The goal must be to empower youth to determine the nature of the society of tomorrow in which they will live as adults.

Endnotes

1 UNDP 2013c.
2 UNDP 2014a.
3 UNDP 2014a.
4 Nawar 2014.
5 Kabeer 1999.
6 See, e.g., the following reports: UN–LAS 2007; ILO 2012a; Issam Fares Institute 2011; UNESCO 2011.
7 World Bank 2007.
8 See http://www.poplas.org/ar/publication.php.
9 Middle East Youth Initiative 2009.
10 UN 2012.
11 ILO 2014e, 2014f, 2014g.
12 UN Habitat 2012.
13 Majed 2014.
14 Malik 2011.
15 Malik and Awadallah 2011.
16 World Bank 2015a.
17 Many Arab governments have ridden the economic liberalization wave since the 1980s and the rollback of the state to maintain their grip on power by shifting from social modernizing populism to an alliance with elite capital and by relying on crony capitalism.
18 World Bank 2015a.
19 World Bank 2015a.
20 World Bank 2014a.
21 World Bank 2014a.
22 UNDP 2011.
23 UNESCO 2014.
24 World Bank 2015b.
25 World Bank 2010.
26 The TIMSS and the Programme for International Student Assessment are administered to eighth graders and 15-year-olds, respectively, to assess the quality of education among these students. See World Bank (2008, 2013a).
27 World Bank 2013a.
28 World Bank 2015b; ILO 2015.
29 Chaaban 2013.
30 WEF 2012.
31 Dhillon and others 2009.
32 European Commission 2010.
33 ILO 2012a.
34 Dhillon and others 2009.
35 World Bank 2015b; ILO 2014b.
36 UNDP 2005, 2009.
37 In Algeria, Iraq, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Sudan and Syria, the constitution explicitly prohibits gender-based discrimination (in theory).
38 IPU 2015.
39 UN–LAS 2013.
40 UN–LAS 2013.
41 Jabbour and others 2012.
42 Dhillon and Youssef 2009.
43 Chaaban 2010.
44 Chaaban 2013; Dhillon and Youssef 2009.
45 Dhillon and Youssef 2009.
46 Jabbour and others 2012.
47 Issam Fares Institute 2011.
48 WHO 2013d.

[49] UNDP 2004, p. 8.
[50] UNDP 2005, p 1.
[51] Krayem 2013.
[52] Krayem 2013.
[53] Ramadan 2012.
[54] Ashour 2015.
[55] Harrigan and El-Said 2011.
[56] Fahmy2015.
[57] Fahmy2015.
[58] Fahmy2015.
[59] Fahmy2015.
[60] UNRWA 2015.
[61] UN-ESCWA 2014a, p. 132.
[62] For more information, visit http://www.therefugeeproject.org/#/2011.
[63] UNHCR 2014a.
[64] UNHCR 2014a.
[65] Moller 1968.
[66] Jamal 2009.
[67] World Bank 2015c.

Chapter 2

Values, identities and civic participation

Five key cross-cutting findings emerge from the analysis of attitudes and values among youth in Arab countries on the individual, the family, the polity and society. youth experience less satisfaction and are able to exercise less control over their future than otherwise similar youth elsewhere in the world. This difference exists despite the Arab region's shift towards more socially open values in recent years, including growing support for gender equality and greater civic involvement. However, the region's youth remain conservative in many dimensions compared with youth in countries at similar levels of development, especially on gender equality, the separation of religion and the state, social and religious tolerance, and obedience. Opinions have changed markedly in two directions since the uprisings of 2011: one liberating and one conservative. There are large variations, but the region shows many commonalities, as demonstrated most dramatically by the rapid spread of fresh political ideas emanating from the uprisings.

2.1

The mindset of youth in the Arab region

Young people form a large part of the population, differ from their elders and have been driving change in social values in the region. They differ from their elders because they adjust more readily to changes in global and local circumstances than older people.[1] Youth in the region are more frustrated in their daily lives. They spearheaded the 2011 uprisings because they experience less satisfaction and are more worried about economic issues than their elders and because they have become more liberated than their elders in their views about society and about authority.

The analysis of youth values, based on global opinion polls, focuses on four areas: the individual, the family, the polity and society. At the individual level, it focuses on changes in core values such as self-expression, respect for authority and piety. These changes are affecting the attachment of the individual to family values and support for patriarchy. Self-awareness and attachment to the family shape people's political attitudes, including their propensity to engage in civic action and to show a preference for democracy over autocratic government. Identification with the nation-state, together with the development of values of tolerance, allows individuals to engage peacefully in political action.

Despite the rise of radical Islamist groups, it appears that the opinions of the Arab public, especially youth, are diverse and dynamic. The ideological foundations and social drivers of the Arab uprisings of 2011 represent a departure from the ideologies of the past and may be ushering in a new cultural epoch in the region. The 2011 uprisings were not primarily shaped by past ideologies such as pan-Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, or Islamist fundamentalism. Rather, they were nurtured by values that have grown more organically within society. These values are potent and multifaceted and cannot be assimilated within any single major political theory.[2] The socioeconomic transformation driven by the rise of education, a demographic revolution, rapid urbanization, the development of market economies and, more recently, the emergence of mass communication has led to the creation of a more vibrant cultural space open to the influence of global ideas.

Five key cross-cutting findings emerge from the analysis of global opinion polls. First, youth in Arab countries experience less satisfaction with their lives and feel that they exercise less control over their future than otherwise similar youth elsewhere in the world. They also experience less satisfaction than their elders, which contrasts with youth in the rest of the world, where the young tend to be more satisfied with their lives and more hopeful about the future than their parents.

Second, the region has moved towards more socially open values in recent years; especially, the support for gender equality has increased, and civic involvement has expanded. These values are positively correlated with the value of self-expression (which has been widely embraced among the youth of the region in the last decade) and negatively correlated with respect for authority (which has been diminishing).

Third, in spite of this progress, youth in the region remain conservative in many dimensions compared with youth in countries at similar levels of development, particularly on gender equality, the separation of religion and state, social and religious tolerance, and obedience. The empowering effects of education are less strong than elsewhere, reflecting its conservative content. On several core values, self-expression and agency do not translate into gains in freedom that match the experience in the rest of the world.

Fourth, there are important regional and global commonalities despite the large variations across the countries of the region. Although country dynamics are more important than socioeconomic factors in shaping most of the values studied, many of these dynamics are correlated with regional effects, which also suggests many commonalities, as demonstrated most dramatically by the quick regional spread of the ideas of the uprisings in 2011. The late 20th century produced an unexpected convergence in the region that was driven by physical movements of people, the expansion of media and the consolidation of a region-wide cultural zone. Several social, economic and political phenomena occurred everywhere, such as a decline in fertility, high youth unemployment, a rise in cronyism and corruption, and a rise in piety and patriarchal values.[3] In parallel, however, there has been a convergence of the region's cultural space with global culture.[4]

Fifth, opinions are affected by the political process, and they have changed markedly since the uprisings; One is liberating and is especially marked in greater

gender equality and waning obedience to authority; and one is reactionary to deal with the fear of chaos and of rapid change, such as a decline in the support for democracy and an increase in the support for strong rule. Values have become more divided along class lines. The modernist tendencies among more well-educated and richer people were neutralized, and the grievances among the poor mounted, suggesting that conflicts over income distribution could grow larger in the future, including among youth. Soon after the 2011 uprisings, political Islam ruled for a short time, primarily in Egypt, but that rule led to a fall in the support for political Islam among populations and to a society more polarized over the role of religion and over the correlated values of gender equality and social tolerance. This polarization around identity issues has diverted attention from political, social and economic challenges.

2.2

The young individual — dissatisfied but more self-expressive

Over the past four decades, many Arab governments have implemented numerous policies and established many institutions to foster quietism and obedience among populations. Autocrats, patriarchs, mosques, schools, the media and the mukhabarat (intelligence agencies) became instruments for the suppression of disagreement and independent expression of opinion and, together, managed to deliver over 30 years of political stability despite limited economic growth except in the GCC, often unpopular foreign policies, rising corruption and repression of civic and human rights. Popular culture was emptied of its social content by zealous censors, and a growing regional media controlled by conservative interests became a vehicle for frivolous short-term goals. Education was tightly controlled to promote conservative values and neutralize any potentially corrosive effect on the strict social order. Patriarchy was strengthened in many countries through family law statutes that rolled back the gains of more progressive periods.[5] These institutions created deep scars and rifts in society because of more conservative values, less gender equality and less social tolerance, which in some case took the form of religious intolerance.

However, change has been rapid over the past decade, especially among youth. The change has been driven by two major developments: the high levels of dissatisfaction among youth and a growing sense among youth that they are losing control over their lives, and rapidly expanding links to global knowledge and information networks. The efforts of autocratic regimes to check the forces of change were unable to stop the tide of new attitudes brought about by rising incomes and education, shifting demographics and increasing urbanization, which (as in the rest of the world) principally affect youth and the more well-educated. In the convergence of frustrated aspirations, greater opportunity for self-expression and reduced respect for authority lies the championing role of youth in the popular protests that culminated in the 2011 uprisings.

Satisfaction and control over life

Youth in the Arab region say that they feel extremely low levels of satisfaction with the lack of control they are able to exercise over their lives. An index has been developed based on two questions in the World Values Survey (WVS) relating to life satisfaction: (1) how satisfied are people with their lives and (2) how satisfied are people with the degree of free choice and control they have over their lives (figure 2.1). The life satisfaction index for the region is well below the index in countries elsewhere at similar levels of development. The gap in the index between the region and other parts of the world is about 15 percent (table 2.1), and there was no apparent progress between the WVS wave 5 (2005–2009) and wave 6 (2010–2014). These data reflect the extreme suffering and hardship experienced in countries such as Iraq (20 percent below other countries at similar levels of income), the low levels of life satisfaction experienced in countries in transition (-8 to -10 percent in Morocco and Egypt), and the still high, but more moderate levels of dissatisfaction in Algeria, Palestine, Tunisia and Yemen (about -4 percent relative to other countries at the same levels of income).

Figure 2.1 **Life satisfaction by age group and level of education (6th wave, 2010–2014)**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
Note: These graphs represent the percentage of particular populations (age or education groups in particular countries) whose rating on a particular question (typically on a 10-point scale range) is above the average rating of the comparator global middle-income-country group.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle income countries excluding Arab middle income countries
Higher values indicate better life satisfaction.

In most Arab countries, youth experience less satisfaction than older people in their countries, unlike the more usual negative correlation between age and life satisfaction that is experienced elsewhere. Improved education and rising incomes do, however, lead to higher levels of satisfaction and a greater sense of control, as in the rest of the world, and in more marked ways.

The low levels of life satisfaction among youth in Arab countries can be tied to high unemployment and economic factors. Substantial regional unemployment has generated insecurity about the future, as seen in the WVS data on responses about the level of concern over financial issues such as the difficulty of finding a job, losing a job, or the inability to offer a good education to children in the household. While the average level of concern about economic issues is similar in the region and the rest of the world, the level tends to be higher among youth, a pattern that contrasts with patterns observed elsewhere.

Dissatisfaction affects social values negatively. Low levels of life satisfaction are associated with more support for patriarchy, less social and religious tolerance, and a lower propensity for civic action (table 2.2). It also reduces the scope for self-expression, including civic participation, and tends to promote larger grievances.[6] This means that the observed increase in civic action was largely associated with greater need for self-expression and occurred despite an increase in dissatisfaction. Similarly, dissatisfaction reinforces patriarchal values, reflecting the role of the family as the ultimate refuge in a dysfunctional society and an ineffective state.[7] Finally, dissatisfaction is associated with greater social and religious intolerance, because it fosters reactionary attitudes towards people who are different.[8]

Self-expression

Youth in the Arab region are also more self-expressive than their elders. Self-expression is defined as the ability of individuals to make autonomous decisions and to innovate as needed without undue social constraints. The notion of self-expression is closely tied to the concepts involved in Amartya Sen's capabilities approach.[9] Several questions in the WVS address opinions on related values. An index was constructed based on three questions: two on the extent to which parents encourage imagination and self-expression among children and one on how respondents view their own creativity and critical thinking (see the statistical annex for the terms).

Self-expressive or individualistic agency typically rises in parallel with higher educational attainment, urbanization, and access to knowledge and information, which widens people's intellectual resources, leading them to become cognitively more autonomous.[10] Self-expression tends to be associated with positive forces for social change, particularly demands for greater political equality and gender equality.[11] Self-expression is positively correlated with civic action, gender equality, and social and religious tolerance across all countries and across individuals in Arab countries (table 2.2).

Values of self-expression are embraced more frequently in the Arab world among youth and the more well-educated (figure 2.2), although neither factor translates into self-expression at the level common in the rest of the world (table 2.1). In many countries in the region, patriarchy remains dominant and constrains behaviour and self-expression among individuals.[12] Despite the youth becoming more self-expressive, values connected to self-expression are weaker in the region relative to the rest of the world by about 11 percent. Generally, countries with higher incomes and more democratic countries tend to exhibit more self-expression (table 2.1). This is also true of countries with higher levels of media penetration and countries relying less on oil income. There are wide variations across countries. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia lead, and Egypt, Iraq, Palestine and Yemen trail (figure 2.2).

Starting from a low base, values connected with self-expression are however quickly becoming more prevalent in the region, echoing global changes. The explosive rise in the desire for self-expression among youth is related to secular gains in education, urbanization and incomes over several decades. A more proximate reason is demographic. The current youth generation in the Arab world is not only the largest youth cohort historically, but also one with exceptionally low levels of family responsibility, creating more space for individualism to flourish. This is because, while youth tend to live in households with many siblings and, thus, share responsibility in supporting parents in old age, they are tending to delay marriage and have fewer children.[13] In the WVS data, values of self-expression are spreading rapidly among all age-groups; this was especially so during the lead-up to the 2011 uprisings. The more recent period, however, has seen slight declines in Egypt and Morocco that appear to be related to the chaotic social situation after the uprisings that may have acted as a barrier to self-expression because of greater concerns about livelihood and personal security.

Table 2.1 **Opinions on life satisfaction, connectivity, self-expression, piety, authority, and gender equality, by individual and country characteristics, Arab countries and other selected countries**

	Total effect (%)		Individual effects				Country effects	
	Global gap	Time trend	Youth	Education	Women	Income	Democracy	GDP per capita
Electronic connectivity	0	-1	+/+	+/+	--/-	+/+	+	+
Self-expression	-11	4/-8	+/++	+/+	-/-	+/+	+	+
Life satisfaction	-15	0/0	-/+	+/0	-/0	++/+	+	+
Piety	31	0/0	-/+	-/--	+/+	0/0	0	-
Obedience to authority	11	0/-13	-/0	-/--	0/0	0/0	+	0
Gender equality	-30	0/0	+/+	+/+	++/+-	0 /0	+	+

Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.

Notes: All variables are defined in the statistical annex. Results from OLS panel regressions using data from the WVS – see Akin and Diwan (2014) for details. The data covers 11 Arab countries in 2013 and 76 other countries, and includes responses by about 80,000 people in Arab countries and 140,000 people in middle-income countries. Global gap is the percentage point deficit or surplus of the Arab opinions relative to global opinions, expressed as a share of the global standard deviation in the global responses; all other entries that take the form x/y refers to Arab and Global slopes respectively between opinions and individual (youth, educated, women, income level), or country (level of democracy, GDP per capita) characteristics; (++) refers to a quantity larger than (+), and similarly, (--) is smaller than (-). Arab region effects based on 11 countries; Arab time trend based on average trend in 5 countries only, between 2008 and 2013.

Table 2.2 **Correlation coefficient, support for gender equality, civic action, and social and religious tolerance and responses on self-expression, life satisfaction, piety, authority, democracy and political Islam, among individuals and in 10 Arab countries and selected middle-income countries**

	Correlation between countries, global sample (%)				Correlation for individuals, Arab sample (%)			
	Gender equality	Civic action	Social tolerance	Religious tolerance	Gender equality	Civic action	Social tolerance	Religious tolerance
Self-expression	27	35	30	10	13	9	7	8
Life satisfaction	49	21	42	22	12	6	4	3
Piety	-54	-26	4	-48	-10	-8	-5	-13
Authority	-29	-50	-18	-12	-10	-10	0	-7
Democracy	72	50	60	50	10	-2	2	7
Political Islam	-67	-50	-52	10	-8	7	-7	-12

Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.

Variables defined in the annex using data from WVS; see Akin and Diwan (2014) for details. The data cover 10 Arab countries in 2013 and 76 middle-income countries and include responses by about 80,000 people in Arab countries and 140,000 people in middle-income countries. Correlation coefficients are calculated for country averages in the first four columns and among individual Arabs in the four last columns. Correlation coefficients are shown in percentage points.

Electronic connectivity

Through their access to information and communication technology, youth in Arab countries are increasingly connected to the world. Although access to information and communication technology in the region is lagging behind the world average in several fields, there has been significant progress.

Figure 2.2 **Self–Expression by age group and level of education**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle income countries excluding Arab middle income countries
Higher values indicate higher levels of Self-Expression

While, in the 1990s, the region was starved of information in a context of complete state dominance of the media, regional television and radio channels, websites and blogs, and social media proliferated in the mid-2000s.[14] This exposure opened a portal for youth connected to electronic means of information but living in an inhibiting environment to form and then express their opinions and challenge existing power structures, thereby transforming themselves from passive members of society into active, self-aware individuals.[15]

Youth in Arab countries are as connected to electronic means of information as their peers around the world, and social media have become a major part of their daily lives. Mobile phone use has surged from below the world average, at 26 percent, in 2005 to almost 108 percent in 2015, above the world average (figure 2.3). Similarly, internet use jumped from 8 percent in 2005 to 37 percent in 2015, a higher rate than the rest of the developing world and the world average and representing an increase from 5 million subscriptions in 2000 to 141 million in 2015 (figure 2.4). Among people with Facebook accounts, 67 percent are youth aged 15–29.[16] The 2013 ASDA'A Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey reported that more than 50 percent of connected youth aged 15–24 are active on Twitter; 46 percent read blogs (18 percent have their own blogs); and 59 percent obtain their news from online sources, compared with only 24 percent who obtain their news from newspapers.[17] WVS data confirm these findings and allow one to look more closely at variations across age and education levels. The electronic connectivity index constructed based on WVS questions includes information on the extent and frequency of individuals accessing media through electronic means (television, mobile phones, radio, and internet) - see the annex. Across population groups (for example, young Egyptians, highly educated Tunisians), there are great variations in the region, from a high of 90 percent among young Lebanese or Qataris (well-educated Lebanese, Moroccans and Qataris are more well-connected than the average resident of a middle-income country), to a low of 10 percent among older or less educated Egyptians, Moroccans and Yemenis (figure 2.5).[18]

Connectivity to news and knowledge is greater among youth and the well-educated. Youth are also more well-connected than their parents in all countries. In Lebanon and Qatar, youth are nearly all connected electronically, and, in Algeria, Libya and Tunisia, the share reaches 75 percent. Youth in Algeria, Palestine and Tunisia are about four times more well-connected than their parents. The lowest intergenerational differences are in Egypt, Morocco and Yemen, countries with low connectivity, suggesting that, when connectivity rises, it spreads first among youth.[19] Connectivity also tends to be sharply higher among the more well-educated even in countries with low connectivity such as Egypt and Yemen. In Morocco, connection to information is highly unequal between the well-educated (access is among the highest in the region) and the uneducated (the lowest).

2.3 The family—patriarchy still strong but gradually weakening

There is a close link between the values of patriarchy and values associated with gender inequality, respect for authority, extreme religious interpretation and support for autocratic governance. Patriarchy is a social structure that privileges men and promotes gender inequality and control over women. It touches all aspects of life.[20] The traditional patriarchal family structure is prevalent throughout the region, especially among rural and poorer social strata, and influences the attitudes of youth towards gender equality.[21]

Gender inequality is a central tenet of the patriarchal order. Gender inequality in politics, the labour market, education and the family is tolerated and even sanctioned either by law or in practice in Arab countries.[22] Past analyses have uncovered the relationship between the patriarchal order and the social environment, showing how values connected to patriarchy evolve and are transmitted through social comparisons with nearby reference groups.

The Arab region scores far lower on support for gender equality than middle-income countries in responses to WVS survey questions about whether men should have access to jobs before women if jobs

Figure 2.3 **Mobile cellular subscriptions per 100 inhabitants (%)**



Source: ITU 2015.
a. Estimate
Note: The developed/developing country classifications are based on the UN M49: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/definitions/regions/index.html.

Figure 2.4 **Individuals using the internet (%)**



Source: ITU 2015.
a. Estimate
Note: The developed/developing country classifications are based on the UN M49, see: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/definitions/regions/index.html.

Figure 2.5 **Electronic connectivity index by age group and level of education, 2013**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.

Note: Electronic connectivity is defined in the annex. The figures represent the share of particular populations with more connectivity than the global MIC overall average over countries and individuals. MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries. Higher values indicate more electronic connectivity.

are scarce, whether a university education is more important for a man, and whether men make better political leaders. The region shows a gap of 36 percent for this index (table 2.1). This gap is also reflected in the positive correlation among gender equality, civic action and tolerance (table 2.2). Gender inequality is likewise associated with more respect for authority and less support for democracy.[23] Values supporting gender equality are highest in Algeria, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia and lowest in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen (figure 2.6).

Younger and more well-educated youth in Arab countries tend to be more pro–gender equality than the rest of the population, which is in line with global experience. The difference between the young and older generations and between the well-educated and less educated is, however, not as wide in views on gender equality as views on self-expression, suggesting that gender equality is a value that changes slowly. Indeed, the slopes with respect to age and education are comparable with those observed elsewhere in the world (table 2.1). The age effect is most marked in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, countries with higher pro-gender scores, but also in Iraq and Yemen, countries with lower ratings (figure 2.6). The education effects are sharpest in Lebanon and Tunisia (where the overall scores are high), but low in Jordan and Qatar and also in Iraq and Yemen (where the age effects are strong). Richer countries and more democratic countries show higher pro-gender attitudes (table 2.1). Patriarchy tends to be less well accepted in countries with more religious diversity.[24] Some Arab states have shown a commitment to women's rights, albeit in a top-down manner (see chapter 4).

In most Arab countries, there was a jump in pro-gender views after the uprisings, but from an extremely low base. Youth mobilization, including among women, to create social change is likely to have had wide implications. Whether this shifting perspective extends to gender equality can be validated by looking at the Gallup data.[25] Because they are clustered around the uprisings of 2011 (data are for 2005–2013), they allow to investigate the effect of the uprisings on the value of gender equality (figure 2.7). The jump in support for gender equality is especially large in Egypt, the GCC countries and Palestine. It deteriorated only in Sudan and Syria. In many of the countries that evolved positively in terms of gender equality over the observed period, the shift is more marked among women than among men, but the progress is occurring from a low base.

The increasingly favourable pro-gender sentiments are closely tied to opinions about the strength of family ties. Dependence on family life can be measured in the WVS through responses to questions on the importance of making one's parents proud, how fulfilling it is to be a housewife, and how much one trusts the family in relation to the broader community. Family values in the region in 2013 were at levels equivalent to those in the rest of the world, though they had dropped by about 12 percent after the 2011 uprisings. Family values are less prevalent among youth and the well-educated and more prevalent among the more religious, as in the rest of the world.

Women throughout the region are more pro–gender equality than men (figure 2.7).The differences of opinion between men and women on gender equality is larger than in the rest of the world -- about 20–40 percent in the Arab region, but only 7–10 percent in the rest of the world.[26] The WVS data suggest that the opinion of young and educated women is halfway between the average global opinion and the average among Arab men. Women's pro-gender attitudes suggest that they do not (entirely) internalize patriarchy. Male youth have more egalitarian views than older men, but their values tend to be closer to their fellow citizens, reflecting a strong country effect. Women in Arab countries, however, seem to form a collective; their opinions are closer to the opinions of women elsewhere than to the opinions of men in their own countries. Yet, if men do not adopt a more egalitarian worldview, it does not appear that women alone will be able to alter the current position. This seems especially true during periods of duress, as after 2011 when women became the primary victims of violence, and patriarchal values became more popular, leading women to become even more victimized.[27]

Obedience to authority

Younger and more well-educated youth in Arab countries are becoming less accepting of obedience to authority, which is central to traditional, patriarchal and autocratic values. The WVS measures obedience to authority through questions on obedience towards parents and political leaders (see the statistical annex). The region is about 11 percent more obedient than the global average (table 2.1). Obedience is less prevalent among youth than among older people and also less prevalent among the well educated than among the uneducated. The strength of the age effect and of the resulting generational fault line is more marked in the region than in the rest of the world, suggesting that youth are changing rapidly. In sharp contrast however, the education effect is dampened relative to the rest of the world, reflecting education curricula and teaching methods that discourage critical thinking and encourage instead a submissive attitude towards higher authority.

Figure 2.6 **Gender equality index by age group and level of education**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
Note: A higher score indicates a more pro-gender stance.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries.

Figure 2.7 **Gender equality before and after 2011**





Source: Report team calculations based on Gallup 2013.
Note: The above figures allow for a comparison of the gender equality index before and after the uprisings. Higher values on the axes indicate increased support for gender equality. See the statistical annex for the definition of the gender equality index using Gallup.

Countries seem to fall into three groups. Countries close to the global average (Morocco and Tunisia) show stronger generational and educational effects; countries far below or far above the global middle-income-country average tend to be less dynamic and exhibit smaller educational and generational effects (Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine on top and Egypt, Jordan, Qatar and Yemen at the bottom). There are, nonetheless, important changes over time in all countries of the (small) WVS sample with data over several waves, even in Egypt and Jordan. The dropoff in obedience to authority is more marked after the Arab uprisings, a dramatic example of their liberating impact on Arab societies (figure 2.8).

Piety

Piety is an expression of religiosity, which is a broader concept. It involves more visits to a place of worship and listening to sermons, which serves to amplify the messages of these religious institutions. By a large margin (21 percent), the countries of the

Figure 2.8 **Obedience to authority, by age cohort and over time, and piety, by age group**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
Note: Higher values indicate higher levels of obedience to authority / piety.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries.

Arab region are more pious than other countries around the world at similar levels of development. The sociological literature has attributed this level of piety to the dominance of conservative values.[28] The WVS measures piety through an index that combines the frequency of visits to a place of worship and the perception of the degree of importance of God in one's life. The piety index rises with age, meaning that young people tend to be less pious than their elders, which is unlike the situation in the rest of the world, where there is a resurgence of piety among the youth (table 2.1). The age effect is marked in some countries, especially Algeria, Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen, where piety is significant. WVS waves 4–6 (1999–2014) reveal that piety has gone up in Iraq, Jordan and Morocco in recent years.

While progress towards less patriarchal values has taken place, piety remains strong in Arab societies, even as some liberal values such as self-expression and less respect for authority are becoming more common. The tension between changes in some dimensions, such as lower respect for authority, and a persistence of traditional values in others, such as attachment to family values, creates situations of multiple or overlapping identities whereby individuals behave differently across the spheres in which they participate and describes the attitude of a society in transition.[29]

2.4 Polity—civic engagement and forms of government

The combination of less satisfaction, less control over life, a greater space for self-expression and a lower prevalence of obedience to authority must have driven youth protests that ultimately led to the uprisings of 2011. The WVS data suggest not only that youth demonstrated disproportionately more than others, but also that this was associated with a disproportionate increase in their demands for a more democratic order.

Civic engagement

Civic engagement in politics had been expanding in the run-up to the uprisings, and youth took a leading role in this development. An index of civic engagement was constructed based on whether respondents took part in demonstrations, joined in boycotts, or signed petitions. Figure 2.9 depicts the intensity of civic engagement along the dimensions of age and education.

In 2013, the region stood at about the global average in civic activism (table 2.3). Among youth and the well-educated, it was slightly above the global middle-income-country average (figure 2.9). Rising civic activity is correlated with declining respect for authority and greater self-expression (table 2.2). Civic engagement is highest in more democratic countries and countries with greater media penetration such as Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Palestine and Yemen and lowest in Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Qatar.[30]

The relationship between life satisfaction and civic action seems complex and is unlikely to be linear. Some dissatisfaction is likely to fuel protest, but high levels of dissatisfaction are associated with low levels of social activism both in comparisons across countries around the world and in the behaviour of individuals in Arab countries (table 2.2). This suggests that deeply dissatisfied individuals tend to be less driven to engage in social action to change their environment, and, if they do engage in such action, they tend to choose more violent forms of protest.[31]

Age and education effects are significant nearly everywhere. Youth are more active than their elders, and the effect of age on civic engagement is larger in the region than in the rest of the world. Education has a positive effect, but at a rate lower than in the rest of the world (table 2.1). Age and education effects are huge in Yemen, and the education effect is marked in Morocco (figure 2.9). The age effect is weak in Egypt, which is also typical of Egypt on several other values such as demonstrating and demanding democracy, where, unlike other countries, young and old tend to have similar values, possibly reflecting the strength of family values.[32]

Civic engagement has largely involved greater willingness to participate in demonstrations. Even after the uprisings, citizens of Arab countries demonstrated at about the global average and the global middle-income-country average; youth and the well-educated were above the middle-income-country average (figure

Figure 2.9 Civic engagement by age group and level of education





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries excluding Arab middle-income countries. Higher values indicate more civic engagement.

Table 2.3 The relationship between views on politics, civic action, and tolerance and individual and country characteristics, in Arab countries and in the rest of the world

	Total effect (%)		Individual effects				Country effects	
	Global gap	Time trend	Youth	Education	Women	Income	Democracy	GDP per capita
Civic engagement	0	-/--	+/0	+/++	--/-	0	+	+
Demonstrated	0	-/--	++/+	+/+	--/-	+/0	+	+
Voted	-20	0/0	-/--	+/+	-/0	+/+	0	0
Democracy	-9	0/-	+/+	+/++	+/0	-/-	+	+
Political Islam	18	0/0	-/+	-/--	+/+	+/+	0	-
Social tolerance	-26	0/0	0/0	+/+	0/0	0 /0	+	0
Rel. tolerance	-24	0/0	-/0	++/0	+ /+	+ /+	0	0

Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.

Notes: All variables are defined in the statistical annex. Results from OLS panel regressions using data from the WVS see Akin and Diwan (2014) for details. The data cover 10 Arab countries in 2013 and 76 middle-income countries and include responses by about 80,000 people in Arab countries and 140,000 citizens in middle-income countries. Global gap is the percentage point deficit or surplus of the Arab opinions relative to global opinions, expressed as a share of the global standard deviation in the global responses; all other entries that take the form x/y refers to Arab and Global slopes respectively between opinions and individual (youth, educated, women, income level), or country (level of democracy, GDP per capita) characteristics; (++) refers to a quantity larger than (+), and similarly, (--) is smaller than (-). Arab region effects based on 10 countries; Arab time trend based on average trend in 5 countries only, between 2008 and 2013.

2.10). The scores are highest in Algeria, Lebanon, Libya and Palestine and lowest in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen; Tunisia stands at about the regional average. There are strong age and education effects in nearly all countries. Comparing waves shows that participation in demonstrations rose between waves 4 and 5 (1999–2009), but fell by wave 6 (2010–2014).

Why do demonstrations and protests attract the more well-educated? Raj Desai and others (2014) argue that, as a signalling mechanism for their preferences, demonstrating tends to be more credible among this group because their opportunity cost of time is high. Poorer and less well educated youth tend to express their grievances—when they do—more violently. The data from the region seem to be consistent with this hypothesis.[33]

But outside demonstrations, civic and political participation are weak among young people. In 2014, the share of youth who had volunteered their time to an organization was less than 9 percent in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Yemen, but more than 20 percent in Bahrain, Sudan and the UAE. In 2015, the share was only 10 percent in Tunisia, and 18.0 percent Mauritania.[34] Conservative schooling systems seem to lie behind this paltry participation. Supporting youth involvement in school or community affairs during their schooling years, when their political identity is being formed, is one of the best ways to foster political involvement among adults in the future.[35]

The willingness of youth to demonstrate did not translate into a greater propensity to use the ballot box after the uprisings; in fact, relative to the rest of the population, young people preferred demonstrating to voting. In voting, every country in the region is well below the global average among all age-groups, with a gap of about 20 percent (figure 2.10; table 2.3). In several countries, voting is low among youth compared with the overall population, reflecting the lack of confidence of youth in undemocratic institutions. For instance, in Tunisia's latest elections in 2011, young people represented the highest ratio of voters who refrained from voting, with only 17 percent of Tunisians aged between 18 and 25 registering to vote.[36]

WVS data that span several waves are limited. They show increased voting in Egypt with a rising convergence between young and old, but a rising generational divergence in Iraq and Morocco. There do not appear to be significant legal barriers to formal youth participation in parliaments in the region. The age of eligibility to vote is 18 years in

Figure 2.10 **Share of population that has demonstrated and voted, by age group**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries.

Table 2.4 **Indicators of formal barriers to civic engagement in selected Arab countries, latest available data**

	Freedom of Association	Voting Age	Candidacy Age		Average age of Council of Ministers
	(Yes / No, Min. age of association members)	People's Assembly	Parliamentary/ People's Assembly	Municipality	
Algeria	Yes, 18, by authorization	18	25	23	62
Bahrain	N.A	20	20	N.A	N.A
Comoros	N.A	18	18	N.A	N.A
Djibouti	N.A	18	23	N.A	N.A
Egypt	Yes, not determined, by authorization	18	25	25	61
Iraq	N.A	18	30	N.A	N.A
Jordan	N.A	18	30	N.A	N.A
Kuwait	Yes, 21	21	30	30	N.A
Lebanon	Yes, 20, by notification	21	25	25	62
Libya	N.A	18	25	N.A	N.A
Mauritania	N.A	18	25	N.A	N.A
Morocco	Yes , not specified, notification required	18	23	25	57
Oman	N.A	21	30	N.A	N.A
Palestine	N.A	18	28	N.A	N.A
Qatar	N.A	N.A	24	N.A	N.A
Saudi Arabia	Yes, 18	N.A	30	25	59
Somalia	N.A	N.A	25	N.A	N.A
Sudan	N.A	18	21	N.A	N.A
Syria	N.A	18	25	N.A	N.A
Tunisia	Yes, 16, by notification	18	23	23	58
UAE	N.A	25	25	N.A	N.A
Yemen	N.A	18	25	N.A	N.A

Source: Report team compilation from various national sources. Data from February 2015.
N.A = Not available

most Arab countries on which data are available (apart from the GCC and Lebanon), and the average age of eligibility for parliament is 26 years.[37]

At government executive level, however, there seems to be a bias towards older people: the average age of ministers of state in some Arab countries is 58; the highest average is in Lebanon, at 62 (table 2.4).

Civic and political participation in the region remains weak among youth because of a combination of institutional and structural constraints that obstruct positive engagement in the public sphere. Most Arab countries share common institutional and legislative shortcomings, characterized by restricted freedom, gaps between law and practice, and limited power sharing, especially in electoral laws and laws on freedom of association. In most Arab countries, the latter are granted primarily by the constitution and country-specific laws, in addition to Article 20 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association"). Yet, enjoyment of this right

has often been suppressed by governments. Cases of detention and other acts of violence incompatible with legal texts have been reported frequently, aside from the selective authorization required by many Arab countries for associating or for demonstrating. The fight against terrorism, for example, has given some states, with or without newly issued emergency decrees, supreme power to restrict the right.

Some Arab countries do not have laws on the establishment of political associations or parties, rendering their formation illegal. In several countries, individuals who want to form an association are subject to discretionary decisions of the granting authority, which abuses the vague language of the legal text so as to ban associations or to shut down existing non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

Without true political competition, meaningful opposition parties and independent judiciaries and legislatures and with little room for independent civil society organizations, unconventional and volatile political and civic action may possess an appeal. The spectrum of unconventional or informal channels of engagement is diverse and ranges from activism on social media platforms to militant extremist action. While social media platforms have proved constructive in mobilizing youth, militant radicalization is obviously disastrous.

Support for democracy

It is possible to measure the preference for democratic order using the WVS, which asks respondents to rank their main concerns about democratic governance and strong rule.[38] On the eve of the uprisings, opinion surveys revealed that, with respect to the rest of the world, people in Arab countries desired a more democratic order relatively less; the gap was 9 percent.

In nearly all countries, youth and the more well-educated have a greater preference for democracy (figure 2.11). According to regression analysis, the age effects are stronger than the education effects, and younger citizens support democratic values more than their elders in ways similar to global trends, but the positive effects of education in increasing the preference for democracy are much less potent in the region than globally (table 2.3), another reflection of the conservative nature of the education system. As in the rest of the world (and controlling for levels of education), richer people tend to be less favourable of democracy.[39] As in the rest of the world, the desire for democracy is correlated positively with high levels of self-expression.

Support for democracy has been profoundly affected by recent political changes. Although the preference for democracy has held up since the uprisings, many countries have shown sharp compositional effects, whereby the preference is diminishing among the more well-educated and affluent, but rising among poorer citizens.[40] The noticeable pushback among the more well-educated, who were the main champions of change leading up to the uprisings, can be attributed to fears of chaos or of redistributive policies by democratically elected governments dominated by the interests of poor.

While the focus has been on identity politics, an examination of opinions reveals that, by 2013, social polarization around class issues had widened, especially in Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen.[41] An open question is whether the ebbing of support for democracy among the wealthier and the more well-educated will be temporary, or whether it will stretch over the longer term and be increasingly associated with a class struggle.[42]

Support for Political Islam

In the second part of the 20th century, the separation of religion and politics became one of the most contentious issues between adherents of political islamist movements and followers of secular political ideologies. Starting in the late 1990s, some groups within the broad range of parties espousing political Islam, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Party of Justice and Development in Morocco, moderated their political and social messages and came to participate in a democratic process.[43]

By 2012, however, the early dominance of Islamists led to a backlash, resulting in rising social polarization around the role of religion in politics. The WVS allows one to measure the degree of support for religion in politics via the question whether "religious authorities should ultimately interpret the laws."[44] Support for political Islam had fallen among respondents during WVS wave 6 (2010–2014), in all the countries in the sample (except among older Moroccans), with a rising divergence between younger and older groups in Egypt and Iraq (figure 2.12). In parallel, attitudes towards religion have also become more polarized, more so than in any other region of the world.[44] Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia and even Yemen are extremely divided among groups that feel strongly, but differently, about religion and politics. The political focus on identity issues, especially in the context of the drafting of new constitutions in Egypt and Tunisia, has obscured the need to find politically feasible solutions to the economic challenges facing these countries.

Figure 2.11 **Support for democracy by age cohort over time, and by level of education**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries. Higher value means more support for democracy

Figure 2.12 **Support for political Islam**





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
Note: A higher value means more sympathy for political Islam. MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries.

Even in 2013, opposition to the separation of religion and politics was more pronounced than in the rest of the world, with a gap of 18 percent (table 2.3). Lebanon alone stands out clearly, with about 75 percent of the population more secular than the global middle-income-country average. Tunisia is at the global middle-income-country average. Political Islamist sentiment is strongest in Egypt, Iraq and Morocco, followed by Jordan, Libya, Qatar and Yemen, all of which are above the Arab average (itself much higher than the global middle-income-country average).

Strong sentiments about political Islam tend to rise with age and to fall with education, but with some exceptions. Younger individuals are more likely to support secular forms of governments. The gap between the young and the older generation is particularly wide in Tunisia; contrariwise, young people in Jordan and Yemen lean more towards political Islam than their elders (figure 2.12). In Iraq and Morocco, nearly 80 percent of the old support a non-secular state. More educated individuals support secularism more than those with low levels of education, but here, too, the emancipative effects of education are muted if set against global experience (table 2.3).

2.5 Society—national identity and tolerance of differences

To support a shift towards more inclusive and democratic societies, greater self-expression needs to be associated with other values such as identification with the nation-state and acceptance of the rights of all citizens. Self-expressive values that are not backed by favourable political rules and institutions can lead to frivolous, self-gratifying behaviour that does not foster social progress or to utopian ideologies with no popular roots.[46] A lack of tolerance of social and religious differences means that democracy could be associated with a tyranny of the majority, a prospect that has often led other social groups and socially progressive individuals to sign on to the autocratic bargain involving moderate repression in exchange for security.

Secular identity

Around 2013, more people in Arab countries defined themselves in national and secular terms rather than in religious terms, although religious affiliation remains common in some countries. The basis of identity—whether nation, ethnicity, or religion—has been one of the most contested issues in the Middle East for a century. During the period of territorial nationalism of the early 20th century, which produced nationalist regimes in Egypt, Iran and Turkey between 1919 and 1925, the nation was considered the basis of identity, in contrast to the pan-Arab nationalism that constituted the official ideology of the regimes that seized power in Egypt, Iraq, Libya and Syria between 1952 (Egypt) and 1969 (Libya).

Some identification with the nation-state is required for the development of citizenship, such that the country becomes the social reference group for nurturing political attitudes, and the attitudes then help promote citizen participation in the country.[47] Mansoor Moaddel and Julie De Jong (2014) developed a questionnaire—used in five Arab countries—to look more deeply into the basis of identity by measuring the choice among several entities with which people primarily identify.[48] In countries on which data are available, apart from Tunisia, more people define themselves in national secular terms than in religious terms (figure 2.13). A small minority define themselves only by ethnic origin, such as Arab or Kurdish.

The growth in identification with the nation-state offers important avenues for dealing more effectively with a variety of social tensions in the region for two main reasons. First, the strength of religiosity is not the main determinant of identification, meaning that social-policy issues grounded in religion need to be resolved at the country level and that the association of parties with transnational movements will not be perceived as legitimate political action by most citizens. The majority of Saudi Arabians, for example, identify with their

Figure 2.13 **Index of secular nationalism (mean for total population)**



Source: Moaddel and De Jong 2014.
Note: The national averages for the five countries covered by Moaddel and De Jong (2014) (Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia), along with two comparator countries, Pakistan and Turkey, are plotted against age.

nation rather than their religion (figure 2.13). On the other hand, a majority of Tunisian respondents, despite sharing a relatively liberal orientation on many other issues, see themselves first as Muslims. It is not clear why national identity is weaker in Tunisian than in most other countries, but this may be tied to the country's small size and ethnic homogeneity, which makes such identification less threatening to the social order.

Second, the uprisings have been experienced in some countries as a founding national moment, creating a vision of a nation-state that appeals to citizens and sways them away from other frames of reference or political ideologies that expand beyond the geographic borders of countries.

Ethnic heterogeneity and tensions as in Iraq and Lebanon do not automatically cause people to identify with their ethnicity. These two countries, both gripped by intergroup tensions, score highest on secular nationalism.[49] This does not mean that ethnic divisions do not matter, but, instead, that they do not lead directly to ethnic identification. So, rather than a purely psychological phenomenon that reflects ethnic tensions, identification is the result of a more thoughtful decision by individuals about the type of governance structure that can work in their particular environment.

For example, Moaddel and De Jong (2014) show that, in Lebanon, there is a striking level of sectarianism, independent of education and age, reflecting a deep Sunni-Shia divide. Around 80 percent each of both Sunnis and Shias trust their co-religionists 'a great deal,' while only 30 percent trust members of other sects and religions as much. Yet, a large majority of Lebanese consider themselves Lebanese first, even though results show that the Lebanese do not take pride in their nationality.[50] This must reflect the knowledge that splitting into several ethnic-based countries is not attractive, despite the known ethnic divisions and tensions, a feeling that can also describe the Iraqi population.

Social and religious tolerance

It is mainly because of its high levels of social and religious intolerance that the region stands out among countries at similar levels of development around the world. Tolerance is a core value in pluralistic societies and a cornerstone of more democratic systems.[51] It is measured by two groups of questions in the WVS, one social, and one religious. The first builds on a question about the acceptability of various types of neighbours, including unmarried couples or people of a different

Figure 2.14 Social and religious tolerance by age (6th wave, 2010–2014)





Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.
MIC excluding AMIC: Middle-income countries, excluding Arab middle-income countries. Higher values indicate more religious tolerance.

race, nationality, or language. The second focuses on questions about the morality of various religions and whether all should be taught in schools.

The region's gap with the rest of the world in tolerance is large, 26 percent in social areas and 24 percent in religious areas (figure 2.14; table 2.3). Egypt and Lebanon, more religiously diverse countries, score above the global average, suggesting that diversity fosters tolerance. In the averages across countries and populations, youth do not appear to be more tolerant than the elderly and are, in fact, less religiously tolerant (table 2.3). Yet, there is a clearly positive and significant education effect, which is even larger in the region than in the rest of the world. It is one of the most beneficial aspects of education found so far. Some cohorts are especially tolerant, perhaps because defining historical moments occurred during their formative stage, for example, older Jordanian and Tunisian individuals and younger and more well-educated Iraqis and Palestinians. There has been no discernible progress on the values of social and religious tolerance since 2000 in the WVS data, including among youth.

This wide regional deficit and lack of progress on values of tolerance are worrying for the future of democracy in the region. Social and religious tolerance is positively correlated with self-expression and life satisfaction, and religious tolerance is negatively correlated with piety and obedience (table 2.3). Tolerance also correlates positively with support for democracy and negatively with support for political Islam.

Endnotes

1 Inglehart and Welzel 2010; Yates and Youniss 1998; Burke and Stets 2009.
2 Moaddel and De Jong 2014.
3 Cammett and Diwan 2013; Moghadam 2004.
4 Arvizu 2009.
5 Zaatari 2014.
6 Inglehart and Welzel 2010.
7 Alesina and Giuliano 2007.
8 Herrmann and others 2009.
9 Sen 1999.
10 Inglehart and Welzel 2010. Such modernizing tendencies were recognized by sociologists early on, starting with Durkheim who identified a shift from "communities of necessity" to "elective affinities" as part of a liberating process that diminishes social constraints on human choice and nurtures a sense of autonomy.
11 Inglehart and Welzel 2010.
12 Moaddel and De Jong 2014.
13 Fargues 2003.
14 Bennett 2012; Arvizu 2009.
15 Issam Fares Institute 2011; Norris 2012.
16 Arab Social Media Report 2015, p. 8.
17 ASDA'A 2013.
18 For international comparisons, an aggregate middle-income-country comparator has been developed as the unweighted average of all middle-income countries in the WVS (35 countries).
19 This may sound surprising for Egypt, given all the news about the effect of social networking on the 2011 uprising. But it also underlines the fact that this is a national average—it may well be that youth in particular parts of Cairo are well connected electronically, but not in Egypt taken as a whole.
20 Zaatari 2014.
21 Issam Fares Institute 2011.
22 For a review of family law, see Zaatari 2014.
23 Rizzo, Abdel-Latif and Meyer 2007.
24 Alexander and Welzel 2011; Moghadam 2004.
25 In Gallup, the index is based on the same two questions as the WVS, but the third is different, asking whether women should be allowed to initiate divorce.
26 Alexander and Welzel 2011.
27 Zaatari 2014.
28 Esmer 2003; Norris and Inglehart 2002.
29 Burke and Stets 2009.
30 Norris 2012.
31 Desai, Olofsgård and Yousef 2014.
32 Beissinger, Jamal and Mazur 2012; Diwan 2015.
33 This is also consistent with the earlier result that dissatisfied people tend to demonstrate less.
34 Gallup 2015.
35 Yates and Youniss 1998.
36 Chekir 2014.
37 For more information, see youth policy factsheets (per country) on http://www.youthpolicy.org.
38 For details, see the statistical annex.
39 Diwan 2013 argues that the middle class has played a leading role in the uprisings of 2011 because they were at the intersection of forces of grievances particularly marked among the poor, and modernist aspirations particularly marked among the educated.
40 Al-Ississ and Diwan 2014b; Robbins and Tessler 2014.
41 Al-Ississ and Diwan 2014a.
42 See El Gamal 2013, who argues that people in Arab countries want a market economy with redistribution.

[43] At the same time, insurgency movements had declined after they were severely repressed in the 1990s. The moderation of political Islam may have therefore facilitated the adhesion of the middle class to democracy by reducing its fear that elected government would push for conservative social policies. See Bubalo, Fealy and Mason 2008.

[44] Al-Ississ and Diwan 2014a.

[45] These questions were asked in all countries covered by the WVS, with the religious authority pertaining to that of the respondent's religion.

[46] Zaatari 2014.

[47] Sherrod 2003.

[48] These include whether people define themselves by nationality, ethnicity, or religion. Questions on identity were asked in two different ways in Moaddel and De Jong 2014: (a) individual identity and (b) communal affiliation. An index of secular affiliation is then built using both variables.

[49] Ethnic diversity in the Middle East can be explained by the mechanisms that nurtured it under the Ottoman Millet system for centuries. Moreover, the short colonial experience has marked some countries deeply, advantaging particular communities, shaping borders in many cases, and affecting the early independence nation-building in the 1940s and its founding 'national settlement', whether modeled around consensual ideas as in Lebanon, or as a strong rule of the minority in Iraq and Syria.

[50] Moaddel, Kors and Gärde 2012.

[51] Muasher 2014.

Chapter 3

Education and the transition to work

Arab societies perform below the world average on educational attainment, achievement and equitable access. Once young people in the Arab region try to get work, they find that the main, traditional avenue to secure employment, the government, has been closed. Finding stable and satisfying employment is one of the most prominent challenges facing youth. Arab economies are not providing enough private sector jobs owing to poor policy stability, which hampers private investment, alongside red tape, a failure to build a manufacturing base, little access to credit (outside a favoured circle), and, in the formal sector, tight labour regulations. Women are especially hard hit in multiple areas.

The policy prescriptions are fairly standard, which makes it all the more difficult to understand why governments have shown little interest in solving the problem over the last couple of decades. They include investing more in infrastructure and improving the business environment. Labour market programmes and micro-finance are less practical approaches.

3.1 Mixed educational outcomes among youth

> *"There are entire generations of Arabs who have not learnt how to play a musical instrument, and who have not read literary works because they were not accustomed to do so in school. Creative pursuits taken for granted in developed country schools have simply been neglected in the Arab world, with damaging results to the creative potential of its people."*
>
> *Arab Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP 2003, p. 83).*

Education and social mobility

Education is the main path to social and economic mobility, but substantial inequality of opportunity in education is undermining the Arab social contract, in which the state, at a minimum, furnishes a level playing field in education. The analysis of this inequality must rely on measurements of educational attainment (quantity) and educational achievement (quality). These measurements are usually based on years of schooling and scores in standardized international tests.

One key dimension of access to education is economic development, according to which the Arab region may be divided into three groups: the oil-rich GCC; middle-income countries, including Sudan and Yemen; and low-income countries, such as Comoros and Somalia. The last two groups account for more than 86 percent of the region's population. The poorest countries are still struggling with inequities in access to basic education, such as enabling poor children, especially girls, to attend school. Issues of quality—central to the inequality of opportunity evident in the middle-income group—are important only to the extent that the middle-income countries overcome the inequalities. Inequality in achievement is no less severe in the oil-rich countries, but economic mobility in oil-rich countries is less dependent on equity in education than on the equitable distribution of oil rents.

Educational attainment

The progress in access to education in the Arab region has generally been promising. Net enrollment rates have been increasing. The primary enrollment rate rose from 76.6 percent in 1999 to 84.5 percent in 2013. The latter is close to the world average (89.0 percent). Many countries are close to achieving universal primary enrollment. Gains in enrollment can also be seen at higher levels of education; rates rose threefold in secondary education and in higher education over 1970–2003.[1] However, Arab countries suffer from under-enrollment in scientific disciplines among secondary and tertiary students and a continued reliance on outdated pedagogical techniques such as rote memorization.[2] This has resulted in educational systems that have mediocre performance in average educational attainment, equitable distribution and achievement.[3]

In average years of schooling, Arab countries fall below the international benchmark according to per capita GDP, even though, on this metric in the last two decades, they have been improving more rapidly than other world regions except East Asia. Average educational attainment is largely a function of economic development, which determines the amount of resources available for allocation to school construction and administrative costs. Richer countries enjoy greater levels of educational attainment, but, above $10,000 per capita GDP (PPP), the relationship between GDP and educational attainment is flat. Among Arab countries, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates show the highest average educational attainment; Iraq, Sudan and Yemen the lowest. Apart from Algeria, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, all Arab countries are either at or below the predicted mean in years of schooling (figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 **Average years of schooling: most Arab countries are below the mean expected for per capita GDP**



Source: Salehi-Isfahani 2014.

Note: For 171 countries, the figure shows the relationship between mean years of schooling among 15–19-year-olds and log per capita GDP.

Inequality in educational attainment—an important determinant of overall inequality—is higher among the Arab countries as a group than in any other major country grouping (annex 2 table A.4).[4] Yet, in the region, inequality in educational attainment in some countries, such as Jordan and Palestine, is far below the regional average and closer to the average in East Asia than to the average among Arab countries.

The gap between educational progress and development outcomes has encouraged some policymakers to consider alternative paths of educational advancement. Some observers have noted that economic growth, equality and poverty reduction have not occurred in parallel with educational progress in the Arab countries.[5] Though the gap is typically attributed to a lack of flexibility in the educational system, some countries are beginning to introduce educational reforms, including reorganizing university curricula, assuring quality tertiary education and expanding vocational training programmes. The last aims to include programmes for entrepreneurship, as well as greater integration with the private sector.[6]

According to 2012–2013 survey data collected for the School to Work Transition Surveys of the ILO in four Arab countries, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia, the top two reasons youth give for ceasing their studies are failure in school exams and no interest in education (annex 2 table A.5). Other reasons given are a desire to begin working, economic reasons, or personal reasons such as wanting to get married (particularly female respondents). The surveys allow us to explore the trajectories of youth transitioning from education to work.

Educational achievement

In education, Arab countries lag in achievement relative to their performance in attainment. Although quality of education is more difficult to measure because of the multiple dimensions in which individuals with a given number of years of schooling may differ in their productive skills or human capital, one aspect of quality that is fairly easy to measure is the level of learning in a given subject. Several international tests, such as the TIMSS, the Programme for International Student Assessment and the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study, aim to measure learning in different subjects. Many Arab countries that have taken part in rounds of the TIMSS since 2003 consistently score below the world average of 500, and many score below the intermediate international benchmark of 475 (table 3.1).[7] This poor performance has been attributed to many aspects of Arab educational systems, including too little public provision, too little computer testing, and weak labour market signals.[8]

Table 3.1 **Average TIMSS scores, 8th grade students in mathematics and science, by year and gender**

	Mathematics								Science							
	Boys				Girls				Boys				Girls			
	1999	2003	2007	2011	1999	2003	2007	2011	1999	2003	2007	2011	1999	2003	2007	2011
Algeria	...	...	389.4	...	...	...	384.1	...	...	...	407.8	...	...	...	408.4	...
Bahrain	...	385.8	383.3	396.9	...	417.4	415.4	434.7	...	423.9	437.4	430.1	...	452.2	499.5	483.8
Dubai	...	...	395.5	453.7	...	...	410.6	475.3	...	...	436.5	453.5	...	...	448.5	487.1
Egypt	...	415.8	405.5	...	...	415.5	403.8	...	...	432.5	411.1	...	...	432.4	423.3	...
Jordan	413.7	409.0	413.2	394.2	421.1	438.0	436.4	421.2	431.3	460.8	463.6	430.1	451.2	487.8	499.1	472.7
Kuwait	...	...	345.4	...	...	...	364.0	...	...	...	395.5	...	...	...	441.1	...
Lebanon	...	442.0	461.9	464.7	...	435.0	446.3	451.6	...	399..7	425.0	417.9	...	400.3	413.6	413.3
Morocco	345.8	398.7	389.7	377.2	327.9	383.8	378.5	376.7	334.2	407.0	404.4	379.9	315.5	397.2	404.9	382.9
Oman	...	...	350.0	342.4	...	...	402.1	399.3	...	...	396.4	384.7	...	...	455.3	457.4
Palestine	...	392.1	355.7	399.5	...	398.3	388.3	415.2	...	434.7	394.9	414.1	...	445.3	426.6	435.7
Qatar	...	...	279.9	410.5	...	...	317.3	423.3	...	...	274.1	413.8	...	...	332.0	441.7
Saudi Arabia	...	337.8	317.2	384.6	...	324.6	339.4	401.8	...	393.0	383.0	421.9	...	407.3	423.8	449.9
Syria	...	360.9	409.9	386.3	...	354.4	391.1	372.1	...	418.6	464.1	429.9	...	405.4	451.7	421.3
Tunisia	460.5	424.0	434.4	426.6	436.3	399.7	411.8	413.5	442.7	417.4	458.2	441.2	417.3	393.4	437.0	428.1
UAE	...	...	...	442.9	...	...	...	463.2	...	...	...	446.0	...	...	...	475.1

Source: NCES various years (1995–2011 results).

Note: The table presents average scores for the participating Arab countries in various rounds of TIMSS since 1995. The world average for TIMSS scores has been calibrated at 500 in 1995 to allow comparison over time and between countries.

TIMSS: Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.

"...": Not available or not applicable.

3.2 Inequality of opportunity in education

The chance of a most vulnerable girl (has illiterate parents, lives in a rural area, and is in the bottom wealth quintile) ever attending school is only 6 percent in Yemen against 95 percent in Tunisia. Their inequality of opportunity in education varies hugely. This measure refers to the extent to which circumstances beyond children's control determine their educational attainment and achievement. The most important circumstances are family background (parental income and educational attainment) and community characteristics (urban or rural location and the quality of schools). Thus, for example, well-educated parents can use their own resources of time and money to invest more in the human capital of their children. International comparisons indicate, meanwhile, that, in some Arab countries, the inequality of opportunity is at least as great in educational achievement as in attainment.[9]

Ragui Assaad and others provide estimates of the inequality of opportunity in attainment for the seven Arab countries on which harmonized survey data are available.[10] They estimate the extent to which circumstances affect two measures of attainment: a categorical variable that indicates whether a child has ever attended school and a categorical variable that indicates whether, having attended, the child reached secondary school (grade 9 or higher). Both measures display a wide range across countries in the inequality of opportunity in attainment. Thus, Iraq and Yemen are the least opportunity-equal countries, and Jordan and Tunisia are the most opportunity-equal countries (table 3.2). According to the simulations of the authors, all countries considered in the study provide near-perfect chances for children from the most advantaged backgrounds of entering school and reaching secondary level, but only Tunisia comes close to providing the same opportunities for children from the least advantaged backgrounds. In the remaining countries of the study, the probabilities of ever attending school and of reaching secondary school depend significantly on family background.

Table 3.2 Simulated probabilities of 12–17-year-olds attending school and reaching secondary level, by family background

	Ever attending school (%)				Reaching secondary school (%)			
	Most vulnerable		Most advantaged		Most vulnerable		Most advantaged	
	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl	Boy	Girl
Egypt	83	75	100	100	54	43	100	99
Iraq	38	24	100	100	8	3	94	96
Jordan	99	89	100	100	52	46	91	100
Palestine	81	66	100	99	25	31	92	93
Syria	91	79	100	100	17	10	93	96
Tunisia	100	95	100	100	41	30	100	99
Yemen	40	6	100	99	27	4	99	99

Source: Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, and Hendy 2014.

Note: Predicted probabilities of ever entering school and reaching secondary school by synthetic backgrounds of rural, illiterate parents, in lowest wealth quintile (most vulnerable); and urban parents with above secondary education in top wealth quintile (most advantaged). Sample covers children 12–17 years of age who live with their parents.

Unequal access to schooling in Yemen, one of the poorest countries, is not surprising. In such poor countries, access to schools, especially at the secondary level, is generally limited to larger cities and richer families because governments lack the resources to build and run schools more widely. Yet, Iraq's similarity to Yemen is surprising, given that Iraq is an oil-rich nation with a GDP per capita four times higher than that of Yemen, with a sizeable middle class and a mostly urban population. The inequality of opportunity observed in educational attainment in Iraq testifies in part to the effects of years of sanctions and war that have undermined the government's capacity to provide schooling.

Arab countries fail to provide the skills needed for the workforce partly because there are too few school facilities and qualified teachers. In most non-Arab countries, higher education and a university degree generally ensure positive labour market outcomes among the recipients. However, in many parts of the Arab region, already high unemployment rates tend to rise with skill level, and vulnerability to unemployment appears highest among people with secondary educational attainment.[11] This fosters a deep sense of disappointment and discouragement among youth and pushes many young people to hide out in the educational system rather than face a desperate job search.

3.3 A tough school-to-work transition

Joining the labour market

Among world regions, the Arab region has the highest rate of labour force exclusion among young women. More than two thirds of women in Arab countries in the 15–29 age-group are not in the labour force, compared with 20 percent among young Arab men and 50 percent among young women worldwide (annex 2, figure A.7).[12]

Some have attributed women's low labour force participation rate to conservative social norms.[13] Yet, the lower female participation rate is a tragic waste of resources. Well educated women especially represent an untapped potential in the Arab world. The inclusion of women in the workforce would have several positive outcomes, including enhanced productivity, greater visibility of important issues revolving women and the family, and, frequently, the greater impact of women on society more generally. One estimate indicates that the national income of the economies of the Arab Countries could expand by as much as 37 percent if gender gaps were eliminated.[14] Economic participation is a cornerstone of women's empowerment, which should be one of the main targets of human development in the Arab world.[15]

Employment

Job creation, particularly decent and sustainable job creation, is the most challenging issue facing the region. If the workforce continues to grow at current or similar rates, 60 million new jobs will need to be created in the next decade to absorb the large number of workforce entrants.[16]

Informality is one of the characteristics of employment in the region, and a large number of youth work in the informal sector where jobs are unstable and offer low wages and poor working conditions.[17] For instance, over 2000–2005, 75 percent of new labour market entrants in Egypt were employed in the informal sector, a startling jump from only 20 percent in the early 1970s. Similarly, during 2001–2007, 69 percent of new jobs in Syria were in the informal sector.[18] In 2011, vulnerable employment across the Arab region accounted for almost 30 percent of all jobs.[19] The problem is even serious among low-income youth, who are more likely to settle for informal or unpaid family work.[20]

Traditionally, young individuals found their first job in the public sector. In Egypt, for example, the public sector absorbed 70 percent of the workforce in 1980, compared with 16 percent in the informal sector and barely 8 percent in the formal private sector. In 2000, the public sector employed only 23 percent of the workforce, compared with 42 percent in the informal sector and 10 percent in the formal private sector.[21] Even though the preference for public sector employment remains high, few such opportunities now exist except in the GCC and Jordan, which seem to be able to sustain public sector employment (box 3.1; annex 2, table A.6).

Box 3.1 Steffen Hertog Characteristics of the GCC labour market

All GCC labour markets share two fundamental characteristics: private labour markets are dominated by foreigners, and the role of government is outsized in employing nationals.

The main economic causes of GCC labour market segmentation are essentially the same across cases: employer-driven open migration regimes leading to large imports of cheap, low-skilled workers, gaps in labour rights between nationals and foreigners within and across sectors, and generous public employment policies.

Although around 20 percent of nationals typically have a public sector job in developed and developing countries, there are more nationals in the public sector than in the private sector in all GCC countries. Average wages for nationals in government are higher; benefits are better; working hours are shorter, and jobs are more secure.

GCC governments have historically used government employment as the main channel for sharing wealth with their citizens. As states and economies have matured and populations grown, the economic rationale for this form of patronage has become less obvious, while distortions have become more salient. Thus, government employment is rationed in the lower-rent GCC countries (Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia), leading to highly inequitable distribution. This removes national talent from the private sector and parks it in often-idle public sector jobs. It severs the link between local business and the citizenry. It weakens the incentives to acquire an education relevant to the modern economy, and it creates overhead costs and, arguably, weakens the quality of administration. As the GCC's working-age populations continue to grow at 2 percent or more a year, mass government employment is also becoming fiscally unsustainable. The experience of the 1980s and 1990s shows that public salary spending tends to crowd out development spending in austere times because the former is difficult to eliminate. Already, salaries and benefits as a share of total government spending in most GCC countries lie considerably above the global average.

Figure B3.1.1 Distribution of employment by sector and nationality in the GCC



Source: Labour Market Regulatory Authority (Bahrain), Public Authority for Civil Information (Kuwait), Central Bank (Oman), Qatar Statistics Authority, Central Department of Statistics (Saudi Arabia), report team estimates combined with 2005 census data (United Arab Emirates).

At the same time, in combination with low prevalent wages in the private sector, the lure of government employment leads to low labour market participation among nationals. Many young adults are in a state of waithood, remaining on stand-by until they are hired by government instead of actively searching for jobs in the private sector. Labour market participation rates among nationals in the GCC range from 36 to 51 percent, compared with two thirds in advanced economies. The rates are especially low among women, for whom fewer government jobs are available (with the partial exception of Kuwait).

The private sector is characterized by low labour productivity owing to its dependence on low-skilled migrants and the rigid sponsorship system, which undermines labour mobility, thereby weakening the incentives for skill accumulation and efficient matching. In all GCC countries but Oman, labour productivity has declined since 1990 despite rapid economic growth. This pattern is shared by all high-rent countries worldwide that strongly rely on migrant labour. The old distributional model is gradually becoming obsolete, but a new one is not yet available.

Note: Steffen Hertog is professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

High youth unemployment rates are one of the most distinctive features of Arab labour markets. They have been nearly twice as high as the rates in other global regions since the early 1990s (figure 3.2). The ILO estimates that youth unemployment will keep rising, reaching 29.1 percent in the Middle East and 30.7 percent in North Africa by 2019, whereas the peak rate in other world regions will not exceed 18 percent.[22] Moreover, while unemployment rates have surged in, for example, the European Union in recent years, Europe has a functioning social welfare system. In the Arab region, many youth are excluded from work altogether or are engaged in temporary marginal informal activities.[23]

In some Arab countries, unemployment duration exceeds a year for more than half of their youth without work, and fewer than 10 percent find new jobs within a month. Such periods of unemployment among job seekers can have serious consequences beyond income. Extended unemployment causes skills to wither. The damage to health may be as extensive. Psychologists associate unemployment with anxiety, low self-esteem and depression. The longer youth are unemployed, the more detrimental are the effects on health. Long-term joblessness also increases the risk of not reentering the labour force. Employers are less likely to hire candidates who have been jobless for more than six months.[24]

One explanation for the long periods of unemployment is insufficient labour demand. More than 40 percent of youth in some Arab countries believe there are not enough jobs available (annex 2 table A.7). In some countries such as Jordan and Tunisia, the mismatch between job requirements and applicant qualifications is a substantial barrier to finding a decent job.

Personal contacts play a central role in youth's ability to find jobs. Friends and relatives are the dominant resource (more than 70 percent) for youth in Egypt and Palestine, though in Jordan and Tunisia visiting and socializing with potential employers take on increasing importance (annex 2 table A.8).

Among young women, unemployment rates are the highest in the world, almost double the rates among young Arab men, 48 versus 23 percent.[25] Similarly, the ratio of the share of women to the share of men in vulnerable employment in the region is the world's highest (177 percent versus 102 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean countries and 121 percent in sub-Saharan Africa).[26] Women also receive lower wages than men in the Arab region.[27] Adjusted for age, education and experience, the male-female wage gap reached 20 percent in Jordan, 25 percent in Palestine and 35 percent in Egypt in the public sector. The wage gap is far wider in the private sector, reaching 80 percent in Egypt.[28]

Figure 3.2 Youth unemployment rate (% of total labour force ages 15–24, modelled ILO estimate), 1991– 2013



Source: World Bank 2015b.

3.4 Constraints on job creation

Economic growth in the Arab countries over the past 50 years has been accompanied by substantial volatility, a result of reliance on resource extraction and narrow fiscal policies.[29] Arab countries have not incentivized private investment outside oil and gas, sectors that create few jobs. Macroeconomic and political instability discourages potential new market entrants and investment or expansion by established firms.[30] Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which often have the greatest potential for employment growth, are usually the most sensitive to this lack of stability.[31]

The lack of private investment, coupled with the inefficient regulatory capacity of most Arab countries, has stifled the emergence of a competitive private sector capable of creating employment opportunities among today's youth.[32] The structural reforms of the 1990s increased the role of private investment in the economy, but unproductive public investment still dominates. The ratio of private to public investment expanded by nearly half from the 1980s to the 1990s, but still lagged far behind the ratios in OECD countries and East Asia.[33] Private investment is skewed towards new SMEs or large firms. There is limited empirical evidence that SMEs are an important source of jobs or growth, and productivity growth in large firms is small or negative.[34] What investment exists is tilted towards real estate and resource extraction.[35] These investment distortions have held back any real expansion in the region's manufacturing base over the past 20 years.

A key constraint to developing the private sector is access to credit. The relative share of Arab firms reporting difficulties with credit is 39 percent, the second largest in the world, and the share of firms using banks to finance investments is 7 percent, the smallest in the world.[36] These challenges are faced disproportionately by smaller firms.[37] Public banks tend to dominate the banking systems, and they favour large, well-established firms, mirroring the behaviour of private investors.[38]

Another institutional straitjacket is the red tape private firms must deal with in doing business. Some of it is unique to the region, such as export restrictions.[39] Inefficient customs processes are also impediments.[40] Although many business policies are comparable with those elsewhere, Arab governments do not implement them reliably. Existing policies should be enforced rather than rewritten.[41] This is clear in the World Bank's Doing Business indicators, which find that the policy environment in the region is similar to that in East Asia and the Pacific and more substantial than those in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.[42]

Inadequate physical infrastructure (roads, phone networks, and the like) hinders productivity.[43] Investment in infrastructure—measured as capital accumulation per worker—fell during the 1990s and 2000s following structural adjustment.[44]

The variety of political and social institutions across Arab countries is also problematic. Dalia Hakura—using an index of institutional quality that includes quality of bureaucracy, rule of law, government stability and corruption—demonstrates that the weaknesses of Arab political institutions likewise hinder productivity.[45] Some analysts argue that poor institutional quality is the greatest barrier to the development of the private sector.[46]

Labour regulations stymie job growth. First established in the 1960s and 1970s as part of a social contract in Arab countries, they hamper formal firms in responding to economic shifts, thereby discouraging small firms from joining the formal economy.[47] Active labour market policies, including national employment strategies, are also thin on the ground (box 3.2). Those that have been applied have shown little success.

Corruption, too, is holding back job creation. Many large, inefficient and politically connected private and public firms are sheltered from competition and protected by a policy environment remapped in their favour.[48] Thus, rather than investing in new production facilities or productive technologies, firms waste resources on greasing relationships with policymakers.

Many smaller enterprises do not join the formal economy to avoid the bureaucracy and regulation that are particularly onerous for smaller firms. This informality entails heavy costs, however, such as constricting the employment growth potential of Arab countries because informal firms are notably unproductive; worse, informal workers in Arab countries are less productive than their peers elsewhere in the developing world.[49] Nor do people employed in informal enterprises benefit from the protection of labour law, social security, health insurance and other key aspects of decent work.

Box 3.2 Active labour market policies: Promising rather than producing long-term jobs

Using active labour market policies, governments throughout the world have tried to help young job seekers join the labour market. Many of these policies are integrated policies, including training, public works programmes, wage subsidies and employment services. Some are run by the central government alone; others allow a role for the private sector.

During economic crisis, they have been effective, but, in encouraging longer-term private sector job growth, the policies have been largely redundant. During the 2000s, some were funded both locally and internationally, but implemented primarily through government providers. Most were of one of two types. The first relied on employment agencies, often combined with training programmes, such as the National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies, which was funded internationally and functioned as the monopoly provider of active labour market policy services in Morocco. The agency typified these programmes. It faced myriad bottlenecks, including graduating entrepreneurs who had difficulty accessing credit, subsidized job programmes that did not last beyond the subsidized period, vocational programmes that did not teach useful skills, and job placement services that put educated candidates in positions for unskilled workers.

The second involved cash-for-work programmes that had the immediate goal of creating employment, but a secondary goal of transferring skills to programme participants to boost their long-term employability.

National employment strategies supported by active labour market policies require reform. National employment strategies in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Palestine and Tunisia tend to rely heavily on active labour market policy–type approaches, which may help overcome short-term challenges, but are not deliberate policies aimed at job creation and educational reform. A randomized control trial of an active labour market policy in Yemen—the Labour Intensive Works Project—showed the programme to be effective at generating short-term work opportunities for programme participants, but not at generating long-term employability improvements.

While several Arab countries—the five above, plus Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Yemen—have active labour market policies run by NGOs and donors, most of these programmes lack the design features associated with success among similar programmes in other contexts. Thus, they lack coordination between programme implementers and the government; their labour-market training approaches do not reflect international best practices; they are not well designed for less well educated women and men; most lack any formal mechanism for communicating what the individual learned as part of the programme; and few are accompanied by monitoring or evaluation.

Source: The Report team.

3.5 Policies that could help labour markets in the Arab region

Labour market programmes: a palliative, but not much more

Active labour market policies could play an important role in smoothing the transition for youth into the labour market. The related programmes, such as career guidance and matching services, might help mitigate the challenges youth face after they leave the educational system, including offsetting the weak social safety nets for the unemployed and supporting entrepreneurship among youth.[50]

Vocational training programmes are often considered a cost-effective way of addressing youth employment. The differences in youth unemployment rates in Europe between countries with well-developed vocational training systems and countries without these systems are often offered as evidence of the value of the systems.[51] Yet, while apprenticeship programmes have positive impacts on employment outcomes across many types of countries, Van der Sluis, Van Praag, and Vijverberg (2005) conclude, after reviewing the effects, that there is only mild evidence of a positive influence on entrepreneurship.[52] On-the-job training and private rather than public sector programmes appear more effective.[53] However, these conclusions are complicated by the adverse selection bias of these programmes.

Meanwhile, in the Arab world, the evidence is still limited.[54] Recent studies in Morocco find that unemployment rates among individuals participating after graduation in programmes at a vocational training centre are roughly one-half the rates among other graduates (annex 2, figure A.8). Youth who undergo more extensive training are less likely to be unemployed afterwards.[55]

Realizing the benefits that vocational training could have among young workers requires that two obstacles be removed: the apparent limited interest by the international community in supporting these efforts and the stigma associated with vocational training among the Arab public, which views vocational training as less desirable than other educational options.[56] One approach to overcoming these obstacles would be to encourage researchers throughout the region to explore the impacts of and best practices in vocational training. Entrepreneurship programmes such as the ILO's Know about Business often prove to be good potential sources of job creation.[57] These programmes frequently involve coordination with the private sector and focus on providing skills to help young people start businesses. Evidence that they work is scant and hardly reassuring. A recent assessment of entrepreneurship initiatives managed through a vocational training programme in Morocco found no evidence of a positive effect. The initiatives enjoyed only 2–10 percent of the expected uptake.[58] Data of the School to Work Transition Surveys show similar results: only 4 percent of youth entrepreneurs in Jordan and 15 percent in Palestine reported they benefitted from any type of training within the previous 12 months.

Infrastructure: money well spent

Infrastructure investment has the potential to create significant short-term employment among youth. An additional $1 billion in infrastructure investment could create more than 100,000 short-term jobs in labour-intensive enterprises.[59] If properly implemented, the long-term benefits of these programmes would also enhance the quality of public infrastructure, a key challenge facing the Arab countries. In particular, improvements in transport networks, which are often a key focus of these types of interventions, could be particularly beneficial for men and women in rural areas because it would expand their economic opportunities by enhancing their access to markets.[60]

Investment support programmes: money not well spent

Despite the international focus on SMEs as a source of employment growth, access to credit remains tight for SMEs. The estimated financing gap is $2 billion.[61] Few of the products offered by financial institutions meet their needs. Evidence from Lebanon and Morocco shows that, if these products do meet the needs, SMEs willingly borrow.[62]

The past 15 years have seen a rapid expansion in access to microfinance in the Arab world. In 2000–2009, the number of microfinance borrowers in Tunisia rose more than 35-fold (figure 3.3). Yet, despite significant initial optimism, most of these programmes faltered quickly. As of 2009, the only countries with any likely future for microfinance programmes were Tunisia and Yemen.

Labour market integration: the jury's still out

Labour market integration has long been important for the Arab world. Thus, employment in the resource-rich countries of the GCC has been a major source of export revenues (remittances) and jobs for other Arab countries. However, over 1990–2010, the number of migrant workers in the labour-receiving countries of the GCC more than doubled, whereas the share of migrant workers from labour-sending Arab countries fell from nearly half to only a third.[63] Thus, while workers from Arab countries in the GCC countries tend to be more highly skilled, which likely reflects human capital flight from the poorer countries in the region, the number of jobs available to them has not grown as quickly as the number of jobs available to workers from non-Arab countries.[64]

Identifying new approaches for expanding employment opportunities for Arab emigrants within the region has significant potential to ameliorate employment challenges in the poorer countries of the region. Demand- and supply-side programmes are more likely to benefit more mature workers with more experience rather than youth. For example, Mohamed Ali Marouani (2014) explores the impact of liberalization in contract-based employment in labour-receiving countries and argues that such reforms may be more feasible than other labour market reforms because the former are associated with fewer political and socio-cultural costs in host countries and may reduce human capital flight, while providing new opportunities for Arab graduates.[65] Hoekman and Özden (2010) argue that this type of temporary labour movement is mutually desirable for sending and receiving countries.

The business environment needs to be upgraded

Improving the business environment could have a positive effect on labour markets. Arab entrepreneurs continue to face relatively high

Figure 3.3 Growth in access to microfinance



Source: Report team calculations using Mix Market data and SFD Yemen 2011.

regulatory costs in starting and running their businesses, have less intellectual property protection than competitors throughout the world, and encounter significant inequity in how policies are implemented.[66] Loko and Diouf (2009), using data from the Maghreb countries, demonstrate that reforms in the business environment, as well as reforms to attract foreign direct investment and decrease public spending, are important for total factor productivity growth. (Box 3.3 supplies information on some of the challenges facing entrepreneurs in technology start-ups.)

Reforming the business environment will require substantive change in how the economies of Arab countries function. Arab countries continue to make improvements in the domestic business environment. For example, about 20 pro-business reforms were implemented between June 2010 and May 2011; 13 Arab countries made at least one policy change. However, because effective reform will require changing local and international perceptions of the relationships between governments and economic enterprises, it will likely require major political economy shifts. Though some Arab countries, such as those in the GCC, have navigated this challenge, it is not clear that the lessons learned will be transferrable to other countries needing reform.[67]

Box 3.3 Jamil Wyne: Technology entrepreneurs in Arab countries

In a 2013 study of the challenges facing start-ups in the Middle East and North Africa, the Wamda Research Lab surveyed more than 700 companies, nearly half in technology. The study classified technology companies as companies involved in software development and services, e-commerce and online services, gaming, or telecommunications and mobile phone services.

Profile of the entrepreneurs

Technology entrepreneurs tend to be slightly younger, have more access to higher education, have slightly less work or academic experience outside their home countries, work more often with co-founders and are more likely to be men than their non-technology counterparts.

Age: Over half the technology companies surveyed had founders with an average age of around 30 when the company was founded.

Gender: The majority of the technology companies had male founders; only 16 percent of the entrepreneurs were women.

Education: Nearly all the entrepreneurs surveyed had at least a bachelor's degree when they started their company.

Expansion prospects: In the next one or two years, 70 percent of the surveyed entrepreneurs planned to open new offices either in different countries or in countries where they were already operating. Many hoped to expand into Saudi Arabia (26 percent) or the United Arab Emirates (29 percent).

Size: These companies were relatively small, with an average of 15–20 employees.

Challenges: Thirty percent of the entrepreneurs indicated that obtaining investment was a challenge.

Financing: Greater shares of technology companies received better access to important resources such as angel investment (28 percent), incubation (24 percent) and venture capital (17 percent) than the non-technology companies surveyed. However, only 8 percent had obtained some funding from commercial banks.

Suggested improvements to benefit technology start-ups

Increase access to capital: Entrepreneurs pointed to challenges in obtaining investment. A larger pool of capital, comprising different types and sources of funding, could improve the access to finance.

Facilitate market entry: Many companies pointed to challenges in finding partners to help expansion abroad, as well as in general costs and legal hurdles.

Promote inclusion: The representation of women was limited at technology companies. This lack of inclusion suggests that enabling diversity in education and gender could help expand the pool of innovation.

Note: Jamil Wyne is head of the Wamda Research Lab, http://www.wamda.com/.

Endnotes

[1] World Bank 2015b.
[2] For example, see El-Haichour 2005; Valverde and others 1995; World Bank 2008.
[3] UNDP 2003.
[4] Földvári and van Leeuwen 2010; Benaabdelaali, Hanchane, and Kamal 2012.
[5] For example, World Bank 2008.
[6] World Bank 2008.
[7] These tests have been conducted since 1995 with the participation of 13 Arab countries in the 2011 round. Students in the 8th grade are randomly chosen and tested on questions in math and science originating from a common pool but appropriate for the curriculum taught in that country's schools. TIMSS data are an essential source of comparative information on inequality of achievement in the Arab region. Student achievement is described according to the following assessment scales: Advanced International Benchmark (cutpoint score of 625), High International Benchmark (550), Intermediate International Benchmark (475), and Low International Benchmark (400).
[8] Salehi-Isfahani 2012; World Bank 2008.
[9] Salehi-Isfahani 2014.
[10] Assaad, Salehi-Isfahani, and Hendy 2014.
[11] World Bank 2012.
[12] Chaaban 2013.
[13] Clark, Ramsbey, and Adler 1991.
[14] Cuberes and Teignier 2012.
[15] UNDP 2005.
[16] WEF 2012.
[17] Dhillon and others 2009.
[18] European Commission 2010.
[19] ILO 2012b.
[20] Dhillon and others 2009.
[21] UN ESCWA 2014b.
[22] ILO 2015.
[23] Angel-Urdinola and Tanabe 2012.
[24] Ghayad 2013.
[25] World Bank 2015b.
[26] ILO 2012b.
[27] ILO 2012b.
[28] World Bank 2013c.
[29] Chaaban 2013.
[30] James 2009.
[31] World Bank 2008.
[32] World Bank 2009.
[33] Sala-i-Martin and Artadi 2003.
[34] Chaaban 2013; Jelili 2013.
[35] Chaaban 2013.
[36] IMF 2014a.
[37] World Bank 2009.
[38] Ersel and Kandil 2006.
[39] Bhattacharya and Wolde 2010.
[40] Bhattacharya and Wolde 2010.
[41] World Bank 2009.
[42] World Bank 2012.
[43] In Nabli 2007; e.g., Nabli and Véganzonès-Varoudakis 2007.
[44] Nabli and Keller 2002.
[45] Hakura 2004.
[46] Agénor and others 2007.
[47] Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo 2010.

[48] IMF 2014b.
[49] World Bank 2013a.
[50] Angel-Urdinola and Kuddo 2010; ILO 2013.
[51] Ryan 2001.
[52] See also Frick 2006; Rosholm, Nielsen, and Dabalen 2007.
[53] Friedlander, Greenberg, and Robins 1997; Kluve 2006.
[54] Existing analyses of vocational training in the region tend to use duration models to explore the correlates of postgraduation performance, e.g., Montmarquette, Mourji, and Garni 1996.
[55] Boudarbat and Egel 2014.
[56] Masri and Wilkens 2011.
[57] WEF 2011.
[58] Boudarbat and Egel 2014.
[59] Estache and others 2013.
[60] World Bank 2013a.
[61] Stein, Goland, and Schiff 2010.
[62] Nasr and Pearce 2012.
[63] Marouani 2014.
[64] Awad 2007.
[65] These types of labour imports typically provide services such as accounting, construction, engineering, information technology and legal services (Cattaneo and Walkenhorst 2010).
[66] World Bank 2012.
[67] World Bank 2009.

Chapter 4

The new dynamics in the inclusion and empowerment of young women

This chapter assesses the varying degrees to which young women in Arab countries are empowered or disempowered, included or excluded. Setting aside the stereotypes of subordination, it presents a nuanced picture of the changing circumstances of young women today, the struggle against injustice and the triumphs over injustice. The chapter shows how a new generation of young feminists is challenging the considerable barriers creatively and with determination.

4.1 The challenges facing young women in Arab countries

> *" My resignation is a warning to the government and a protest against its inability to evaluate the needs of women. "*
>
> *Nawal Al-Samaraie, tendering her resignation as Minister of Women's Affairs, Iraq*[1]

Various barriers restrict the freedoms of women in areas such as law, politics, education and employment in several countries, where discrimination often occurs in an environment of socially tolerated violence. However, across and within the Arab countries, the reach of injustice can vary sharply.

Legal barriers to equality

Young women across the region face legal barriers to gender equality. Among the Arab countries, the constitutions of 15 explicitly recognize equality between men and women before the law or feature anti-discrimination clauses.[2] Among the Arab states, all but Somalia and Sudan have signed and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. However, Arab signatories have entered so many reservations to the Convention that they have undermined its significance in the region. Indeed, despite the constitutional recognition of equality, most Arab countries have no laws that directly ban gender discrimination. Further, while several constitutions explicitly refer to the state's commitment to protect women against all forms of violence, the commitment is often undone by the penal code, which is usually indulgent towards male perpetrators of crimes of violence against women, notably spousal violence, rape and so-called honour crimes.[3]

Laws on citizenship rights are important for their symbolic and practical significance: they offer insight into the link between gender norms and the construction of national identity. Most laws show glaring differences between men and women in the eligibility for citizenship through marriage or through the birth of children. In 13 Arab countries, laws do not allow foreign spouses to gain citizenship through marriage to women who are citizens, and, in 10 countries, citizenship cannot be assigned to children through mothers only.[4] In some countries, children can gain citizenship through their mothers only in certain cases, for example if the father is unknown or has died or if there has been an irrevocable divorce. Women can apply for passports without the permission of their husbands or guardians in only 12 countries.[5] Many countries require women who are travelling to be accompanied by male guardians.[6]

Although family laws differ, they tend to enshrine gender inequality by limiting women's right to marry, divorce, obtain child custody and inherit. Family law or personal status codes remain a core source of symbolic and material inequality.[7] Personal status codes embody a patriarchal bias that is legitimized by religious institutions and are thus difficult to challenge. The legal basis of the codes in most Arab countries is Muslim Fiqh (jurisprudence), which is supposed to reflect Sharia Law, but, in reality, reflects patriarchal interpretations of Sharia Law. Personal status codes largely codify women's status in terms of male guardianship and authority. This framing of gender relations can sanction domestic violence, as a husband's violence towards his wife can be considered a form of ta'dib (correction or discipline). In some countries, family law conflates rape with adultery or premarital sex so that, if a woman cannot prove rape, she is liable to be tried for zina (fornication).

The past decade has witnessed some improvement in the legal rights of women. In Morocco and Tunisia, personal status codes have been amended to support more egalitarian gender relations, and progressive amendments to laws and codes have been passed recently in Algeria and Bahrain. Moreover, while personal

status codes are a grim indicator of the extent of gender discrimination, they do not necessarily reflect the realities of gender relations or the gains that women are making by manoeuvring within the system, and some are challenging the laws and codes by proposing alternative religious readings and their own visions of equality.

Representation in formal politics

Limited improvements have been made in the past decade on women's electoral rights and political representation.[8] Globally, women account for 22.2 percent of national parliamentarians; the share in the Arab region was only 18.1 percent in 2014.[9] The share of seats held by women in parliamentary bodies across the region was below 4 percent in seven countries: Qatar (0 percent), Yemen (0.3 percent), Oman (1.2 percent), Kuwait (1.5 percent), Egypt (2.0 percent in 2012), Comoros (3.0 percent) and Lebanon (3.1 percent) (annex 2 table A.9).[10]

Quota systems in countries such as Iraq, Jordan and Palestine ensure the presence of women in representative assemblies from municipalities to parliament. After introducing a quota in 2012, Algeria became the first Arab country to surpass the 30 percent target for the parliamentary representation of women put forward in the Beijing Platform for Action and the general recommendations for the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.[11]

Women's presence in parliament does not necessarily signify an improved situation in the political realm, nor has it necessarily contributed to gains in political rights or women's rights in general. Numerical increases belie the complexities and conditions of women's entry into formal politics. In some places, the introduction of quotas has simply led to nepotism so that women relatives of sitting politicians are appointed. Women continue to suffer from unequal treatment and condescending attitudes. Women politicians do not yet enjoy the decision-making power of their male counterparts. In Iraq, for example, no women took part in negotiations to reach a compromise government after the parliamentary elections of 2010, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs is only a state's cabinet with no allocated budget.

Similarly, the inclusion of women in decision-making positions does not always lead to fresh measures to advance equality. Researchers and activists in Iraq and Palestine, for example, have observed that quotas have enabled women in conservative religious parties to enter parliament, where they often support laws and regulations that undermine women's rights.[12]

Figure 4.1 Female and male educational attainment in the Arab region, 1970–2013



Source: World Bank 2015b.

Box 4.1 Aseel Alawadhi: Cancellation of the discriminatory admission policy at Kuwait University

On 25 March 2012, the Administrative Court of Kuwait pronounced a judgement in favour of a female student at Kuwait University that was the first of its kind in the country. The judgement was followed, on 6 June that year, by three similar rulings for the benefit of other students. The judgements prevented the university from refusing to accept women students to certain departments based solely on the university's admission policy.

A group of women students had filed lawsuits against the university for rejecting their applications to the Department of Medicine even though they had scored higher averages than male students who were accepted. The female students had graduated with honours from high school and had finished the first academic year at the Center of Medical Sciences with distinction.

Kuwait University had for many years followed an acceptance policy in certain departments, including medicine, distinguishing between men and women students. Men students were accepted with lower averages than women students.

The court affirmed that the principle of equality is among the general constitutional principles on which the rule of law is based. It indicated that equality, intrinsically, is equal treatment between people in similar situations or positions and unequal treatment between people in different situations or positions. In the opinion of the court, the defendant—the university administrative body—had set the minimum average for acceptance by the Department of Medicine at 2,080 for Kuwaiti males and 3,020 for Kuwaiti females, although the two groups were in the same legal position of having passed the foundation year at the Center of Medical Sciences. Considering this to be in violation of the principle of equality stipulated in Article 29 of the Constitution, the court voided the acceptance policy based on gender discrimination.

Note: Aseel Alawadhi is visiting researcher, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, assistant professor, Kuwait University and former member of Parliament.

Education

Young women's access to education has been improving, as most Arab countries have provided access to public and free education for most girls and boys (figure 4.1). Except for tertiary education, educational attainment among women has been expanding since 1970. Enrollment in primary education in developing regions reached 90 percent in 2010, up from 82 percent in 1999.[13] In 2013, net enrollment among girls in primary education reached nearly 83 percent in the region, against a world average of 88.3 percent. The ratio of female-to-male primary enrollment in the region was 96 percent in 2013, against 98.3 percent worldwide.[14] Literacy rates among adults and youth are rising, and gender gaps are narrowing. In 1990, there were 90 literate young women for every 100 literate young men; by 2010, the ratio had narrowed to 95 women for every 100 men.[15]

The access of young people to education varies by country. In 2011, the number of female children of primary school age who were out of school ranged from 2,500 in Qatar and Syria to 597,200 in Yemen, while, for male children, the corresponding numbers ranged from around 2,200 in Oman and Qatar to 351,750 in Yemen. In some countries, particularly those in the GCC, young women's participation in education is rapidly outpacing men's.[16] Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have the highest female-to-male university enrollment ratios in the world. Even among extremely conservative families, young women's educational achievement is often encouraged and prized.

In situations of conflict or poverty, young women's educational opportunities are greatly reduced. The access to education among young women is less in rural and nomadic communities than in urban areas, owing, in some cases, to transport difficulties.[17] Poverty, conflict and rural residence often have a similar effect on young men's education. However, among women, these factors tend to intersect negatively with the characteristics of women's gender experience, such as the high prevalence of early marriage in Yemen or young women's burdensome caregiving roles when families are disrupted by war, as in Iraq and Syria. Among those women who have access to education, school quality

Figure 4.2 **Gender inequality and economic opportunities**



Source: UNDP 2013; Women's Economic Opportunity Index (WEOI); regional calculations based on EIU data 2012.
Note: The Gender Inequality Index (GII) is rated on a 0–1 scale, where a higher score indicates a more pro-gender stance. Here, GII scores are multiplied by 100 for ease of comparison. The WEOI is rated on a 0–100 scale, whereby higher values indicate better economic opportunities.

is sometimes an issue. For instance, young women's concentration in disciplines typically reserved almost exclusively for women, such as care-giving and certain services, can narrow women's future opportunities by excluding them from better paying employment in supposedly male professional preserves (box 4.1).

Employment

In the past 30 years, the global economic situation has been marked by two interrelated phenomena that have contributed to the feminization of poverty.[18] First is the transition from state-led development to neoliberal economics, which has been accompanied by an international division of labour that is reliant on cheap female labour. Second is the emergence of temporary, part-time, casual home-based jobs, alongside the decline of the welfare state in developing countries.[19] Privatization and restructuring have in many places—notably Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia—led to layoffs that have affected women relatively more than men. Thus, like their peers elsewhere, young women in Arab countries must toil disproportionately to find meaningful, fulfilling and properly remunerated employment, especially in their first jobs after university.

The share of women who work outside the home has risen in all Arab countries in recent years, but especially where women have benefited from government policies that seek to nationalize the labour force and lower unemployment. Women are working mainly in the public sector. In Jordan, for example, 82 percent of women's positions are in the public sector.

Employed women face challenges in the region that are similar to those encountered elsewhere. They are often paid less than men for the same jobs, must carry the double burden of employment and domestic work, and must often struggle to be taken seriously or to acquire decision-making positions in the workplace. Many young women must also face prejudice and harassment at work. No Arab country has legislation prohibiting sexual harassment in the workplace. Young women in Arab countries, like all women, face discrimination in laws on pensions and benefits because men are considered the household breadwinners.

Statistics at a global level show that the higher the rate of gender equality, the more women have access to economic opportunities, that is, the more women are financially independent. In Arab countries, the high rates of gender inequality coincide with a lack of economic opportunities among women (figure 4.2).

Box 4.2 Hibaaq Osman: Girls in conflict

The instability and breakdown in law and order that accompany conflict make girls and young women particularly vulnerable to gender-based violence. The failure to protect them exposes an entire generation to damage, thwarting their dreams and pushing them to rethink their future.

In March 2015, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported that Da'esh subjected Yezidi women in Iraq to sexual violence that may amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity, and that "the promise of sexual access to women and girls has been used in ISIL propaganda materials as part of its recruitment strategy".[1] Girls as young as 6 years of age were raped by captors who viewed them as "spoils of war".[2] They were "inspected . . . to evaluate their beauty" before being enslaved or traded and sold to fighters.[3]

According to UNICEF, sexual violence in conflict is "unbearably common".[4] Such atrocities are perhaps the most acute example of the traumas faced by girls and young women in conflict settings, but there are also chronic risks that are equally significant. Fleeing conflict does not mean young women are safe; displacement still leaves them at great risk of gender-based violence, including rape and forced marriage. UN Women finds that many of the gender-specific problems displaced young Syrian women and girls encounter stem from cultural values that prevent them from leaving the home unescorted. This has a devastating impact on their ability to access basic and specialized services in the midst of a humanitarian crisis, when the cumulative nature of such obstacles has even greater impact. UNICEF finds that the share of Syrian refugee child brides in Jordan increased from 12 percent in 2011 to 32 percent in the first quarter of 2014. Syrian child brides were also significantly more likely than counterparts in the Iraqi, Jordanian and Palestinian communities to marry men 15 or more years older than them. Access to physical and mental health treatment from such trauma in times of conflict is severely limited, while the stigma around sexual violence in the Syrian refugee community makes it a taboo subject among victims, potentially preventing them from reporting incidents or seeking treatment. Such stigma can make access to justice a particular problem in the region.

UNDP has determined that women who are victims of gender-based violence in Libya tend to avoid formal, tribal and traditional justice systems, primarily for fear of being "publically shamed or blamed for the crime".[5] This and the "lack of confidentiality, specialized staff, and physical reporting outlets" mean that gender-based violence is underreported and widespread, creating additional barriers to agencies seeking to address the problem, assess its scale and respond appropriately.[6] In Yemen, before the latest conflict, literacy rates among girls of primary-school age were only 74 percent compared with 96 percent among boys. If young women are to participate fully in the country's future, then too many have already been excluded through lack of educational opportunity. Because of the ongoing conflict, youth displaced by violence now face huge disruptions in their education, and many will encounter barriers that will prevent them from returning to their studies.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 provides an important framework to understand what needs to be done to help young women at times of war and in pre- and post-war scenarios. However, the resolution itself has not prevented these atrocities. The recommendations of women leaders in the region, led by Karama, underscore that international organizations involved in peace processes, such as the United Nations and the League of Arab States, must make such processes inclusive, ensuring that women are adequately represented in at least 30 percent of decision making positions. The women, peace and security agenda should also be given some teeth through the establishment of a mechanism whereby member states can be held accountable if they fail to implement resolution 1325 and related resolutions.

Note: Hibaaq Osman is founder and chief executive officer of Karama, http://www.el-karama.org/.

1. UN News Centre 2015.

2. UNHRC 2015, p. 9.

3. UNHRC 2015, p. 9.

4. UNICEF n.d.

5. UNDP 2015, p. 4.

6. UNDP 2015, p. 5.

Gender-based violence

Gender-based violence affects women across the region. Some forms—such as "honour killings" and female genital mutilation (FGM)—affect young women particularly. The so-called honour killings or femicide affect young women at higher rates than older women. In Jordan, for example, 81 percent of victims are under 30, and the largest subcategory of victims is aged 19–24.[20] The dangerous practice of FGM relates particularly to young women. Although usually carried out during childhood, it is entwined with ideas of sexual propriety and marriage prospects, which affect young women especially. Some Arab countries have set laws on gender-based violence, such as the 2014 law against domestic violence in Lebanon and the 2008 law on the protection against marital violence in Jordan. Draft laws on gender-based violence also exist in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, as well as sexual harassment laws in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.[21] But these laws have yet to be passed, let alone enforced. Physical abuse is generally prohibited by law, but none of the Arab countries explicitly recognizes marital rape as a crime, and special protection against domestic violence is rare. Although repealed in Morocco in 2014, laws that allow rapists to escape punishment if they marry their victim remain on the books in various Arab countries, as in other parts of the world.[22]

All these forms of violence are associated with deprivation, poverty and personal insecurity. Poverty and rural residence usually correlate with FGM.[23] Similarly, among the victims of the so-called honour crimes, most are not only young, but also from impoverished families. A study in Jordan reveals a strong correlation between poverty and "honour crimes" among both victims and perpetrators.[24] The physical and economic insecurity caused by conflict can be a lead determinant in earlier or less-favourable marriages for young women (see chapter 6). Young women in conflict situations suffer from higher rates of gender-based violence. Such rates are usually even higher if the women also belong to a minority or marginalized group. No stratum of society is immune to gender-based violence; however, the ability to seek judicial redress or medical treatment or the opportunity to seek services to escape from gender-based violence depend heavily on a woman's social standing and access to economic resources (box 4.2).

The effects of social and political conservatism

Conservative social and political forces form a rigid, insidious alliance against the empowerment of young women in Arab countries. Their gender discourses are not new in the region, but are now flourishing in unstable times. Their dissemination across borders is being fuelled by new media technologies. Whether religious or secular, they tend to involve a rejection of Westernization and the promotion of an authentic national or regional and often religious culture. As these forces expand their political power base, they more closely police women's movements, behaviour and dress and constrict women's choices. Conservative Islamic parties promote a normative and discriminatory gender ideology, treat women as legal minors and insist that women's bodies must be fully covered.

The patriarchal society is repressive of young women for reasons of both gender and age because it favours not only men, but also maturity and seniority.[25] Because of their use of social media, young women tend to be more globally well connected than older women, but this can lead them to be accused of turning away from the generation of their parents and becoming too Western. Changing fashions in clothing are common in global youth culture, but, in societies in which older women observe strict dress codes, such changes visibly separate young women and help target them for disapproval. Young women's demographic position in a large youth population that is postponing marriage puts their sexuality under particular scrutiny.

4.2 Family, marriage and reproductive rights

Changing family patterns

The Arab family is undergoing significant changes in many countries. In recent decades, patriarchy and family realities have encountered contradictions

Table 4.1 Population and reproductive health indicators for selected Arab countries

Countries	Female population,aged 15–49			Women aged 20–24 who are currently married, %	Total fertility rate	Married women aged 15–49 using contraception, %		Lifetime risk of maternal death (1 in:)
	In million		% change			Any method	Modern method	
	2014	2025	2014–2025					
Egypt	21.3	25.2	18.2	53	2.7	60	58	490
Iraq	8.6	11.7	35.6	53	3.91	51	33	310
Jordan	2.0	2.2	11.2	36	3.12	59	42	470
Lebanon	1.4	1.4	-5.4	19	1.49	58	34	2,100
Libya	1.8	2.0	10.9	15	2.26	42	20	620
Morocco	9.2	9.5	2.6	37	2.71	67	57	400
Palestine[a]	2.4	3.4	43.3	40	6.36	53	40	330
Somalia	1.1	1.5	33.5	60	3.88	15	1	16
Sudan[b]	9.4	12.6	33.4	58	4.28	9	6	31
Syria	5.6	7.5	34.0	42	2.88	47	33	460
Tunisia	3.1	3.1	0.7	14	1.97	63	53	860
Yemen	6.3	8.5	35.8	57	3.83	23	13	90
Regional total[c]	95.9	114.4	19.3	41	3.23	46	40	...

Source: UN DESA 2009, 2013c, 2014; Haub and Caneda 2011; WHO 2012; Iraq Central Organization for Statistics & Information Technology and Kurdistan Regional Statistics Office 2007; PAPFAM 2014.

Note: ... = Data are not available. The total fertility rate is the average number of children a woman would have if current age-specific fertility rates remained constant throughout her childbearing years. Any method includes modern and traditional methods. Traditional methods include periodic abstinence, withdrawal, prolonged breastfeeding and folk methods. Modern methods include sterilization, IUD, the pill, injectable, implant, condom, foam/jelly and diaphragm.

a. Data for Palestine refer to the Arab population of Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

b. Population data refer to what is today Sudan (estimated at 80 percent of the total population of South Sudan and Sudan); other data refer to South Sudan and Sudan (that is, pre-partition).

c. Regional total includes all 22 members of the League of Arab States; those not shown are Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Kuwait, Mauritania, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates.

and challenges linked to economic development, demographic transitions, legal reform and women's increasing educational attainment.[26] Declining fertility rates, changes in the structure of the family, widespread activism over women's rights and a conservative backlash are all signs of the questioning of patriarchy.[27]

Yet, marriage remains an integral institution in Arab societies. As in most countries, government institutions and laws enshrine marriage and reinforce its centrality to the social fabric. Nonetheless, the emergence of a new social group, the singles, is an important feature of the changes in the family. The mean age at first marriage among women has risen: 50 years ago it was around 18; now it is around 25 (annex 2 table A.10). The highest mean is in Libya (31), while Iraq, Palestine and Saudi Arabia are at the other end of the range (20).[28]

The greater educational attainment of young women is one of the main factors explaining the changes in the age of marriage. To pursue their studies, many educated young women are choosing to delay marriage until after graduation. Even in the oil-rich countries known for their conservative gender norms, the rise in the share of young, unmarried women is apparent; the average age of women's marriage in Qatar and United Arab Emirates is 25, but 20 in Saudi Arabia (annex 2 table A.10). The general trend towards delayed marriage is also closely related to the economic crisis and the high levels of unemployment, particularly unemployment among young men because men tend to bear the financial burden of marriage. Establishing a home for a new family is becoming increasingly difficult in the current economic climate.[29]

In most poorer and more rural economies, the age at first marriage has not risen as much as elsewhere.[30] Mean-based comparisons of this indicator in rural and urban settings within countries produce surprisingly small discrepancies. However, studies specifically measuring early marriage (under age 18) reveal that such marriages tend to take place in rural and impoverished settings; conflict and lack of education are also strong determinants.[31]

The legal marriage age is still below 18 years in nearly half the countries in the region (annex 2 table A.11). Moreover, in most countries, a woman needs a *waly* (male guardian) to marry, that is, women are not allowed to marry without the authorization of their father, elder brothers, or uncles. Activism for women's rights has made some encouraging advances. Morocco's reformed Mudawana (family law) in 2004 set the minimum age of marriage among both men and women at 18 years.[32] Jordan's campaign on the issue of marriage age and the reform of the Jordanian family law of 2010 also aimed to raise the marriage age among young women. (Nonetheless, in Jordan, the law still provides judges with the right to evaluate special cases and rule accordingly. The special cases are not defined in the law, and, so, the paradoxical effect of the reform is that a girl can be married at any age).[33]

Reproductive rights and marriage as a norm

The sexual and reproductive health of young men and women is characterized by a lack of access to information; sex education curricula are rare. Health service providers seldom recognize the need of youth for knowledge in this area of health or make youth welcome, particularly if they are not married. Apart from Tunisia, which undertook the most serious effort to establish a national programme to address young people's sexual and reproductive health, such services are limited (Egypt, Morocco and Palestine) or non-existent in most Arab countries.[34]

Precarious forms of marriage are also reported, such as temporary marriages practised under different names. The few studies carried out on these forms of marriage show that they favour men and that women are denied most marital rights.[35]

Four married women of reproductive age in 10 in Arab countries use modern contraception, in contrast with six women in the developing regions as well as globally (table 4.1).[36] Unwanted pregnancies are very common, especially in poorer countries such as Sudan, Somalia and Yemen. These three countries have the lowest contraceptive use (i.e., percentage of married women ages 15–49 using contraception) and account for 77 percent of maternal deaths in the region.[37]

Data on unwanted pregnancies, abortions, sexually transmitted infections and HIV/AIDs are difficult to obtain.[38] Young women's sexuality and childbearing before or outside marriage are generally taboo. The stigma is reflected in how governments approach children born out of wedlock. In some countries, unmarried mothers cannot register their babies, and the children of unmarried parents have limited nationality rights. The actual choices and coping strategies of young women who become pregnant vary greatly depending on their social and legal environment.

Lack of information and access to health care services among poor and uneducated women are the main factors in many unwanted pregnancies. In Morocco, of the 78 percent of married women who would prefer to avoid a pregnancy, 67 percent use contraceptives, and 11 percent do not. These 11 percent have no access to contraception, an unmet need, which is usually more prevalent in the poorest wealth quintiles and among women with less education (annex 2 table A.12).[39]

One particularly harmful consequence of unintended pregnancy is unsafe abortion, especially where women face legal barriers to obtaining a safe abortion, that is, in most Arab countries. Abortion is illegal except to save a woman's life in 13 Arab countries, and abortion is legal to save a woman's life or preserve her physical and mental health in eight.[40] Only in Tunisia is abortion legally available without restriction.[41] According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in the six countries of North Africa alone, nearly 1 million unsafe abortions were performed in 2008.[42] Complications from these abortions accounted for 12 percent of maternal deaths in the subregion. The unavailability of legal abortion puts the weight of the state behind the existing dissonance between later marriage and the taboo on premarital sexual activity. The disconnect is especially notable in countries such as Lebanon and Libya, where the highest marriage ages combine with the strictest positions on abortion.

In the countries where abortion is illegal, seeking one is likely to result in different outcomes depending on who the women are and where they live. Indeed, a young woman's socioeconomic

Box 4.3 Islamic feminism across borders: the Musawah Movement

Musawah (equality) is a global movement for equality and justice in the Muslim family. It was launched in February 2009 at a global meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, and initiated by the Malaysian Muslim feminist group Sisters in Islam. The movement was a transnational response to the equally transnational problem of the use of Islam to resist women's demands for equality. Musawah comprises NGOs, activists, scholars, legal practitioners and policymakers across the globe and approaches gender equality in the Muslim family along three axes: knowledge-building, capacity-building and international advocacy.

Focusing on progressive and feminist interpretations of Islamic texts to counter the male-centric interpretations of Islamic orthodoxy, Musawah highlights the efforts of women to reclaim their right to shape the religious interpretations, norms and laws that affect their lives. Musawah starts from the premise that equality is a founding principle of Islam, and gender equality is therefore in line with Islam, rather than opposed to it. The movement rejects absolutist religious understandings, and it critiques both the way Islam is used as a political ideology and the discrimination against women and the violations of fundamental liberties that often stem from this use. The approach also criticizes notions of feminism—necessarily imported—that have a Western or anti-religious bias.

Musawah has produced a working document, the Framework for Action, which advocates for initiatives based on Islamic sources, international human rights, national laws, constitutional guarantees and the lived realities of women and men and calls for reforms in law and practice. The framework offers the possibility that these various approaches can be in harmony with each other and that women activists can choose how to emphasize these approaches in their advocacy according to specific needs and contexts. The framework has been adopted by Muslim feminists across the world, including those in Arab nations, and has informed their strategies for change. It has been an important tool for countering the rising dominance of conservative interpretations of Islam and the use of these interpretations in politics.

The transnationalism of Musawah is a core of the movement. Bringing together Muslim women from across geographical borders has been important in building solidarity, and women across the world realize that they are not working in isolation, but that they are fighting similar battles. Musawah's transnational ties represent a channel that is important to women activists in sharing information and strategy. Musawah has established an affinity group for young women advocates, the Young Women's Caucus, in which some 30 Muslim women under age 35 are working on issues among young Muslim women and based on the Musawah framework.

Source: Report team.

standing can be as important as whether abortion is legal. Within each country, the level of service provision and class and wealth add an element of differentiation in the choices available to unmarried women. A middle-class woman living in a city where illegal abortion medication is easily purchased may have more choice than an impoverished woman in a rural environment where abortion is legal, but services are geographically and financially inaccessible. While young women seeking to terminate pregnancy in Cairo are likely to seek out drugs that are relatively easy to acquire and safe to use, women in rural areas are likely to rely on other means. In one rural area in Upper Egypt, 92 percent of women who had had an abortion sought the services of a friend, neighbour, or traditional midwife to carry out the procedures.[43]

Negotiating waithood in the parental home

The social and legal treatment of women as dependent individuals within the family as daughters, sisters and then wives produces frictions, especially among unmarried young women whose freedoms are constrained by family members as they grow older and continue to live in the parental home. Social and economic norms that cast men as breadwinners and women as caregivers shape how young women find marriage partners even if the realities are somewhat different for other reasons. The idea that higher education is inappropriate for women, especially if the education would require women to live far from home, is an obstacle in some settings, mainly in lower class and suburban areas.

While certain freedoms during waithood are reduced, others are increased, such as the ability to pursue educational and social activities without the worry of supporting oneself financially. The family is also a key source of emotional and social support for many young women. This can be especially important for young women in migrant or minority groups who experience oppression along lines other than gender. In this case, the family may represent a haven from discrimination in the outside world. The often violent conditions under the Israeli occupation have bolstered a Palestinian (neo-)patriarchy that is highly deleterious to women.[44] However, a study of Palestinian women's birthing experiences in Occupied East Jerusalem shows that husbands and family members are the most important support for young women in difficult times.[45] Embattled situations can strengthen patriarchal society, while also strengthening young women's reliance on and appreciation of family members.

4.3 Young women mobilizing in a globalized world

From feminism to social justice

The political and social mobilization of young women was a conspicuous feature of the recent popular uprisings across the region. Young women not only participated in these protests, but many also took the lead in organizing them. Campaigns and activism have focused primarily on women's rights and gender equality, addressing issues as diverse as legal rights (reforms of the personal status codes and the penal and labour codes), political representation and gender-based violence and harassment. Because gender-specific injustices are closely tied to wider forms of inequality and injustice, it is no surprise that, in much of the mobilization of women, gender-specific and broader issues are addressed together. This has been the case especially among the young women involved in the uprisings who have used the momentum of the protests and transitions and the climate of questioning authority to promote gender justice as an integral element of wider social justice. This was evident, for example, in the International Women's Day gathering in Tahrir Square in 2011, where Egyptian women joined one another to ensure that women's rights issues constituted essential claims within the broader issues being advocated, such as economic justice, freedom of expression and labour rights.

Some of the most powerful feminist mobilizations tackle gender-based violence and denounce the broader structural violence that underpins it. For example, a Palestinian feminist initiative, the Committee for Resisting Women's Killing, has demanded the use of the term qatl al-nisa (femicide) so as to counter the legitimization and justification of these crimes and to respond to the reliance on the term "honour crime" by the Israeli authorities to promote the idea that such violence originates in Palestinian and Arab culture.

Women's activism is diverse and stretches across the spectrum of traditional party-based politics to lobbying, informal activism and alternative cultural initiatives. Historically, movements of women across Arab countries comprise different strands: liberal feminist, reformist, anti-imperialist, nationalist, Marxist, Islamic and Islamist. In a context where much of the population is sensitive to or supportive of Islamist-oriented political projects, Islamic feminist movements have emerged. Groups taking this approach concentrate on the radical transformation of Islamic jurisprudence or otherwise use Islamic arguments to challenge gender inequality (box 4.3). Examples include movements that focus on challenging male guardianship laws or that use religious texts to challenge domestic violence. Many women's rights activists combine religious approaches with an international human rights framework, arguing that the two are compatible; an example is the transnational Musawah movement (box 4.3). Other groups pragmatically shift their focus depending on the issue or the authority they are lobbying. Many initiatives across the region

Box 4.4 An inclusive space: Egypt's Imprint Movement

The Imprint Movement is a voluntary social organization founded by a group of young women and men in Cairo in July 2012 to confront a range of social issues in Egypt, from illiteracy to the plight of street children. It was founded in the context of post-revolution Egypt. Through the revolution, many young people became aware of the oppressive conditions experienced by Egyptians, especially by Egyptian women. This awareness amplified the voices of the women who were speaking out for social justice and refusing to accept gender inequality. These voices were crucial because they broke the silent assumption that sexual harassment is an accepted element of Egyptian society. Nonetheless, a year after the beginning of the Egyptian revolution, many young people were still struggling to find a way to make their voices audible. The Imprint Movement sought to create a safe space that was not divided by political rifts, where people from different backgrounds could work side by side to improve society.

Against this backdrop grew the movement's first project, on sexual harassment. The project's co-founders, having witnessed an increase of oppression and violence against women during the upheaval, started the project in a belief in justice and security for all. The project is based on two fundamental principles: nonviolence and the power of dialogue. It completely rejects the use of physical or verbal violence to combat harassment, believing that the only way to end harassment—itself a phenomenon of violence—is through respectful dialogue. While the emphasis is on learning practical strategies by taking part in the project, Imprint members learn about the power structures that lie behind the phenomenon of sexual harassment, including patriarchy.

In addressing the problem of sexual harassment, the movement agreed on the importance of including men in its work, which came naturally as two of Imprint's co-founders are men. During Egypt's major holidays, when harassment is typically at its worst, Imprint organizes patrols in public spaces, made up of young male volunteers who intervene non-violently to prevent incidents of harassment, to deliver harassers to the police, and to help in filing legal claims against harassers. The patrols also act to promote positive examples of masculinity. They show that there is an alternative, that joining the movement against harassment is cool. The sight of men commanding respect without using violence or harassing women is as a powerful tool for change.

Imprint functions at the grassroots level and through advocacy, transmitting voices from the streets to the government through online media and through face-to-face meetings with officials. The movement relies on teams that work at various levels and aim at different targets, though all have the overarching aim of fighting sexual harassment.

Source: Report team with input from Nihal Saad Zaghloul, co-founder of Imprint.

are pursuing a secular approach across a broad spectrum of political trends.

Obstacles to women's mobilization

One obstacle faced by those mobilizing for gender equality is the suspicion that such groups are often met with. One reason for such suspicion is the history of "state feminism" within the Arab countries. State-building and modernizing efforts in many Arab countries in the 1970s and 1980s led to policies pushing for women's education and entry into the workplace alongside men. Subsequently, in order to consolidate state power, women's unions were incorporated into the ruling parties. As such, feminism continues hold some associated with an authoritarian past, and a lack of independence from the ruling political class. The "NGO-ization"46of the women's movement in the past two decades or so has also fostered suspicion of women's mobilizations. The weighty presence of global funders has helped create a damaging view that feminist groups are "inauthentic" to local culture, or are "agents of the West".

Another major hindrance to women's political organization is the undemocratic character of political regimes that suppress dissent and ban civil society organizations and public gatherings. Women's groups often frame themselves as philanthropic or as community projects to avoid government interference. Another response is to seek refuge on the web to share information and mobilize (see below).

A common pattern is that women's rights activists are sidelined by broader movements. The involvement of young women in uprisings and revolutions has not necessarily led to the inclusion of their demands in post-transition political landscapes. In the Iraqi Kurdish region, young women are often forced to choose between airing their gender concerns among mainstream feminist groups (which do not address their specific position as Kurds) or forgoing such concerns so as to be included in the male-centric struggles for national liberation.[47] The relegation of feminist demands was a feature of the activism of young women in the recent uprisings. Thus, while the protests brought young men and women together in displays of solidarity with the struggles of women, young women can still be marginalized in male-dominated social movements, and many suffered abuse during the demonstrations.

A new political consciousness that transcends divisions

The massive participation of young women alongside men in the demonstrations, which included physical confrontation with security forces, has galvanized and altered political consciousness in the region. Such involvement in new forms of protest and solidarity has inspired a new political image of women in which the wider public, as well as women themselves, recognize young women as important agents of change. Public perceptions were impacted most in cases where the involvement of women in protests represented a dramatic shift in their customary behaviour.[48] Several feminist initiatives that have sprung up in the wake of the 2011 uprisings have been organized on the principles of participatory democracy, leading to grassroots entities characterized by less hierarchy and bureaucracy. These initiatives are re-politicizing the NGO-dominated landscape of women's rights and social justice.

The active involvement of women in the uprisings helped erode divisions within the women's movement and build new alliances in the wider landscape of activism. The mobilization of women in street demonstrations, informal gatherings and online were often characterized by an overarching framework of dignity, which transcended differences among religious and political positions. This feature has been adopted and incorporated into many of the gender-focused groups that have been formed since the uprisings, such as the Cairo-based Harakat Basma (imprint movement) (box 4.4).

New research underlines that various political streams have begun to coalesce under the banner of women's rights. Research conducted on the February 20 Movement in Morocco and mobilizations focusing on the Moroccan family code that hinged on the debate between equality and the complementarity of the sexes represent instances in which feminism not only penetrated the social imagery of a new generation of activists, but also in which many of the young women who are mobilizing for equality are not anti-Islamist or anti-religious.[49] According to many participants in the pro-equality demonstrations, this new generation has a much broader base and is willing to advocate for women's rights and gender equality, regardless of the different religious and political views of its members.

Research on women's rights in Egypt highlights that various initiatives have drawn together young and older activists from diverse backgrounds and span different discourses ranging from human rights to Islamic feminism.[50]

Another feature of contemporary feminists in Arab countries is their willingness to broach new and potentially sensitive topics such as gender norms, sexual choices and the politics of the body. Previously, only a few well-known intellectuals such as Nawal al-Sa'dawi and Fatima Mernissi were prepared to tackle such issues, which most activists felt lay beyond the pale of social, religious and cultural acceptability. But with topics such as sexual harassment, FGM and femicide now openly targeted in recent feminist campaigns, an emerging group of young, urbanized and educated women's rights activists is speaking to these issues more directly.

4.4 Removing the cultural and economic obstacles to women's equality

Although the experiences of young women in Arab countries have much in common, they are greatly affected by different specificities in the various political, legal and economic contexts across countries. The plight of young women in Iraq, Palestine and Syria, for example, is inextricably linked to the conflicts in those countries; war is leading to first-hand experiences of violence and displacement among young women that their counterparts living in relative peace do not face. Many women in the Gulf States, for example, occupy a complex gendered space where wealth and economic privilege, at least among women who are citizens, rather than migrant workers, are confronted by rigid social codes and constraints. These women are free from want and may never experience the violence of war; yet, they live without an elementary freedom of movement, of expression and of association and may have few means to challenge violence in the home.

The struggle against authoritarianism may push women's activism more deeply online, while women elsewhere in the world may have greater opportunities for offline action. The activism of young women varies according to the shape of the particular popular uprising or revolution in Arab countries. This diversity of experience across countries needs to be recognized. Failure to recognize it will favour ignorance of the complex roots, forms and outcomes of the fight of young women in Arab countries for their rights.

The variations in the experiences of young women in each Arab country, especially between rural and urban settings, are significant. Although no group in society is immune to gender-based violence, the violence is often associated with other social and structural deficiencies and tendencies towards marginalization. Among young women in poor rural areas, lack of access to contraception is likely to be compounded by lack of access to safe abortion to end unwanted pregnancies; in contrast, women in cities have a larger range of options. Economic conditions within rural areas also contribute to the greater prevalence of child marriages and gender-based violence, such as FGM.

Nonetheless, within cities, migrant status and race can dictate the obstacles women face. By virtue of her immigrant and indentured status, a migrant domestic worker in the GCC has little room to challenge the pervasive structures that affect her life. Meanwhile, well-educated, non-migrant, urban-dwelling, middle-class young women might have more room to challenge oppressive norms and structures, whether by joining an organization addressing taboo topics or through routine choices about non-traditional lifestyles.

While culture and religion are often central to discussions of women in Arab countries, the impacts of political economy are often neglected. Concepts of culture, stigma and taboo are present in young women's lives, yet these concepts are one part of the picture, not the driving force in inequalities. The negotiations in which young women engage vis-à-vis marriage and the views of their immediate families, for example, are closely related to changing demographics and economic necessity. For women seeking entry into the workforce, the realities and opportunities of the labour market are as crucial as any cultural sanction against women working outside the home.

The problems facing young women in Arab countries are linked to the dominant neoliberal economic model of the last three decades, which has failed to produce jobs or decent livelihoods for many of the young. Indeed, the challenges facing young women in the Arab countries have many parallels with those facing women living in other parts of the global South and some in the global North. Culture and political economy are intertwined. While the former calls for public education, changes in attitudes and religious reform, the latter requires structural change without which it will not be possible for women to achieve sustainable advances.

Young women in Arab countries are anything but passive victims. Women in these countries, as in many other locations, are suffering due to instability and conflict, gender-based violence, exclusion and discrimination in work and education. These problems should not be downplayed. Nonetheless, despite and in reaction to this situation, young women are far from victims of circumstance. Contrary to the mainstream global media depictions of women in Arab countries - which paint the latter as passive, oppressed, and voiceless – these women are negotiating and contesting systems of power in diverse, creative, and transformative ways.

Endnotes

1 IRIN 2009.

2 Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Somalia (Provisional Constitution), Sudan, Syria and Tunisia explicitly enshrine gender equality in their constitutions in some way (although not all of these countries explicitly define and prohibit gender discrimination). Other constitutions—Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Libya's Interim Constitutional Declaration—either make generalized commitments to equality that omit explicit references to sex or gender or make ambiguous statements about women's equality.

3 Only Tunisia and Jordan provide special protection against domestic violence, and none of the Arab countries explicitly recognizes marital rape as a crime. In Saudi Arabia, there is no written penal code; the legal approach is based on Sharia law, which is open to interpretation by individual judges. In Sudan, criminal law, which is based on Sharia law, allows discrimination against women in many contexts.

4 Through marriage to women citizens, true of Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia (applies only to non-Muslim husbands), United Arab Emirates and Yemen. In Qatar, the Qatari Citizenship Act (No. 38 of 2005) allows foreign husbands to apply for citizenship, but there are extensive restrictions. Bahrain, Jordan, Oman, Sudan, Syria and United Arab Emirates do not allow citizenship to be passed from mothers to children. In 2012, United Arab Emirates issued a one-time decree granting citizenship to 1,117 children of women citizens married to foreigners. In Qatar, the Qatari Citizenship Act grants non-citizen children the right to seek citizenship, but subject to extensive restrictions. In Egypt, children of Egyptian mothers and Palestinian fathers cannot obtain citizenship, and the law prohibits such children from joining the army and police forces or taking up certain government posts.

5 This is the case in Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Syria, Sudan (unmarried only) and Tunisia.

6 Legally, women in only 13 Arab countries can travel freely without the permission of husbands or guardians: Algeria, Bahrain (clearly stipulated in the Constitution), Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates.

7 See Moghadam 2004, p. 147. Personal status codes are a primary source of the authority of conservative patriarchal structures and are viewed as the legal basis for religious or cultural norms. This arises because of the origin of the codes in the struggle for national liberation against European colonialism.

8 IPU 2014a.

9 IPU 2014a.

10 IPU 2014a.

11 The Beijing Platform for Action was drafted during the Fourth World Conference on Women organized by the United Nations in Beijing in September 1995 to put forward the goals of equality, development and peace. The Platform supports the diversity of women's voices, the recognition that, despite progress, women suffer because of obstacles to achieving equality with men and that further progress is hindered, especially, by the poverty suffered by so many women and children.

12 Al-Nadawi 2010 (Arabic); Jameel Rashid 2006 (Arabic); Mekki Hamadi 2010 (Arabic); Richter-Devroe 2008.

13 UN 2013a.

14 World Bank 2015b.

15 World Bank 2015b.

16 Ridge 2010.

17 Lewis and Lockheed 2007.

18 This term was coined by Diana Pearce in 1978 in relation to her research in the United States. It has since come into common parlance and used in reference to women's economic position on a global scale.

19 Moghadam 2009.

20 Mansur, Shteiwi, and Murad 2010.

21 CAWTAR 2015 (Arabic).

22 Amnesty International 2014.

23 UNICEF 2013c, p. 20; 37.

24 Mansur, Shteiwi, and Murad 2010.

25 Kandiyoti 1988.

26 Despite common characterization of the 'Arab family,' the realities are more nuanced, meshed with elements such as class, ethnicity, urban/rural residence and the nature of the state.

27 Moghadam 2004.

28 UN-ESCWA 2013a; Moghadam 2004; De Bel-Air 2012.

[29] Obermeyer 2000; Singerman 2007.

[30] Carmichael 2011.

[31] Roudi-Fahimi and Ibrahim 2013; World Vision 2013.

[32] See http://www.hrea.org/programs/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment/moudawana/

[33] SIGI 2014.

[34] Roudi-Fahimi and El Feki 2011.

[35] Roudi-Fahimi and others 2012.

[36] UN 2014.

[37] Roudi-Fahimi and others 2012.

[38] The mobility and displacement associated with conflicts in many Arab countries today are risk factors for sexual transmitted infections.

[39] UNFPA 2013a.

[40] It is illegal except to save a woman's life in Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Oman, Palestine, Somalia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. In some of these countries, it is explicitly allowed by law, while, in others, the allowance is only implied through general legal principles. See also WHO 2011c.

[41] Center for Reproductive Rights 2007; UN 2013b.

[42] WHO 2011c.

[43] Dabash and Roudi-Fahimi 2008, p. 7.

[44] Moghadam 2004.

[45] Shalhoub-Kevorkian 2012.

[46] Al-Ali and Pratt 2011.

[47] AWID 2013.

[48] Salime 2012.

[49] Amar 2011; Singerman 2013.

Chapter 5

Health Status and Access to Health Services

Optimum health and well-being ensures that young people can grow and thrive. Inequities in health care usually stem from social determinants shaped by wealth, resources and power. Yet, in some places, even where services are fully accessible, there are gaps in the quality of services, often for social and economic reasons.

Thus, the biggest challenges in health care may lie outside the field of health in the wider socioeconomic context. Yet, because individual behaviour affects health promotion and disease prevention if the environment is not supportive, governments must improve the health care environment.[1] While giving young people all the facts about how their own decisions impact their health and well-being, governments must encourage young people to make the healthy choice, so that they live longer and healthier lives.[2]

5.1 The health status of youth

> *" Good health is both a driver and a beneficiary of economic growth and development. Ill health is both a consequence and a cause of poverty. "*
>
> *A Million Voices: The World We Want (UN 2013c.)*

Health is rarely a primary objective for any person. Rather it is a resource for everyday living. Health as a resource suggests that the concept has utility in the minds of people and professionals beyond itself.[3] When asked to define health, people usually use terms such as the capacity or ability to engage in various activities, fulfill roles, and meet the demands of daily life.[4] The interactions between health and social conditions are inseparable.

Youth well-being is generally an indicator of future adult well-being. The health of youth is affected by factors beginning with conception; as in turn adult health is affected by youth health.[5] The past decades have witnessed impressive worldwide gains in child health and steep falls in infant and under-5 mortality rates. However, these gains need now to be matched through similar investments in the second and third decades of life.[6]

Challenges to improving health among youth

Understanding youth health and planning for interventions depend on accurate, up-to-date data for monitoring and evaluation. Yet, globally comparable data for measuring the health status, health risks, and protective factors among the 15–29 age-group are in short supply.[7] At least three global surveys provide health-specific data

Box 5.1 Hadeel Abou Soufeh: Disability, access to services and basic rights

As a wheelchair user, Hadeel from Jordan, who survived a car accident at age 11, faces daily obstacles that restrict her mobility and choices. She offers a few examples of these problems, which are shared by many other people with disabilities across the region.

- Lack of physical infrastructure to accommodate her wheelchair; the absence of slopes, elevators and accessible restrooms
- Stereotypes and judgements according to which the disabled are incapable of doing anything unaided
- The looks of superiority, arrogance, or pity
- Lack of specialized transport facilities for persons with physical restrictions
- Lack of parking spaces for wheelchair users; if the spaces do exist, lack of enforcement against people who use them, but do not need them
- Reluctance of private or public institutions to hire people in wheelchairs because of biases about their abilities

The main problem in Jordan is the failure to implement the Law on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, issued in 2007 by virtue of a royal decree, and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

Policies that could help solve these problems include the following:

- Ensuring real integration by adopting and enforcing every article of the Convention
- Developing an annual budget within government programmes and projects and stipulating environmental arrangements to accommodate people with disabilities
- Building and maintaining equipped transport through a special plan of the Ministry of Transportation
- Conducting awareness programmes in schools, universities and the media on the rights of people with disabilities

Note: Hadeel Abou Soufeh was a participant in the report's youth consultative group meeting.

on younger adolescents in the 13–15 age-group, but surveys rarely produce health data on the 16–18 age-group, and none cover the 15–29 age-group (annex 2 table A.13).[8] The gap must be closed.

Health care systems in Arab countries also suffer from insufficient capacity to deal with youth health needs, which is a worldwide pattern.[9] A 2012 review of the history of population health care services that was not limited or necessarily specific to young people indicates that the access to and utilization of health care services remain a great concern, especially for vulnerable groups (box 5.1).[10] Barriers exist and relate to, for example, exclusion of services (dental and mental health care are excluded from the health basket), access (transport issues and remoteness), culture and society (gender, nationality, religion, ethnicity and health literacy), functions (administrative hurdles), the supply side (information technology) and finance (out-of-pocket fees). This is the grim picture for the general public; the situation among youth is likely worse. Thus, for instance, a 2009 UNICEF situational analysis concluded that health services and public awareness and informational campaigns on sexual and reproductive health are targeted only at young married individuals and do not address the needs of the vast majority of young people in the Arab region.[11]

Youth can be powerful catalysts in their own development and in the development of their communities.[12] Youth participation in health promotion efforts helps empower youth to become involved in their own development.[13] Such efforts can be built up through intervention programs that include opportunities for adults and youth to work together equally and meaningfully to enhance the development of youth. The relationships can be controlled by adults or youth, or the control can be shared. Research in Lebanon indicates that young people value relationships with adults and more active engagement and that such engagement has a positive impact on their well-being.[14]

Youth across the Arab region have used their voices to become agents of change in health care. For example, a variety of youth-led initiatives have been developed in the Arab region such as the Y-Peer network, the Arab network for Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights, and the Middle East and North Africa Youth Network of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

The Report team organized two forums with youth from Arab countries in the 18–29 age-group. These young people raised three main concerns over the health status in their respective countries: the deteriorating health status among women, the lack of awareness of health risks and differential health service provision between the public and private sectors (annex 2 table A.14).

The main causes of youth mortality and morbidity

With two exceptions, all Arab countries have succeeded in reducing youth mortality over the past decades (figure 5.1). In Iraq, the rate rose by around 6 per 1,000 population, while, in Syria, it surged almost fourfold. In both cases, the increases may be attributed to the continuing conflicts in the two countries. In the other Mashreq countries, the rates fell, notably, in Lebanon, where the rate dropped in 2012 to almost one ninth the rate in 1990. All

Figure 5.1 Trend in mortality rates per 1,000 population, 15–19 age-group, Arab countries



Source: WHO 2012a.

Maghreb countries saw a reduction in rates, ranging from 4 per 1,000 in Tunisia to around 13 per 1,000 in Morocco. The rates in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar are the lowest in the region and approach the rates in high-income developed countries. Though the rates in the least developed countries are improving, progress is slow, and the rates are still unacceptably high.

In all Mashreq countries, Maghreb countries (except Tunisia), Qatar and the least developed countries in the region, the 25–29 age-group faces a higher burden of mortality, accounting for around 40 percent of all deaths among youth deaths (figure 5.2). By contrast, in Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, more deaths occur among adolescents (15–19 years), while in Bahrain, Oman, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia, more deaths occur in the 20–24 age-group than the other youth age-groups.

The main causes of death among the 15–29 age-group are almost equally divided among diarrhoeal diseases, lower respiratory tract infections and other infectious diseases; cardiovascular diseases; transport injuries; and unintentional injuries (annex 2 table A.15).[15] The main causes of disability-adjusted life years in this age-group are diarrhoeal diseases, lower respiratory tract infections and other infectious diseases; cardiovascular and circulatory diseases; mental and behavioural disorders; musculoskeletal disorders; unintentional injuries; transport injuries; other non-communicable diseases (NCDs); and HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis.

Road traffic injuries and deaths: a plague among more well off young men

Road traffic injuries are the leading cause of death in the 15–29 age-group globally, and about 75 percent of traffic-related mortality occurs among young males.[16] In a comparison across 193 countries, five Arab countries were among the top 25 in the fatality rate associated with road accidents per 100,000 population, and 10 were among the top 25 in fatalities due to road accidents as a share of fatalities from all causes. Four Arab countries were the highest in the world on this indicator: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and United Arab Emirates.[17]

The global burden of morbidity and mortality associated with road traffic events among youth suggest that these have implications for this age-group in Arab countries. The WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region exhibits the second-highest number of road traffic deaths per 100,000 population among WHO world regions, second only to Africa. Globally, road traffic fatality rates are more than two times greater in low-income countries than in high-income countries. In the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, however, this trend is reversed: the rate is 21.7 deaths per 100,000 population in high-income countries in the region versus 8.7 deaths per 100,000 population in high-income countries globally.[18]

The distribution of deaths by type of road user in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region shows that vulnerable road users account for 45 percent

Figure 5.2 Mortality by age category, 15–29 age-group, Arab countries



Source: WHO 2012a.

of fatalities (annex 2 figure A.9). However, in high-income countries, 63 percent of fatalities occur among car occupants.[19] Men account for 75 percent of fatalities associated with road traffic events in the same WHO region, and 63 percent of fatalities occur among the 15–44 age-group.[20]

This does not tell the whole story: it is estimated that there are at least 20 nonfatal road traffic injuries for every road traffic fatality.[21] Thus, in a hospital-based study on road traffic crashes in Libya in 2001–2010, individuals in the 20–29 age-group accounted for the highest share of traffic-related patients; men represented 81 percent of such patients.[22] In Qatar, a hospital-based study in 2006–2010 found that road traffic crashes constituted 42.1 percent of all injuries. Of these, almost half (49.4 percent) were among the 15–29 age-group; and almost 90 percent (87.7 percent) were among men.[23] A national study in Bahrain in 2003–2010 indicated that under-25-year-olds accounted for 40 percent of road traffic fatalities. Within this age-range, death rates were generally higher among 15–19-year-olds and 20–24-year-olds than among other age-groups.[24]

Traffic-safety rules should cover five key areas: seat belts, child restraints, drunk-driving, excessive speed, and motorcycle helmets.[25] Only five Arab countries require all passengers to wear seat belts (Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Saudi Arabia); two have comprehensive speeding laws and child restraint laws (Sudan and Tunisia for the former; Palestine and Saudi Arabia for the latter); seven have comprehensive drunk-driving laws (Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia and United Arab Emirates); and three have comprehensive motorcycle helmet laws (Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia). Enforcement is a problem, however. Only 37 percent of the countries in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region rated the implementation of any of these laws as 'good'.[26] The problem will only grow; car use is accelerating in Arab countries. Between 2009 and 2013, 8 million additional vehicles came onto the roads in the same WHO region. Some NGOs have tried to raise awareness, particularly among youth, and to advocate for policy change and stronger legal enforcement.

Non-communicable disease: an increasing burden

NCDs are the leading cause of global deaths, resulting in two thirds of deaths worldwide in 2008 and 2010; 80 percent of these deaths occurred in low- to middle-income countries.[27] In the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region in 2005, 50 percent of all deaths were due to NCDs, and the regional NCD burden is increasing.[28] In the Arab region, nutrition-related NCDs are the leading cause of NCD deaths, the other risk factors being physical inactivity, tobacco and alcohol use.[29] One-fourth of the adult population in this region is hypertensive and six Arab countries are among the top 10 worldwide for diabetes prevalence. [30] Overweight and obesity are important public health concerns in the Arab region. Data suggest that 20–40 percent of under-18-year-olds are overweight or obese in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (annex 2 figure A.10).[31]

Sexual and reproductive health: a delicate discourse

In Arab countries, sexual and reproductive health among youth is often a sensitive topic surrounded by political and cultural barriers: some countries still have significant proportions of 15–19-year-olds marrying; FGM remains a problem in some countries, and young people are engaging in sexual relations outside marriage or in alternative marriage arrangements, particularly in countries with a higher mean age of marriage.[32]

Arab countries have experienced an overall trend towards delayed marriage, but there are, nonetheless, population groups among which early marriage and childbearing remains common. In Arab countries overall, 15 percent of women in the 20–24 age-group had married prior to age 18. According to the available data, 0–14 percent of girls in Arab countries marry by the age of 15, and from 2 to 34 percent marry by the age of 18.[33] The highest rates of early marriage occur in the least developed countries, Comoros, Mauritania, Sudan and Yemen. A report of the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA 2012a) indicates that two Arab countries (Sudan and Yemen) showed rates of 30 percent or more of women currently aged 20–24 who had married before they were 18. Algeria, Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia show the lowest rates of early marriage among girls in Arab countries on which data are available (figure 5.3). Cultural and traditional values in Arab countries encourage families to have daughters marry before age 18. Girls who marry early are pressured by their families to have children quickly, and they are more likely to have less knowledge about family planning and sexual and reproductive health than their older counterparts; they and their offspring thus face greater health risks. A recent UNICEF report (2014a) provides some hope, indicating that, among all regions, the Middle East and North Africa "Made the fastest progress in reducing child

Figure 5.3 **Share of girls married by the age of 15 and 18, Arab countries**



Source: UNICEF 2014b.

marriage" between 1985 and 2010, halving the share of women married under age 18 from 34 to 18 percent.

There are wide variations in early marriage by educational attainment and rural or urban residence.[34] Across the region, the share of women who married early was 12 percent in urban areas, but 20 percent in rural areas; 17 percent among women with some secondary education, but 54 percent among women with no education; and 7 percent among women in households in the richest quintile versus 25 percent among women in households in the poorest quintile. Recommendations to decrease early marriages focus on changing social and community norms, initially by adopting policies that foster empowerment and enhance opportunities among women.

The adolescent fertility rate—the number of births per 1,000 women aged 15–19 years—in Arab countries ranged from 2.5 in Libya to 110 in Somalia (figure 5.4). Many of these births are a result of early marriage.

FGM is concentrated in seven countries: Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Mauritania, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. However, it may exist in pockets in a few other countries. In the least developed countries, the incidence of FGM among women who have ever been married ranges from 23 percent in Yemen to 98 percent in Somalia. Around 91 percent of such women in Egypt and 8 percent in Iraq were circumcised early in life (annex 2 figure A.11). Most of the cutting occurs between 5 and 14 years of age. The majority of girls have had their genitalia cut and some flesh removed. In nearly all countries, FGM is carried out by traditional healers.

Figure 5.4 **Adolescent fertility rate per 1,000 girls aged 15–19, 2010–2015**



Source: UN DESA 2013c.

While FGM is supported by religious traditions and is socially accepted, the majority of girls and women living in areas where it is practiced believe it should end, though this is so to a lesser extent in Egypt and Somalia.

Little is known about the dynamics of the HIV epidemic in Arab countries because of a belief among the public that the region is immune to the epidemic. The sensitivity of the topic has resulted in denials in almost all Arab countries. HIV prevalence is currently classified as low in the region, despite pockets of high prevalence in almost all countries among key populations at elevated risk of HIV, such as injecting drug users, men who have sex with men and women sex workers. According to United Nations General Assembly Special Session national reports in 2014, around 290,000 cases of HIV were reported in Arab countries through the end of December 2013.[35] The epidemic touches both men and women to varying degrees, ranging from dominance among men in almost all countries on which data are available, except Qatar, where the epidemic touches both sexes equally, as well as Djibouti and Sudan, where the infection is more concentrated among women.

Arab countries can be classified in terms of the HIV epidemic as follows:

- Countries with a generalized epidemic (prevalence >1 percent in the general population): Djibouti and Sudan
- Countries with a concentrated epidemic (prevalence >5 percent in at least one high-risk group and <1 percent in the general population): Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia and Yemen
- Countries with low prevalence (prevalence <5 percent among high-risk groups and <1 percent in the general population): Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria and United Arab Emirates
- Countries in which the magnitude of the epidemic cannot be determined because of a lack of data: Algeria, Comoros and Mauritania

Young people represent a rapidly growing share of the people living with HIV worldwide. In 2013 alone, 670,000 young people in the 15–24 age-group were newly infected with HIV, of whom 250,000 were adolescents between the ages of 15 and 19 years. In Arab countries, it is clear from reported cases that there is an annual expansion of the epidemic. UNAIDS estimates the number of people living with HIV in Arab countries at double or triple the reported figures.[36] In Arab countries on which information is available, the share of adolescents (10–19 age-group) among people living with HIV is estimated to range from 6 percent in Algeria and Tunisia to 8 percent in Sudan.

Access to sexual and reproductive health information and services is limited. Taboos on discussing sexuality and sex, except in a context of formal marriage, often prevent youth from obtaining information and other services.[37] A 2010 survey among 10–29 year-olds in Egypt explored a variety of youth issues, including reproductive health.[38] Only 24 percent of respondents had talked to their parents about pubertal changes; young women (42 percent) had done so more often than young men (7 percent). Almost half (43 percent) of the respondents felt they had not received sufficient information about puberty.

UNICEF reported on the knowledge about HIV/AIDS among older adolescents 15–19 years of age in all world regions. Young women in the Arab region had the lowest rate of knowledge among all young men and young women globally.[39] Research in Arab countries confirm this dearth of knowledge.[40] For example, among 15–20-year-old young men in Saudi Arabia, only 51 percent knew that condoms could prevent sexually transmitted infections.

Differential access to sexual and reproductive health information and services seems to be mostly along lines of gender rather than any other characteristic, and, because social norms discriminate against women, they are at greater risk.[41] Young women in the region are less likely to have information about sex than young men, less able to speak about it or protect themselves, and have less opportunity to access emergency services where and when they need them.

Mental health among youth: a dangerous age

Mental health issues are prevalent in about 20–25 percent of youth populations worldwide.[42] In developed nations, this prevalence has risen drastically: five times as many college students scored high enough on the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory to suggest they had mental health problems in 2007 than in 1938, and rates are higher among young people than among any other age-group.[43] In Oman, a 2006 study by Afifi and colleagues found that rates of depressive symptoms among 14–20-year-old students were higher among girls (19.4 percent) than boys (14.7 percent) and range between 7.0 percent and 19.0 percent. As part of the World Mental Health Survey, Oman carried out a survey in secondary schools in 2005.[44] Mental health

protective factors included being male and younger, having a good relationship with social contacts and sleeping 7–8 hours each night. Risk factors included abuse by parents, older age, being female, failing a year at school, a history of organic illness and a history of mental illness.

Based on burden-of-disease data for 2000, an analysis of patterns of suicide among people aged 15 or above in the countries of the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region suggested that the peak age for suicide among women is 15–29 years (8.6 per 100,000) and that suicide accounted for 20 percent of all deaths due to injuries among women in this age-group.[45] Suicide rates among women and men were lowest in high-income countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates). Official statistics are likely to underreport actual rates, given sociocultural and religious taboos; likewise, mental conditions are underreported because of the attached stigma.[46]

5.2 Risk and protective factors

Risk factors: Tobacco and substance abuse [47]

In the Arab world, the tobacco epidemic is characterized by high cigarette use among men; water-pipe use, particularly among youth and women and lax policy enforcement.[48] Tobacco use is estimated to kill 6 million people each year worldwide, a global figure expected to rise to 8 million by 2030; 80 percent of these deaths occur in low- and middle-income countries.[49]

The Global Youth Tobacco Survey has been conducted in all Arab countries.[50] Survey results indicate that the share of 13–15-year-olds who have ever smoked cigarettes ranges from 7.4 percent in Iraq to 35.4 percent in the West Bank. These rates are alarming at this young age, but, in most Arab countries in which the survey has been carried out more than once, decreasing prevalence rates have been found, suggesting that interventions against cigarette use have been successful.

Similarly, the Global Health Professions student survey assessed tobacco use among university students studying nursing, medicine, pharmacy, or dentistry. Data on third-year medical students across 48 countries (including eight Arab countries) over 2005–2008 indicated relatively high use.[51] Current smoking among the students ranged from 12.9 percent among men in Egypt to 39.1 percent among men in Palestine. Prevalence rates were lower among women, from 1.2 percent in Egypt to 16 percent in Lebanon. Other surveys of university students across the Arab world indicate current prevalence rates of cigarette smoking of 29 percent in Irbid, Jordan; 14.5 percent in Riyadh and 11.7 percent in Jazan region, Saudi Arabia; 21 percent among medical students in Baghdad, Iraq; and 9.4 percent in Sharjah, United Arab Emirates.[52] Determinants of the use of cigarettes among people from Arab countries are similar to those globally and include gender (men are more likely to smoke); having friends, parents, or siblings who smoke, and having less knowledge of the harmful effects of smoking.

In the Arab region, water-pipe tobacco smoking is another predominant youth behaviour. Youth rates of the use of this method exceed adult rates in almost every study conducted.[53] Global statistics on high school and university students who are now or who have ever used this method reveal alarming levels, often surpassing rates of cigarette use.[54] Water-pipes are not a safe alternative to cigarettes: the toxicant yields and health effects are equal to or worse than those associated with cigarettes.[55] Determinants are similar to those of cigarette use, including the social and policy environment.[56]

Most Arab countries are taking part in the global fight against tobacco use, but are lax in enforcing rules. Thus, although Jordan and Qatar ban smoking in all public places, public tobacco use remains common.[57] In 2003, the first-ever global health treaty came into force, with 168 signatory countries. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control sets out evidence-based strategies to control and prevent tobacco use.[58] Though not specific to youth, these strategies can have an impact on youth smoking.[59] The Convention includes price and tax measures to reduce the demand for tobacco, as well as non-price measures to reduce demand and protect from the harm of tobacco such as protecting others

from exposure to tobacco smoke, regulating the contents of tobacco products and tobacco-product disclosure, making packaging and labelling of tobacco products unattractive and pointing out the dangers of tobacco use, and restricting tobacco advertising. Of the 22 countries of the Arab League, 20 are parties to the Convention (Morocco and Somalia are not).[60]

Abuse of alcohol is the third-largest risk factor behind disease and disability, contributing more than 60 types of NCDs and other diseases.[61] It is a concern among youth because of the high prevalence rates of abuse and the younger ages of initiation to alcohol use in some countries.[62] The religious stigma against alcohol consumption ensures there is a dearth of data in most Arab countries, despite anecdotal information on prevalence rates and data on per capita consumption.[63] Although the Global School–based Student Health Survey was conducted in 16 countries in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, surveys in only three (Lebanon, Morocco and Syria) included questions on alcohol use.[64] A recent review of alcohol harm reduction and control policies in Arab countries indicated that comprehensive policies are all but absent, largely because of cultural and religious reasons.[65]

The information available on illicit drug use among youth in the region is limited. Epidemiologic trends suggest that age at first use is decreasing, and that cannabis is the substance most used among young persons in the 15–25 age-group.[66] The 2012 Atlas on Substance Use in the same WHO region indicates that Bahrain, Sudan and Syria have no data on illicit drug use among youth. In Iraq in 2011, 322 young men and 106 young women under age 17 were among the registered patients with drug or alcohol use problems. In Egypt in 2009, 18.9 percent of 15-year-olds were reported to have used cannabis. In Morocco in 2009, the share of 15–17-year-olds who had ever used cannabis was estimated at 6.6 percent, and, in 2010, the share of those in the same age-group who had used cannabis at least once in the previous year was estimated at 4.6 percent. Of 13–15-year-olds in Morocco in 2010 who had ever used drugs, 84 percent had used them for the first time before age 14. In Oman in 2012, there had been an increasing trend towards substance use among young people during the previous five years. In Saudi Arabia in 2010, medical students perceived alcohol and drug problems to be common among young adult men. In Tunisia in 2008, 3.8 percent of 13–15-year-old students had used drugs at least once.

Other studies indicate that, in Egypt, the most abused drugs are hashish, stimulants, tranquilizers, hypnotics, and opium. Male university students are more likely to use these substances than females except for tranquilizers and hypnotics, for which rates of use are similar.[67] Secondary-school students are most likely to use hashish; the main reason for the use is entertainment and socializing with friends. Sedatives and hypnotics are the second most widely used substances, to help cope with psychosocial problems or if tired or studying for examinations.[68] In Bahrain, the risk factors involved in overdose among young people include family problems, relationship problems with the opposite sex, unemployment and problems with school performance.[69] In Lebanon, 10 percent of university students have tried tranquilizers at least once, 8 percent barbiturates, and 4 percent marijuana; women are more likely to have tried the first two, and men the last.[70] Considering the size of the problem, there is little research on the prevalence or the determinants of drug use and abuse among young people.

Protective factors: positive behaviours, experiences and characteristics

A variety of behaviours and systems operate to protect young people from health risks, though hard data are scarce. A common conceptualization of youth protective factors is seen in the Search Institute's 40 Developmental Assets for Adolescents, 20 internal and 20 external.[71] Internal assets are "Characteristics and behaviours that reflect positive personal and psychological development in young people" and include the themes of commitment to learning, positive values, social competencies and positive identity. External assets are "Positive experiences, relationships, and encouragement and support young people receive from peers, parents, teachers, neighbours, and other adults in the community" and include support, empowerment, boundaries and expectations, and constructive use of time.

Global data provide evidence of the power of these assets in protecting young people from risks such as tobacco use, violence and early sexual behaviour and in enhancing thriving outcomes such as success in school.[72] Research in Lebanon has found that internal and external assets are negatively associated with tobacco use, involvement in violence and victimization in bullying, and positively associated with self-rated health, school achievement and the relationship with the mother and father.[73]

5.3 Inequities in young people's health

Health status, risk factors and protective factors among youth often show serious inequities within and across countries. These inequities frequently stem from the social, economic and political circumstances that create unhealthy environments. The landmark document "Closing the Gap in a Generation: Health Equity through Action on the Social Determinants of Health," published by the WHO Commission on the Social Determinants of Health, places social determinants of health squarely on the global agenda as the main drivers of population health and well-being (see below).[74] WHO defined these determinants as follows:

The conditions in which people are born, grow, live, work and age. These circumstances are shaped by the distribution of money, power and resources at global, national, and local levels.[75]

The social inequities lead to different outcomes in well-being and health, including morbidity and mortality. These differences are unjust and nearly always preventable.

As a country's GDP rises, rates of infant mortality, under-5 mortality, and maternal mortality fall, whereas rates of life expectancy at birth and healthy life expectancy rise. For individuals, the results in the Arab world generally confirm the international literature on the links between social determinants (such as wealth, education, rural or urban residence and gender) and health (such as live births, stunting, anæmia and chronic disease).[76] While some of the health outcomes are specific to children, and others specific to adults (included those aged 15 and over), the links have not been measured specifically for adolescents and youth.

However, some interesting analysis on the connection between structural determinants (neighbourhood variables) and health has been conducted in Egypt (respondents aged 22 and above). Body mass index varied by neighbourhoods in Cairo and was negatively associated with the neighbourhood's educational attainment—measured as the share of households including respondents who had more than secondary- school educational attainment—even if other socio-demographic, economic, health and environmental factors were considered.[77]

A report published in Lancet provides evidence on the impact of social determinants on adolescent health (the 10–24 age-group).[78] Drawing on multiple analyses, the report indicates that structural conditions such as GDP and income inequality within a country are tied to health outcomes such as all-cause mortality among young men aged 15–19, as well as birth rates among young women aged 15–19. The birth rate data cover 14 countries of the Arab League; most have higher GDPs, replicating the patterns in the other countries on this link.

Youth in poorer Arab countries exhibit worse health outcomes than youth in richer Arab countries. Data compiled on health-adjusted life expectancy and mortality rates among three age-groups (15–19, 20–24 and 25–29) per 100,000 population in all Arab League countries confirm the findings in the international literature, revealing increasing gradients of inequity among the 15–29 age-group (figures 5.5 and 5.6). The pattern was the same overall and across both genders: youth in low-income countries show worse outcomes than youth in lower-middle-income countries, who exhibit worse outcomes than youth in middle-income countries, and so on through upper-middle-income countries and upper-income countries. These variations accounted, in 2010, for a difference of 10 years in health-adjusted life expectancy across young people in the three age-groups in low-income countries and upper-income countries and a fivefold increase in the mortality rates in lower-income countries relative to the rates in upper-income countries overall and in each age-group. As one climbs the income ranks, health-adjusted life expectancy rose and mortality rates per 100,000 population declined within countries in an almost perfect dose-response relationship.

Among men in the 20–24 age-group, inequities widened over 1990–2010 between the poorest Arab countries and countries in every other category of income (figures 5.7 and 5.8). While health-adjusted life expectancy increased and death rates decreased in lower-middle-income countries, upper-middle-income countries and upper-income countries, health-adjusted life expectancy declined and death rates rose in low-income countries.

Figure 5.5 Healthy life expectancy, 15–29-year-olds, by income group, 2010 (unweighted average)



Source: GBD 2010.

Note: Based on World Bank country income groupings in 2014. LIC = low-income country. LMIC = lower-middle-income country. UMIC = upper-middle-income country. UIC = upper-income country.

Figure 5.6 Mortality rate per 100,000 population, 15–29-year-olds, by income group, 2010 (unweighted average)



Source: GBD 2010.

Note: Based on World Bank country income groupings in 2014. LIC = low-income country. LMIC = lower-middle-income country. UMIC = upper-middle-income country. UIC = upper-income country.

Figure 5.7 Health-adjusted life expectancy, men aged 20–24, by income group, 1990 and 2010 (unweighted average)



Source: GBD 2010.

Note: Based on World Bank country income groupings in 2014. LIC = low-income country. LMIC = lower-middle-income country. UMIC = upper-middle-income country. UIC = upper-income country.

Figure 5.8 **Mortality rate per 100,000 population, men aged 20–24, by income group, Arab region, 1990 and 2010**



Source: GBD 2010.

Note: Based on World Bank country income groupings in 2014. LIC = low-income country. LMIC = lower-middle-income country. UMIC = upper-middle-income country. UIC = upper-income country.

Within the same gender norms, disparities are evident by income and location of residence (figure 5.9). The gap in coverage in deliveries assisted by skilled birth personnel between the poorest and richest population segments is highest in Egypt, Sudan and Yemen. The gap is also evident in the share of deliveries assisted by skilled personnel between rural and urban residents. This gap is highest in Djibouti and Sudan. Similar disparities were reported in antenatal care coverage and contraceptive prevalence between poorest and richest and between rural and the urban (figure 5.9).

Figure 5.9 **Disparities in assistance by skilled personnel at childbirth, Arab countries**



Source: UNICEF 2011c.

5.4 Health interventions to promote well-being: adolescent and youth friendly health services

Adolescent and youth friendly health services, though initially focused on sexual and reproductive health services, have since expanded to cover many more areas, in great part because of feedback from youth explaining what they need (box 5.2).[79]

In the region, adolescent and youth friendly health services have been implemented in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Morocco. Process evaluations have been carried out on most of these services, but no known impact evaluations have been conducted.[80] In all but Iraq and Lebanon, the services focus on youth sexual and reproductive health. Estimates based on global data indicate that the scaling-up of essential services in this service group in 74 low- and middle-income countries, including eight in the Arab League, had required additional annual per capita spending of $0.82 by 2015.[81] This is financially efficient in view of the cost of treatment and rehabilitation among adolescents now and, in the future, owing to the health problems avoided because these adolescents do not undertake risky behaviours following their experience with the services.

In Egypt, the services have shown mixed results. They have not been implemented in a comprehensive manner, and gaps exist. Interviews conducted in Egypt in 2013 with physicians, nurses and social workers in 10 clinics affiliated with the Ministry of Health and Population or managed by NGOs and supplying these services, as well as with two young anonymous clients (one young man and one young woman), indicated that young patients could not locate the clinics especially when they were in a hospital hosting such a clinic "Because there were no signs and,

Box 5.2 Domains and delivery of adolescent and youth friendly health services

The five aims targeted by adolescent and youth friendly health services are equity, effectiveness, accessibility, acceptability, and appropriateness of care, but many barriers—economic, social and religious—prevent young people from using the services, according to a 2007 review.[1] Modes of delivery are varied and encompass delivery through inpatient units for young people, community-based primary health care centres, school or university health services, general community centres, pharmacies and outreach.

The 2007 review, which examined studies worldwide (including in developing countries) to gather information on the effectiveness of these services in any delivery mode, showed that the services tended to enhance access to care, reduce health risk behaviours (although only four studies investigated this issue, three of which were on sexual behaviour), and improve provider performance after training.[2] The review suggested that, although the evidence was promising and although high-order principles such as the fulfillment of human rights compel one to promote such services, more robust evidence was needed on service impact.[3]

Still, the review recommended that "each country, state, and locality has a policy and support to encourage provision of innovative well assessed youth-friendly services."[4] Because no impact studies have been published in the meantime, it is impossible to determine how much the recommendation has been followed.

1. Ambresin and others 2013; Tylee and others 2007.

2. Tylee and others 2007.

3. Tylee and others 2007, 1567.

4. Tylee and others 2007, 1572.

in some instances, staff members at the hospital were not aware of the presence of the clinics."[82] Moreover, the physicians were often absent, and patients had to return several times to receive professional care.[83]

Most of the providers in Egypt had not had training in youth sexual and reproductive health. No clear guidelines on youth triage had been drafted, nor were there referral guidelines. The interviews with providers suggested that the services might not be acceptable to young people because few of the providers believed in the importance of supplying services to youth regardless of marital status, although they were more likely to supply the services in any case to young men than to young women, indicating possible inequities.[84] This gender bias was reflected in the experiences of the anonymous patients. The providers spent much more time with the young man and answered his questions, while the young woman reported that she felt insulted by their treatment.[85] Privacy was breached in many clinics. Providers stated that the clinics were underused partially because parents discouraged young household members from relying on the services, although the experience of one NGO was positive after parents had participated in awareness sessions.

The results of the report echo those of a previous report by Family Health International 360 that was conducted six years earlier.[86] However, a 2014 Population Reference Bureau report based on a much larger number of interviews with youth after the youth had visited adolescent and youth friendly health services in Egypt in 2010 and 2011 indicated overall satisfaction with the assistance of the clinics.[87] Among the youth, 74 percent described their discussions with the providers as good, and 80 percent said the privacy and confidentiality measures were good. Over 90 percent stated they would return to the clinics. The report identified the same barriers as above on provider attitudes and gender differences. It found that the services did not meet many of the needs expressed by youth, such as mobile clinics, educational programmes targeted at specific age-groups and according to gender, outreach services, and training courses on how to tackle major risk factors.

In sexual and reproductive health care, three main strategies are recommended to enhance outcomes among youth: clinical services that are accessible and of high quality, evidence-based and developmentally appropriate sexual education programmes, and life-skills building programmes.[88]

A primary intervention that enhances health among youth is universal health care coverage. According to WHO, universal health care coverage ensures that all people have access to "Promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that people do not suffer financial hardship when paying for these services."[89] The commitment to universal health care coverage is substantial in the Arab region, but barriers remain in several countries, including high out-of-pocket fees, the poor quality of care, the shortage of trained health care professionals, lack of access to essential medications and technologies, and deficiencies in health information systems.

WHO has developed the 4S strategy to strengthen the response of health care systems to issues in adolescent health and development.[90] The 4Ss are (1) gathering and using strategic information, (2) developing supportive evidence-based policies, (3) scaling up the provision of health care services and products, and (4) strengthening other sectors. Elements of all four should be evident in adolescent and youth friendly health services and universal health care coverage. A 2009 report on missed opportunities in the provision of adolescent health services noted these sorts of factors that need to be considered in undertaking interventions to enhance youth health and well-being, as follows:[91]

- **Timing:** many risk behaviours are initiated in adolescence, and this stage of life is thus critical in health promotion.
- **Need:** the needs of adolescents are different from the needs of other population groups. Within the age-group of adolescents, some segments exhibit health needs that require particular attention (diabetes, sexual behaviour and so on).
- **Context:** social, cultural, economic and geographic contexts affect access to services as well as health care needs.
- **Participation:** health care services aimed at adolescents must engage adolescents actively and, if possible, engage their families as well.
- **Family:** families, especially parents, are critical because of their influence in health care and access to health care services of youth.
- **Community:** the communities in which adolescents live have an impact on the health of adolescents because they provide social support.
- **Skills:** health care providers must be equipped with the skills they require to engage with young people.

- **Money:** the services available to young people and the quality of these services depend on financial factors.
- **Policy:** "Policies, both public and private, can have a profound effect on adolescent health services. Carefully crafted policies are a foundation for strong systems of care that meet a wide variety of individual and community needs."[92]

Interventions that are aimed at enhancing youth well-being and that tackle the social and structural determinants of health, promote healthy social and physical environments, and decrease inequities are the most effective. A systematic review that used an equity lens on health interventions found that upstream interventions that attempt to minimize, control, or prevent upstream policy and social determinants were more likely to reduce inequities in health, whereas downstream interventions that focus on the individual were more likely to foster inequities and even make them worse.[93] The barriers to access to health care services in the Arab world, as in other regions, are often exacerbated among marginalized or vulnerable groups, including adolescents and youth.[94]

O'Neill and others (2014) apply the acronym PROGRESS (place of residence; race, ethnicity, culture and language; occupation; gender and sex; religion; education and socioeconomic status; and social capital) to represent interventions that embody an equity lens in their efforts to minimize barriers to access among vulnerable groups. They find that the mere availability of an intervention in a particular context does not guarantee that inequities in health care will be reduced; rather, the interventions must be accessible, acceptable, and effective among the most disadvantaged groups within a population and used by these groups.[95] Does the intervention disadvantage rural residents or young people who are out of school? Several additional categories have been added to the PROGRESS tool, which is then labelled PROGRESS Plus.[96] These include personal characteristics that put people at a disadvantage (such as a disability), relationships (exclusion from school), and time-dependent issues (such as respite care).[97] The tool should help governments and others to ensure that all interventions in the Arab region promote youth health and well-being by being designed, implemented and evaluated with an eye to equity and coverage even among the hardest to reach.

5.5 Current non–health sector interventions: from health for all to health in all policies

Interventions that are limited to the health care system will not be sufficient alone to promote youth well-being.[98] The health in all policies approach, which has been finding adherents in the last decade, is a collaborative approach to improve the health of all people by incorporating health considerations into decision making across sectors and policy areas.[99] The approach essentially requires that policy makers should be informed about and consider the impact of various policy options on health, sustainability and equity. One example is linked to a risk factor among youth, obesity. Policy strategies to curb the obesity epidemic will need to incorporate ministries and other entities involved in transport, planning, agriculture, economics and education. In Arab countries, the approach is beginning to be discussed.[100] Though not targeted specifically at health among youth, the approach can be used to ensure that policies have a positive impact on health among youth.

Another approach not specifically oriented to health involves the development of national youth policies. Such policies represent a declaration of a government's position towards youth issues. Ten Arab countries have developed or are drafting youth policies.[101]

Other key interventions include positive youth development programmes, which are aimed at building skills and strengthening the social environment among youth. According to the approach, young people are assets in their own and their community's development. A typical slogan of the programmes is 'problem-free

is not fully prepared.' Effective programmes share several axes. Thus, they "Strengthen social, emotional, cognitive and/or behavioural competencies, self-efficacy, and family and community standards for healthy social and personal behaviour; target healthy bonds between youth and adults; increase opportunities for youth participation in positive social activities; and recognize and reinforce that participation."[102]

Research into the impact of the programmes on individuals and on the schools, families and community-based organizations involved in the programmes has found that programme outcomes among individuals include positive reproductive and sexual health outcomes that extend into adulthood, as well as social and educational outcomes such as greater school success.[103]

5.6 Looking to the future

Non-communicable diseases

The global NCD strategy outlines key NCD prevention and control interventions with six objectives, including the following:[104]

- Raising the priority accorded to NCD prevention and control in global, regional and national agendas and internationally agreed development goals through strengthened international cooperation and advocacy
- Strengthening national capacity, leadership, governance, multisectoral action and partnerships to accelerate country responses for NCD prevention and control
- Reducing modifiable NCD risk factors and underlying social determinants by creating health-promoting environments
- Strengthening and orienting health systems to address NCD prevention and control and the underlying social determinants through people-centred primary health care and universal health coverage
- Promoting and supporting national capacities for high-quality research and development for NCD prevention and control
- Monitoring NCD trends and determinants and evaluating the progress in NCD prevention and control

The WHO Eastern Mediterranean Regional Office has developed a plan that identifies NCD actions that should be taken by member states, by WHO and by regional and international partners. The plan provides guidelines to reduce NCD prevalence and incidence among all population groups. At the first global ministerial conference on healthy lifestyles and NCD control, WHO also identified a set of best buys for the control and prevention of NCD risk factors, as follows:[105]

Tobacco use

- Raise taxes on tobacco.
- Protect people from tobacco smoke.
- Warn about the dangers of tobacco.
- Enforce bans on tobacco advertising.

Unhealthy diet and physical inactivity

- Reduce salt intake by reducing salt in food.
- Replace trans fat with polyunsaturated fat.
- Promote public awareness about diet and physical activity (through mass media).

School- or university-based interventions

Interventions that are based on protective factors and assets and that involve a focus on positive development should be designed and incorporated into the youth programmes and policies of relevant agencies and ministries in the region. Many of these interventions would be carried out through schools. Such interventions will have little effect unless they focus on skills and unless they are paired with other interventions. In view of the lack of programme evaluation in the Arab region, the evidence for this assertion comes from programmes around the world on tobacco abuse, bullying, drugs and obesity.[106] A school approach is appropriate for sexual and reproductive health, although, in this area, cultural stigma and taboo are barriers to access to information.

Regional cooperation is crucial to ensuring that health and non-health interventions are successful. Although the analysis in this chapter identifies policies that each country can implement, success will be enhanced if countries apply the policies comprehensively and if groups of countries adopt similar policies. Tobacco shows why: before 2006, Jordan and Syria had bans on advertising in tobacco products, although Lebanon did not. Because they received satellite television transmissions from Lebanon, the impact of the bans in Jordan and Syria was largely nullified.[107]

Endnotes

1 WHO defines health promotion as the "process of enabling people to increase control over, and to improve, their health" by building public health policy, reorienting health services, creating supportive environments, strengthening community action, and developing personal skills. WHO, The Ottowa Charter for Health Promotion, http://www.who.int/healthpromotion/conferences/previous/ottawa/en/index1.html.

2 WHO 1986.

3 A variety of conceptual frameworks have been developed to explain the influences on youth health (Afifi and others 2012; Blum and others 2014; Sawyer and others 2012; WHO 2010c). All highlight the interplay of a range of determinants at different levels on health (Richard, Gauvin, and Raine 2011), from the biological to the individual to the social and to the political (Halfon and others 2014). The political may be least obvious, but includes global health, trade and economic policies (Bettcher, Yach, and Guindon 2000; Navarro and others 2006). For example, the "extended promotion and marketing of harmful commodities (as a result of trade liberalization), especially tobacco, cannot be overlooked," (Bettcher, Yach, and Guindon 2000, p. 522).

4 Williamson and Carr 2009.

5 Life-course models suggest that adult health is "more than a combination of his/her genetic endowment and adult lifestyle choices, and that social, psychological, and environmental factors operating early in life could have major impacts on both short- and long-term outcomes" (Halfon and others 2014, p. 345). Though early life-course models focused mainly on the impact of early infant and child experiences and circumstances, more recent discussions have focused on four pathways during adolescence (health, health behaviour, social relations, school / education) that have a unique impact on adult health (Due and others 2011, p. 65) and therefore identify adolescence as a "sensitive and critical period" (Halfon and others 2014) for adult health.

6 Health among youth is on the global agenda. See WHO, "Health of the World's Adolescents", May 2014, http://apps.who.int/adolescent/second-decade/. A Lancet Youth Well-Being Commission was also established in 2013.

7 Patton and others 2012.

8 The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation Unit at Washington University has collected all data related to this age-group from any type of national, community, facility, or school-based survey and therefore is a good source of information.

9 NAP 2009.

10 Kronfol 2012.

11 UNICEF 2009.

12 Afifi and others 2012.

13 Wong, Zimmerman, and Parker 2010.

14 Bteddini and others 2012; Makhoul, Alameddine, and Afifi 2012.

15 Main causes were determined by visual analysis of graphs. Global data indicate that 2.6 million deaths occurred among 10–24-year-olds in 2004; 97 percent of these deaths occurred in lower-middle-income countries (Patton and others 2009). The same report indicates that, in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region (includes 16 lower-middle-income countries), young people (10–24 years of age) had a relative risk ratio of dying of 3.7 compared with those in high-income countries across the globe (39 countries, five in the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region: Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates). The lower-middle-income countries in the same WHO region had the third-highest relative risk of dying among all the low- to middle-income countries after Africa and Southeast Asia. The report classified the causes of death by four causes: maternal causes, communicable disease, non-communicable disease (NCD), and injuries. In the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, in the 15–19 age-group, injuries are the most frequent cause of death among men, followed almost equally by communicable diseases and NCDs. Among women in this age-group, injuries are the most frequent cause of death; maternal deaths are the least likely cause of death. In the 20–24 age-group, death rates among men increase dramatically; injuries are the main cause of the increase. Among women, death rates also rise with increasing maternal mortality. The four causes of death are approximately equally distributed among women in this age-group. A note of caution is warranted, however: this analysis included countries at all income levels. In the WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region, no lower-middle-income country had death registration data with greater than 85 percent coverage; so, cause of death was modelled in six of these countries, and estimates abstracted from epidemiological studies in 10 of the countries.

16 WHO 2013a.

17 Sivak and Schoettle 2014.

18 WHO 2013a.

19 WHO 2013a.

20 WHO 2013a.

[21] WHO 2013a.
[22] Bodalal, Bendardaf, and Ambarek 2012.
[23] Bener and others 2012.
[24] Hamadeh and Ali 2013.
[25] WHO 2013a.
[26] WHO 2013c.
[27] Abdul Rahim and others 2014; WHO 2010d.
[28] Abdul Rahim and others 2014; WHO 2011a.
[29] Musaiger and Al-Hazzaa 2012.
[30] WHO 2011a.
[31] Ng and others 2011.
[32] Ghandour and others 2014; Roudi-Fahimi and El Feki 2011; UNFPA 2012a.
[33] UNFPA 2012a.
[34] UNFPA 2012a; Diers 2013.
[35] UNGASS 2014.
[36] UNAIDS 2014.
[37] De Jong and El-Khoury 2006.
[38] Population Council 2010.
[39] UNICEF 2012b.
[40] Alquaiz, Almuneef, and Minhas 2012; BinSaeed, Mahmood, and Raheel 2013.
[41] Roudi-Fahimi and El Feki 2011.
[42] Patel and others 2007.
[43] Eckersley 2011.
[44] Jaju and others 2009.
[45] Rezaeian 2007.
[46] Jaju and others 2009; Rezaeian 2007.
[47] The focus on risk factors is often called a prevention science approach, and the attention to protective factors a positive youth development approach (Catalano and others 2002). These approaches are complementary rather than competing. Several frameworks have set out key risk and protective factors for youth risk behaviours, such as Dickson and Derevensky 2002, Fong and others 2006, McLeroy and others 1988, and Tyas and Pederson 1998.
[48] Maziak and others 2014b.
[49] Usmanova and Mokdad 2013; WHO 2011a.
[50] Usmanova and Mokdad 2013; WHO 2006b, 2007a, 2007b.
[51] Warren and others 2011.
[52] Khabour and others 2012; Mahfouz and others 2014 (data for 2011–2012); Mandil and others 2007, 2011 (data for 2008–2009); Yasso and others 2013.
[53] Akl and others 2011; Maziak and others 2014b.
[54] Barnett and others 2013; Warren and others 2009; Maziak 2011.
[55] Akl and others 2010; Shihadeh and others 2015.
[56] Akl and others 2015.
[57] Maziak and others 2014a.
[58] WHO 2003.
[59] Lantz and others 2000.
[60] WHO FCTC 2014.
[61] Mathers and Loncar 2006.
[62] Johnston and others 2011; Karam, Kypri, and Salamoun 2007.
[63] Salamoun and others 2008.
[64] CDC 2015.
[65] Afifi and others 2012.
[66] WHO 2012b.
[67] Okasha 1999.
[68] Okasha 1999.
[69] Al-Ansari and others 2001.
[70] Karam and others 2000.

[71] See http://www.search-institute.org/content/40-developmental-assets-adolescents-ages-12-18.
[72] Scales 2011.
[73] Afifi and others 2015.
[74] WHO 2008b.
[75] See http://www.who.int/social_determinants/en/.
[76] Khadr and others 2012, p. 61–74.
[77] Mowafi and others 2011.
[78] Viner and others 2012.
[79] Andrew, Patel, and Ramakrishna 2003; WHO 1978.
[80] Geel 2014; FHI 360 2007; IPPF 2012; Khalaf, Abu Moghli, and Froelicher 2010; Population Council 2013.
[81] Deogan, Ferguson, and Stenberg 2012.
[82] Population Council 2013, p.4.
[83] Population Council 2013, p. 30.
[84] Population Council 2013, p. 32.
[85] Population Council 2013.
[86] FHI 360 2007.
[87] Geel 2014.
[88] Bearinger and others 2007.
[89] See http://www.who.int/healthsystems/universal_health_coverage/en/.
[90] WHO 2009a.
[91] NAP 2009.
[92] NAP 2009, p. 27.
[93] Oliver and others 2008.
[94] Kronfol 2012.
[95] O'Neill and others 2014, p. 57.
[96] Evans and Brown 2003; Kavanagh, Oliver, and Lorenc 2008.
[97] Considering the evidence on social and structural determinants of health, ministries of health "have an important role to play as active stewards, affecting the development plans, policies, and actions of players in other sectors" (Oliver and others, 2008).
[98] Viner and others 2012.
[99] Rudolph and others 2013.
[100] WHO 2012a.
[101] ESCWA 2010.
[102] Catalano and others 2002, p. 6.
[103] Gavin and others 2010; Roth and others 1998; Roth and Brooks-Gunn 2003.
[104] WHO 2013b.
[105] WHO 2011b.
[106] Cuijpers 2002; Glantz and Mandel 2005; Gonzalez-Suarez and others 2009; Wiehe and others 2005.
[107] Maziak, Nakkash, and Afifi Soweid 2006.

Chapter 6

The Effects on Youth of War and Violent Conflict

Protracted warfare has long-term physical and mental impacts on the individual, as well as intergenerational economic impacts. Yet, young people can be extremely resilient and resourceful; They have to be. They thus create for themselves an oasis of stability in a world of shifting social and political landscapes. At a societal level, such stability is also key, or else young individuals themselves will become victims or perpetrators of violence.

This chapter looks at five war-torn countries in the Arab region—Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan and Syria—and depicts how, in the midst of ruined cities and devastated lives, most young people strive to help their communities function, while finding opportunities to empower themselves.

This chapter offers a snapshot of the effects of violent conflict up until 2014.

6.1 Youth in war-torn countries: growing up amid strife and violence

Becoming an adult is challenging even in the most peaceful settings; coming of age surrounded by destruction, violence and the breakdown of social order is horrific. Describing the implications of protracted warfare for the economic and social prospects of young people in the Arab region and highlighting the effects of violence on the physical, psychological and social well-being of youth are crucial. Young people are future leaders and potential peacemakers (or combatants), and they are the keys to a strong economy. Beyond the inherent value of promoting their welfare, young people deserve special attention because they are the foundations of better future societies.

Conflict, war and violence damage the future of youth and make it extremely difficult to develop and empower them. Nonetheless, even labouring against these formidable constraints, young people are agents. They can be resilient and resourceful, and they can find ways to help rebuild their communities, and, in so doing, they can find fulfillment by developing and empowering themselves constructively, even though marginalized and at-risk youth are subject to structural violence on a daily basis.[1] In underscoring these constraints, this chapter shifts the analysis from the individual to society to explore the conditions and prospects of young people in societies at war or in post-conflict transition. The analysis recognizes the talents, creativity and coping skills that individual young people apply in their daily lives.

The Arab region has experienced the most rapid increase in war and violent conflict among all global regions over the past decade. The region also has the dubious distinction of encompassing the largest number of countries that have become failed states and is home to the largest refugee and internally displaced population worldwide.[2]

This chapter focuses on countries in which war, civil conflict, or occupation are protracted or have erupted on an especially large scale, notably, Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan and Syria. These countries have been selected to showcase a scale of fragility and failure, including a humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, failed reconstruction and rehabilitation in Iraq, occupation in Palestine, a failed state in Somalia and failed development in Sudan.[3] Many of these countries have experienced repeated cycles of violence and are characterized by periods of fragility, wherein states and other institutions "Lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence."[4] The dynamics of war and violence have varied across each of these countries, yet with similar impact across other Arab countries in conflict (box 6.1 and 6.2).

6.2 The effects on physical health

War has immediate and long-term effects on the health and well-being of individuals and their communities. For individuals, it is difficult, if not impossible, to realize one's potential when living in a state of ill health. For society, excess death and widespread disability can reduce economic growth and development, as the crisis of HIV/AIDS in sub-Saharan Africa attests.[5] The health-related costs of war are both direct and indirect and affect physical and mental health (see below). Women face particular risks (box 6.3).

The most obvious and direct effect of war and violent conflict is on physical health.[6] Almost by definition, war causes widespread death and disability not only among combatants, but also among civilians. Death, disease and injury may

Box 6.1 Yemen: One of the worlds' worst humanitarian crises

Since March 2015, escalating hostilities have brought Yemen to the verge of collapse, and resulted in one of the largest humanitarian crises in the world. In December 2015, an estimated 21.2 million people - that is 82 percent of the Yemeni population - required humanitarian assistance. This is up 33 percent from late 2014 (15.9 million people).[1] More than 2.3 million people are displaced internally and in neighboring countries, and by October 2015 over 5,600 have been killed and more than 16,000 injured.[2]

The economy and basic services have been collapsing further due to drastically reduced imports and growing insecurity; 12.9 million people struggle with access to sufficient food, while 20.4 million lack access to safe water or adequate sanitation.[3] Many health facilities – including hospitals – have closed, leaving 15.2 million without access to basic health care.[4]

Before the conflict of 2015, Yemen was ranked 154 in the Human Development Index, registering the highest levels of poverty, unemployment, and illiteracy and lowest rates of education and nutrition of all countries in the Arab region. The conflict has rapidly compounded the pre-existing crisis, reversing human development gains made in recent years. These gains had seen education levels and indicators on access to food and shelter improve or stabilize. Poverty, already increasing prior to the latest political crisis, has risen further from 42% of the population in 2009, to 54.5% in 2012.[5]

Due to the conflict, more than 1.8 million school-aged children lost access to school with more than 3,500 schools, a quarter of all schools, shut down and some 600,000 children unable to take their exams.[6] This resulted in a total of nearly 3 million - 47 per cent of Yemen's school-aged children - unable to receive education due to conflict, poverty and discrimination.[7] Yemen has one of the highest rates of chronic and severe malnutrition. According to UNICEF, about 1.8 million children are likely to suffer from some form of malnutrition in 2015 – an increase of almost 1 million children from 2014. A projected half a million of these children will be at risk of severe acute malnutrition in 2015, which is over three times the number reported in 2014.[8]

The situation of women in Yemen, who have faced longstanding gender inequalities that limit their access to basic services and livelihood opportunities, has been exacerbated by the escalating conflict. Displaced women – estimated at 54 per cent of all IDPs in early May 2015– often bear the burden of supporting their families, despite challenges in accessing assistance, especially outside their communities. Pre-crisis assessments in Yemen demonstrated that women in food insecure families often eat less in order to provide for their children. Since the conflict began, women report that their workloads have increased enormously, and they require additional support to meet their responsibilities.[9]

Recent conflict and displacement have also increased Gender Based Violence (GBV) risks, especially of sexual violence, domestic violence, early marriage and trading sex to meet basic survival needs. Displaced women may not have access to hygiene or dignity items, forcing them to remain out of sight. Lack of life-saving response services and safe refuges for survivors – who often fear stigma or rejection – compound the problem. GBV disproportionately impacts women, including those already facing elevated protection risks, such as IDPs and other vulnerable groups.

The strength of the Yemeni society is embodied in its informal systems through family, regional, and community ties. These informal ties are subject to erosion as assets are depleted, income sources cut, law and order collapsed, and people's psychological strength exhausted. Communities are consumed with coping with the harsh reality of the conflict, as the complexity of the crisis fragments society, exposing its old divides and provoking new ones.[10]

The needs of the Yemeni people are urgent, but the impact will be long term. Even if the conflict were to end tomorrow, it will take years to undertake the repairs necessary for basic services to resume, for urban and rural livelihoods to be restored, for internally displaced people to return to their homes and for the threat of unexploded ordnance to be mitigated and finally eliminated. The long-term impact on the young is particularly worrisome, and is likely to impact several generations to come.

1. UNOCHA 2015.
2. UNOCHA 2016a.
3. UNOCHA 2015.
4. UNOCHA 2015.
5. World Bank Yemen Overview 2015
6. UNICEF 2015.
7. UNOCHA 2015.
8. UNOCHA 2015.
9. UNOCHA 2015.
10. UNDP 2015.

continue long after peace treaties are signed and violence has officially ended. Unexploded and unmarked land mines are one obvious cause of death and injury. Survivors may also experience malnutrition, stunting and starvation, which have long-term ramifications for cognitive development among children and for the well-being and employability of young people and adults. Torture, a horrifying, but widespread practice during some conflicts, also leads to death and disabilities. However, it is difficult to document torture owing to political sensitivities, information constraints and the fact that the bodies of many victims are hidden or burned beyond recognition.

The effects of war and conflict on health can be captured at least partially through health indicators such as life expectancy at birth, infant mortality rates, health-adjusted life expectancy, and the prevalence of malnutrition, stunting and various communicable diseases and NCDs, particularly if these are assessed before, during and after a conflict (annex 2 figures A.12–A.14; statistical annex).[7] The impact is stark in Iraq and Somalia, where life expectancy at birth and health-adjusted life expectancy have stagnated or declined in the last two decades. In Palestine, life expectancy at birth among young men began to decline after 2000. This may be attributed to the escalation of the conflict in the 2000s. Health-adjusted life expectancy among young men stagnated, but rose

Box 6.2 Libya slides into chaos

Libya continues to navigate a tumultuous transition period characterized by political divisions, failing institutions, clashes in various regions, and rising insecurity and criminality. The security situation deteriorated in early 2015 resulting in increased attacks against civilians. As of June 2015, it is estimated that two million people, almost one-third of the total population, have been affected by the conflict.[1]

The scale of human suffering is staggering for a country with large oil reserves and strong economic potential. According to different United Nations agencies, an estimated 1.9 million people require urgent humanitarian assistance to meet their basic health care needs. Access to food is a major problem for some 1.2 million people, mostly in Benghazi and the rest of Libya.[2]

The figure for internally displaced persons across Libya stands around 550,000.[3] The healthcare system is on the verge of collapse, with many hospitals across the country overcrowded and operating at severely reduced capacity, reporting acute shortages of medicines, vaccines and medical equipment. Power cuts are endemic in many areas of the country; some neighborhoods such as in Benghazi are enduring electricity cuts almost round the clock.

The country's economy continues to contract rapidly, the result of a significant reduction in oil revenues due to falling oil prices and low oil production from Libya's oilfields. Libya's financial reserves are also being heavily depleted, in large part the result of unsustainable expenditures on non-productive items. The political-institutional crisis in the country has also manifested itself in a growing competition over key financial and other sovereign institutions.[4]

Intensive fighting in 2011 resulted in prolonged disruption to the education system and damage to school facilities and equipment. Since the resurgence in fighting in 2014, more than half of internally displaced and returnees in the east of the country reported that their children do not attend school. In addition, many schools in the north-east and south of the country are reported to be hosting internally displaced people.[5]

Close to 250,000 migrants are estimated to be in the country or transiting through, many of them facing significant protection issues, including arbitrary arrest and detention in abusive conditions, sexual abuse, forced labour, exploitation and extortion. The year 2015 alone has seen over 2,000 migrants drown in the Mediterranean Sea, the vast majority in a desperate bid to make the sea crossing from Libya to Europe's southern shores.[6] Individuals attempting sea migration from Libya face the risk of being detained by the Libyan Coast Guard and transferred to government run detention centers, which to date exceed 4,500 detainees, including women and children.[7]

1. UNHCR 2015e.
2. UNDPA 2015
3. Save the Children 2015.
4. UNDPA 2015.
5. UNICEF 2015.
6. UN 2015.
7. UNHCR 2015e.

among women. In Sudan, a rapid increase in life expectancy at birth and in health-adjusted life expectancy occurred among cohorts of young men and women, but especially among young women. Syria was exhibiting a similar trend by 2010, prior to the outbreak of violent conflict, but the severe violence and destruction caused by the current war have led to a sharp deterioration in health outcomes (see below).[8]

War and violent conflict also have indirect effects on physical health. War causes widespread damage to basic infrastructure, leading to the breakdown of water, transport and sanitation systems, the destruction of public health facilities and large cuts to the number of health workers. Damaged infrastructure contributes to the spread of communicable diseases, including those previously eradicated, such as poliomyelitis in Syria recently, and prevents people from receiving curative or preventive health care, which then leads to spikes in NCDs. Access to food and safe drinking water may also be reduced. Internally displaced persons and refugees are particularly vulnerable to ill health because they generally live in poor conditions in which diseases spread easily, and access to health services is minimal. The presence of internally displaced persons and refugees can also place additional stress on the health systems and welfare regimes of host countries, leading to further deterioration in living conditions. Under these circumstances, citizens in countries hosting large refugee populations may become increasingly resentful of non-nationals.

The diversion of resources from social spending, including health spending, is another potential indirect consequence that war has on health care and health outcomes. Although evidence is mixed on the issue of whether higher military expenditures lead to lower spending on social welfare, it is undeniable that resources are better spent on human welfare. Compared with countries in other global regions, Arab governments have devoted a disproportionate amount of their resources to the military rather than to social investment. On average, per capita total expenditure on health care in Arab countries in 2013 was $683, almost half the world average ($1,229) and between East Asia and the Pacific ($828) and sub-Saharan Africa ($193).[9]

"By propping up a massive security apparatus, Arab States have created funding shortages or inefficiencies in social spending and public infrastructure, where investment is needed most", notes a recent ESCWA report.[10] The report argues that the mismatch between military and social spending in the Arab region provides evidence of a potential "Crowding-out effect that military expenditure can have on social expenditure, particularly in countries with limited budgets."[11]

War and violent conflict can also destroy the environment, with negative effects on health. The breakdown of infrastructure needed to preserve a safe environment, the use of chemical and other toxic weapons, the use of large quantities of non-renewable fossil fuels and the creation of toxic waste by militaries pose dangers to populations.

These indirect effects of war—the breakdown of public health care infrastructure and the diversion of resources away from health care and environmental conservation—have long-term implications. As Hazem Adam Ghobarah and colleagues suggest, many more deaths and disabilities arise from the spread of infectious diseases and other causes in the wake of wars than as a result of direct war violence, partly because of the breakdown of social norms and political order during and after conflict.[12] Siyan Chen and colleagues provide evidence that the improvement in mortality is slower in post-conflict countries than in non-conflict countries largely because of the direct and indirect deaths that occur even after the conflict has come to an end.[13]

What follows is a more detailed look at some of the impacts of war and conflict in each of the five war-torn countries.

Syria

More than five years after the uprisings began in Syria, the human toll of the armed conflict has reached over 250,000 people dead[14] and more than one million wounded. On the eve of the conflict, life expectancy in Syria was high (75 years in 2010), but, by the end of 2014, it had declined by 27 percent to 55.7 years.[15] This is certain to impact the under-5 mortality rate (15 per 1,000 live births in 2010), which was low relative to many neighbouring countries.

Many of Syria's achievements in health development are rapidly being reversed. The relatively strong health care infrastructure built in earlier decades is now devastated in significant areas of the country, and health outcomes are declining.[16] As of September 2014, 24 percent of 97 public hospitals in Syria were so damaged they could not function, and another 35 percent were partially damaged.[17] A WHO report released in 2013 found that, on average, one hospital functioned for around every

Box 6.3 The impact of war and violent conflict on young women

Sexual violence, conflict and militarization threaten women's freedoms in many ways. Following the U.S.-led invasion of 2003, the militarization of Iraqi public spaces turned Baghdad into a city of men: checkpoints, walls and soldiers dominated the streets. In Palestine and Syria today, the presence of the military in public spaces and routine violence have marked a deep change in everyday life, dominated by the figure of the male soldier.

In these settings, women are marginalized from public spaces; stricter traditional ideologies of gender roles gain ground, and natalist policies are strengthened in support of the war effort. Broadly, situations of conflict and insecurity heighten conservative attitudes. For example, the appropriation of gender inequality by the United Kingdom and the United States as one of the justifications for the 2003 invasion of Iraq led to the negative association of gender equality with foreignness and imperialism.

Conflict also affects young women through forced migration. Through conflict-induced migration, women and children make up the majority of the displaced and suffer in gender-specific ways.[1] Increased levels of sexual assault occur within refugee camps owing to the combined effect of lawlessness, a breakdown of normal societal bonds and the decreased security of women's living arrangements. Rights workers tracking the issue in Syria and Turkey have received a flood of rape reports from refugees who have fled to border camps.[2]

Young unaccompanied women, as well as women from ethnic minority groups, are the most vulnerable to gender-based violence in refugee camps.[3] It is also possible that younger women have a weak social support network and feel less able to articulate and report sexual abuse, although empirical confirmation of this hypothesis is lacking. Young women and girls, especially lone women heads of households, may be at greater risk of turning to prostitution, which brings new risks such as sexual violence, pregnancy, and exposure to disease.

The economic insecurity resulting from displacement leads young women into earlier marriages. Reports of Syrian refugees arriving in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey and marrying off their daughters at a young age are increasing. In Libya, observers have noted the establishment of offices devoted to organizing marriages between Libyan men and young women refugees from Syria.[4] This phenomenon is often assessed in certain categorized ways, measuring rates of child marriage, early and forced marriage and polygamy. Not all these marriages will be forced or involve child brides, although some certainly do. Rather, the broad trend is that women or their families are settling for less desirable marriages than they would otherwise do and at younger ages, with older men, with men of lower social standing, or as second wives.[5]

Young women entering such marriages occupy points on a continuum between choice and coercion. While some women may be forced into marriage, such marriages for many women represent a pragmatic decision in a difficult situation. Some families marry off their young daughters, often reluctantly, to improve their own diminished financial situations and to afford their daughters economic and physical protection, along with protection of their reputations and therefore their future prospects.[6] Giving daughters a chance to escape refugee camps is another consideration, but good intentions do not influence reality: young wives are more likely to suffer domestic violence and health problems.[7]

Source: The Report team.

1. Forced Migration Online 2011.

2. AWID 2012; UN Women 2013.

3. Forced Migration Online 2011.

4. UN Women 2013.

5. Save the Children 2014.

6. Save the Children 2014, p. 1; Council on Foreign Relations 2014, p. 3.

7. Save the Children 2014, p. 5; UNICEF 2014, p. 33.

400,000 people, meaning that large segments of the population lacked access to public health care services.[18] The ratio of hospitals to population is even lower in areas that have witnessed the highest levels of fighting, notably Aleppo, ar-Raqqa, Dar'a, Deir ez-Zor, Homs and rural Damascus.

The devastation of the Syrian health care system has resulted in a sharp decline in immunization rates across the country, from 90 percent before 2011 to 52 percent in March 2014, and will almost certainly lead to a rise in under-5 mortality rates.[19] The reduced availability of safe water, which is currently about one third the pre-crisis levels, and poor living conditions in insecure regions are contributing to deteriorating health outcomes. Epidemics such as measles and poliomyelitis and the limited response by the health care system are worsening the situation.

Iraq

The decline of the Iraqi health system preceded the outbreak of the Second Gulf War in 2003; the country has been in a virtually continuous state of conflict since the start of the 1980s.[20] Although Iraq was at war with Iran from 1980–1988, the state maintained the health care system, which still reached around 97 percent of the urban population and 79 percent of the rural population. Health indicators even improved during the 1980s; the infant mortality declined from 80 per 1,000 live births in 1979 to 40 in 1989, and the under-5 mortality rate fell from 120 to 60 per 1,000 live births.[21] International sanctions imposed during the 1980s and the consequent economic development rollback, however, took a toll on the health system and health outcomes. During the 1990s, immunization coverage fell, and public health campaigns became virtually non-existent.[22] As a result, the infant mortality rate rose to 101, and the under-5 mortality rate had climbed to 126 by 1998.[23]

The continuous conflict since 1990 has had detrimental effects on the health status of youth. Life expectancy at birth and health-adjusted life expectancy did not improve among young people between 1990 and 2010. Life expectancy among 20–24-year-olds was 54.4 years in 1990 and had risen to only 54.7 by 2010. In a comparable time period, life expectancy among 20–24-year-olds increased from 54.7 to 59.0 years in neighbouring Syria, which had not yet experienced violent conflict. The health-adjusted life expectancy rate for the same age-group also stagnated in Iraq at 45 years, while it improved from 45 to 49 years in Syria.[24]

The war that erupted after the 2003 invasion turned armed violence into one of the leading causes of death, especially among men. A 2008 large-scale household survey found that 151,000 deaths had resulted from the conflict between March 2003 and June 2006.[25] Another survey suggested that the risk of death was 2.5 times higher in the first 18 months after the U.S.-led invasion than before the invasion, and violence was the primary cause of death. The same survey found that infant mortality increased by at least 37 percent in the immediate aftermath of the invasion owing to the lack of health services and the growing preference of mothers to deliver at home, given the security threats.[26]

Children born in Iraqi areas affected by high levels of violence are 0.8 cm shorter than children born in low-violence areas. This grim fact constitutes one of the clearest signs of the effects of violence on health, especially among children.[27] These health indicators are related to the high rates of under-5 mortality: in 2005, one child in eight under the age of five had died, demonstrating that there had been no improvement since 1998.[28] According to a UNICEF survey carried out in 2006, only 39 percent of Iraqi children were fully immunized, and more than one fifth (21 percent) were severely or moderately stunted.[29]

Violent conflict in Iraq has also destroyed the country's health care infrastructure. During the invasion of 2003, public institutions, including health care facilities, were frequently looted. About 7 percent of hospitals were damaged initially, and 12 percent were looted.[30] The bulk of Iraq's roughly 2,000 primary health care centres had to be rebuilt.[31] The Iraqi Medical Association estimates that up to 2,000 doctors were killed in the aftermath of the invasion, and, in this insecure environment, around half of the country's 34,000 registered doctors fled during the years immediately after the invasion, greatly weakening the health care system.[32] In 2010, the number of doctors was estimated to have climbed back to 23,000, or about 8 doctors per 10,000 people, but still well below, for example, Jordan (27 per 1,000) and Syria (16 per 1,000) at that time.[33]

Palestine

The conflict in Palestine has even deeper roots than those in the other conflict-affected countries in the region. The Israeli occupation has been constant for more than six decades, and there are periodic outbreaks of large-scale violence, particularly in Gaza. The 1990s were relatively calm in Palestine in terms of widespread violence, but armed conflict escalated again during the 2000s with the second Intifada in 2000–2001, the ensuing Israeli intervention, the blockade of Gaza after Hamas gained control in 2007 and Israeli assaults on Gaza.

Youth-specific health outcome indicators point to the declining health situation in Palestine during the 2000s. Life expectancy at birth among 20–24-year-olds rose from 54.6 years in 1990 to 56.3 years in 2000, but declined to 55.7 years in 2010, when the health-adjusted life expectancy rate was 45.7 years. In 2007, life expectancy at birth was estimated at 71.7 years among men (71.9 years in the West Bank and 71.4 years in Gaza) and 73.2 years among women (73.6 years in the West Bank and 72.5 years in Gaza).[34]

NCDs are a major challenge. Triggering the risk factors for chronic illnesses are urbanization, poor living conditions because of the ongoing blockade of Gaza, territorial fragmentation in the West Bank and the stresses of living under occupation.[35] Under-5 mortality rates are 32 per 1,000 live births in Gaza and 26 in the West Bank (28 in Palestine overall). Although infant mortality and under-5 mortality rates have fallen substantially in recent decades, they have plateaued since 2000 as a result of the worsening socio-economic environment and stresses on the health care system.[36] However, the 2006 Palestinian Family Health Survey indicated that immunization coverage was high, at around 97 percent.

Israel's repeated aggressions have caused significant destruction to the Palestinian health sector. As of 2007, there were 76 hospitals for 3.8 million people, putting the hospital-to-population ratio at around 1 per 50,000. During the war in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009, also known as Operation Cast Lead, Israeli forces damaged 38 primary health clinics, 29 ambulances and 14 of Gaza's 27 hospitals.[37] Despite the blockade, the health facilities were repaired within a year of the conflict's end.[38] Relative to other conflict-ridden zones in the region, the number of physicians is favourable in Palestine: in 2007, there were 2.2 physicians per 1,000 population (1.9 in the West Bank and 2.7 in Gaza) (box 6.4).

Somalia

Somalia has been in a state of violence and civil strife for decades and is characterized by an even more profound breakdown of state institutions than other war-torn countries in the region. Between 450,000 and 1.5 million Somalis have died since 1991 either as a direct result of armed clashes or because of famine caused or exacerbated by the conflict.[39] This is equivalent to 10–25 percent of Somalia's population in the mid-1990s. Millions have been injured and affected by disabilities, sexual violence and disease. As of January 2014, 1.1 million people were internally displaced, and 1.1 million more had fled to neighbouring countries, primarily Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen.[40] During the 1990s, health outcome indicators plummeted;

Box 6.4 Ghassan Abu-Sittah: Gaza's plight under Israel's aggression

If you are a 6-year-old living in Gaza, you would have already lived through three wars that have taken the lives of more than 3,800 Palestinians, of whom 770 were children. There is a 50 percent chance that you suffer from the psychological trauma of these wars. You have lived your whole life in a blockade that was intensified before you were born and has led to the following:

- The unemployment of 34 percent of the working adults and half of the youth in your family.
- A 70 percent chance that your family is living on an income of less than $1 a day.
- An 80 percent chance that you and your family are dependent on aid and a 44 percent likelihood that you live in food insecurity.
- The inaccessibility of 35 percent of Gaza's farmland and 85 percent of its fishing waters.
- A 10 percent chance that you have stunted growth due to prolonged exposure to malnutrition and a 58.6 percent chance that you have iron deficiency anaemia.

You drink water from an aquifer that is 90 percent unsafe for human consumption. For recreation, you swim in a sea that has 90 million litres of untreated and partially treated sewage dumped into it each day. There is an 85 percent likelihood that you go to a school that runs double shifts because of the chronic shortage of facilities. If you or your family need specialist medical treatment, such as complex heart surgery or treatment for some type of cancer, you must seek it elsewhere. You will need to apply for an exit permit and will most likely see your application denied or delayed by the Israeli authorities. There is a chance, like many before you, that you will die while waiting.

Note: Ghassan Abu-Sittah is director of the Plastic Surgery Department, American University of Beirut.

the under-5 mortality rate rose to 224 per 1,000 live births in 1997–1999, and life expectancy at birth had fallen to 45 years in 1993.

Subsequent studies find some improvement in outcomes, especially in the latter half of the first decade of the 2000s. A UNICEF survey in 2006 put the under-5 mortality rate at 145 per 1,000 live births.[41] In 2013, life expectancy at birth was estimated at 55.1 years.[42] However, improvements in health indicators may be associated with marginal increases in access to food and clean water, rendering these gains in health outcomes insecure because of low immunization coverage and continuing risk of famine.[43]

Somalia's youth have been harmed by protracted political conflict and the resulting lack of health services. From 1990 to 2010, life expectancy at birth among 20–24-year-olds fell from 44.5 to 43.7 years (annex 2 figure A.13). During the same period, health-adjusted life expectancy dropped from 36.6 to 35.9 years. Even before the conflict started in 1991, the level of social development in Somalia was among the lowest in the world.[44] Armed conflict led to additional damage and extensive looting of the health infrastructure. In the northwest, 90 percent of the health facilities were looted, and the number of hospital beds per person declined from 0.9 in 1988 to 0.4 in 1997.[45] In 2008, Somalia had only 544 health posts, 248 maternal and child health centres and 34 hospitals for a population of about 9.6 million people.[46]

Somalia also suffered from a severe shortage of medical professionals. As of 2007, there were only 253 physicians in the country, or about 3 per 100,000 people, less than half the 7 per 100,000 in 1984.[47] With virtually no newly qualified young people replacing the current stock of physicians, the health system faced a major crisis that prompted a surge in private providers, especially folk healers, whose treatments may include religious rather than biomedical practices. Ethnographic data suggest that the services of these healers may be more expensive; yet, people still turn to them because "Healers provide patients with meaningful cultural and religious illness explanations."[48]

Sudan

Since Sudan gained independence in 1956, it has experienced more years of conflict than peace. This prolonged conflict has contributed to poor health outcomes. Sudan has also experienced severe droughts in the past 30 years, and the population suffers from the continuous problems associated with poor access to food.[49]

Prior to the partition in 2011, the gap in health outcomes between northern and southern Sudan was persistent. The south exhibited poorer outcomes than the north, but the gap had been narrowing, especially since 2005. In 2007, the under-5 mortality rate was 112 per 1,000 live births for the entire country, but 250 in the south. The gap in infant mortality was much narrower (81 for the whole country and 102 in the south), suggesting that immunization rates and child nutrition were inferior in the south. Life expectancy at birth also differed, reaching 57 years for the country as a whole in 2007, but only 42 years in the south.[50] Age-specific life expectancy indicators showed that youth were experiencing marginal gains in health and well-being. Thus, among 20–24-year-olds, life expectancy at birth was 51 years in 1990 and had risen to 54 years by 2010. Health-adjusted life expectancy among this youth cohort also improved, climbing from 40.6 years in 1990 to 43.5 years in 2010 (annex 2 figure A.13).

In 2004, 36 percent of primary health care centres were not functional.[51] The hospital-to-population ratio was 1 to 100,000 in the whole country, but only 1 to 400,000 in the south, where there was virtually no hospital access. Today, following South Sudan's independence in 2011, most of the country's health services are provided by international NGOs and faith-based organizations.

6.3 Effects on mental health

Combatants and civilian victims of war may experience a range of psychological effects, including depression, anxiety disorder, panic disorder and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which is the most common clinical diagnosis following exposure to war. The harm that political violence causes to the mental health of youth is well established.[52] The diagnosis of PTSD requires the presence of a precipitating catastrophic event or a specific trauma that involves exposure to actual

injury, or a threat of injury, or a threat to the physical integrity of oneself or others.[53]

The prevalence of depressive disorders seems especially wide in the Middle East and North Africa region.[54] A study published by the Global Burden of Disease in 2011 found that, in 2010, more than 5 percent of people in the region suffered from depression, and people lose more than 1.3 percent of their lifetime years to depression.[55] The authors speculate that high levels of conflict in the region are responsible for the prevalence of depressive disorders. Palestine is among the three countries with the highest rates of depression highlighted in the study (the other two are Afghanistan and Honduras).[56] The findings suggest that, among 21 global regions analysed in the study, the Arab region ranks second after Eastern Europe in years lost to depression.[57] However, because the authors measure only diagnosed depression, the data show a wider prevalence of depression in countries with more developed mental health services and greater awareness of psychological conditions. This may explain why Iraq, where the health infrastructure has been decimated, exhibits particularly low levels of depression.[58]

Iraq

A number of regional surveys on mental health have been conducted in Iraq, and these often focus on PTSD. The nationally representative Iraq Mental Health Survey, which was conducted in the midst of the 2006–2007 violence on a national sample of Iraqis over 18 years of age, is one of the few nationwide studies to examine the recent effects of war on youth. It found that the majority of people with an anxiety or behavioural disorder had experienced the onset of the illness by the time they had entered the age cohort of youth.[59] It also found that panic disorder and PTSD exhibited a lifetime prevalence that was about 5.3 times wider at comparable ages in the younger cohort (ages 18–34) than in the oldest cohort (ages 65+).[60]

Five years after the Anfal military attacks were carried out in 1988 by the Iraqi army against Kurdish populations residing in Iraqi Kurdistan in the north, a small-sample study there found that 87 percent of children and 60 percent of caregivers suffered from PTSD.[61] Today's younger generations have been far more exposed to violence than their elders, and the grave consequences in their psychological well-being have been severe. In Mosul, a 2006 study of 1,090 adolescents screened for mental disorders from eight secondary schools found that 30 percent were suffering from PTSD.[62] In 2011, PTSD rates as high as 61 percent were found among older adolescents in Baghdad.[63]

Al-Shawi and colleagues used complex PTSD, a revised measure of PTSD syndrome, to capture the effects of repeated exposure to trauma.[64] They found the condition in about 10 percent of their sample of university students in Baghdad. While research on the impact of mental illness on daily life in Iraq is limited, one study found that the presence of any disorder resulted in 33 days out of role per year among Iraqis; these are days characterized by an inability to work or conduct normal daily activities.[65]

Palestine

The Palestinian Ministry of Health reported that, in 2006, three quarters of Palestinians living in Palestine suffered from depression.[66] Another study undertaken in the immediate aftermath of the second Intifada in Gaza suggested that, of 229 adolescent participants, 69 percent had developed PTSD and 40 percent had reported moderate or severe levels of depression.[67]

In conflict-ridden societies, younger generations suffer more from mental health problems than their counterparts in more peaceful societies. Over 80 percent of adolescents in Palestine have witnessed shootings, and over 60 percent have seen family members injured or killed.[68] Similar rates of exposure to traumatic violence, such as shooting and seeing other community members exposed to violence and humiliation, were found by another study in a representative sample of the Ramallah district in the West Bank.[69] In that study, the exposure of individuals to trauma and violence was compared with collective exposure, and there were few significant differences in the negative effects shown in depressive, emotional and somatic measures. Other research, however, indicates that the exposure of individuals to conflict is the most important determinant of PTSD.[70] Based on a sample of 224 Lebanese children, Macksoud and Aber hold that the exposure of individuals is associated with PTSD, whereas separation from parents is more correlated with depression.[71]

Other factors beyond direct exposure can likewise take a toll on mental health. Lack of employment, fearfulness and concerns about the safety of self, home and family are also correlated with depression, trauma-related stress and feelings of being broken or destroyed, all three of which are based on culturally derived measures of mental health.[72]

Lebanon

Although Lebanon is not experiencing a full-blown conflict now, it also shows relatively high rates of mental health disorder because of protracted civil war and on-going instability. However, its mental health infrastructure, particularly the facilities for psychiatric patients, is far more well developed than the other countries discussed here. The effect of war on the mental health of youth in Lebanon has been demonstrated in a number of ways.[73] Karam and colleagues found that people in the 11–35 age-group at the onset of Lebanon's war in 1975 were more likely to be exposed to war-related traumatic events compared with other age-groups.[74] In turn, the trauma of witnessing violence, losing a loved one and being a civilian in a war zone increased the chances of developing a mood disorder, while being under 10 years old at the onset of war increased the risk of an onset of anxiety and mood disorders later in life. Another study conducted by Karam and colleagues in 2002–2003 found that youth had higher rates of both anxiety and substance-abuse disorders at the time of the survey.[75] These studies do not include the more than 450,000 Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A survey conducted by Chaaban and colleagues in 2010 indicated that 27 percent of Palestinian refugees aged 20–55 reported experiencing psychological problems, including depression and anxiety, over the 12-month period preceding the survey.[76]

Across Arab countries

The region's mental health services do not meet the burden of the region's wide prevalence of psychological disorders. Comparative data on the availability of health infrastructure that addresses mental health issues indicate the extent of the problem (table 6.1). All five war-torn countries have fewer beds in mental health hospitals and fewer psychiatrists than the global median, although some countries, such as Palestine and Sudan, have more psychologists.

Other psychological effects have received relatively little attention. Impaired cognitive functioning, mood disorders and culturally relevant syndromes might be as prevalent as more frequently studied effects and may actually result in longer-term challenges to functioning. Some attempts have been made to fill this gap, including a study by McNeely and colleagues, who developed contextually appropriate measures linking the broader sociopolitical environment of human insecurity with psychological trauma in Palestine.[77] Other work aims to bridge the divide between trauma-based approaches (that is, PTSD) and an emphasis on the difficulties of daily life, such as those in Lebanon after the civil war of the mid 1970s and 1980s, in Algeria after the civil war of the 1990s, and in the West Bank, where daily adversity because of conflict explains high rates of psychological distress among survivors.[78]

The cost of the effects of mental illness on large portions of the population is more than the sum of these individuals. The emphasis on the prevalence rates of psychological disorders highlights the larger limitation of the current body of mental health research in conflict-affected countries in the region. Using PTSD as the main or sole measure necessitates a focus on acute trauma to the individual, but the experiences of youth and of the effects on youth are shared at the population level.

Many young people do not develop adverse psychological conditions despite exposure to war and the constraints imposed by war on their lives and prospects for future development. Evidence suggests that the influence of adversity,

Table 6.1 Mental health infrastructure in conflict-affected Arab countries, per 100,000 population

	Beds in mental hospitals	Psychiatrists in the mental health sector	Psychologists in the mental health sector
Iraq	4.26	0.27	0.15
Lebanon	39.44	1.41	2.12
Palestine	5.24	0.82	0.34
Somalia	4.17	0.04	0.00
Sudan	0.42	0.06	0.48
Syria	6.09	0.31	0.10
World median	7.50	1.27	0.30

Source: WHO 2011b.

including war, on well-being is mediated by the presence of a variety of protective factors both within the individual and in the surrounding social and physical environments. These factors are sometimes characterized as resilience.

Resilience was originally conceptualized as a trait of individuals who were apparently not as prone to mental illness if they were exposed to certain hardships or stressors.[79] Increasingly, however, resilience is being identified outside individuals in social sources of support, which is particularly relevant to societies weakened by war.[80] Managing exposure to the psychological effects of war is dependent on individuals being able to tap into familiar sources of support, including economic and educational opportunities as well as local social networks. In Palestine, for example, people who can go back to school or regain employment and family ties to normalize their living conditions, even if conflict is on-going or has permanently altered daily life, are the least likely to exhibit symptoms of mental conditions.[81]

Policy interventions should thus seek to highlight the structural constraints imposed by war on the development of youth, including macro-level political, economic and social factors.[82] A more ecological understanding of the effects of conflict—one that takes into consideration a broader range of the effects of violent conflict such as human insecurity and economic constraints—is essential to capturing the relationship between both war and violence and psychological well-being.

6.4 The impact of conflict on education and employment

Losses in education have a lasting effect on development, one that can lead to irredeemable intergenerational losses in well-being.[83] Losses in education because of conflict thus have a dual impact. First, they reduce productivity among the generation incurring the loss, which limits economic opportunity among future generations. Second, they indirectly expose the country to a higher risk of perpetuated conflict through these economic losses, particularly in the case of civil war. The danger of a violence trap from a damaged education system is more directly at play in the sociocultural and political value of a conciliatory educational system that aims to build peace and trust, a value lost with the disruptions in education that violence might cause. Conversely, education in crises can play a dual humanitarian-development function whereby it not only meets basic schooling needs, but can also serve as a means of transitioning out of crises into recovery.[84]

Syria

Prior to the crisis, Syria had achieved a 93.1 percent net enrollment rate in primary education and a 62 percent net enrollment rate in secondary education. By 2013, these rates had dropped to 67 and 44 percent, respectively.[85] Almost two years after the conflict had erupted, over 11 percent of schools in Syria had been damaged or destroyed, and another 9 percent were being used as shelters.[86] There had also been numerous reported attacks on the teachers and staff of educational facilities as well as students, including kidnappings and threats. The Ministry of Higher Education reported that public universities in Damascus had received 40,000 students displaced from other universities in the country, and sources at the University of Damascus claimed that 10 percent of its faculty members had left the country by the end of 2013.[87] These events will have severe consequences for the educational attainment and educational achievement of thousands of Syria's youth.

Additionally, the Assistance Coordination Unit reported large regional gender disparities in secondary school attendance rates that were attributed to the security situation and the presence of ruling groups of different ideologies.[88] Colleges and universities were reportedly less affected than primary and secondary schools, except in Ar-Raqqa, a Da'esh stronghold in October 2014.[89]

Recent evidence suggests that, in some parts of the country, the curricula of schools that continue to operate in areas controlled by Da'esh have been

changed.[90] The start of the 2014 school year came with a modified curriculum in northeastern Syria. Philosophy, art and music were eliminated, and history and religious education among minorities was banned. In addition to resembling the Salafist curriculum, the new educational system adopted in some parts of Iraq and Syria where Da'esh is in control has become entirely gender segregated.[91]

Similarly, in 2014, the Syrian Ministry of Education reformed the official education programme, replacing nationalist education with civic education, with noted departures from a focus on Baathist history and state formation.[92] To the extent that these rapid changes in curricula are implemented, differences in curricula risk widening the gap among Syrian youth receiving education: to the same extent that education can be an invaluable tool to mitigate conflict through equal access, economic opportunity and the teaching of equality and tolerance, it can also be perniciously divisive.[93]

In the few years preceding the conflict, close to 19 percent of the Syrian labour force aged 15–24 was unemployed, and about 15 percent had been unemployed for over a year.[94] Syrian youth labour force participation was one of the lowest in the Arab world, especially among young women. However, unemployment rates increased dramatically, from almost 15 percent in 2011 to 57.7 by the end of 2014.[95] Youth became over-represented in informal employment and in non-contractual and unregistered work, which is far less secure and offers fewer benefits than the formal sector. If pre-conflict youth unemployment had displayed the same rate of increase as overall unemployment, it would probably have reached around 76 percent in 2014. Poverty also showed a parallel rise, reaching almost 82.5 percent in 2014, while extreme poverty hit 64.7 percent.[96]

On the eve of the conflict, Syria had a high rate of youth inactivity relative to the rest of the region; 35 percent of young men and over 71 percent of young women were neither in the labour force nor in education.[97] The effect of conflict on this category varied. Drops in enrollment meant that more youth were leaving education; the reported household security and safety concerns have meant that many of the youth leaving education were simply staying home, thereby increasing the inactivity rate.[98] Against this, the number of first-time entrants in the labour force among young people was rising, as more people were seeking to make ends meet.[99] In 2013, Syria suffered the second worst economic contraction recorded in a single year; the deterioration in GDP increased in each quarter, and GDP fell to 39 percent of the 2010 level.[100] Private consumption, a more direct measure of household welfare, showed a similar pattern.[101] This massive loss in productive capacity and well-being will affect education and employment for years to come.

Iraq

Years of war, violence and sanctions in Iraq have caused the country to fall behind on a raft of educational indicators. Youth illiteracy (15–29) has climbed back to 15 percent among young men and 20 percent among young women, higher than regional averages.[102] Educational attainment is higher among men for the cohort born in the early 1960s than for all younger groups and has been stagnant among adult women born between the mid-1960s and the 1990s.[103] Net secondary enrollment is 44 percent (39 percent among young women in 2007), and gross tertiary enrollment is around 16 percent.[104] Seventy-five percent of children not enrolled in school are girls, and over a fifth of adolescent girls are married.[105] The children of uneducated mothers are three times more likely to be wed young than the children of mothers with secondary education.[106] Urban youth are far more likely to attend secondary school than rural youth, and young women in the top socioeconomic quintile are more than three times more likely to be literate than young women in the poorest quintile.[107]

In the climate of rising sectarian tensions of the years following the U.S. invasion, the Iraqi educational system could have served to promote a culture of tolerance and unity. Instead, sectarian bias appears in the curriculum for religion, and disunity prevails in the development of an educational programme specific to the autonomous Kurdish region.[108] Because of the recent surge in violence and the seizure by Da'esh of parts of northern Iraq, regional disparities are likely to rise further: schools in Mosul now follow Da'esh–dictated curriculum, a sharp departure from the national school curriculum.[109]

Iraqi youth in the labour force are significantly more likely to be working outside Iraq than their older counterparts. The same is true of the university educated, whose situation partly reflects the frequent attacks on academics and educational facilities, especially in the few years after the invasion.[110] For the academic and teaching corps who stayed in Iraq, the years of sanctions brought isolation from

the larger regional community of knowledge and extreme deprivation of the most basic of teaching materials and resources.[111] The Ministry of Higher Education responded with measures to protect academics and safeguard the higher educational system. Academics were allowed to work from home part of the time, and distance-learning programmes were set up with organizations.[112]

Palestine

Israel's policies of closure and the restriction of movement within and between the West Bank and Gaza and between Palestine and other countries affect young people disproportionately. These policies limit not only the access of youth to education and jobs, they also indirectly affect the families of youth because of the reduced remittances and income. The case of the second Intifada is a clear illustration: the unemployment rate was consistently higher among young workers than among the overall labour force, but, during the second Intifada and immediately following, the increase in unemployment was far more rapid among young people.[113]

While Palestine shows good enrollment rates in secondary and tertiary education relative to world averages, there are issues. In 2013, a report published by the Ministry of National Economy and Applied Research Institute found that 65 percent of young Palestinians are dissatisfied with their academic specialization, mainly because of financial hardship, the cost of tuition and the lack of proper guidance or information.[114] Indeed, Palestine shows the highest rate of youth (15–25 years) inactivity of any Arab country.[115] Close to 63 percent of this age-group are neither students nor in the labour force. The rate is alarmingly high among women, at 81 percent. While this statistic is one of a hallmark of countries experiencing protracted or large-scale violence, the rate of Palestinian youth (15–29 years) in transition—unemployed or employed in unsatisfactory jobs—is also high, at around 32 percent.[116] Income is significantly correlated with a successful transition from education to the labour force; education, however, plays no significant role.[117]

Even before the war of 2014, the blockade had gradually made Gaza uninhabitable.[118] Among families, 80 percent were in need of humanitarian assistance; hospitals were already running on emergency reserves; factories were laying off workers, and youth unemployment was at 50 percent.[119] A ban on imports of building materials into Gaza meant that nine construction projects in 10 (including 12 schools of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East [UNRWA]) were suspended. Because of power cuts, limits on the importation of diesel fuel and the rising price of fuel and basic food stuffs, jobs were few.

The blockade also means that Palestinian workers in Gaza are denied the opportunity to train abroad and lack exposure to the latest technology and expertise in areas such as health care, a loss that is especially difficult to bear during times of crisis.[120] The armed conflict of 7 July to 26 August 2014 was the deadliest escalation in hostilities to affect Gaza since 1967; 1,563 Palestinian civilians were killed, including 538 children and 306 women.[121] On top of the virtual crippling of all economic activity during the military campaign, the heavy casualties and the permanent maiming and disabling of civilians, the Israeli offensive damaged six UNRWA schools sheltering refugees (such attacks on UN schools are not new; two UNRWA schools were hit by Israeli fire during Operation Cast Lead in 2009).[122] The Islamic University of Gaza was also badly damaged by Israeli rockets, as had happened during the 2008–2009 offensive.

Somalia

In 2010, Somalia stood near the bottom of the world's Human Development Index rankings, at 165 out of 170.[123] In a country that had suffered a protracted civil war and still suffers great destitution, sharp inequalities threaten development as they perpetuate two traps: poverty and violence. In 2006, a quarter of young Somali women (15–29) were illiterate. A survey conducted in 2012 showed that 48 percent of youth were literate (53 percent of young men and 43 percent of young women) and that youth literacy was higher in urban areas.[124] While these rates are still alarmingly low, there is a glimmer of hope: the cohort aged 15–29 shows higher literacy than the overall adult population, particularly men.

Somalia's youth unemployment rate of 67 percent in 2012—and the average duration of a period of unemployment reaching one year—is among the world's highest.[125] The rate among young women stood at 74 percent. Somalia, like Syria, shows a high rate of inactive youth: around 21 percent were neither in the labour force nor in education in 2012.

According to a UNDP survey conducted for the Somalia National Human Development Report 2012 that covered more than 3,300 young Somali men and women aged 14 to 29, many of the inactive

young men gave no reason for their inactivity, indicating lack of hope.[126] Young people are already heavily involved in the Somali conflict: they form much of the membership of Al-Shabaab and many other armed groups and militias. In fact, inactive young people are more susceptible to being drawn into such behaviour. Financial incentives appear to be the primary reason for youth voluntarily joining armed groups, and grievances are the second.[127] But, where grievances are the main motivator, relative deprivation, marginalization and exclusion stand out.

The conflict is so prolonged in Somalia that the country seems stuck in a statelessness trap.[128] Many Somalis may not ascribe the prolongation of violence to state failure and have become wary of empowering a central authority. This has led to the emergence of groups who support local governance and conflict reduction, but are suspicious of state revival, particularly as a generation comes of age, but has no living memory of a functioning central state.[129]

Sudan

Before South Sudan's independence, regional indicators of illiteracy and unemployment were highest in the southern areas of Sudan and showed significant regional disparity: women in conflict areas were at a higher risk of illiteracy than men and women in non-conflict areas.[130] Today, following South Sudan's independence, literacy rates in Sudan are highest in the capital and lowest in the conflict-affected regions of Darfur and eastern Sudan. 2012 data indicate that 73.4 percent of Sudanese aged above 15 years are able to read and write.[131]

While gender gaps in education and labour market participation in Sudan remain well above world averages for developing countries, they have been shrinking. In 2012, the ratio of literacy rates among women to literacy rates among men was 73 percent for the entire population, but 84 percent among the 15–24 age-group.[132] However, these rates obscure large geographical and socio-economic disparities: the enrollment of young women in secondary schools exceeds the enrollment of young men in urban areas and among the richest quintile.[133]

Sudan also shows an alarming rate of youth unemployment, particularly among urban youth and among young women.[134] In 2013, the unemployment rate among young people, at 24.5 percent, was almost double the rate among adults (12.5 percent).[135] Youth unemployment is 27.5 percent among young women versus 20.4 percent among adults.[136] The unemployed are mostly first-time job seekers (70 percent of 15–19-year-olds and 34 percent of 20–24-year-olds), but a sizeable share are jobless because they are discouraged (19 percent and 32 percent, respectively).[137] While unemployment decreases with higher educational attainment among the overall population, education is associated with higher rates of unemployment among young people: unemployment is highest among youth with more than secondary educational attainment (48.7 percent) and lowest among illiterate youth (23.4 percent).[138]

6.5 Forced migration and its impact on youth

Forced migration resulting from war or looming conflict is one of the most serious socio-economic issues facing the region. In 2013, there were 10.7 million individuals newly displaced from their homes as a result of conflict. Both the duration and the speed of escalation of these conflicts are bound to intensify the social, economic and political exclusion of refugees. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the largest internal displacements in 2013 related to conflict and violence were in Syria (6.5 million), Sudan (2.4 million), Iraq (2.1 million) and Somalia (1.1 million).[139] By July 2015, those displaced by the Syrian conflict alone had reached 11.6 million.[140] Of these, 7.6 million were internally displaced persons, while the rest were refugees (that is, outside their country of nationality). Children under 18 years constituted 50 percent of the global refugee population in 2013, the highest share in a decade.[141] Somali children ranked high among roughly 25,300 asylum applications lodged by unaccompanied or separated children in 77 countries in 2013.

Long-term displacements create generations who lack access to quality education and thus

reproduce and deepen the negative effects of forced displacements. Since the beginning of the war in Syria, 90 percent of the Syrian refugee children and youth aged 6–17 are estimated to be out of school.[142] In 2013, of 2.8 million Syrian refugees outside the borders of their own country, less than 359,000 children were enrolled in formal primary or secondary education.[143] In Jordan, where the Syrian refugee population reached an estimated 800,000 in 2014, secondary-school enrollment rates recorded in Zaatari camp (the largest, with close to 160,000 refugees) were at 24 percent among girls and 15 percent among boys.[144] Of the Syrian refugees in Lebanon, almost 30 percent of the men and 36 percent of the women are 15–29 years old. The gross secondary-school enrollment ratio among Syrian refugees in Lebanon is 19 percent (16 percent among young men and 24 percent among young women).[145] Considering Syria's enrollment rates before the crisis, the loss of schooling among the refugees in these host countries is stark. Syrian children also face a number of other barriers in the educational systems in host countries. While the national Syrian curriculum is solely in Arabic, for example, Lebanon's is in English and French. Moreover, Syrian children at Lebanese schools have been facing discrimination, violence and acculturation issues and a lack of support in the classroom.[146] The Lebanese Ministry of Education and Higher Education has imposed barriers to the registration of refugees that are sometimes prohibitive to the education of refugees in public schools.[147]

Similarly, access to education among internally displaced persons is negatively affected by conflict, as is evident in the case of Somalia.[148] Post-conflict trends in other cases show that lower educational attainment among conflict-affected cohorts persists because these cohorts rarely resume their education after the conflict has ended.[149]

Conflict can also have spillover effects on the educational system and labour market of neighbouring countries hosting refugees. In Lebanon, for example, UNESCO estimates that 140,000 Lebanese school-age children are directly affected by the demands represented by Syrian refugees on the Lebanese educational system.[150] The influx of Syrian labourers has also put downward pressure on wages in the informal sectors in both Jordan and Lebanon.[151]

Another consequence of forced displacement is the severing of ties within the family, a major protection and support institution in Arab societies. This is bound to have a multiplier effect on the future of refugees. Internally displaced persons in Somalia are often members of minority clans who lose their social support when uprooted, are subject to exploitation and violence and are vulnerable to recruitment by armed groups, particularly if the households of internally displaced persons are headed by women or children.[152] The family unit has often been shattered; children have been separated from their parents, as reported in the Zaatari refugee camp in Jordan, where grandparents stay with their grandchildren, while parents remain back home to secure a possible income and to protect the family's property.[153] Decision-making roles and responsibilities in the household thus shift abruptly: children become breadwinners, and women take responsibility for raising the children and earning income after losing their partners.

6.6 Conflict and civic participation

'Truth is the first casualty of war,' they say. Trust may well be the second. War and violent conflict undercut social and political trust and reduce political participation in mainstream civic life. Exposure to violence can reduce trust in political institutions that fail to ensure public security, as in Somalia, leading to political apathy. If state institutions can no longer provide political order or jobs, young people may be attracted to extremist groups or their ideologies. Rebel leaders have always known this.

"In the south [of Sudan], it pays to rebel", said Dr John Garang de Mabior, leader of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in 1983.[154]

The breakdown of state institutions and power struggles among armed factions have led to a rise in sectarian politics, a fairly new development in countries such as Iraq and Syria.[155] With the increasingly sectarian tone of the conflict and the emergence of groups operating in the name of Islam or other religious and ethnic identities in

Syria, people are likely to depend more heavily for care on religious networks and other types of organizations that emphasize social differences, as in Lebanon.[156] Some reports on the evolution of civic life under war conditions in Syria indicate, however, that the conflict has stimulated civic participation and enhanced social capital in the country.[157]

Similarly, youth in war-torn countries of the Arab region report higher levels of altruism vis-à-vis strangers than their counterparts in more peaceful countries both in the Arab region and among middle-income countries worldwide (annex 2 figure A.15). This finding is consistent with studies in other regions, where citizens in war-torn countries express particularly high generosity towards and feelings of solidarity with others.

Youth, especially young men, are usually the largest demographic group in armed organizations and are often depicted as especially prone to violence, in what may be considered a form of political participation.[158] Yet, most young people do not engage in violence. Although reliable data are few, most extremist groups have low memberships, especially as a share of the total youth population.[159] The U.S. Department of State put the membership in Al-Qa'eda in Iraq, a precursor to Da'esh and the largest Sunni extremist group in Iraq, at only 1,000–2,000 in 2012.[160] More recent estimates from September 2014 indicate that the group may have more than 30,000 fighters, but this is still small compared with the overall youth population in the countries where it operates, and it also includes fighters recruited globally. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab was estimated to have several thousand members, including foreigners, although its numbers were bolstered by alliances with certain clan militias in some areas.[161]

But why do the young people who engage in violence do it? Some motivations reflect a feeling of lack of choice in a collapsing social order or the need to support themselves and their families.[162] They may do it for money, in response to grievances such as poverty and economic or political exclusion, or to avenge violence against themselves or loved ones.[163] Some may be coerced into joining.[164] In many cases, the decisions of a minority of young people to enlist in militant organizations or to engage in acts of violence can be viewed as a form of resistance and may reflect resilience under challenging circumstances rather than resignation. Resistance and resilience imply agency, but resignation connotes despair.

If social capital is well developed, young people may be less likely to join armed groups. If local associations serve and engage youth, whether in sports clubs or civil defence units, young people have alternative outlets for their energies through which they may gain a sense of community inclusion.[165]

During wartime, new forms of civic and political participation emerge, which, under certain conditions, may have a liberating effect during the post-conflict period. Some research on war-torn sub-Saharan African countries indicates that political participation—such as registering to vote and attending community meetings, as well as civic engagement, such as membership in political groups and local associations—increases during and after violent conflict.[166] Exposure to violence is associated with increased social trust and associational membership, perhaps because of post-traumatic growth or an enhanced appreciation of life and reordering of priorities—after living through conflict—that leads to more intimate relationships with others and a greater sense of personal strength and development.[167]

In its tribes and groupings around the world, humankind lives under a delicate and brittle shell of apparent order and stability. Shatter it, and the worst elements sneak out. Autocrats have always known that, arguing "après moi le déluge" ("after me the flood"), and usually secure the often begrudging quiescence of their people. Yet, when the protective structure breaks, no one can predict how long the devastation will last or how widely it will spread.

There will always be conflict. Humankind's hope is to minimize the conditions where it thrives, lessening thereby the scope for conflict itself. As every generation—today's young—learns the awful costs of warmongering and civil conflict, their yearning for a return to stability grows.

Endnotes

1 Farmer 2004, p. 307. "Structural violence is violence exerted systematically—that is, indirectly—by everyone who belongs to a certain social order".... The term was used by Johan Galtung in 1969 "Broadly to describe 'sinful' social structures characterized by poverty and steep grades of social inequality, including racism and gender inequality."

2 UNHCR 2015d. The Global Peace Index 2013 Report also shows the worst deterioration for the MENA region of any region over the past seven years. See Institute for Economics and Peace 2013.

3 The five countries stand out both within the region and globally for the intensity and duration of violence occurring in their territories. Accordingly, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), a widely cited database for categorizing and analysing wars and armed conflicts, classifies these countries as cases of high conflict. The UCDP database differentiates between "minor" conflicts, in which between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths occur, and "wars," in which at least 1,000 battle-related deaths result in a given year (UCDP various years). By these definitions, all of the countries covered in this chapter qualify as wars or full-blown civil conflict based on their coding since at least 2011, and in most cases for many years prior. Libya and Yemen, too, have more recently slid into states of civil war, with competing factions, often based on tribal and regional affiliations, vying for local and sometimes national power, although given the especially recent and dynamic nature of conflict in these countries, they are not covered in detail in this chapter.

4 World Bank 2011: xvi

5 Dixon, McDonald, and Roberts 2002.

6 On the effects of war on health, see Levy and Sidel (2007).

7 WHO developed the concept of health-adjusted life expectancy (HALE) to provide a more accurate picture of actual health than standard measures, such as life expectancy at birth, convey. HALE measures the number of healthy years an individual is expected to live at birth by subtracting the years of ill health, which are weighted according to their severity, from overall life expectancy (WHO http://www.who.int/healthinfo/statistics/indhale/en/).

8 Data on health outcomes from the Global Burden of Disease dataset of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation are not available after 2010.

9 World Bank 2015b.

10 UN ESCWA 2013c, p. 16.

11 UN ESCWA 2013c, p. 17.

12 Ghobarah, Huth, and Russett 2004.

13 Chen, Loayza, and Reynal-Querol 2008.

14 UNOCHA 2015b.

15 SCPR, UNRWA and UNDP 2015.

16 Mehchy 2014.

17 ACAPS 2014, p. 21.

18 WHO 2013e.

19 WHO 2014a.

20 For more on the effects of war and conflict on the Iraqi health system, see Dewachi 2014.

21 WHO 2006a.

22 Medact 2004.

23 Ali, Blacker, and Jones 2003.

24 Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation. Data come from 1990 and 2010.

25 WHO and Republic of Iraq 2008.

26 Roberts and others 2004.

27 Guerrero-Serdan 2009.

28 Save the Children 2007.

29 UNICEF 2007.

30 Medact 2008.

31 UNICEF 2003.

32 Medact 2008.

33 Al Hilfi, Lafta, and Burnham 2013.

34 WHO 2010b.

35 WHO 2010b.

36 WHO 2010b, p. 16.

37 WHO 2010b.

38 UNDP 2010.
39 UNDP 2012a; Norris and Bruton 2011.
40 UNHCR 2014a.
41 UNICEF 2008.
42 UNDP 2014c.
43 WHO 2011a, p. 20–21.
44 UNDP 2012a.
45 World Bank 2013a.
46 WHO 2011a.
47 WHO 2011a; World Bank 2013a.
48 Tiilikainen 2012.
49 WHO 2010a.
50 WHO 2009b.
51 WHO 2009b, p. 22.
52 Barber 2008.
53 American Psychiatric Association 2013.
54 Depressive disorders refer to a set of symptoms indicating sadness or irritability that exceeds normal levels and is often accompanied by physical functions such as aches, low energy, or difficulties in sleeping and eating.
55 Ferrari and others 2013.
56 Dewey 2013.
57 Ferrari and others 2013.
58 Dewey 2013.
59 Al-Hasnawi and others 2009.
60 Al-Hasnawi and others 2009.
61 Ahmad and others 2000.
62 Razokhi and others 2006.
63 Al-Hadeth and others 2014.
64 Al-Shawi and others 2011.
65 Al-Hamzawi and others 2014.
66 Ministry of Health (Palestine) 2008.
67 Elbedour and others 2007.
68 Qouta and El-Sarraj 2004; Qouta, Punamäki, and El-Sarraj 2003.
69 Giacaman and others 2004.
70 Ahmad and others 2000; Karam and others 1998.
71 Macksoud and Aber 1996.
72 McNeely and others 2014.
73 Though no longer a war-torn country, Lebanon is included as it offers a wealth of data on the health impacts of war on young people.
74 Karam and others 2008.
75 Karam and others 2006.
76 Chaaban and others 2010.
77 McNeely and others 2014.
78 Al-Krenawi, Lev-Wiesel, and Sehwail 2007; De Jong 2004; Farhood and others 1993.
79 Olsson and others 2003.
80 Rutter 1999.
81 Nguyen-Gillham and others 2008.
82 Summerfield 2001.
83 Blattman and Miguel 2010; Blattman and Annan 2010.
84 Barakat and others 2012, p. 126.
85 World Bank 2015b.
86 HRW 2013a.
87 Al-Monitor 2014a.
88 SNAP 2014.
89 SNAP 2014.

[90] Mehchy 2014, p. 17.
[91] Al-Monitor 2014b.
[92] Hassan 2014.
[93] Barakat and others 2012; Brown 2011.
[94] IFAD 2011; ILO 2012a.
[95] SCPR and UNDP 2015.
[96] SCPR, UNRWA and UNDP 2015.
[97] ILO 2012a.
[98] ILO 2014a; REACH 2014; UNHCR 2013c, 2014b.
[99] ILO 2014h; UNICEF 2013a.
[100] SCPR, UNRWA and UNDP 2014; World Bank 2013a.
[101] SCPR, UNRWA and UNDP 2014.
[102] Dewachi 2014.
[103] Shafiq 2012.
[104] World Bank 2013a.
[105] UNICEF 2012a.
[106] UNICEF 2012a.
[107] UNICEF 2012a.
[108] Mohammed 2010.
[109] Al-Monitor 2014b.
[110] By 2013, 500 academics had been killed (Schwitzer 2013); see also GCPEA 2014; Shafiq 2012.
[111] Powers 2008.
[112] UNESCO 2009.
[113] Daoud 2014.
[114] Abu Fasheh 2013.
[115] ILO 2012b.
[116] Sadeq 2014.
[117] Sadeq 2014.
[118] The Guardian 2013.
[119] Shaban 2014.
[120] Abu Sittah 2014; Shaban 2014.
[121] UN OCHA 2015a.
[122] Abu Sittah 2014.
[123] UNDP 2012a.
[124] UNDP 2012a.
[125] UNDP 2012a.
[126] UNDP 2012a.
[127] UNDP 2012a.
[128] Menkhaus 2011.
[129] Menkhaus 2011.
[130] Ali, Blacker, and Jones 2003.
[131] UNESCO 2015.
[132] Nour 2014.
[133] Nour 2014.
[134] Ministry of Human Resources and Labour (Sudan) 2013.
[135] ILO 2014b.
[136] Abuagla, Yousef and Badr 2013.
[137] UNDP 2012b, p. 58
[138] Nour 2011.
[139] IDMC 2014.
[140] UNHCR 2015d.
[141] UNHCR 2013b.
[142] UNHCR 2013c.
[143] UNHCR 2013c.

[144] ILO 2014a.
[145] ILO 2013.
[146] Shuayb 2014.
[147] Parkinson 2014.
[148] Smith and Smith 2012.
[149] UNESCO 2010.
[150] UNESCO 2013.
[151] ILO 2013; UNDP 2013.
[152] UNDP 2012a; UNICEF 2013b.
[153] Sharpe 2013.
[154] Ali, Blacker, and Jones 2003.
[155] Davis 2005; Jaber 2003.
[156] Cammett 2014 and Thomas 2013, p. 3.
[157] Harling and Birke 2014.
[158] Urdal 2006; 2007.
[159] Sommers 2011; Barker 2005.
[160] U.S. Department of State 2013: 282
[161] U.S. Department of State 2013: 289
[162] Humphreys and Weinstein 2008.
[163] Bloom 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Moser and Rodgers 2005; Østby 2007; Richards 1996; Stewart 2008.
[164] Humphreys and Weinstein 2008.
[165] Cuesta, Alda, and Lamas 2007; Dowdney 2005; Peters, Richards, and Vlassenroot 2003.
[166] Bellows and Miguel 2009; Blattman 2009; Gáfaro, Ibáñez, and Justino 2014.
[167] Carmil and Breznitz 1991; Tedeschi, Park, and Calhoun 1998; Tedeschi and Calhoun 2004.
[168] UNFPA 2013b.

Chapter 7

Exclusion, mobility and migration

The chapter reviews migration patterns to and from the 22 Arab countries, and the profile of young migrants in the GCC and in Western OECD countries. It then examines youth's reasons to migrate and possible exclusion factors, and envisages the role of migration policies in receiving or sending states, before emphasizing the role of inclusion in the migration process. Lastly, the chapter highlights impediments to the mobility of labor. The chapter emphasizes the range and diversity of capabilities allowing youth to migrate in sizeable numbers to other countries inside the region, as well as outside the Arab region. However, it also questions the origin countries' continuous reliance on youth exit in order to curb unemployment and increase national households' income through remittances.

7.1 Migration pressures and patterns

Most common among 20–30-year-olds, migration is intrinsic to human development, in a process of expanding a population's options and skills. The act of migration enhances capabilities: some people migrate to access better financial, educational or professional opportunities; others, to obtain greater security or more political rights.

Those unable to use their capabilities at home may seek to migrate from a national economy failing to incorporate young professionals; from a socioeconomic, political, or religious setting discriminating against youth; or from a subnational space (for example, where unequal access to development prevents fulfillment at home).[1] Against a backdrop of tightening international borders, transnational circulation is becoming more difficult for some groups, notably, low-skilled, developing-country workers who are often denied Amartya Sen's five "Instrumental freedoms" that spatial mobility can offer, especially "Protective security".[2]

For an individual, crossing a border is the endpoint of a web of push factors at the personal, family and community level and at the macro-political and societal level, among which the scarcity of Sen's five instrumental freedoms may well loom large. Yet, crossing a border may also involve a process of inclusion mediated by pull factors through one's ability to use the remnants of these freedoms to expand the freedoms abroad.

Most Arab countries are marked by outward migration; yet, the vast stock of immigrants in GCC countries means that Arab countries as a whole receive more migrants (Arab and non-Arab) than they send out. (This is shown by data on the immigrant stock, refugees and non-refugees, in the Arab region and on Arab emigrants inside and outside the region).[3] An estimated 27 million immigrants live within the borders of the richer Gulf countries of the region; these countries took in about 80 percent of all immigrants (Arab and non-Arab) in the region in 2010–2014 (annex 2 table A.16). Jordan and Lebanon stand out as both major migrant receivers and migrant senders: 9 percent and 14 percent of their national populations are expatriated abroad, while 19 percent and 22 percent of their resident populations consist of foreign migrants.[4]

Recent conflicts have left a huge mark on migration patterns. Some countries already embroiled in open conflict or threatened by looming violence have always been migrant-sending, but political instability accentuates these trends. The number of Syrian emigrants living abroad in 2010 was 415,745 or 1.9 percent of the total resident population, a share that had shot up to nearly 14 percent by mid-2014 (see annex 2 table A.16).[5] Oil-producing Iraq and Libya used to be destinations for huge numbers of migrant workers until the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the overthrow of the Libyan regime in 2011. Before the Libyan revolution, the International Organization for Migration estimated that roughly 2.5 million foreigners were living in the country.[6] The country is again receiving flows of sub-Saharan African and Asian migrants, some of whom are seeking to reach Europe from the Libyan coast. As of mid-2014, more than 1 million Egyptian workers (along with some from Tunisia) were said to have returned to Libya to work owing to high unemployment in Egypt, but recent battles have forced some to move back to Egypt.

Migration from Arab countries in West Asia is directed towards other Arab countries, while migration from GCC countries and Arab countries in North Africa is mostly to non-Arab countries. Citizens of Arab countries in North Africa migrate in huge numbers to Europe, mainly France, Italy and Spain; citizens of GCC countries are dispersed between Australia, Europe and North America (Canada and the United States), and many Lebanese have settled in South America and West Africa (figure 7.1). By contrast, refugees from war-torn or politically unstable countries (Iraq, Mauritania, Somalia and Syria) remain largely confined to neighbouring countries: most Mauritanians are in Senegal; Somalis have sought refuge in neighbouring East African countries, and, as of August 2015, more than 630,000 refugees from Syria were in Jordan, almost 1.2

Figure 7.1 **Arab migration by region of destination (Arab or other countries), 2010–2014**



Source: Annex 2 table A.17.

Figure 7.2 **Arab migrants outside the Arab region: main destinations, 2010–2014**



Source: Annex 2 table A.17.

million in Lebanon and 1.8 million in Turkey, besides seeking shelter in Egypt and Iraq (annex 2 table A.17; figure 7.2).

North African countries, including Egypt, do not have large shares of migrants, unlike GCC countries. The share in Qatar, for example, is 90 percent (annex 2 table A.16). Immigrants to the GCC countries, as well as to Jordan and Lebanon, come from the Arab world and Asia. Partial data emphasize the dominant share of Asian migrants in the GCC countries; Indians make up the majority: 2.0–2.8 million in Saudi Arabia, 544,000 in Qatar and 700,000 in Kuwait (figure 7.2; annex 2 table A.18).[7] An estimated 100,000 women workers from Indonesia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka work in Jordan as domestic helpers; in Lebanon, workers in that sector include a high share of Ethiopian nationals, alongside Asian nationalities. In Libya, some pools of migrants from Asia, Egypt and sub-Saharan Africa are said to have returned (or never left their home countries) since the onset of the conflict in 2011.[8] Among Arab migrants, Egyptians account for the lion's share: an estimated 482,000 in Kuwait or 21 percent of all migrants and over 1 million in Saudi Arabia. Egyptians also represented 71 percent of all permit-holding foreign workers in Jordan in the late 2000s.[9] In Lebanon, Syrians are the most numerous as workers before the Syrian war and as workers and refugees today.

7.2 Profile of young migrants from the Arab region

Migrants to the GCC countries are often skilled and highly skilled men

Most young migrants to the GCC countries are men who perform highly skilled activities. Partial data for the GCC countries indicate that non-national Arab populations in GCC countries consist mainly of men: 205 men for every 100 women, on average, in Kuwait, for instance.[10] Among the Arab migrants ages 15 and above, 15–29-year-olds comprise more

Figure 7.3 Origin of migrants in selected receiving Arab countries, around 2010



Source: Annex 2 table A.18.

than a quarter (26 percent). By comparison, young Asians, for example, account for only 18 percent of all Asian migrants in Bahrain. Many Arab nationals in Bahrain are also well educated: 22 percent are university graduates, while, among Asians, this is true of only 7 percent.[11] People from Arab countries often perform highly skilled activities: 22 percent of migrant workers are in managerial and specialist jobs, compared with 9 percent of foreign workers as a whole.[12]

This migration of largely skilled men from Arab countries to the GCC countries has demographic implications. In the GCC countries, family reunification depends on a worker's position and income, as well as the sponsor's approval (see below). Low-income workers therefore have little chance of bringing their dependants over, which may explain the higher share of young age-groups among Arab migrants to the GCC countries relative to the Asian migrants (who form the bulk of workers in oil-producing countries). Partial data on Qatar, for instance, indicate that family dependants accounted for only 17 percent of Indian expatriates in the country (among Nepalese, 0.2 percent, but, among Arabs, almost half).[13] The professional status also conditions the length of stay because highly skilled workers benefit from longer-term contracts, which are more easily renewable than those of manual workers. Some Arabs born in the GCC may be classified as foreigners and, hence, as migrants; in the GCC countries, naturalization is extremely rare.[14]

However, not all Arabs in the GCC countries match the high-income, highly educated profile. Half of the Egyptian migrants to the GCC countries have a secondary-school education and are employed in middle-range occupations such as technician or sales and services workers.[15] Even though many are skilled, Egyptians in the GCC countries may not earn sufficiently to allow them to reunify with their families because their wages either fall below an official bar such as the minimal legal income or are too low for the family to meet their living expenses in the GCC. Egyptian workers in Jordan, by contrast, are usually in low-skilled activities in agriculture, construction and hospitality services.

Migrants to OECD countries: education looms large

The composition of young migrants varies hugely by nationality. Men make up the majority of Arab migrants; there are 176 men for every 100 women. Young age-groups (15–29) make up 18 percent of all Arab migrants, and the 15–24 group makes up 10 percent. Young Somalis, for example, are a third of all Somalis in OECD countries,[16] probably because of the share of unaccompanied asylum-seeking Somali minors, while young Algerians are less than 5 percent of the total of their expatriate nationals in the region. Among nationals who are migrants of GCC countries in the region, 40–80 percent are under 25-year-olds (figure 7.3).

Sending countries can be divided into two groups based on the age of the migrants. The first group—mainly sending migrants of ages 30 and above—includes southern and eastern Mediterranean countries, from Mauritania to Syria, suggesting that most of the migrants are economically active. The second group—with a higher youth presence—includes East African countries, Yemen and, especially, the GCC countries and points to the dominance of families with children (15–19 years), as well as students (20–24 years). Saudi Arabia exemplifies the growing trend of GCC countries' student migration to Western countries (box 7.1). Arab migrants in the 15-24 age-group are likely also to be economically inactive (correlation coefficient +0.83).[17]

The proportion of graduates among Arab migrants in OECD countries is 22 percent. Among young migrants who have completed tertiary education (25–29 years), it stands at 26.1 percent. However, young Iraqis and Somalis, who often arrived as refugees, and young Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians have a below-average proportion of those attaining tertiary education, while more of the students from Arab countries in West Asia (Jordanians, Lebanese, Palestinians and Syrians), as well as young Egyptians, are highly educated (annex 2 figure A.16).

Subregional patterns—from North Africa,mixed in the Mashreq, and to the GCC. Refugees stay close to home

Outward migration prevails in Arab countries in North Africa; patterns are mixed in

Box 7.1 Growing presence of Saudi youth studying in Western universities

Students—the vast majority are young men—account for the bulk of Saudi nationals abroad. Of the country's students, 199,285 were enrolled abroad in academic year 2013–2014, from undergraduate to PhD levels, up from a low of 12,800 in 2002–2003 (table B7.1.1).

Table B7.1.1 Saudi Arabian students abroad, 2013–2014

	Males	Females	Total
Arab Countries	**13,736**	**9,050**	**22,786**
Of which Egypt	3,255	990	4,245
Jordan	6,067	1,216	7,283
Asia and Oceania	**18,251**	**3,690**	**21,941**
Of which China	1,241	175	1,416
Malaysia	1,134	227	1,411
Australia	10,734	2,268	13,002
Europe	**19,622**	**9,152**	**28,774**
Of which UK	13,794	6,458	20,252
America	**98,500**	**27,284**	**125,784**
Canada	14,280	4,646	18,926
United States	84,220	22,638	106,858
Total	**150,109**	**49,176**	**199,285**

Source: Ministry of Higher Education (Saudi Arabia) 2015.
Note: The table refers to all the students enrolled (muqayydoûn) during academic year 2013–2014, from undergraduate to PhD levels.

Their number has grown since the mid-2000s, reflecting heavy investments in education that quadrupled enrollment in tertiary education after 2000, as well as programmes to encourage studying abroad, such as the King Abdullah Scholarship Programme. This encourages young Saudis to acquire world-class training in scientific and related specialties (medicine, engineering, law, accounting, and marketing, for instance) in overseas universities to upgrade future Saudi human capital to competitive international standards.

The programme started with the United States and was expanded to other countries. Along with other incentive programmes, it provides generous financial support to Saudi students and to the spouses or other family members accompanying them. In 2013–2014, 83 percent of the 199,285 students received scholarships, and the rest paid their own expenses. A similar policy is being pursued by Oman, Qatar and United Arab Emirates.

The gains from such programmes are hard to track. No study has assessed the socio-economic or financial impact of the programmes or whether students return to their countries of origin or whether they work in the local labour market.

Figure 7.4 **Share of young migrants from Arab countries in OECD countries by nationality and age group, 2011**



Source: OECD 2014.

Arab countries in West Asia (Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Syria), and the oil-rich Gulf economies are mainly destination countries.

The Arab countries in North Africa (Comoros and Mauritania to a lesser extent) are emigration countries towards Europe; these migrants are, most often, workers 30 years of age or older. Most young migrants from the region have no tertiary education. Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine are more diverse. Jordan and Lebanon are major recipient countries of blue-collar workers from other Arab countries and from Asia, as well as refugees from neighbouring countries. The four countries are also major emigration countries, most often to other Arab countries, but especially to the oil-producing Gulf countries. Lebanese migrate everywhere. Migrants from these four countries are workers as well as families because of the relatively high skills of the workers (slightly less so among Egyptians, who are more often skilled and semi-skilled than highly skilled). The GCC countries and Libya before the 2011 uprising are major immigration countries, taking in people from Arab countries, Asians and sub-Saharan Africans. Few of their citizens emigrate; most that do are students and family dependents.

Refugees tend to cluster in neighbouring countries. Refugees from the Arab region (Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Syria) are mainly clustered in neighbouring countries, but some are also dispersed across the world, especially in northern Europe and North America. Their emigration patterns display differences in skills and age structures; yet most migrate as families. Pull factors include receiving-country policies and political trends. Somali migrants, especially, are characterized by a large proportion of younger people who only rarely have attained tertiary education.

The exclusion of the highly skilled and the flight of human capital

Migration is a symptom of the exclusion of highly skilled youth from their societies. Long before the onset of the Arab uprisings, the structural foundations of the high emigration rates from Arab countries had been pinpointed: lagging incomes, patronage-led economies, nepotism and the lack of political expression. All these hampered the socio-political engagement of youth, especially the skilled and the highly skilled. During the 2000s, Arab countries had among the highest rates worldwide of skilled emigration.[18] Several youth surveys showed an increasing number of youth seeking to emigrate. For example,

among the highly educated in Tunisia, the share of youth aged 15–29 willing to emigrate jumped from 22 percent in 1995 to 76 percent in 2005.[19] In Lebanon, a third of young graduates were willing to leave their country in 2008.[20] In 2010, 62 percent of Jordanian migrants abroad were university graduates.[21]

In Arab countries, migration is most prevalent among university graduates. For instance, in Jordan in 2011, unemployment among graduates was 16 percent, against an official overall rate of 13 percent.[22] In Morocco in the 2000s, 19 percent of graduates were without jobs in 2013, as opposed to 4.5 percent of the population holding no degree at all.[23] In Tunisia in 2010, the share of unemployed graduates was nearly double the 13 percent national rate, and matters grew worse when unemployment among graduates reached 32.6 percent in 2013.[24]

Graduate unemployment started rising in the late 1990s after many countries in the region had, in the 1980s and early 1990s, picked up the pace of economic reform and structural adjustment, joined the World Trade Organization and realigned their economies to international productivity standards, sometimes via privatization, leading to hard-hitting cutbacks in public jobs, formerly the main absorber of graduates.[25] The insertion of Arab economies into globalized markets accelerated these trends.[26] The reforms compelled employers to invest in labour-intensive, low value added economic sectors, such as industrial subcontracting, assembly and textile manufacturing, and to use low-skilled workers. Labour and wages thus became devalued and failed to satisfy the financial and social ambitions of the professional class, all the more so because skilled and highly skilled young nationals exhibit high reservation wages, "Based on expectations of obtaining public sector or foreign jobs."[27] Meanwhile, average standards of living fell everywhere in the region, as economic rationalization toughened.

Migration may also be understood as a political reaction to the nepotism and clientelism that plague all Arab countries, including educational and professional systems. The structural adjustment plans, which were seen as prerequisites for political reform in ossified polities, in fact achieved the opposite.[28] States kept tight control over economic liberalization, stymying the expected dismantling of rentier systems and monopolies of power, ironically using the international rhetoric of reform to justify greater political control.[29] Access to congested labour markets became more problematic, requiring personal connections as well as qualifications and skills. Even entrepreneurs and investors came to need such connections to cut through red tape, access markets and develop business.

The enduring power of clientelism in redistributing assets and the poor environment for evolving one's capabilities also created deep development inequalities. In Tunisia, for example, the fact that the first spark of the uprisings actually ignited in Sidi Bouzid stems from the extreme poverty in the central region, which is deprived of industry and tourism and characterized by low education, poor infrastructure and an absence of international ties.[30] In Tunisia as a whole, graduate unemployment reached 23 percent in 2010. Yet, in the centre of the country, the rates were twice as high: 46.5 percent in Gafsa and 38.5 percent in Kasserine and Tataouine. In Sidi Bouzid, the rate was 40 percent.[31]

Such development inequalities affected migration from the central region. During the 2000s, it was mainly directed towards the coastal regions of Tunisia rather than to international labour markets, which required assets and capabilities these youth did not possess.[32] Deprived of the wherewithal to emigrate legally, youth from the southern and central regions resorted en masse to irregular migration, which intensified after 2008.

According to statistics of the Tunisian Consular authorities in Tripoli, Libya, of all Tunisian migrants arrested by Libyan authorities or by the Italian coast guard, most (67 percent) came from the southern and central regions of Tunisia.[33] The would-be migrants may not have appreciated it at the time, but arrest may have saved them from drowning (box 7.2).

The overlap in the irregular sources of migration flows (in many instances, unsuccessful if immigrants are arrested) and socio-economic development inequalities are striking in Tunisia. Because infrastructure development in the poorer regions has not improved, the frustrations of younger potential workers have mounted, reproducing the factors that support precarious and irregular migration.

However, by choosing to exit rather than give voice, emigrants help maintain the conditions

of their exclusion at home.[34] The open door to emigration in all Arab states allows the states to export potential malcontents in the political, economic and social sphere and to maintain socio-political stability or stagnation. The emigration of ambitious young graduates acts as a valve, permitting the state to control its elites across generations, especially through patronage networks, at the cost of economic, social and political reform. It is a deliberate, though not widely touted policy choice of the state.

Box 7.2 When hope ends in death

The year 2015 has been murderous for migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean towards Europe. By mid-April, more than 500 people had lost their lives, 30 times more than those who had lost their lives during the same period in 2014.[1] In one weekend alone, the Italian coast guard registered more than 8,500 immigrants making their way into the country by sea.[2]

European border authorities recorded about 841,000 irregular entries by sea to the European Union between January 1998 and September 2014; about 138,000 of these occurred in 2014.[3] Several factors may explain this peak. The growing political instability in the Arab region entailed massive displacements. The summer war of 2014 in Gaza compelled youth to risk their lives to get away from poverty and hopelessness. And the collapse of the state in Libya broke down the last barrier between Africa and Europe for many in Libya.

Data of the Italian Interior Ministry, analysed by Fargues and Bonfanti (2014), show that political events correlate with massive attempts at illegal crossings by sea. Records of Tunisians entering illegally shot up after the repression of social uprisings in Gafsa region in 2008. In 2011, flows of Palestinians, Somalis, Sudanese and Syrians were mainly refugee flows. However, such dangerous migration routes are also used by mixed migration flows: Algerians, Egyptians (to a lesser extent), Moroccans and Tunisians comprise a higher share of economic migrants in these mixed migration flows.[4]

In view of the huge risks run by migrants smuggled by sea, the distinction between economic and forced migrants becomes less clear. Indeed, economic migrants seeking livelihoods to support family members back home and even better life prospects in Europe were among the 15,000 dead and missing persons counted from January 1998 to 30 September 2014, which is a minimal estimate given that many deaths remain uncounted.[5]

Source: The Report team.

1. UNHCR 2015b.

2. UNHCR 2015b.

3. Fargues and Bonfanti 2014, p. 2.

4. Fargues and Bonfanti 2014.

5. The data and the analyses discussed here are taken from Fargues and Bonfanti (2014). Data have been interpreted by the Report team.

7.3 Migration policies in receiving and sending countries

State migration policies play a central role in pulling or pushing migrants. Some receiving countries use economic policies to cherry pick the best migrants, while others are more liberal about refugee admissions. Other factors in these countries may also be at play, such as sponsorship. Most sending countries are closely involved in the migration process, but few supervise the welfare of their citizens once those citizens are abroad.

Receiving countries

The West attracts many top graduates

Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States have, over the last two decades, attracted the lion's share of the Arab region's highly skilled migrants, reflecting a strategy that encourages labour migration (rather than reunifying families or granting refugee status). Labour migration accounted for roughly two thirds of admissions in these three countries (60.7 percent in Canada, 70.6 percent in the United Kingdom and 60.3 percent in the United States in 1996–2011).[35] The share of young migrants with a tertiary education from the Arab countries in North Africa is higher in North America than in Europe, where migrants are much more numerous (annex 2 figure A.17).

The share of the younger age-groups in migrant populations serves as a rough proxy for the share of workers in a national group. A comparison of this indicator in the three main sub-regions of OECD countries (Australia, Europe and North America) shows, for instance, that the share of tertiary educated young Algerians and Tunisians in North America is twice that in Europe, where these communities are much larger and consist mainly of workers aged 30 and above. Although still in modest numbers, students from the Maghreb enroll in North American universities (in 2012, 1,200 Tunisians against 11,000 in France according to UNESCO). Some graduates who are migrants from Arab countries in North Africa work in North America as young professionals.[36]

Scandinavian countries have relatively generous refugee policies, which is why few Jordanians and Lebanese with tertiary education are in Denmark (4.3 and 8.2 percent, respectively) or Norway (7 and 0 percent, respectively), unlike France (61.5 and 71.4 percent, respectively), where they are the most highly educated of all young migrants. The skills of many migrants are not, however, recognized in receiving countries, forcing the migrants to trade down, or deskill, which has possible effects on their health (box 7.3).

Subordinating through sponsorship

The sponsorship system (kafala) has created a structural separation between migrants and local economies. Predominantly used in the GCC countries, but also in Jordan and Lebanon, the system provides that most foreign blue-collar workers and their dependants are granted only basic rights such as family reunion, access to education, health care, housing and freedom of movement and are never on an equal footing with nationals.

Foreign nationals are not meant to settle permanently or become integrated within local society; the length of stay is determined by labour contracts. Nationals and non-nationals are separated in the workplace (dual labour markets) and in the social and political spheres (dual societies).[37] This separation is engineered by the sponsorship system, a fundamental element of GCC, Jordanian and Lebanese migration policies. In these countries, the employment contract is issued by the sponsor, who may be a placement agency, a company, an institution, or an individual (if the individual is a citizen of the employing country).

The system requires the local employer to bear full economic, social and legal responsibility for the employee during the contract period, including the migrant's registration for the appropriate public services and, for business people or investors, access to markets, supplies, bank facilities, and

Box 7.3 Florence Jusot: The impact of deskilling on health among young Moroccan migrants in three European countries.

Moroccan immigrants ages 18–35 show worse health outcomes than young nonimmigrants in France, but not in Italy and Spain.[1] In France, twice as many Moroccan immigrants than native French citizens self-assessed themselves as limited in their activities because of a health problem. Conversely, in Italy and Spain, Moroccan immigrants reported relatively similar perceptions of their health status to non-immigrants. This is all the more shocking as migrants usually have better health than nonmigrants, as only those in the best health can migrate, while many unhealthy migrants return home.

Differences in legal migration frameworks and patterns of incorporation into national labour markets may induce differences in migrant health. In Italy and Spain, immigrants are selected in response to the needs of labour-intensive economic sectors (construction and agriculture for instance), which rely on workers' physical abilities, attracting young Moroccans generally less educated than those attracted to France.

Yet the gap in the self-assessment of health status between immigrants and nonimmigrants was also observed among educated migrants (France has a higher proportion of educated immigrants than Italy and Spain). Nonrecognition of skills acquired abroad and discrimination in the labour market towards some educated immigrants may then lead to deskilling and career disruptions, which may well reflect on their health.

Note: Florence Jusot is a professor at Université Paris-Dauphine and draws here on data from the European Union and North African Migrants Project: Health and Health Systems. The project, which is supported by the European Commission (EU FP7/2007-2013 grant 260715), compared the health status of North African migrants in Belgium, France, Italy and Spain. The data sources were the several waves of national health interview surveys conducted during 2004–2010 and providing information on migratory status, country of birth, health status and socio-economic status. See Moullan and Jusot (2014).

1. In the countries covered by the project, Moroccan immigrants are defined as persons born in Morocco who reside in another country. For France, immigrants are persons born in Morocco with no French citizenship at birth.

so on. In return, the sponsor controls salary and work conditions. National labour laws are typically only sporadically enforced and exclude the most sensitive sectors, including the domestic sector. The sponsor's clearance is required for the migrant to leave the host country, and the worker's passport is often retained by the sponsor. Until recently, switching sponsors was also impossible without a non-objection certificate issued by the initial sponsor, an obligation partly lifted for some types of workers in all GCC countries save Qatar. The system thus makes the foreign worker completely dependent on the sponsor.

The dual labour markets, especially in the GCC countries—where nationals face no competition from non-nationals—have severed the professional mobility of nationals from their economic productivity; for foreigners, the difficulty of switching sponsors bars them from professional competition and upward mobility, excluding them from a real labour market.

The sponsorship of migrant workers underlines not only the inverse relationship between the number and the skill profile of migrants, but also supports the trade-off between numbers versus rights emphasized by Ruhs and Martin: the more migrant workers in a host state, the more likely they are to be deprived of basic human rights.[38] Governments in Arab immigration countries are reluctant to abolish the sponsorship policy formally, for this would mean depriving certain citizens of the economic, social and political privileges they currently enjoy.[39]

Sending countries

Closely involved in migration, but need to protect the vulnerable more

Most Arab worker–sending countries organize the employment of their nationals abroad. The design and scope of institutions dealing with expatriates is important because it signals the aim to give attention to "The increasingly multidimensional nature of the concerns of communities: housing, education, social security, customs, personal status, investments and the law."[40] Although no regional body (for

example, the Arab League or the Arab Labour Organization) is directly involved in migration, every country in the region maintains an open door for the emigration of its nationals. However, most sending governments consider expatriate affairs a major economic and political concern, and government institutions dealing with nationals abroad are most often high profile; they are ministry-level bodies in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia. Thus, in Algeria,

a ministry-level institution, the Ministerial Delegate, is in charge of the National Community Established Abroad, which is attached to the Ministry of National Solidarity. Morocco has no less than three official institutions charged with dealing with expatriate affairs: the Ministry in Charge of Moroccans Living Abroad and Migration Affairs, as well as the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad and the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Residing Abroad.

The countries of origin of migrants should be accountable for protecting their citizens abroad. Beyond the obvious necessity to amend immigration policies in certain countries, which is now being addressed by international bodies and human rights movements, the sending countries should consider pressuring other countries to reform the sponsorship system. In source countries, easily adopted measures include licensing and supervising recruitment agencies, reviewing and vetting employment contracts, giving pre-departure training, posting labour attachés at embassies or consulates abroad and ensuring diplomatic protection.[41]

Qatar Foundation, responding to allegations of the bad treatment of construction workers in Qatar, recommended promoting government-to-government diplomatic negotiations for protecting citizens and enacting strict monitoring, possibly transnationally, of private institutions and all other actors involved in the migration process.[42]

In Jordan, responsibility is shared between the Section of Consular Affairs and Expatriates within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates and the Ministry of Labour.

Morocco's National Agency for the Promotion of Employment and Competencies manages labour contracts and organizes the placement of nationals abroad and their reintegration on return.

Tunisia, where about a third of the 20–29 age-group are unemployed, has set up institutions to provide Tunisian workers with opportunities abroad. Among these, the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation had 12,900 technical experts abroad in 2012, of whom 9,800 were in other Arab countries, chiefly in the GCC countries. Since the mid-2000s, the number of technical experts has been rising by 4.6 percent a year. The Ministry of Professional Training and Economy signed bilateral agreements to secure legal employment for Tunisians in Europe and in the GCC. It also negotiated a French-Tunisian Agreement for Organized Migration in 2008 for skilled workers, investors, seasonal workers, workers able to fill positions open to foreign blue-collar workers, and young professionals in exchange schemes. The agency has also signed labour placement agreements with Italy, Libya, Qatar and Switzerland.[43]

Conflicts are creating a divide between nationals of mainly labour-sending countries and nationals of mainly refugee-sending countries, such as Iraq, Palestine, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. Recent decades have seen educational attainment rising, generation after generation, leading to higher shares of tertiary graduates among migrants in the 25–29 age-group than older groups (annex 2 figure A.18). Not every nationality shows this, however, especially migrants from refugee-sending countries such as Syria.

7.4 Some benefits of mobility

Young people will find it easier to migrate if they already have the necessary qualifications—such as a tertiary education or other skills required by the host country—and funding for transport and social connections in the host country. Once working abroad, many become involved in diaspora networks, academia, or other professional networks. A truism perhaps, but migration can be a classic win-win situation, bringing benefits to both sides and to groups that may not have secured these benefits by staying at home. But migration is not without pitfalls.

Migration of young women from Arab countries

Improved educational outcomes among women have opened opportunities abroad for them and facilitated the migration of highly skilled women professionals. Until recently, women from Arab countries were considered mobile only rarely, unless they were moving with their families, a view that underwent a sea-change after the increase in tertiary education among young women. Young educated women now travel to all countries, including the GCC countries, where young unmarried women can find sponsorship opportunities and even self-sponsorship, as in United Arab Emirates.[44]

Since the 1990s, growing numbers of women from the Maghreb—most of them unmarried or divorced—have been making their way independently to southern European countries, benefiting from employment opportunities within the health care and home care sectors in these countries.[45]

Arab migrants are usually more well educated than Arab non-migrants. Data on Morocco in the mid-2000s, for instance, give an average duration of education of 8.4 years for Moroccans surveyed in Morocco, while OECD receiving-country statistics indicate that Moroccan migrants had 9.1 years of education on average. In the case of Jordan, non-migrants had an average of 9.2 years of education in 2004 as opposed to 13.0 years for Jordanian migrants to OECD countries in 2011.[46]

Primary- and secondary-school enrollment rates are similar among girls and boys in the southern and eastern Mediterranean Arab countries. In 2004, there were 102 women for every 100 men in university (undergraduate and graduate) in Jordan among cohorts born in 1975–1985.[47]

In Egypt, the female-to-male enrollment ratio in tertiary education in public and private schools was 96 to 100 in 2012 according to the World Bank.[48] Meanwhile, the structure of the typical family in the Arab world has undergone changes since the 1990s. Many educated women now marry later, often above 25–27 years of age, which is comparable with Europe. Remaining unmarried, though formerly extremely rare (except in Lebanon), has become a reality among women everywhere in the region, including in the GCC countries.[49] The 35–39 age-group among women, for example, once almost all married, divorced, or widowed, now has notable shares of unmarried women (12–16 percent in Iraq, Jordan, Palestine and Syria and 20 percent or higher in Lebanon). In Jordan, 8.5 percent of women in the 45–49 age-group in the late 2000s had remained unmarried.[50]

Scientific diaspora networks and migrant associations

The large number of Arab students and young, highly educated professionals abroad suggest that professional and cultural networks will soon be diversifying. Current professional networks, as well as nationality- and culture-based associations, are able to sustain social integration in host states. Integration with the origin country may also be strengthened through such professional or cultural bonds, which can also help channel ideas sent by migrants to their society of origin (social or ideational remittances), in addition to sustaining development projects.

The process is not automatic, but partly reflects the multipolar circulation and strategic transnationalism of young migrants as the poles of attraction of these migrants diversify, and transnational circulation becomes multifocal rather than bifocal.[51] This applies, first, to highly skilled young professionals who pursue increasingly globalized careers, as is evident among young migrants from Arab countries in North Africa and with many young Lebanese professionals in Europe, the GCC countries and North America. Second, as time passes, young people born in the GCC

countries who, however, remain foreign nationals there do not relate to the country of birth of their parents or their grandparents as their homeland. Yet, confronted with the administrative and legal insecurity characterizing migration to the GCC, they "Build and maintain a set of global networks to mitigate the vulnerabilities rendered by this structure of dominance."[52] This is especially true of long-time refugees, such as Palestinians, who would have nowhere to turn if they were forcibly ejected.[53] Forming ties and acquiring other nationalities, especially Western, is one dominant feature of this strategic transnationalism.

Civil society associations and scientific diaspora networks accumulate expatriate capacities and act as a resource to be tapped for the development of the countries of origin. These associations represent an interface between governmental and international initiatives to mobilize expatriate expertise and the first, second and third generations of the diaspora of the skilled.

Some of the scientific diaspora associations are active at a regional level, such as the Tunisian Scientific Consortium, the Moroccan Association of Researchers and Scholars Abroad, and the Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad. These networks maintain links with governmental agencies, such as the Higher Council for Science and Technology (Amman, Jordan) in the case of the Network of Arab Scientists and Technologists Abroad. Such networks aim at establishing and fostering communication and exchanges between members living abroad and their counterparts in the countries of origin.[54]

Other associations have different aims. For example, the Moroccan association Savoir et Développement promotes innovation and competence-sharing between expatriates and Moroccan businesses.[55] The Network of Moroccan Students in the high-status Grandes Ecoles and its Algerian counterpart, the Réseau des Etudiants Algériens des Grandes Ecoles, founded in 2005, have some 1,400 members, students, or degree-holders at the most prestigious higher education establishments in France.

Considering the inclusion of young skilled Arab workers in international networks and the generally high expatriation rates from the region, the flight of human capital from Arab countries may stir controversy, but there is no doubt which way governments on both sides are inclined. As with Jordan, for example, the GCC countries deprive other countries of the personnel in which these other countries have invested in terms of education. One study suggests that the annual emigration of 1,500 Moroccan engineers costs Morocco about $47 million a year.[56]

Yet, all Arab countries promote such migration to varying degrees for political and economic reasons and consider that the gains outweigh the social costs of breaking up families. Youth unemployment is largely caused by economic policies that favour low value added, low-paying industries with high turnover—such as manufacturing and assembly—that do not appeal to local skilled and highly skilled youth. Moreover, following a resurgence of neoclassical views in economy and development, the concept of a gain in human capital backs up pro-emigration policies and emphasizes that both origin and destination countries profit from the migration of highly skilled workers through technology and knowledge transfers facilitated by returning migrants.[57]

This concept of transfers covers the broader ideas, behaviour, identities and social capital that flow from receiving to sending country communities, or social remittances, which may be political or ideational.[58] Since the onset of the Arab uprisings after December 2010, migrants have shown a renewed interest in their countries of origin and have often tried to re-establish ties previously disrupted by formerly distrusted regimes.[59] Tunisians abroad during the Tunisian Revolution were active in January 2011 via the internet and have been active since as supporters of democratization, including by voting in the election of the Constituent Assembly in October 2011.[60]

From the perspective of some Arab governments, such ideas are bound to come tainted with other, often Western values, rendering this approach incompatible with the desire of some Arab states to maintain an armlock on political discourse. With the notable exception of Tunisia, the early hopes epitomized by the term 'Arab Spring' failed to flower: clientelism and corruption still hamper structural improvements in economies, distance administrative management from citizen concerns and feed undemocratic states and their hermetically contained ruling elites. Thus, longer term, social remittances may become far more important than financial remittances, especially given the latter's vulnerability to falling oil prices.

Remittances

Financial remittances are currently an essential addition to the GDP of many Arab countries, notably, Jordan, Lebanon and Palestine (table 7.1).

Remittances are mainly spent on consumption such as family expenditures and basic needs, rather than savings and productive investment that can generate income and direct employment. About 74 percent of Egyptian migrant households spend the majority of the remittances they receive on household expenses; buying, building or renovating a house was the second-most important area of spending (7.3 percent) and financing the education of household members was the third-most important (3.9 percent).[61] In Morocco, remittances also sustain small development projects such as shops and businesses.[62]

Faced with inefficiency, corruption and patronage-led economic and political systems in most sending countries, international agencies started promoting the idea of placing expatriates at the centre of the development process, that is, making expatriates agents of development at home.[63] However, benefits from remittance funds (technical innovation, for instance) can be reaped only in certain favourable structural contexts.

A survey in the south of Morocco showed some local economic gains from financial investments and spending from abroad (saffron production and tourist guest houses).[64] Yet, the success of such small-scale enterprises is highly sensitive to the local context, such as roads and commercial or tourist infrastructure. Investments from abroad cannot be large enough to change an unfavourable local infrastructure, let alone the human capital base. Moreover, in the words of the survey's authors, "Governments' role in migrant initiatives is ambiguous, contested, and not necessarily desirable."[65]

Without a favourable business climate, remittances might as well simply disappear into the sand. For this reason, stronger ties are needed between investors and facilitating government bodies both for financial remittances and to spread knowledge and expertise more widely in home countries. Placing the responsibility for development on migrants alone—rather than simultaneously reforming institutional structures—will not necessarily benefit sending countries.[66]

Table 7.1 Arab migrant remittances as a share of GDP by country, 2005–2014 (%)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Algeria	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	...
Djibouti	3.6	3.7	3.4	3.0	2.7	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.4	...
Egypt	5.6	5.0	5.9	5.3	3.8	5.7	6.1	7.3	6.6	6.8
Iraq	1.4	0.6	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0	...
Jordan	19.2	18.6	19.4	16.0	14.5	13.3	11.7	11.3	10.8	...
Lebanon	23.1	23.9	23.5	24.9	21.5	18.2	17.2	15.6	17.7	...
Morocco	7.7	8.3	8.9	7.8	6.9	7.1	7.3	6.8	6.6	...
Sudan	2.7	2.2	2.2	2.9	2.6	1.7	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5
Syria	2.9	2.4	2.6	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
Tunisia	4.3	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.5	4.6	4.4	5.0	4.9	...
Palestine	13.3	18.8	19.5	18.2	16.5	16.9	15.9	18.3	14.0	...
Yemen	7.7	6.7	5.2	4.6	4.1	4.9	4.5	10.4	9.3	...

Source: World Bank 2015b.

Note: "..." Not available or not applicable.

7.5 Reducing barriers to mobility in the region

Visas

The main impediment to migration arises from labour market laws in Arab countries. These laws rarely distinguish between temporary and permanent labour. Restrictions on movement include burdensome and costly procedures for work permits, limitations on the length of stay, quantitative limits on work permits and sectoral bans, job nationalization, educational conditions, restrictions on foreign investment, and controls on the mobility of family members.[67]

Applying for a visa can be time consuming and complicated. Uncertainty over delays may discourage worker mobility (and imports of services), undermine business relationships and generate steep costs because of labour misallocation across countries.[68] The lack of transparency and harmonization in visa systems and in the duration of visa validity across countries also burdens labour mobility.

An Arab citizen needs, on average, around 16 visas to travel to all countries in the Arab region.[69] Syria has the least restrictive system (6 of 22 Arab nationalities require a visa), and Djibouti, Iraq and Yemen have the most restrictive systems (the nationals of every Arab country require a visa). This number seems high considering that the GCC countries do not require visas for GCC citizens travelling between member countries, nor do Maghreb countries have such a requirement for their citizens traveling within the Maghreb.

Some nationalities, despite requiring a visa, might benefit from more rapid procedures and less bureaucratic paperwork. In some Arab countries, Europeans or Americans can obtain visas at the airport, while it requires several weeks for visitors from other Arab countries to obtain visas.

One solution, implemented by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, was a business travel card. Initiated in 1999, the card allows multiple short-term visits to member countries over three years, as well as a single stay of up to three months. A similar scheme could be adopted in the Arab region to promote greater regional professional mobility.

Fees for the issuance, renewal, or transfer of work permits are nontrivial, differing by country. Work permits are also granted for limited durations of stay that are not always tailored to the needs of greater labour mobility. Some Arab countries impose quantitative limits on certain types of work permits over a specific time and prohibit foreign workers in some economic sectors, in some cases publishing a list of jobs barred to foreigners.

Mutual recognition

The mutual recognition of diplomas and other qualifications is crucial for greater job mobility, but Arab countries have done little to foster a region-wide approach. Such an approach would allow workers to access the jobs that correspond to their skills and avoid the negative effects of overqualification. It would also help staunch human capital flight. However, the Mutual Recognition Agreements proposed by the World Trade Organization have only been signed by developed economies and by developing countries in South America.[70]

Although some regional and international agreements have taken tentative steps towards the mutual recognition of professional qualifications, alongside an Arab standard classification of occupations crafted by the Arab Labour Organization in line with ISCO 88, there are practically no indicators to assess whether countries honour these commitments. One of the few examples is the agreement between the Algiers and Tunis bars to facilitate trade in legal services between the two countries.[71]

Most of the accredited professions require migrants to meet requirements—apart from those of nationality or residency—in both education and experience. Legal professions require university degrees, a minimum period of practical experience and a professional examination. Similarly, accounting professions require at least three years of post-secondary education and a period

of practice. Finally, engineering and architecture require, beyond degrees and practical experience, membership in professional associations.

7.6 Easing tensions

Mobility around the region is good for young people economically and socially. Rather than permanent migration outside the region, labour and study migration within the region should be encouraged, especially in an economic climate where country budgets have been badly damaged by collapsing oil prices. Oil-rich governments will struggle to maintain the financial largesse they expend on their citizens, which will have large secondary effects on the workers of other countries and remittances. These shocks will make it even more urgent to improve the mobility of entrepreneurs and investors, who can generate non-oil jobs. Such initiatives could also keep most of the benefits of labour migration within the region. Governments in all Arab countries can act in this direction.

First, the GCC countries, Jordan and Lebanon would see gains from cancelling policies such as private sponsorship, which denies free movement to migrants. In several of these countries, including Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, such reforms have been mooted or government bodies are being set up to manage the foreign labour force. Such measures should make destination countries more readily accountable for the treatment of migrants by employers in the destination countries.

Second, the mutual recognition of qualifications and skills needs to be strengthened. Labour exchange programmes would be more beneficial to all parties and stimulate more dedication and creativity if the administrative and legal obstacles hampering mobility were removed.

Finally, enhanced mobility should be a two-way ticket, encouraging emigrants to return with their skills honed, turning young people from Arab countries into agents of development in their home countries. Given that expatriation may be one of the reasons for political ossification in the Arab region, closer involvement by expatriates and diasporas may help accelerate socio-political reform, including change in the ruling elites. Structural reforms may likewise raise expatriate confidence in investment back home.

Endnotes

1 Yet exclusion may be no less prevalent in receiving countries, due to inflammatory anti-immigrant debate, blinkered policy and even police operations, all of which push immigrants from public space.

2 In his book Development as Freedom, Sen (1999, p. 38–40) identifies five types of "instrumental" freedoms that "Tend to contribute to the general capability of a person to live more freely": (1) political freedoms: freedom to criticize actions of authorities, freedom of expression, freedom of the press; free elections, on so on; (2) economic facilities: opportunity to have and use economic resources or "entitlements"; (3) social opportunities: all people's ability to access health and education services; (4) transparency guarantees: the ability to trust others and the information received; and (5) protective security: social protection for vulnerable people. These freedoms are interconnected and complementary, a means as well as an end for achieving development.

3 The immigrant stock is the total number of international migrants present in a given country at a particular time. The flow is the number of persons entering or leaving a given country during a specific period. Unless stated otherwise, all estimates used in the chapter include refugee and non-refugee migrant populations. Refugee, unless stated otherwise, refers to persons registered with the UNHCR or the UNRWA (as regards Palestinians). This chapter does not use, unless, in exceptional cases mentioned in the notes to tables, the UN DESA database. Major discrepancies were found between these and available national data. Certain categories and definitions adopted by UN bodies do not match those adopted in this chapter; for instance, we count refugees as migrants only if they are born outside their country of residence, whereas in the UN data all refugees are counted as migrants. International databases sometimes replace missing data by self-generated data that reflect the hypotheses of statisticians rather than a proven demographic reality.

4 This definition does not incorporate Palestinian refugees: most of them were born in Lebanon or in Jordan and thus do not fall under the "migrant" definition used here (see Annex 2 tables A.16, A.17 and A.18).

5 Di Bartolomeo, Jaulin, and Perrin 2012.

6 MPC 2013a.

7 Gulf countries, where migrants are the most numerous, provide few data on immigrants. Their national origin, for instance, remains undisclosed. A partial exception is made for Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman, where some published data are broken down by regional origin. For all other countries, expatriates' figures are aggregated.

8 Attir 2012; Mustafa 2014.

9 Ministry of Interior (Kuwait) 2012; Gulf Migration (2013a); Ministry of Labour (Jordan) 2012.

10 The demographic, educational, professional and family profile of Arab workers can only be estimated indirectly and can only rely on Kuwaiti data (and on Bahraini data to a lesser extent). See also PACI 2013.

11 Central Informatics Organization, Kingdom of Bahrain 2010.

12 "Legislators, senior officials and managers" and "Scientific, technical specialists": PACI 2013; and Central Informatics Organization, Kingdom of Bahrain 2010.

13 Drawing on Qatar Ministry of Labour's data collected from Babar (2014) and De Bel-Air (2014).

14 Fargues and Brouwer 2012.

15 Ministry of Manpower and Migration (Egypt) (2013) statistics on work permits for employment abroad in 2013. This is consistent with studies by Wahba (2005) and Ghoneim (2010), for instance.

16 OECD countries considered here are the "Western" destinations: United States and Canada; Western Europe; and Australia and New Zealand. Non-'Western" OECD countries (Korea, Japan and Mexico) have been excluded as they have very few or no Arab migrants; Turkey is excluded because its immigrant Arab population comprises largely refugees. Israel is also excluded.

17 This confirms, for example, that inactive persons are not homemakers or retired elderly individuals, for instance.

18 Docquier, Johansson de Silva, and Marfouk 2010.

19 Fourati 2008.

20 Kasparian 2009.

21 Ministry of Labour (Jordan) 2012.

22 Department of Statistics (Jordan) 2012.

23 Higher Planning Commission (Morocco) 2013.

24 Higher Planning Commission (Morocco) 2014; and National Institute of Statistics (Tunisia) 2010.

25 Structural adjustment programmes were negotiated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in South and East Mediterranean Morocco (1983); Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria (1986); and Jordan (1988). Even Syria launched a process of structural adjustment (1991), but without borrowing from the IMF. The exception is Lebanon, where no structural adjustment programmes were enacted in spite of the country's large debt, due to lack of economic planning and political instability. However, several countries delayed most of the plans' implementation until the 1990s, after the first Gulf War of 1990–1991. Several agreements were thus signed throughout the 1990s.

26 All South and East Mediterranean countries except Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and United Arab Emirates are members of WTO.

27 Razzaz and Iqbal 2008.

[28] The logic was that economic liberalization should lead to a political liberalization, under the assumption that liberal economic reforms, for example, limit the redistributive capacities of patrimonial states or promotes the emergence of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie able to convene democratic claims (Anderson 1992; Catusse 2006).

[29] Catusse 2006, p. 231–234.

[30] Grasland 2011.

[31] National Institute of Statistics (Tunisia) 2010.

[32] Bouchoucha and Ouadah-Bedidi 2009.

[33] Governorates of the Centre-West (Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid and Kairouan) and the South (Medenine, Tataouine, Gafsa) of Tunisia. Boubakri (2013, p. 4).

[34] Hirschman (1970) distinguishes between alternative ways of reacting to deterioration in business firms and, in general, to dissatisfaction with organizations: One way, "exit," is the member's quitting the organization or the customer's switching to the competing product. Another response, "voice," is the member's or customer's agitating and exerting influence for change "from within." The third response is "loyalty" against all odds.

[35] Di Bartolomeo and Fargues 2015.

[36] Khelfaoui 2006.

[37] Fargues 2011.

[38] Ruhs and Martin 2008.

[39] Except in Bahrain, where the kafala was terminated in 2009. In other GCC countries, certain categories of immigrants such as investors (for example in Saudi Arabia) can be their own sponsors. See also Fargues and De Bel-Air, forthcoming.

[40] Brand 2006, p. 75.

[41] ILO 2009b.

[42] Jureidini 2014.

[43] Kriaa and others 2013.

[44] Benabdennebi and Rahmi 2012; De Bel-Air 2014.

[45] Et-Tayeb 2012.

[46] Department of Statistics (Jordan) 2004; Higher Planning Commission (Morocco) 2014; OECD 2014a (population of ages 25 and above).

[47] Department of Statistics (Jordan) 2004. This figure covers up, however, the fact that boys emigrate abroad to study, and girls more rarely.

[48] World Bank 2015b.

[49] De Bel-Air 2012.

[50] De Bel-Air 2008.

[51] Gardner 2008.

[52] Gardner 2008, p. 75.

[53] Jamal forthcoming.

[54] Meyer and Brown 1999.

[55] Mghari 2008.

[56] Khachani 2010, p. 16.

[57] Stark 2004; IOM 2005.

[58] Levitt 1998, p. 926.

[59] LAS/IOM 2012.

[60] Jaulin 2012.

[61] Nassar 2010.

[62] Et-Tayeb 2012.

[63] Skeldon 2008.

[64] De Haas and Vezzoli 2010.

[65] De Haas and Vezzoli 2010.

[66] This kind of policy approach fits into (neo)liberal policy trends currently in vogue, in the EU development policy schemes as much as in the international ones. The current optimism shown for migrants' input fits in with a communitarian approach and praises the principles of individualism and self-help: "Immigrants, rather than governments, then become the biggest provider of 'foreign aid'" (Kapur 2004, p. 7).

[67] Marouani 2014.

[68] Ng and Whalley 2005.

[69] OECD 2003.

[70] Cattaneo and Walkenhorst 2010.

Chapter 8

Empowering youth secures the future: Towards a development model fit for youth in the Arab region

This chapter provides a brief summary of the challenges that youth are facing in the Arab region. It also proposes that responding to the needs and aspirations of youth requires adopting a development model fit for youth that focuses on the imperative of building capabilities, expanding opportunities and mainstreaming gender equality. This model should also be solidly based on the achievement of peace and security at the national and regional levels.

8.1

Youth in the Arab region: Challenges to human development in a changing reality

This Report focuses on the many causes and dimensions of the challenges in Arab countries that affect human development especially among youth. It relies on a broad concept of human development as the process of enlarging people's real freedoms, that is, the opportunities and choices they have reason to value. How the Arab region has fared in terms of enlarging the choices of its youth in the last decade is a central inquiry of this Report.

The growth rates in the 1960s and 1970s created a large, demographic wave that is rippling through the population (table 8.1). Today, the region is more populous than ever, and almost 30 percent of the population is below the age of 30. Today the region's youth are more educated, urban, and more networked and connected to global knowledge and information than previous generations, but they enjoy fewer opportunities than their parents to convert their skills into higher living standards. Because youth possess so little hope of achieving tangible progress, the presence of such a large and dynamic youth population is also shaping the region's security landscape. Research on conflict and political violence indicates that young populations are more prone to engage in conflict than older ones and that youth are more likely to join radical organizations than adults. For this reason, this Report examines the problems and challenges of youth in light of the recent uprisings as well as the role of youth in society and proposes ways to ensure the inclusion of youth in the development process locally, nationally and regionally.

Issues revolving around youth in the Arab region attracted the attention of scholars, policymakers, civil society and international organizations even before 2011. While this Report represents a natural progression from earlier Arab Human Development Reports, it has been drafted within a quite unique context. Since 2011, several countries in the region witnessed uprisings, and the region has experienced the most rapid expansion in war and violent conflict among all global regions over the past decade.

8.1.1

Youth exclusion is pervasive in the Arab region

The main conclusion of this Report is that youth in the Arab region are struggling to attain full social and economic inclusion in their societies. The exclusion of youth is pervasive throughout the Arab region, and it is felt in multiple ways. The high levels of exclusion ignited uprisings across many Arab countries in late 2010 and early 2011, causing some to descend into social and political instability and deep economic uncertainty.

The mass disenfranchisement of youth constitutes one of the key stumbling blocks in the development process in Arab countries. Young people have not been recognized as legitimate agents of change, nor have they been empowered to fulfill this responsibility. Many of the root causes of

Table 1 **1970–1990 and 1990–2010: The biggest rise in youth populations in the Arab region**

	Youth population increase, ages 15–29									
	1950–1970	Increase as % of total population, 1970	1970–1990	Increase as % of total population, 1990	1990–2010	Increase as % of total population, 2010	2010–2030	Increase as % of total population, 2030	2030–2050	Increase as % of total population, 2050
Sub-Saharan Africa	25,521	9%	55,832	11%	101,473	12%	154,835	11%	174,896	8%
Arab states	11,085	9%	29,458	13%	41,800	12%	20,208	4%	11,326	2%
Africa	32,583	9%	73,303	12%	121,189	12%	162,809	10%	178,810	7%
Latin America and the Caribbean	29,189	10%	52,018	12%	31,860	5%	2,286	0%	-13,110	-2%
Asia	169,880	8%	378,188	12%	192,653	5%	-57,138	-1%	-76,549	-1%
Oceania	1,921	10%	1,975	7%	1,526	4%	1,663	4%	1,413	2%
Northern America	16,429	7%	9,816	3%	6,477	2%	2,896	1%	7,471	2%
China	70,146	9%	146,539	13%	-6,248	0%	-95,377	-7%	-38,726	-3%
Europe	6,452	1%	15,792	2%	-13,312	-2%	-26,805	-4%	-8,315	-1%
Japan	6,652	6%	-2,167	-2%	-6,418	-5%	-3,738	-3%	-2,044	-2%

Source: Report team calculations based on UNDESA 2013c.

the exclusion of youth stem from the institutional arrangements in Arab societies, such as insider–outsider models of employment and political participation, whereby well-established individuals (insiders) can effectively block the inclusion of newcomers (outsiders).[1] Youth are outsiders by definition, struggling to join institutions such as public sector agencies.

One of the main means of achieving progress in human development among youth is education. Yet, in the Arab region, though indicators have shown improvement, this has not translated into tangible gains. Inequality in educational attainment is greater in the region than in any other group of countries. In the region, children in poor households and children in rich households do not have an equal opportunity to attend school, and the probability of ever attaining or even attending secondary education depends significantly on family background. The state-dominated educational systems of the Arab countries have supported a rapid rise in average years of schooling, but have failed to ensure that students secure good results on international standardized tests.

Likewise, the region, which, until only a few years ago, had the goal of universal primary education well within reach, today faces a disastrous situation: more than 13 million children, or 40 percent of the 34 million school-age children, are not attending school in the countries affected either directly or indirectly by armed conflict.[2]

Youth in the region exhibit low labour force participation rates (primarily among young women), alongside the highest unemployment rates among this age-group in the world. Five years after the uprisings, the youth unemployment rate is close to 30 percent and is projected to remain at this high level until 2019.[3] Many youth endure long periods of idleness in the hope of landing secure public sector jobs. However, the traditional social contract whereby governments are the first-best providers of jobs is breaking down as governments in non–oil-producing economies struggle to contain public sector wage expenditures. Meanwhile, in the private sector, most economies in the region are specializing in industries with low potential for employment growth. Jobs are not being created quickly enough to employ the huge number of young people in the region. Overreliance on the public sector for jobs at the expense of the private sector, a lack of business financing, poor access to external markets, and misguided economic policies have resulted in an anæmic private sector that does not create a sufficient number of jobs.

Figure 8.1 **Perceptions of youth on the constraints to obtaining a job, selected Arab countries, 2013**



Source: World Bank 2014b.

In attempting to secure jobs, young people, particularly poor youth, have less access to support networks than adults, which disempowers youth economically.[4] Though a large majority of young people rely on family connections when they are looking for jobs, youth in more well connected families generally do better on the job market (figure 8.1).

Another of the principal factors in achieving progress in human development among youth is ensuring and maintaining optimum health among this age-group. Youth is a stage in life when people begin to adopt new behaviours – for example, smoking, consuming alcohol and drugs, engaging in unprotected sex – that may negatively affect their future health. However, one of the least discussed challenges facing youth in the region is the maintenance of good health in light of the numerous socio-economic barriers youth must overcome. Health care systems in Arab countries suffer from insufficient capacity to deal with the health needs of youth. The data on health, though scarce, generally confirm the link between socio-economic determinants – such as welfare status, educational attainment, rural or urban residence, and gender – and health outcomes among youth. The problems in capacity are compounded by poor transport networks, administrative hurdles, high out-of-pocket fees and other common obstacles confronting youth in accessing health services.

People in the Arab countries are denied voice and representation in various fields. As indicated in figure 8.2, no Arab country is among the countries with positive per capita GDP growth and high levels of voice and accountability. The participation of young people in formal institutionalized political processes in the Arab region is among the lowest worldwide, despite few formal legal barriers to such participation. The voting age is 18 in most Arab countries, and the average age of eligibility to become a member of parliament is 26. Yet, political participation is limited, and civic engagement among young people in the region is the lowest in the world. A median of only 9 percent of the 15–29 age-group across Arab countries volunteer to work with organizations in a given month, compared with 14 percent in sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the next lowest rate of volunteerism.[5]

This calls into question the representativeness of the political system and reflects the disenfranchisement of young people. These trends maintain the exclusion of young people from many routine experiences in adult life because young people face financial difficulties in marrying, finding independent housing and starting families. Distrustful of the political processes in the region, youth are voting less and are thus becoming excluded as agents of voice. This has played a major role in driving regional instability and unrest in recent years.

Figure 8.2 **Voice and accountability versus per capita GDP growth, 2013**



Source: World Bank 2015b; World Bank 2014c.

Young women suffer substantially because of the political, legal and economic conditions in various Arab countries. As conservative factions gain more influence and power, the movements, behaviour and dress of young women are more likely to become constrained, including by law enforcement authorities, while the freedom of choice among women about their lives is tending to become more narrow. This is especially true in the poorer and more rural areas of the region.

As shown in the previous chapters, there are significant roadblocks to fostering the progress of human development in Arab countries. The hobbled process of development exposes youth to the harsh effects of exclusion. This failure of Arab countries is leading young people to form negative perceptions of society and the future and providing a fertile ground for radical thinking and radical action among youth. Deeply disgruntled individuals tend to be less inclined to use social action to change their environment and, if they engage in such action, they tend to choose more violent forms of protest. Inactive young people confronting deprivation, marginalization, and exclusion are more susceptible to recruitment by armed groups and militias. Absent true political competition, meaningful opposition parties, and independent judiciaries and legislatures, and with little room for independent civil society organizations, calls to unconventional and volatile political and civic action may have appeal.

8.1.2 Violent conflicts: Human development under fire

The deep polarization and profoundly violent conflicts in the Arab region are derailing development and represent a threat to communities and the lives of individuals. More than any other phenomenon, conflict strips people, communities and countries of the options they require to become productive, establish security and plan for a better future. It erases hard-won gains in development and makes progress in addressing long-standing challenges all the more difficult.

War and violence inflict enormous damage on young individuals and the prospects for their future. Over the past five years, the Arab region has

Figure 8.3 **Number of terrorist attacks, 1970–2014**



Source: START 2015.

witnessed a sharp rise in the number of conflicts, accompanied by an increase in the number of violent terrorist attacks.[6] In 2014 alone, the region accounted for almost 45 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide (figure 8.3). These attacks claimed the lives of more than 21,000 people.[7]

In addition to the deterioration in living conditions, the destruction of property and the suffering and death among people, these events adversely affect human development in the region. A clear example is the contraction of GDP in Iraq, where terrorism is estimated to have cost US$159 billion (in purchasing power parity dollars) since 2005. This is equivalent to 32 percent of the country's 2014 GDP (figure 8.4a). In the case of Syria, the ongoing crisis led to a decline by almost 31.0 percent in GDP in 2012, and the drop had almost reached 38 percent by the end of 2013 (figure 8.4b).

Conflict has led countries to allocate large shares of public expenditure to military and security programmes, further weakening the prospects for development. Currently among the most militarized in the world, several Arab countries are characterized by huge military outlays, which represent missed opportunities to invest in broader economic and social progress. In 1988–2014, military expenditures in the Arab region reached almost US$2 trillion. Military expenditures increased by a factor of more than two in 2000–2014, and per capita military expenditures in the Arab states grew 2.5 times in 1990–2014.[8]

Another adverse effect of conflict on human development is massive displacement. The Arab region is home to only five percent of the world's population, but also home to 47 percent of its internally displaced, and 58 percent of its refugees – the latter growing from 34 percent in 2000.[9] In a matter of days in June 2014, 500,000 people were displaced in Iraq.[10] In Yemen, at least 2.5 million were internally displaced since the conflict erupted in March 2015 (as of December 2015).[11] Three of the six main countries of origin of refugees are Arab countries (Somalia, Sudan and Syria), in addition to the long-standing plight of Palestinians, who constitute the largest refugee group worldwide (more than five million).[12]

Conflict also disproportionately damages the autonomy and development of women, particularly young women. In situations of conflict or poverty, young women's educational opportunities are greatly reduced, and the physical and economic insecurity can be a lead determinant in earlier or less-favourable marriages for them. Young women in conflict situations also suffer from higher rates of gender-based violence, and such rates are usually even higher if the women also belong to a minority or marginalized group.

Regional integration has been affected by the spillovers of conflict in neighbouring countries. According to the World Bank, the Arab Mashreq countries – Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria – lost

Figure 8.4a **Total accumulated losses in GDP because of terrorism, Iraq, 2005–2014**



Source: Institute for Economics and Peace 2015.

Figure 8.4b **GDP growth rate 2005–2013 in crisis and continuing scenarios (constant prices 2000), Syria**



Source: Mehchy 2015.

an estimated US$35 billion in output (measured in 2007 prices) during the first three years of the conflict in Syria (2011–2014).[13] More recently, the trade ties among these countries have nearly collapsed because of the troubles in Syria. The Arab Monetary Fund's 2015 Arab Economic Outlook Annual Report states that "Syria's border recurrent closures have impeded regional trade by discontinuing or cutting off a key route connecting the wider Levant and the Gulf states".[14] On the investment side, inflows of foreign direct investment to the Arab region declined from US$66.8 billion in 2010 to US$47.5 billion in 2013 and to US$43.9 billion in 2014.

Two bits of data are indicative: the Arab region is home to 5 percent of the world population, but around 18 percent of the world's conflicts over 1948–2014 (figure 8.5). Over 2010–2013, the Arab region was home to one-fourth of the world's conflicts.[15]

While past conflict is not necessarily a recipe for future violence, the number of people in the region living in countries at high risk of conflict is projected to grow from about 250 million in 2010 to over 305 million in 2020; the number is likely to double over 2010–2050 (figure 8.6). To stop the past from defining the future, mediating ongoing crises and preventing future violence are crucial.

Figure 8.5 **The Arab region: Home to 5 percent of the global population, but . . .**



Source: Report team calculations based on START 2015, SIPRI 2015, UCDP/PRIO 2015, UCDP 2015, UN DESA 2013, and UNRWA 2015.

Figure 8.6 **The Arab countries most at risk of conflict have the largest populations in the region**



Note: High conflict risk is defined based on 16 or more years of conflict in 1946–2013. Medium conflict risk is defined based on 5 to 15 years of conflict in 1946–2013. Low conflict risk is defined based on less than 4 years of conflict in 1946–2013.
Source: Report team calculations based on UNDESA 2013c and UCDP/PRIO 2014.

8.2 Towards a development model fit for youth in the Arab region

A new development model that is centered on investment in youth, who represent the hope of today and the reality of tomorrow, must be established for the decades ahead. Yet it is easy to lose perspective given the uncertainty in the Arab region today. As one crisis succeeds another, the policy agendas often focus on the most immediate problems rather than the most important ones. It is essential to step back and assess each situation. Populations in an expanding number of Arab countries are suffering from acute distress, a weakening social fabric, increasing threats to personal security and a growing sense of individual isolation. Several countries in the region are on the verge of disintegration. The underlying causes are often lack of socio-economic progress and limited participation in politics and society.

Arab countries should prioritize the expansion of the frontiers of opportunity among young people. Accordingly, an integral part of the role of the government is to allow space for initiative and innovation and then roll out solutions that have a chance for success. This Report considers, accordingly, that it is imperative that Arab countries adopt a development model fit for youth in order to harness the potential of demographic transition to its benefit rather than becoming dangerously burdened with a large young population lacking equal capabilities and missing opportunities. This approach is grounded on firsthand accounts of youth who have actively participated in consultations in the preparation of this Report as well as in regional and global surveys of the opinions and perceptions of young people in various age cohorts.

One of the information sources of the Report is the World We Want, a global survey among citizens, including youth, conducted to identify the main issues that would make the most difference in the lives of respondents and to establish priorities for the post-2015 development agenda (figure 8.7a). The issues were selected from among priorities described by people in research and polling exercises. They included the Millennium Development Goals, plus sustainability, security, governance and transparency. A regional source of information is the Asda'a Burson-Marsteller Arab Youth Survey, which covered 3,500 youth aged 18–24 in 16 Arab countries (figure 8.7b). The Report also relies on the Gallup World Poll dataset, which covers 21 Arab countries, and the World Values Survey, which covers 10 Arab countries.

The main areas selected by survey respondents highlight the importance of achieving peace and security; building capabilities, including better access to health services and good-quality education; expanding opportunities, especially through decent jobs; and acquiring a sense of agency. These areas reflect a broad view of human development and require targeted policy interventions that are derived from a shared understanding of the need to safeguard social justice and equity.

Taking this analysis into consideration, this Report considers that a development model fit for youth should encompass peace and security as overarching goals and, as the two principal pillars, the building of capabilities (through health care and education) and the expansion of opportunities (in employment and participation) (figure 8.8).

The broad outline of a development model fit for youth proposed should not be considered a stand-alone approach, but should be integrated into national policies. Youth-specific policies should be developed based on extensive consultations with stakeholders, including youth represented through youth organizations. They should ensure the participation of all segments of youth. Moreover, all youth policies should be supported and monitored based on indicators that measure the progress achieved in strengthening youth capabilities and expanding opportunities. Implementation and monitoring should be the responsibility of ministries of planning and interministerial committees. Youth organizations should be involved in the implementation and monitoring process to ensure ownership and help identify constraints.

Figure 8.7a My World: The priorities of Arab countries



Source: UN 2014b.

Figure 8.7b Youth perceptions: What do you believe is the biggest obstacle facing the Middle East?



Source: Asda'a 2015.

Figure 8.8 Development model fit for youth in the Arab region



Source: The report team.

8.2.1 Achieving peace and security

Empowering youth requires an enabling national and regional environment of peace and security. Armed conflict is one of the most critical challenges that a majority of young people are facing today in the Arab region, rendering them vulnerable to voluntary and involuntary military involvement. Limited economic, social and political opportunities are key factors causing youth to become caught up in conflict. Exclusion among youth is a leading ingredient in conflict. Thus, without the meaningful participation of youth in discussions and other efforts and interventions to ensure peace and establish security, sustainable peace cannot be achieved.

As young people in the Arab region learn the dreadful costs of war and civil conflict, their yearning for peace and security grows. Development depends on peace and security. Conflict has a high economic cost, including the opportunity cost of military expenditures. Conflict reduces investment by 10 percent or more. Economic growth, meanwhile, lowers the risk of conflict by fostering higher incomes.[16]

Serious initiatives should be undertaken in the Arab region to address the impacts of conflict and to end war. The Arab-Israeli conflict remains one of the most significant challenges in the region. It is of vast legal and moral significance and is a major focus of the political life of the region. The issue of Palestine occupies a central stage in Arab public opinion. According to the 2015 Arab Opinion Index

of the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, 75 percent of people in Arab countries believe that the cause of Palestine is not solely a Palestinian issue, but also an Arab issue, and 85 percent oppose diplomatic recognition of the State of Israel by Arab countries. For decades, the conflict has been a subtext in other regional and global confrontations. The approach to resolving the conflict and its links to other political and economic issues must be comprehensive. Under international law, an occupation that is transformed into a long-term regime of control and governance is unjustified and illegal. From a human development perspective, only the end of Israel's occupation of the territories it seized in 1967 and the restoration of the rights of Palestinians, foremost among which is the right to self-determination, will bring peace. The absence of peace has contributed substantially to the frustration of human development in the region.

Within countries, a peace and security agenda seeking to integrate youth should represent a collective effort that involves all levels of government, the private sector and civil society. Through the participation of youth, it should aim to create more cohesion and inclusiveness and to offer space for innovation among youth. The agenda should provide for local, national and regional cooperation.

Ensuring the active, systemic and meaningful participation of youth in efforts to address issues of peace and security is an imperative for demographic and political reasons. It is crucial to recognize the positive role that youth can play in ending conflict and building peace. This is so also because of the close interrelationship among social justice, sustainable development, human rights and peace in the daily lives of youth. By engaging youth productively in society in ways that strengthen their livelihood opportunities, the vulnerability of young people can largely be addressed. If young people are held back by their lack of experience, their exclusion from mainstream decision-making processes and deliberate political and social marginalization, then a critical constituency necessary to achieve peace and development will be lost.

Youth participation in associations and voluntary youth movements should be encouraged and ensured. Local youth organizations can play an important role in social change and serve as a key link among local communities. Through their participation in associations and movements, youth can become involved in peacebuilding and other processes that seek to improve the quality of the lives of populations.

Peace education should be promoted in Arab countries. Fostering a culture of peace and inclusion within society to achieve sustainable development can contribute to reducing violence. Governments, religious institutions, the private sector, and civil society groups should invest resources in promoting peace education, including reorientation programmes that instill the value of peaceful coexistence. Such education will help youth appreciate the value of peace, thereby making the engagement of radical groups among youth more difficult. Peace education should be integrated in curricula from primary to tertiary education. Radicalization among youth and the insidious ideologies that underpin violent extremism in Islam can be curbed by ensuring that religious leaders preach messages of moderation in mosques as well as through initiatives delivered on television, through social media and in group discussions. Governments, civil society groups and the private sector should partner with artists and film producers to create programmes designed to counter narratives that promote violent radicalization among youth. To confront the destructive trend of conflict and violence, Arab governments should cooperate to build and communicate a message of moderation through interventions focused on dialogue, peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

New tools are needed to promote the active participation of youth in all aspects of social, economic and political life and to enhance the prospects for peaceful and inclusive social change in the region. In countries in conflict, youth are crucial agents in building peace and positive social change. The portrayal of young people as causal or secondary agents of conflict neglects the fact that, if they are able to contribute meaningfully to social, economic and political life, young people can play an important role in facilitating the peaceful transition towards an inclusive society. Youth participation in decision-making at all levels is key to achieving the peaceful resolution of conflict and other difficult problems.

Governments should facilitate an open space for dialogue through formal and informal mechanisms for reasoned debate and for discussions about the future of society, especially the future of youth. Tunisia seems to have achieved this. The new constitution was drafted in a participatory manner, and a free and fair election and a peaceful transfer of power was completed in 2014. In October 2015, Tunisia's National Dialogue Quartet received the Nobel Peace Prize for its key role in

Box 8.1 The United Nations Security Council Resolution on Youth, Peace and Security

On 9 December 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2250 (2015), which:

1. Urges Member States to consider ways to increase inclusive representation of youth in decision-making at all levels in local, national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention and resolution of conflict, including institutions and mechanisms to counter violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, and, as appropriate, to consider establishing integrated mechanisms for meaningful participation of youth in peace processes and dispute-resolution;

2. Calls on all relevant actors, including when negotiating and implementing peace agreements, to take into account, as appropriate, the participation and views of youth, recognizing that their marginalization is detrimental to building sustainable peace in all societies, including, inter alia, such specific aspects as:

(a) The needs of youth during repatriation and resettlement and for rehabilitation, reintegration and post-conflict reconstruction;

(b) Measures that support local youth peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution and that involve youth in the implementation mechanisms of peace agreements;

(c) Measures to empower youth in peacebuilding and conflict resolution . . . ;

Prevention

10. Urges Members States to facilitate an inclusive and enabling environment in which youth actors, including youth from different backgrounds, are recognized and provided with adequate support to implement violence prevention activities and support social cohesion;

11. Stresses the importance of creating policies for youth that would positively contribute to peacebuilding efforts, including social and economic development, supporting projects designed to grow local economies, and provide youth employment opportunities and vocational training, fostering their education, and promoting youth entrepreneurship and constructive political engagement;

12. Urges Member States to support, as appropriate, quality education for peace that equips youth with the ability to engage constructively in civic structures and inclusive political processes;

13. Calls on all relevant actors to consider instituting mechanisms to promote a culture of peace, tolerance, intercultural and interreligious dialogue that involve youth and discourage their participation in acts of violence, terrorism, xenophobia, and all forms of discrimination;

Partnerships

14. Urges Member States to increase, as appropriate, their political, financial, technical and logistical support, that take account of the needs and participation of youth in peace efforts, in conflict and post-conflict situations, including those undertaken by relevant entities, funds and programmes, inter alia, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Population Fund, UN-Women, and by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and other relevant bodies, and actors at regional and international levels;

15. Stresses the vital role [of] the Peacebuilding Commission in addressing the conditions and factors leading to the rise of radicalization to violence and violent extremism among youth, which can be conducive to terrorism, by including in its advice and recommendations for peacebuilding strategies ways to engage youth meaningfully during and in the aftermath of armed conflict;

16. Encourages Member States to engage relevant local communities and non-governmental actors in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative that can incite terrorist acts, address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including by empowering youth, families, women, religious, cultural and education leaders, and all other concerned groups of civil society and adopt tailored approaches to countering recruitment to this kind of violent extremism and promoting social inclusion and cohesion;

Disengagement & reintegration

17. Encourages all those involved in the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to consider the needs of youth affected by armed conflict, including, inter alia, such specific aspects as:

(a) evidence-based and gender-sensitive youth employment opportunities, inclusive labour policies, national youth employment action plans in partnership with the private sector, developed in partnership with youth and recognizing the interrelated role of education, employment and training in preventing the marginalization of youth;

(b) investment in building young persons' capabilities and skills to meet labour demands through relevant education opportunities designed in a manner which promotes a culture of peace;

(c) support for youth-led and peacebuilding organizations as partners in youth employment and entrepreneurship programs.

Source: United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/2250 (2015).

mediating among the various parties involved in the political life of the country after 2011. In the acceptance speech, the Quartet stated that the efforts of Tunisia's youth allowed the country to turn the page on authoritarian regimes.

If they are not encouraged, development and peacebuilding are endangered. Proactive conflict management and peacebuilding should capitalize on the remarkable resilience exhibited by women. Women must be placed at the centre of national policies aimed at development and peacebuilding. Countries must remove the social, economic and cultural barriers affecting women to ensure they have equal access to education and vocational training and equal opportunities for full participation in society, including in the political arena. Governments and civil society must also foster greater participation by girls and young women by adopting measures to promote appropriate role models and facilitate the reconciliation of work and family life.

All Arab states face an array of challenges related to peace and security. This could offer the impetus for regional cooperation. Unilateral and bilateral approaches are no longer sufficient. None of the most pressing issues can be tackled by national governments alone. Yet, Arab regional organizations have been remarkably weak and have proven incapable of playing a decisive role in crisis management and conflict resolution. This lack of capability is partly a product of the fragmentation that characterizes the region. Founded on the basis of Arab cultural solidarity, the League of Arab States functions as an arena for reaching consensus and demonstrating unity among the Arab states. Nonetheless, efforts at conflict management and dispute resolution have been handled by individual actors outside the scope of the League. The establishment of effective regional mechanisms for dealing with crisis is thus one of the challenges facing Arab countries. So long as such mechanisms are lacking, crisis in the region will continue to invite external unilateral or multilateral intervention.

By highlighting the lived reality of countries in the western Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa that have achieved progress in addressing ethnic and territorial conflicts, cross-regional experience sharing would be useful for the Arab region. This could also emphasize the lessons learned through the incorporation of young people in endeavours to achieve sustainable peace. Some countries have sought to end conflicts and promote peacebuilding by enforcing restrictions on access to arms among non-military and by establishing standards for media coverage on conflicts to address the pervasive violence in the media.

In several resolutions, the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations have recognized the importance of youth engagement and empowerment in post-conflict situations. These resolutions have recognized the direct link between youth exclusion and global unrest and insecurity. Safeguarding meaningful youth involvement in efforts to advance peace and security is thus a reasonable step.

The UN Security Council Resolution on Youth, Peace and Security is a powerful tool for engaging young people in such efforts and thereby strengthen peacebuilding (box 8.1). Empowering young people is not simply a matter of equality or justice, but of global peace and security. Peace and human rights are global values that unite young people around the world. Nonetheless, the establishment of justice and equality across generations has to be the first step in acknowledging the role of youth in peacebuilding.

8.2.2 Expanding capabilities: Health care and good-quality education

There is widespread agreement that educational achievements and good health early in life are crucial to proper individual cognitive and physical development. Education and good health in the early years of life are enablers of productive economic participation and civic engagement in adulthood. Among the barriers identified in this Report to improving health among youth in the region are the difficulties these people face in accessing services and information to address their concerns about their own health as well as their inability to formulate their health needs. Few health care systems address the health needs of youth, particularly in reproductive health and mental health. Conflict has also placed health care systems under enormous strain in some countries, making health care among children and youth unattainable and creating other disablers. The number of casualties, refugees and displaced persons associated with conflict has been huge. International organizations and humanitarian relief agencies have been providing much of the health care, but access is still a major problem.

Health among youth is a key determinant of long-term health outcomes. Excellent and equitable health care coverage through universal health care or youth-friendly health services is only half the solution.[17] The other half is awareness, participation and agency among youth.

Among the most effective interventions to enhance youth well-being are interventions that tackle the social and structural determinants of health, including the promotion of healthy social and physical environments and addressing inequities. A primary means of enhancing health among youth is universal health care coverage to ensure that all people have access to "promotive, preventive, curative and rehabilitative health services, of sufficient quality to be effective, while also ensuring that people do not suffer financial hardship when paying for these services".[18] Implementing universal health care coverage schemes among youth, including mental health care and the integration of sexual and reproductive health education in schools, represents an important programmatic intervention that can improve the quality of life among youth.

In several countries in the Arab region, the barriers in the provision of health care include high out-of-pocket costs, the poor quality of care, the shortage of trained health professionals, the lack of access to essential medications and technologies, and deficiencies in health information systems. The mere availability of a service in a particular context does not guarantee equitable health care delivery. Care must be accessible, acceptable, effective, and used by the most disadvantaged groups.[19]

Outside the Arab region, some countries have invested in out-of-the-box private sector–led initiatives such as health micro-insurance schemes, which are considered a potential financing option for covering the poor.[20] While such schemes are appropriate for health care provision among youth, the provision of health care for the elderly should also be a priority not only because this is a right of the elderly, but also because of the burden represented by the elderly on younger household members. In the absence of state-led provision, young household members must care for ageing relatives. This is especially the case in the Arab countries, where the share of adults aged 60 and older is projected to reach 11.7 percent in 2050, up from 4.3 percent in 2015.[21]

Access to adequate health care in the Arab region should not be tied to employment-based insurance schemes or employment status. Arab countries supply excessive food and fuel subsidies (10 percent of the cost). So, there exists fiscal space to support more effective public health care systems. Indeed, according to ILO estimates, by spending the equivalent of 2 percent of GDP, any country can provide a minimum universal level of social and health insurance. Food subsidies do not address the problem of undernourishment, which is endemic in the Arab region. Social barriers that

Box 8.2 Fahem mish hafez*

Tahrir Academy was a non-profit online collaborative learning platform that aims to build the biggest Arabic video library to provide educational content to 13- to 18-year-old youth in Egypt. The Academy website features more than 400 educational videos organized into courses in three main areas: Life, that is, natural sciences and well-being; Humanity, or human sciences and languages, and Numbers, or mathematics and technology. Courses cover subjects ranging from physics and astronomy to Arabic grammar. Elementary- and secondary-school students are also offered the chance to carry out experiments. The Academy produces educational videos based on crowdsourcing knowledge among a pool of volunteers and experts who help revise and produce content that is presented in an unconventional, attractive way. During the first year after its launch, the Academy achieved more than 2.5 million views on YouTube.

** 'Thinking critically, not memorizing': a phrase used to criticize the overemphasis of Arab educational systems on memorization as a learning method.*

Source: Tahrir Academy http://tahriracademy.org/.

***Tahriri Academy suspended its activities on August 10th, 2015 due to lack of funding.*

determine the lack of access to basic incomes and essential services must be resolved first. Out-of-pocket health expenditure can account for over 50 percent of household spending in the Arab region and is a key determinant of poverty and inequality.[22]

Governments in the Arab region should consider how the unemployed, informal sector workers and workers on low salaries may gain access to essential social services and basic incomes. Targeting or means testing raises questions about the inclusion of some, but not others, and may also stigmatize those who do receive assistance. Targeting and means testing also risk creating dependency among vulnerable groups, thereby aggravating long-term problems of poverty. This issue is especially important in view of the high rates of unemployment in the Arab region.

Education, particularly education within small communities, should be a concern of all in society, all government agencies rather than one or two ministries, the private business sector and civil society. This is especially important in higher education.[23] Overcoming education system failure must be a priority for policymakers and educators, who should strive to achieve a good fit between the output of educational institutions and the demands of the labour market. This would involve a survey of the distribution of enrolments across subjects, skills and disciplines, upgrades in technical education and a review of curricula to promote problem-solving skills, entrepreneurial and management capacity and the value of self-employment. Education should also enhance women's social and economic participation and encourage pro-gender attitudes. National efforts have achieved a high degree of quantitative expansion in basic education, particularly in more well off and less highly populated Arab countries. The need to boost the coverage and the output of education systems, especially higher education, is significant in the poorer Arab countries. Improving education quality represents an even greater challenge (box 8.2).

Improved planning and cooperation among the state, the private sector and civil society are necessary to harmonize educational systems and the labour market. There is little hope for education reform unless substantial cooperation emerges between education establishments and local communities. Embedding schools in society requires multiple channels for interaction between schools and communities, not simply the parents of students.

Education is undergoing a massive transformation as a result of the digital revolution. Children and young people are gaining access to vast sources of knowledge, characterized by generally high-quality online courses, learning facilities and other web-based material. However, traditional learning materials are often low in quality. New technologies could be harnessed to create learning opportunities that challenge the traditional role of schools and universities. This should be coupled with greater access among those individuals who now lack internet and the enrichment of the Arabic content of websites and information networks.

8.2.3 Expanding opportunities: Jobs and voice

Unemployment among young first-time job seekers in the Arab region is often measured in years, not months. Governments should adopt policies that promote inclusive employment-led growth and concentrate on economic sectors that benefit the poor. Policies aimed at breaking the cycle of poverty must also focus on youth, given the links among poverty, lack of education and skills, and the absence of decent jobs.

Easing the transition of young people from school to work by offering career guidance and counselling is important. The relevant strategy should be combined with aptitude tests that help young people identify a career matching their strengths and interests. An increasing number of universities in the region have started introducing guidance services or augmenting existing services through the use of psychometric assessments.

Limited access to information and financial concentration have created an economic structure that serves a closed community of businessmen. Amid this constraining economic structure, youth in the Arab region have been widening their entry points into economic activity. Thus, young, socially minded entrepreneurs in the region have been launching initiatives focused on recycling, renewable energy, good nutrition, and training and information awareness (box 8.3). Governments should encourage such efforts or at least not view them as encroaching on government prerogatives. Examples of such enterprises include KarmSolar, a private, commercially viable Egyptian company that installs high-capacity off-grid solar water-pumping stations that reduce reliance on diesel power, and Visualizing Impact, a firm based in Lebanon that aims to improve transparency and attract attention to minority perspectives by visualizing data about social, environmental, political and economic issues. In 2013, the firm won the prestigious Prix Ars Electronica.

Access to information should be facilitated to help young people choose careers, exploit opportunities for civic engagement and become politically involved. Especially important is access to labour market data, particularly sectors that are

Box 8.3 Youth and innovation: KarmSolar

Founded by young Egyptian entrepreneurs, KarmSolar is a solar technology and integration company that delivers innovative solar solutions for the agricultural, industrial, tourism and business sectors. Since its founding in 2011, KarmSolar has been Egypt's largest private off-grid solar energy integrator, with exceptional experience in developing award-winning high-capacity solar pumping stations, including the region's largest off-grid hybrid pumping and irrigation system. KarmSolar also offers megawatt-scale off-grid solar energy stations and grid-connected utility-scale installations. It is the leader in off-grid solar power in Egypt. Other projects centre on private solar panels and, more recently, wind energy. On 18 October 2015, KarmSolar announced a US$17 million project with Tahrir Petrochemicals to build a 10 megawatt solar station for the Tahrir Naphtha Cracker project at the Ain Sokhna station. The station will be implemented during 2016 and 2017 and will be part of the chemical company's diversification of its energy mix. This will triple KarmSolar's energy portfolio from 5 to 15 megawatts. KarmSolar has become the first energy company in Egypt to be allowed to sell electricity from a major off-grid solar power plant. The license, for a 1 megawatt installation at a dairy farm owned by a subsidiary of Juhayna, a dairy foods company, was approved by the Egyptian Electricity Regulatory Agency and has been assigned to KarmPower, a subsidiary of KarmSolar. The installation is expected to be operational by April 2016.

Source: Wamda: http://www.wamda.com/memakersge/2015/10/karmsolar-first-license-solar-power-off-grid; KarmSolar: www.karmsolar.com.

likely to grow and generate jobs. This would help young people make sound career decisions. Labour market intermediation could also contribute to improving the decision-making process. Youth organizations and the private sector in the region, such as Bayt.com, have led the way in innovative programming. Many of these organizations and start-ups, some managed by young people, have embarked on job matching and intermediation initiatives. While personal connections will continue to play a key role in securing jobs, such platforms can widen access to information and inclusion among marginalized groups.

Access to financial and social assets is crucial to helping youth make independent economic decisions and become productively involved in their countries. Enhancing the access of young people to financial services, offering a safe place to save, or an appropriately structured loan for investment in an enterprise or education can promote entrepreneurship, asset building and sustainable livelihoods. Only 13 percent of young people in the region have accounts at formal financial institutions, versus 37 percent worldwide.[24] Across the region, youth are underserved by financial institutions, which perceive youth lending as risky, a view that is not borne out by the data.[25] Few financial service providers, including banks, credit unions and microfinance institutions, understand and adequately serve the youth market, and the regulatory framework is typically not designed to be youth inclusive or to protect youth rights.

The financial component is especially effective among youth if it is accompanied by training in entrepreneurship and financial literacy and by mentorship opportunities. The evidence on microfinance is mixed and anecdotal, but programmes that improve access to credit alone appear not to function as well as programmes that combine training and potential integration into value chains.[26]

A successful initiative has been led by Silatech, which has partnered with Al-Amal Microfinance Bank in Yemen to address such gaps. In 2009, only 15 percent of Al-Amal Bank's lending went to young people. After working with Silatech to develop a youth-lending facility, the share climbed to 53 percent, and the repayment rates were better among youth than among older clients. This experience encouraged Al-Amal to expand its youth customer base and attracted the interest of others in the industry, such as Fondation Banque Populaire in Morocco.

Crowdfunding, that is, funding from multiple sources, holds great potential for plugging the gap in access to finance among youth and unlocking job creation potential in favour of youth.[27] Credit-based crowdfunding or lending is one type of crowdfunding. Kiva Arab Youth, run in partnership with Kiva, the world's largest microlending

Box 8.4 Working together: once a dream, today a necessity

No Arab country alone can achieve dramatic social and economic progress based on the diversification of sources of income and the acquisition of competitive capabilities through accumulated knowledge and industry. However, by coming together, Arab countries can reap the benefits of size and scale, diversify their combined economies and open up opportunities for investment that would be unavailable in the absence of coordinated efforts and cooperation. In addition, acting as a group will empower Arabs and allow them to secure rights and legal claims in international agreements, which are inevitably affected by the negotiating power of the parties involved. More generally, Arab countries must seek to agree among themselves about what they need to do to take their place in this new world. To this end, they should formulate a shared perspective and establish realistic common goals and effective institutions capable of attaining these goals so as to improve the outcomes of economic and societal efforts, along with competitiveness.

The argument for Arab cooperation revolves around the need for an economic and social group with a cooperative, innovative policy designed to fulfil a comprehensive agenda for broad-based social and economic renewal. This endeavour should involve more than the launch of an effective economics programme or even the adoption of a system of government programmes. It should include working towards mutual understanding, assistance and cooperation, together with a clear strategy that allows all in society to join together as partners.

Source: UNDP 2002.

platform, allows direct online peer-to-peer lending to young microentrepreneurs in five Arab countries through the Arab Youth Channel. Kiva Arab Youth mobilized US$5.5 million in financing for 3,900 Arab businesses, enjoyed a 98 percent repayment rate and helped create 30,000 jobs. Equity financing among youth is also emerging as a feasible crowdfunding alternative; examples include Ruwwad in Jordan and Eureeca in the United Arab Emirates.

Enhancing labour force participation among young women in Arab countries requires that governments introduce better structural schemes and incentive packages for employers and potential employees. More young women would be willing to work and persist in the labour market if social protection were extended to cover flexible and part-time work. This would encourage employers to offer these work options. Furthermore, governments should consider undertaking infrastructure investment with the private sector, identifying limited-duration public service jobs among youth and, during economic or political crises, establishing limited-duration public works programmes.

Greater intraregional cooperation, trade and financial flows could help sustain economic growth, increase job creation and promote a healthy labour market. This would benefit not only young workers, but also worker-sending and worker-receiving countries if the relevant bilateral agreements could be reached and policies that support labour mobility and ensure good working conditions are introduced (box 8.4). Reforms would include overhauling the labour sponsorship system, licensing and supervising worker recruitment agencies, reviewing and vetting employment contracts, and ensuring that migrant workers obtain pre-departure training. A business travel card scheme could ease labour mobility. Skills assessments and standard certification can help workers take their skills across borders. Similarly, matching jobs and employment qualifications can boost productivity and provide greater opportunity for youth in the Arab region, whose Arabic language and technical competencies represent advantages.

Regional cooperation can help the Arab countries reduce their structural problems, particularly youth unemployment. One possible approach is to start with the easiest reforms among countries that are prepared for more wide-ranging cooperation. Services and labour mobility should be at the heart of the process. Issuing special long-term visas for businessmen, researchers and students can also be a good starting point. Special programmes for youth should be launched, widening the possibility for students to obtain scholarships to study in other Arab countries. Creating centres of excellence in various fields in each country could contribute to attracting the best students and researchers from other countries and realizing significant scale economies.

The role of civil society in this sensitive period is crucial in convincing political leaders of the need to give youth a more optimistic perspective on their future. A new Arab cooperation project has to be based on solid foundations. These foundations should be realistic, taking into account the security, political economy and social constraints of each country.

Young adulthood is a critical period for forming political beliefs and behaviours. According to life cycle theories, stable patterns of civic engagement tend to emerge once individuals step into the adult roles that build up their stake in community affairs, such as securing stable jobs, housing, marriage and parenting. Civic engagement is important for the functioning of society and is an integral part of any human development agenda that is relevant to the region. It can be argued that, because youth make up a significant share of the current generation of young adults, the level of civic engagement among youth reflects the existing social contract and is an important barometer of the future of societies.

Box 8.5 The Constitution of Tunisia, 2014

Article 8. Youth
Youth are an active force in building the nation.
The state seeks to provide the necessary conditions for developing the capacities of youth and realizing their potential, supports them to assume responsibility, and strives to extend and generalize their participation in social, economic, cultural and political development.

Source: See https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf.

Investment in youth participation represents recognition of the active and positive contribution of young people to society, especially intercultural understanding. Such investment must target youth from all cultural and religious backgrounds, including young people from disparate communities, as well as young people with disabilities and vulnerable or marginalized youth.

Policy advocacy is another form of civil society engagement and participation in which youth can play a meaningful role. There are few youth-led policy advocacy initiatives in the region. Establishing such initiatives could fill a significant policy advocacy gap among youth and provide learning opportunities for those who might become policymakers in the future.

At the legislative and institutional levels, key policies are important in opening the space for youth civic engagement. Despite the fact that the voting age is 18 years in most Arab countries, youth representation in parliament remains a challenge. Based on data available on nearly 100 parliamentary chambers (72 lower houses and 26 upper houses), analysis of the Inter-Parliamentary Union shows that a large majority of members of parliament (39 percent) are between 51 and 60 years of age. The next largest age group is the 41–50 age-group (22.6 percent), followed by the 61–70 (20.5 percent) age bracket.[28] This trend has been changing as countries adopt targeted youth quotas. In Morocco, 305 of the 395 members of the lower house are elected in 92 multi-member constituencies through a proportional representation system, whereas the remaining 60 seats are reserved for women, and 30 seats are reserved for candidates under the age of 40.[29] In Tunisia, at least one candidate under 35 should be among the top four candidates on party lists across the four electoral districts.[30] The Constitution of Tunisia includes an important provision on youth (box 8.5).

Young people who participate actively in their communities early on are more likely to become engaged citizens and voters. Capacity development among young candidates, for example, has proven to be more effective as an ongoing effort rather than as a one-off event three months before an election. Support for the political participation of young people should also extend across the electoral cycle.

Youth political participation needs to be meaningful and effective. Capacity development is an integral part, and, while building individual capacities is important, the capacities of organizations and the degree to which an environment enables individuals and institutions to participate in political processes should also be factored in. Following a rights-based approach entails considering youth as potential agents of change, that is, as part of the solution, not as a problem to be resolved by others.[31]

Young women and men must play a crucial and proactive role in monitoring the performance of governments and public institutions. Participatory, youth-driven accountability monitoring through the establishment of a watchdog tool can be effective. The tool could be used to monitor issues ranging from corruption to water quality.

Endnotes

1 Assaad 2014.
2 UNICEF 2015.
3 ILO 2015.
4 Robalino and others 2013.
5 Silatech-Gallup 2013.
6 The Global Terrorism database defines a terrorist attack as the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion or intimidation. To be included in the database, each of the following three characteristics must be present: (a) the incident must be intentional, that is, it must be the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator; (b) the incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence, including property crimes and violence against people; and (c) the perpetrators of the incidents must be subnational actors. The database does not include acts of state terrorism.
7 START 2015.
8 SIPRI 2015.
9 UNHCR 2015, UNRWA 2015.
10 IOM 2014.
11 UNOCHA 2015b.
12 UNRWA 2015.
13 World Bank 2015, Quick Notes Series No. 93881 (January).
14 AMF 2015, p. 9.
15 UCDP/PRIO 2014.
16 Mueller 2013.
17 Halfon and others 2014.
18 See "Universal Health Coverage", World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/healthsystems/universal_health_coverage/en/.
19 O'Neill and others 2014, p. 57.
20 ILO 2010b.
21 UN-DESA 2013c.
22 Jawad 2013.
23 UNDP 2002.
24 Stein and others 2010.
25 Silatech 2014; Demirgüç-Kunt and Klapper 2012.
26 Goldberg 2005; Robalino and others 2013.
27 InfoDev/World Bank 2013.
28 IPU 2014b.
29 See http://www.quotaproject.org/uid/countryview.cfm?CountryCode=MA.
30 IPU 2014c.
31 UNDP 2013b.

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Statistical Appendix

Chapter 2

Definition of Statistical Terms and Indicators

Definition of variables – World Values Survey (WVS)

The WVS has polled ten Arab countries of the region in its sixth wave, which took place between 2011 and 2013 Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Qatar, Yemen, and Libya. It had covered five countries in its fifth wave (around 2008), and only four countries in its fourth wave around 2000. Thus, it offers a rich set of data for the most recent period, and allows some limited comparisons through time, which helps ascertain the extent to which inter-generational change has been taking place. The WVS data has several advantages: its sample size tends to be reasonable and representative (1500 to 3000 respondents per country). Answers to questions are typically over a range (1–10), helping measure the intensity of particular values. It covers more than 90 countries, allowing for international comparisons. Some of the questions span the three waves, but not all (in particular, Political Islam).

The variables depicted in the graphs are a particular representation of the variables studied in the paper. They represent the percentage of particular populations (age or education groups), in particular countries, whose rating on a particular question (typically on a 10 scale range) is above the average rating for this group in the Middle Income group of countries, which we have constructed as the un-weighted average of all individuals from that group in all middle income countries, as provided in the 6th wave of the WVS data.

The WVS variables used in the chapter and how they are formed is described below. Factor analysis has been performed on all the indexes to ensure that they relate to the same factor.

Age: as reported, over the range 15–29.

Age: as reported, over the range 15–29. In the figures: the youth (value=1) are defined as those between the ages of 15 and 29, the low middle (2) as those between 30-44, the high middle age (3) as those between 45 and 60, and the elder as those above age 60.

Authority: is an index based on two questions, one that asks if greater respect for the authority of ones parents is a good thing, and one that asks if obeying ones rulers is an essential characteristic of democracy.

Civil engagement: is an index of how often respondents have signed a petition, joined in boycotts, or attended peaceful demonstrations during the past year.

Connectivity: is an index that measures the frequency with which respondents get information from electronic sources of information (mobile phone, email, internet, personal computer).

Dependence on family life is measured by responses to three questions on the importance of making one's parents proud, how fulfilling it is to be a housewife, and how much one trusts the family compared to the broader community.

Education: aggregated into a 1–3 scale where (1) stands for people who at most have a primary school diploma, (2) for people who have more than primary school and less than university education and (3) for people who at least start at a university program.

Gender Equality: The WVS index is based on three questions: Whether men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce; whether a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl; and whether men make better political leaders than women. In Gallup, the index is based on the same first two questions as the WVS, but the third is different, and it asks about whether women should be allowed to initiate divorce.

Income: relative to rest of population, reported in a range (1, 10).

Life Satisfaction. An index based on two questions, one focusing on how satisfied people are

with their life as a whole, and a second about the degree of free choice and control over their lives.

Piety: is an index that comprises how often one attends religious services and how important they consider God in their life.

Political Islam: is constructed from answers to a question about whether religious authorities ultimately need to interpret the laws.

Preference for democracy: is a variable that estimates how often a respondent chose democracy over other strong rule when presented with three lists of options to choose from (2 choices allowed per 4 item menus that include options related to democracy, strong rule, a good economy, and a fourth choice).

Religiosity: Based on whether religious faith is an important child quality.
Religious tolerance is an index of two questions: whether all religions should be taught in our public schools, and whether people who belong to different religions are as moral as the respondent.

Self-expression is an index of answers to 3 questions. The first two questions refer to whether imagination and self-expression are be qualities that children should be encouraged to learn at home, and the third asks whether it is important to think up new ideas, be creative, and to do things one's own way.

Social Tolerance: An index based on questions on the desirability of having neighbors that are: people of a different race; immigrants/foreign workers; people of a different religion; unmarried couples living together; people who speak a different language;

Voting: is a variable that measures answers to the question about how often people vote when elections take place.

Chapter 5

Available indicators on youth health

Patton et al.[2] proposed a set of indicators to measure adolescent health (up to age 24 years) and reviewed the availability of data for these indicators (measured through selected data sources - for example GSHS, GYTS, GMHS, or MICS) in selected countries within the region. Twenty-five indicators are proposed.[3] Most are measured of risk meaning that the higher the percentage within the country, the worse off is youth health in that country. Where the indicator is protective (higher percentages=better health), it is noted below. For the Middle East and North Africa region, 18 countries were included, 17 are Arab league countries (MENA countries that are not Arab league countries are not listed in the table below).[4] With respect to data availability, only seven of the 25 indicators were available in 8 or more of the Arab countries that were included in this database.

A search was conducted using PubMed and Ovid databases. The search period was 2005–2014 (second week of June). The total number of articles found using the above search strategy was 534 in the ten years included in the search. This amounts to an average of 2.4 articles/country/year. Annex 2 table A.15 indicated the number of articles found in each of subject areas and by country (the total is greater than the total number of articles, as one article could include more than one risk factor and more than one country). The highest number of articles by far is risk factors for leading causes of death and disability adjusted life years: tobacco (n=296), psychological/mental health (n=223), obesity (n=174) and other nutrition-related/nutrients (n=100). Only 90 research studies were found around the topic of SRH among youth in the Arab region in the last ten years despite the triple burden of SRH described below – perhaps indicating the sensitivity of the topic. Fewer articles are found related to transport injuries despite its high burden of disease (n=13 only). In terms of country, Egypt, Jordan, KSA, and Lebanon have over 50 articles in that time period.

Patton et al. suggests three key recommendations to understand young people's health more clearly: (i) indicator development and measurement with the recommendation for a core set of global indicators of youth health; (ii) extending data coverage to ensure information is collected on the most marginalized, most at risk adolescents, and (iii) leadership and coordination between governments and UN agencies to both collect the data and use it to impact health. As global organizations dialogue around these issues, Arab youth, scholars, and practitioners working with young people should critically explore the adaptations needed so that the set of indicators can provide an accurate picture of our region's young people. For example, in our context, exposure to violent conflict or displacement may be a necessary addition to a set of indicators of youth health.

Although surveys are often touted as the most effective and reliable method of collecting information, they have limitations in the age group 15–29 years.[5] Many young people in this age group may be out of school or university, making systematic access difficult. Household surveys have the limitation of contact with parents or guardians in requesting access to young people around sensitive topics. Facility-based surveys are limited to those who attend the facility for a particular condition. Creative ways to collect data on health, well-being, and risk factors need to be considered. Digital and social media platforms may be one way, but may not reach all youth.

Indicators	Data Source	Age-group	Arab countries reporting
RISK FACTORS			
Gross enrollment rates in early secondary education	UNESCO	Not stated	All
Youth unemployment	ILO	15–24 years	Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, UAE
Early marriage before 18 years	UNICEF global database (MICS, DHS, national surveys)	<18 years	Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Yemen
Underweight	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, UAE, Yemen
Overweight	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, UAE, Yemen
Childbirth before 18 years	UNICEF global data	<18 years	Egypt, Jordan, Morocco,
Maternal mortality	Household surveys	15–19 years, 20–24 years	Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco
Mortality overall and by age group (4 indicators)	WHO mortality database	overall 10–24 years; and for 10–14 years, 15–19 years, and 20–24 years	Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait
Mortality from traffic injuries	WHO mortality database	overall 10–24 years; and for 10–14 years, 15–19 years, and 20–24 years	Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait
Mortality from self-harm	WHO mortality database	overall 10–24 years; and for 10–14 years, 15–19 years, and 20–24 years	Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait
Mortality from violence	WHO mortality database	overall 10–24 years; and for 10–14 years, 15–19 years, and 20–24 years	Bahrain, Egypt, Kuwait
Prevalence of any axis one mental disorders	GMHS	18–24 years	Iraq, Lebanon
Unmet need for mental health treatment in those with axis one diagnosis	Personal communication	18–24 years	Iraq, Lebanon
Binge drinking in past 30 days	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	Lebanon, Syria
Cannabis use in past 30 days	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	Morocco
Prevalence of sexual activity by 15 years	GSHS, HBSC, MICS	<15 years or 13–15 years depending on data source	None
HIV prevalence	DHS, MICS	15–24 years	None
PROTECTIVE FACTORS			
Physical activity for more than 60 each day / week	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen
Parent or guardians understand worries most of the time	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, Yemen
Self-rated health	GSHS, HBSC	13–15 years	None
Condom use at last high risk sex	UNICEF unpublished	15–24 years	None
HPV vaccination rates	Unknown	Females 10–19 years	None
Use of health services in past 12 months	Unknown	15–19 years	None

Endnotes

[1] Moaddel & DeJong 2014.

[2] Patton and others 2012.

[3] The 25 indicators include: mortality data (4 indicators), maternal deaths, HIV prevalence, mental disorder, tobacco use, binge drinking, cannabis use, underweight, overweight, physical activity, parental understanding, self-rated health, sex by 15 years, unemployment, early marriage (before 18 years), early childbirth (before 18 years), secondary education, HIV knowledge, condom use, HPV vaccination, unmet mental health, and health services use.

[4] Countries reviewed included: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen

[5] Patton and others 2012.

Annex 1

Human development indicators in the Arab countries

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Human development indices

1 Human Development Index and its components
2 Human Development Index trends, 1980–2013
3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index
4 Gender Inequality Index
5 Gender Development Index
6 Multidimensional Poverty Index
6A Multidimensional Poverty Index: changes over time (select countries)

Human development indicators

7 Health: children and youth
8 Adult health and health expenditures
9 Education
10 Command over and allocation of resources
11 Social competencies
12 Personal insecurity
13 International integration
14 Environment
15 Population trends
16 Supplementary indicators: perceptions of well-being

Symbols used in the tables

.. Not available
0 or 0.0 Nil or negligible
< Less than
— Not applicable

Acronyms and abbreviations

HDI	Human development index
GNI	Gross National Income
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
HDR	Human Development Report
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
DTP	Diphtheria, Tetanus toxoid and Pertussis
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

Human Development Report 2014 - Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience

Table 1 Human Development Index and its components

HDI rank	Country	Human Development Index (HDI) (Value) 2013	Life expectancy at birth (years) 2013	Mean years of schooling (years) 2012	Expected years of schooling (years) 2012	Gross national income (GNI) per capita (2011 PPP $) 2013	Human Development Index (HDI) (Value) 2012	Change in rank 2012–2013
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT								
31	Qatar	0.851	78.4	9.1	13.8	119,029	0.850	0
34	Saudi Arabia	0.836	75.5	8.7	15.6	52,109	0.833	0
40	United Arab Emirates	0.827	76.8	9.1	13.3	58,068	0.825	0
44	Bahrain	0.815	76.6	9.4	14.4	32,072	0.813	0
46	Kuwait	0.814	74.3	7.2	14.6	85,820	0.813	-2
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT								
55	Libya	0.784	75.3	7.5	16.1	21,666	0.789	-5
56	Oman	0.783	76.6	6.8	13.6	42,191	0.781	0
65	Lebanon	0.765	80.0	7.9	13.2	16,263	0.764	0
77	Jordan	0.745	73.9	9.9	13.3	11,337	0.744	0
90	Tunisia	0.721	75.9	6.5	14.6	10,440	0.719	0
93	Algeria	0.717	71.0	7.6	14.0	12,555	0.715	0
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT								
107	Palestine, State of	0.686	73.2	8.9	13.2	5,168	0.683	0
110	Egypt	0.682	71.2	6.4	13.0	10,400	0.681	-2
118	Syrian Arab Republic	0.658	74.6	6.6	12.0	5,771	0.662	-4
120	Iraq	0.642	69.4	5.6	10.1	14,007	0.641	0
129	Morocco	0.617	70.9	4.4	11.6	6,905	0.614	2
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT								
154	Yemen	0.500	63.1	2.5	9.2	3,945	0.499	0
159	Comoros	0.488	60.9	2.8	12.8	1,505	0.486	-1
161	Mauritania	0.487	61.6	3.7	8.2	2,988	0.485	-2
166	Sudan	0.473	62.1	3.1	7.3	3,428	0.472	0
170	Djibouti	0.467	61.8	3.8	6.4	3,109	0.465	0
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES								
	Somalia	..	55.1	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Index Groups							
	Very high human development	0.890	80.2	11.7	16.3	40,046	0.889	–
	High human development	0.735	74.5	8.1	13.4	13,231	0.733	–
	Medium human development	0.614	67.9	5.5	11.7	5,960	0.612	–
	Low human development	0.493	59.4	4.2	9.0	2,904	0.490	–
	Regions							
	Arab States	0.682	70.2	6.3	11.8	15,817	0.681	–
	East Asia and the Pacific	0.703	74.0	7.4	12.5	10,499	0.699	–
	Europe and Central Asia	0.738	71.3	9.6	13.6	12,415	0.735	–
	Latin America and the Caribbean	0.740	74.9	7.9	13.7	13,767	0.739	–
	South Asia	0.588	67.2	4.7	11.2	5,195	0.586	–
	Sub-Saharan Africa	0.502	56.8	4.8	9.7	3,152	0.499	–
	Least developed countries	0.487	61.5	3.9	9.4	2,126	0.484	–
	Small island developing states	0.665	70.0	7.5	11.0	9,471	0.663	–
	World	0.702	70.8	7.7	12.2	13,723	0.700	–

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 1: 160–163.

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Table 2 Human Development Index trends, 1980–2013

		Human Development Index (HDI)									HDI rank		Average annual HDI growth		
		(Value)										(Change)	(%)		
HDI rank	Country	1980	1990	2000	2005	2008	2010	2011	2012	2013	2012	2008–2013	1980–1990	1990–2000	2000–2013
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
31	Qatar	0.729	0.756	0.811	0.840	0.855	0.847	0.843	0.850	0.851	31	-1	0.35	0.71	0.37
34	Saudi Arabia	0.583	0.662	0.744	0.773	0.791	0.815	0.825	0.833	0.836	34	13	1.28	1.17	0.90
40	United Arab Emirates	0.640	0.725	0.797	0.823	0.832	0.824	0.824	0.825	0.827	40	-5	1.25	0.95	0.28
44	Bahrain	0.677	0.729	0.784	0.811	0.810	0.812	0.812	0.813	0.815	44	-2	0.75	0.72	0.30
46	Kuwait	0.702	0.723	0.804	0.795	0.800	0.807	0.810	0.813	0.814	44	1	0.29	1.08	0.09
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
55	Libya	0.641	0.684	0.745	0.772	0.789	0.799	0.753	0.789	0.784	50	-5	0.65	0.85	0.40
56	Oman	..	..	..	0.733	0.714	0.780	0.781	0.781	0.783	56	6	..	..	..
65	Lebanon	..	..	..	0.741	0.750	0.759	0.764	0.764	0.765	65	2	..	..	..
77	Jordan	0.587	0.622	0.705	0.733	0.746	0.744	0.744	0.744	0.745	77	-8	0.58	1.26	0.43
90	Tunisia	0.484	0.567	0.653	0.687	0.706	0.715	0.716	0.719	0.721	90	1	1.60	1.42	0.77
93	Algeria	0.509	0.576	0.634	0.675	0.695	0.709	0.715	0.715	0.717	93	5	1.25	0.96	0.95
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
107	Palestine, State of	..	..	..	0.649	0.672	0.671	0.679	0.683	0.686	107	1	..	..	..
110	Egypt	0.452	0.546	0.621	0.645	0.667	0.678	0.679	0.681	0.682	108	-4	1.91	1.30	0.72
118	Syrian Arab Republic	0.528	0.570	0.605	0.653	0.658	0.662	0.662	0.662	0.658	114	-8	0.76	0.60	0.65
120	Iraq	0.500	0.508	0.606	0.621	0.632	0.638	0.639	0.641	0.642	120	-1	0.17	1.77	0.45
129	Morocco	0.399	0.459	0.526	0.569	0.588	0.603	0.612	0.614	0.617	131	3	1.41	1.37	1.23
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
154	Yemen	..	0.390	0.427	0.462	0.471	0.484	0.497	0.499	0.500	154	2	..	0.90	1.22
159	Comoros	..	..	..	0.464	0.474	0.479	0.483	0.486	0.488	158	-4	..	..	..
161	Mauritania	0.347	0.367	0.433	0.455	0.466	0.475	0.475	0.485	0.487	159	-2	0.55	1.67	0.91
166	Sudan	0.331	0.342	0.385	0.423	0.447	0.463	0.468	0.472	0.473	166	-1	0.33	1.20	1.59
170	Djibouti	..	..	..	0.412	0.438	0.452	0.461	0.465	0.467	170	-3	..	..	..
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES															
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Index groups														
	Very high human development	0.757	0.798	0.849	0.870	0.879	0.885	0.887	0.889	0.890	–	–	0.52	0.62	0.37
	High human development	0.534	0.593	0.643	0.682	0.710	0.723	0.729	0.733	0.735	–	–	1.04	0.81	1.04
	Medium human development	0.420	0.474	0.528	0.565	0.587	0.601	0.609	0.612	0.614	–	–	1.22	1.09	1.17
	Low human development	0.345	0.367	0.403	0.444	0.471	0.479	0.486	0.490	0.493	–	–	0.64	0.95	1.56
	Regions														
	Arab States	0.492	0.551	0.611	0.644	0.664	0.675	0.678	0.681	0.682	–	–	1.14	1.05	0.85
	East Asia and the Pacific	0.457	0.517	0.595	0.641	0.671	0.688	0.695	0.699	0.703	–	–	1.23	1.42	1.29
	Europe and Central Asia	..	0.651	0.665	0.700	0.716	0.726	0.733	0.735	0.738	–	–	..	0.21	0.80
	Latin America and the Caribbean	0.579	0.627	0.683	0.705	0.726	0.734	0.737	0.739	0.740	–	–	0.79	0.87	0.62
	South Asia	0.382	0.438	0.491	0.533	0.560	0.573	0.582	0.586	0.588	–	–	1.37	1.16	1.39
	Sub-Saharan Africa	0.382	0.399	0.421	0.452	0.477	0.488	0.495	0.499	0.502	–	–	0.44	0.52	1.37
	Least developed countries	0.319	0.345	0.391	0.429	0.457	0.472	0.480	0.484	0.487	–	–	0.79	1.26	1.70
	Small island developing states	0.545	0.587	0.613	0.637	0.658	0.662	0.663	0.663	0.665	–	–	0.75	0.43	0.62
	World	0.559	0.597	0.639	0.667	0.685	0.693	0.698	0.700	0.702	–	–	0.66	0.67	0.73

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 2: 164–167.

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Table 3 Inequality-adjusted Human Development Index

		Human Development Index (HDI)	Inequality-adjusted HDI (IHDI)			Coefficient of human inequality	Inequality in life expectancy	Inequality-adjusted life expectancy index	Inequality in education	Inequality-adjusted education index	Inequality in income	Inequality-adjusted income index	Income inequality		
		(Value)	(Value)	Overall loss (%)	Difference from HDI rank	(Value)	%	(Value)	%	(Value)	%	(Value)	Quintile ratio	Palma ratio	Gini coefficient
HDI rank	Country	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2003–2012	2003–2012	2003–2012
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
31	Qatar	0.851	..	..	..	..	6.0	0.844	..	..	..	..	13.3	..	41.1
34	Saudi Arabia	0.836	..	..	..	..	8.7	0.779	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
40	United Arab Emirates	0.827	..	..	..	..	5.5	0.826	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
44	Bahrain	0.815	..	..	..	..	6.3	0.816	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
46	Kuwait	0.814	..	..	..	..	7.2	0.775	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
55	Libya	0.784	..	..	..	..	10.1	0.765	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
56	Oman	0.783	..	..	..	..	7.0	0.809	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
65	Lebanon	0.765	0.606	20.8	-17	20.3	6.7	0.861	24.1	0.479	30.0	0.538	..	..	..
77	Jordan	0.745	0.607	18.6	-5	18.5	11.9	0.730	22.4	0.543	21.1	0.564	5.7	1.5	35.4
90	Tunisia	0.721	..	..	..	..	10.6	0.768	..	..	..	..	6.4	1.5	36.1
93	Algeria	0.717	..	..	..	..	16.7	0.654	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
107	Palestine, State of	0.686	0.606	11.7	13	11.7	13.1	0.711	6.9	0.617	15.0	0.507	5.8	1.5	35.5
110	Egypt	0.682	0.518	24.0	-5	22.8	13.4	0.682	40.9	0.339	14.2	0.602	4.4	1.2	30.8
118	Syrian Arab Republic	0.658	0.518	21.2	4	20.8	12.6	0.734	31.5	0.379	18.3	0.500	5.7	..	35.8
120	Iraq	0.642	0.505	21.4	0	21.2	17.6	0.626	29.8	0.328	16.1	0.626	4.6	1.2	30.9
129	Morocco	0.617	0.433	29.7	0	28.5	16.8	0.652	45.8	0.254	23.0	0.493	7.3	2.0	40.9
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
154	Yemen	0.500	0.336	32.8	-2	31.7	30.3	0.462	47.2	0.179	17.6	0.457	6.3	1.7	37.7
159	Comoros	0.488	..	..	..	..	34.2	0.414	47.4	0.237	..	..	26.7	..	64.3
161	Mauritania	0.487	0.315	35.3	-2	34.6	36.6	0.405	45.9	0.191	21.2	0.404	7.8	1.9	40.5
166	Sudan	0.473	..	..	..	..	32.8	0.435	..	..	..	..	6.2	1.4	35.3
170	Djibouti	0.467	0.306	34.6	2	33.7	32.5	0.434	47.0	0.162	21.7	0.406	..	..	40.0
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES															
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	42.1	0.312	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Index groups														
	Very high human development	0.890	0.780	12.3	–	12.0	4.9	0.881	8.7	0.769	22.4	0.702	–	–	–
	High human development	0.735	0.590	19.7	–	19.3	10.7	0.749	17.4	0.531	29.9	0.517	–	–	–
	Medium human development	0.614	0.457	25.6	–	25.2	21.9	0.575	35.1	0.331	18.6	0.502	–	–	–
	Low human development	0.493	0.332	32.6	–	32.4	35.0	0.394	38.2	0.241	23.9	0.387	–	–	–
	Regions														
	Arab States	0.682	0.512	24.9	–	24.2	17.4	0.639	38.0	0.334	17.3	0.629	–	–	–
	East Asia and the Pacific	0.703	0.564	19.7	–	19.5	11.7	0.734	19.7	0.477	27.0	0.513	–	–	–
	Europe and Central Asia	0.738	0.639	13.3	–	13.2	14.2	0.676	8.6	0.639	16.9	0.605	–	–	–
	Latin America and the Caribbean	0.740	0.559	24.5	–	23.9	13.2	0.733	22.2	0.502	36.3	0.474	–	–	–
	South Asia	0.588	0.419	28.7	–	28.0	24.4	0.549	41.6	0.274	18.0	0.489	–	–	–
	Sub-Saharan Africa	0.502	0.334	33.6	–	33.5	36.6	0.359	35.7	0.276	28.1	0.375	–	–	–
	Least developed countries	0.487	0.336	31.0	–	30.9	32.3	0.433	35.6	0.253	24.7	0.348	–	–	–
	Small island developing states	0.665	0.497	25.3	–	24.9	18.5	0.626	22.1	0.433	34.2	0.452	–	–	–
	World	0.702	0.541	22.9	–	22.8	17.3	0.647	27.0	0.433	24.1	0.564	–	–	–

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 3: 168–171.

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Table 4 Gender Inequality Index

		Gender Inequality Index		Maternal mortality ratio	Adolescent birth rate	Share of seats in parliament	Population with at least some secondary education		Labour Force Participation rate	
		(Value)	Rank	(deaths per 100,000 live births)	(births per 1,000 women aged 15–19)	(% held by women)	(% aged 25 and above)		(% aged 15 and above)	
							Female	Male	Female	Male
HDI rank	Country	2013	2013	2010–2013	2010–2015	2013–2014	2005–2012	2005–2012	2012–2013	2012–2013
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
31	Qatar	0.524	113	6	9.5	0.0	66.7	59.0	50.8	95.5
34	Saudi Arabia	0.321	56	16	10.2	19.9	60.5	70.3	20.2	78.3
40	United Arab Emirates	0.244	43	8	27.6	17.5	73.1	61.3	46.5	92.0
44	Bahrain	0.253	46	22	13.8	10.0	74.4	80.4	39.2	86.9
46	Kuwait	0.288	50	14	14.5	4.6	55.6	56.3	43.6	83.1
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
55	Libya	0.215	40	15	2.5	16.5	55.6	44.0	30.0	76.4
56	Oman	0.348	64	11	10.6	1.2	47.2	57.1	29.0	82.6
65	Lebanon	0.413	80	16	12.0	3.1	38.8	38.9	23.3	70.9
77	Jordan	0.488	101	50	26.5	12.0	69.5	78.5	15.6	66.6
90	Tunisia	0.265	48	46	4.6	28.1	32.8	46.1	25.1	70.9
93	Algeria	0.425	81	89	10.0	31.6	20.9	27.3	15.2	72.2
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
107	Palestine, State of	..	..	..	45.8	..	31.5	32.2	15.4	66.4
110	Egypt	0.580	130	45	43.0	2.0	43.4	59.3	23.7	74.8
118	Syrian Arab Republic	0.556	125	49	41.6	12.0	29.0	38.9	13.5	72.7
120	Iraq	0.542	120	67	68.7	25.2	22.0	42.7	14.9	69.8
129	Morocco	0.460	92	120	35.8	17.0	20.1	36.3	26.5	75.8
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
154	Yemen	0.733	152	270	47.0	0.3	7.6	24.4	25.4	72.2
159	Comoros	..	..	350	51.1	3.0	..	..	35.2	80.1
161	Mauritania	0.644	142	320	73.3	25.2	8.0	20.8	28.7	79.1
166	Sudan	0.628	140	360	84.0	24.3	12.8	18.2	31.3	76.0
170	Djibouti	..	..	230	18.6	12.7	..	..	36.3	67.7
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES										
	Somalia	..	..	850	110.4	13.8	..	..	37.2	75.5
	Human Development Groups									
	Very high human development	0.197	–	16	19.2	26.7	86.1	87.7	52.3	69.0
	High human development	0.315	–	42	28.8	18.8	60.2	69.1	57.1	77.1
	Medium human development	0.513	–	186	43.4	17.5	34.2	51.4	38.7	80.0
	Low human development	0.587	–	427	92.3	20.0	14.9	29.6	55.7	78.4
	Regions									
	Arab States	0.546	–	164	45.4	17.7	32.9	46.4	23.3	75.4
	East Asia and the Pacific	0.331	–	72	21.2	18.9	54.6	66.4	61.3	78.5
	Europe and Central Asia	0.317	–	31	30.8	25.1	70.4	80.6	50.8	67.3
	Latin America and the Caribbean	0.416	–	85	68.3	25.9	53.3	53.9	53.6	79.6
	South Asia	0.539	–	202	38.7	19.3	28.4	49.9	30.5	80.6
	Sub-Saharan Africa	0.578	–	510	109.7	22.9	22.9	32.9	63.6	76.6
	Least developed countries	0.570	–	389	97.0	21.8	16.5	27.2	65.7	82.6
	Small island developing states	0.478	–	195	61.5	23.0	50.4	55.2	52.8	73.3
	World	0.451	–	130	47.4	22.2	54.2	64.2	50.2	76.7

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 4: 172–175; World Bank WDI 2015.

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Table 5 Gender-related development index (GDI)

		Gender-related development index		Human development index value		Life expectancy at birth		Mean years of schooling		Expected years of schooling		Estimated GNI per capita	
		Female to male ratio of HDI	Rank	(years)		(years)		(years)		(years)		(2011 PPP$)	
				Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
HDI rank	Country	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2013	2002–2012	2002–2012	2000–2012	2000–2012	2013	2013
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
31	Qatar	0.979	32	0.838	0.856	79.5	77.8	10.1	8.7	14.0	13.9	45,863	141,468
34	Saudi Arabia	0.897	112	0.773	0.861	77.6	73.9	8.0	9.2	15.9	15.4	16,197	78,689
40	United Arab Emirates	0.958	70	0.800	0.835	78.2	76.1	10.2	8.7	13.9	12.9	23,903	72,659
44	Bahrain	0.961	66	0.798	0.831	77.5	75.9	9.1	9.6	15.1	13.7	24,531	36,660
46	Kuwait	0.987	22	0.801	0.812	75.5	73.5	7.9	6.8	15.2	14.2	43,134	114,532
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
55	Libya	0.931	93	0.749	0.805	77.3	73.5	7.5	7.5	16.4	15.9	10,649	32,678
56	Oman	..	..	..	..	79.0	74.8	..	..	13.9	13.4	17,346	56,424
65	Lebanon	0.900	110	0.715	0.794	82.3	78.1	7.6	8.2	13.0	13.3	7,199	25,038
77	Jordan	0.842	130	0.658	0.781	75.6	72.3	9.4	10.4	13.5	13.1	2,875	19,459
90	Tunisia	0.891	116	0.669	0.751	78.3	73.6	5.5	7.5	15.0	14.0	4,751	16,226
93	Algeria	0.843	129	0.629	0.746	72.7	69.4	5.9	7.8	14.2	13.8	3,695	21,219
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
107	Palestine, State of	0.974	41	0.612	0.628	75.0	71.5	8.4	9.3	14.0	12.5	1,651	8,580
110	Egypt	0.855	125	0.617	0.722	73.6	68.8	5.3	7.5	12.7	13.3	4,225	16,522
118	Syrian Arab Republic	0.851	127	0.588	0.691	77.8	71.8	6.1	7.1	12.0	12.1	1,922	9,478
120	Iraq	0.802	137	0.556	0.693	73.2	65.9	4.4	6.7	8.7	11.4	4,246	23,555
129	Morocco	0.828	132	0.545	0.658	72.7	69.1	3.2	5.6	10.6	11.6	3,215	10,692
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
154	Yemen	0.738	146	0.415	0.562	64.5	61.8	1.2	3.8	7.7	10.6	1,775	6,080
159	Comoros	..	..	..	..	62.3	59.5	..	..	12.3	13.2	798	2,201
161	Mauritania	0.801	138	0.425	0.530	63.1	60.0	2.6	4.9	8.1	8.3	1,362	4,592
166	Sudan	..	..	..	..	63.9	60.3	2.5	3.8	..	..	1,692	5,153
170	Djibouti	..	..	..	..	63.4	60.2	..	..	5.9	6.9	1,907	4,300
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES													
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	56.7	53.4	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Groups												
	Very high human development	0.975	–	0.874	0.896	83.0	77.4	11.6	11.8	16.7	15.8	26,677	53,683
	High human development	0.946	–	0.710	0.750	76.8	72.3	7.5	8.5	13.4	13.1	9,426	16,966
	Medium human development	0.875	–	0.565	0.646	70.0	65.9	4.7	6.4	11.4	11.8	3,199	8,619
	Low human development	0.834	–	0.446	0.535	60.5	58.2	3.1	5.1	8.3	9.8	2,011	3,789
	Regions												
	Arab States	0.866	–	0.626	0.722	72.2	68.4	4.9	6.7	12.1	12.8	6,991	23,169
	East Asia and the Pacific	0.943	–	0.682	0.724	75.8	72.3	6.8	7.9	12.8	12.6	8,154	12,488
	Europe and Central Asia	0.938	–	0.705	0.752	75.4	67.3	8.8	9.8	13.4	13.8	7,287	17,867
	Latin America and the Caribbean	0.963	–	0.716	0.744	78.0	71.8	7.7	8.0	13.6	13.0	8,962	18,732
	South Asia	0.830	–	0.522	0.629	68.9	65.7	3.5	5.8	10.8	11.4	2,384	7,852
	Sub-Saharan Africa	0.867	–	0.460	0.531	58.0	55.6	3.7	5.4	8.8	10.1	2,492	3,812
	Least developed countries	0.859	–	0.447	0.520	62.8	60.3	2.9	4.5	9.0	10.1	1,576	2,629
	Small island developing states	..	–	..	..	72.4	67.7	..	..	13.5	12.8	6,993	12,017
	World	0.920	–	0.655	0.712	73.0	68.8	6.0	7.4	12.0	12.3	8,956	18,277

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 5: 176–179.

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Table 6 Multidimensional Poverty Index

		Multidimensional Poverty Index												
		Revised specifications		Specifications (2010)		Population in multidimensional poverty		Population near multidimensional poverty	Population in severe poverty	Contribution of deprivation in dimension to overall poverty			Population below income poverty line (%)	
		Index	Head-count	Index	Head-count	Head-count	Intensity of deprivation			Education	Health	Living standards	PPP $1.25 a day	National poverty line
Country	Year/ Survey	(Value)	(%)	(Value)	(%)	(thousands)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	2002–2012	2002–2012
Djibouti	2006	0.127	26.9	0.139	29.3	212	47.3	16.0	11.1	36.1	22.7	41.2	18.84	..
Egypt	2008	0.036	8.9	0.024	6.0	6740	40.3	8.6	1.5	41.8	45.6	12.6	1.69	25.2
Iraq	2011	0.052	13.3	0.045	11.6	4236	39.4	7.4	2.5	50.1	38.6	11.3	2.82	22.9
Jordan	2009	0.004	1.0	0.008	2.4	64	36.8	4.1	0.1	33.7	56.3	10.0	0.12	13.3
Mauritania	2007	0.362	66.0	0.352	61.7	2197	54.9	12.8	42.3	33.5	18.2	48.3	23.43	42
Palestine, (State of)	2006 /2007	0.007	2.0	0.005	1.4	74	36.9	7.4	0.1	16.6	72.3	11.1	0.04	21.9
Somalia	2006	0.500	81.8	0.514	81.2	7104	61.1	8.3	63.6	33.7	18.8	47.5	..	..
Syrian Arab Republic	2006	0.024	6.4	0.021	5.5	1197	38.0	7.7	0.9	44.4	43.1	12.5	1.71	..
Tunisia	2011 /2012	0.006	1.5	0.004	1.2	161	39.3	3.2	0.2	33.7	48.2	18.1	..	..
Yemen	2006	0.191	37.5	0.283	52.5	7741	50.9	16.7	18.4	33.4	21.3	45.3	17.53	34.8

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 6: 180–181.

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Table 6 A Multidimensional Poverty Index - changes over time for select countries

	Population in multidimensional poverty							Contribution of deprivation to overall poverty		
	Multidimensional Poverty Index		Headcount		Intensity of deprivation	Population near multi-dimensional poverty	Population in severe poverty	Education	Health	Living standards
Country	Year/Survey	(Value)	(%)	(thousands)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Iraq	2011	0.052	13.3	4236	39.4	7.4	2.5	50.1	38.6	11.3
Iraq	2006	0.077	18.5	5182	41.8	15.0	4.3	45.7	33.9	20.4

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 6A: 182–183.

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Table 7 Health: Children and Youth

		Infants exclusively breastfed	Infants lacking immunization		Mortality rates		Antenatal coverage	Child malnutrition		HIV prevalence			HIV prevention
		(% of 0–5 months olds)	DTP (% of one-year-olds)	Measles (% of one-year-olds)	Infant (per 1,000 live births)	Under-five (per 1,000 live births)	(% of live births)	Stunting (moderate or severe) (% under age 5)	Overweight (moderate or severe) (% under age 5)	Children living with HIV (ages 0–14) (thousands)	Youth (% ages 15–24) Female	Youth (% ages 15–24) Male	Pregnant women living with HIV not receiving treatment to prevent mother-to-child transmission (%)
HDI rank	Country	2008–2012	2012	2012	2012–2013	2012–2013	2008–2012	2008–2012	2008–2012	2013	2012–2013	2012–2013	2011
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
31	Qatar	..	6	3	7	8	100.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
34	Saudi Arabia	..	2	2	13	16	97.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
40	United Arab Emirates	..	6	6	7	8	100.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
44	Bahrain	..	1	1	5	6	100.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
46	Kuwait	..	1	1	8	10	100.0	..	..	..	..	..	..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
55	Libya	..	1	2	12	15	93.0	21.0	22.4	..	..	..	..
56	Oman	..	1	1	10	11	99.0	9.8	1.7	..	..	..	..
65	Lebanon	14.8	16	20	8	9	95.6	..	..	..	..	..	..
77	Jordan	22.7	2	2	16	19	98.8	7.7	4.4	..	..	..	..
90	Tunisia	6.0	1	4	13	15	96.0	10.1	14.3	..	0.1	0.1	18.2
93	Algeria	7.0	1	5	22	25	89.4	15.0	12.9	1.1	0.1	0.1	24.7
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
107	Palestine, State of	27.0	2	2	19	22	98.8	10.9	..	..	..	..	..
110	Egypt	53.2	6	7	19	22	73.6	28.9	20.5	0.5	0.1	0.1	85.7
118	Syrian Arab Republic	42.6	32	39	12	15	87.7	27.5	17.9	..	..	..	..
120	Iraq	19.6	13	31	28	34	83.8	22.6	11.8	..	..	..	..
129	Morocco	31.0	1	1	26	30	77.1	14.9	10.7	1	0.1	0.1	70.0
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
154	Yemen	12.0	11	29	40	51	47.0	57.7	5.0	0.5	0.1	0.1	97.8
159	Comoros	..	9	15	58	78	75.0	30.1	9.3	..	1.6	2.8	..
161	Mauritania	45.9	5	25	67	90	75.4	22.5	1.2	..	0.2	0.1	95.7
166	Sudan	41.0	1	15	51	77	55.9	35.0	..	4.6	0.2	0.1	..
170	Djibouti	1.0	15	17	57	70	92.3	30.8	8.1	1.1	0.1	0.1	80.1
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES													
	Somalia	9.0	48	54	90	146	26.1	42.0	4.7	5.4	0.2	0.2	94.0
	Human Development Groups												
	Very high human development	..	2	6	5	6	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	High human development	..	2	3	13	15	94.9	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Medium human development	..	10	20	37	46	78.7	40.3	5.3	..	..	..	8.3
	Low human development	..	18	27	64	94	70.5	39.8	4.2	..	..	..	46.1
	Regions												
	Arab States	..	8	15	30	40	78.1	27.7	..	..	..	..	..
	East Asia and the Pacific	..	4	6	15	19	93.4	18.4	7.0	..	..	..	..
	Europe and Central Asia	..	6	7	11	12	95.2	15.5	9.7	..	..	..	..
	Latin America and the Caribbean	..	4	5	15	18	96.1	14.6	..	..	0.2	0.3	11.9
	South Asia	..	11	22	45	57	71.8	46.7	2.5	..	..	..	..
	Sub-Saharan Africa	..	20	28	61	92	76.9	37.8	4.6	200.8	2.2	1.1	34.8
	Least developed countries	..	10	20	55	80	69.1	41.1	3.8	..	0.9	0.6	33.7
	Small island developing states	..	11	25	..	..	92.1	..	..	..	..	..	..
	World	..	9	16	34	46	84.8	..	6.3	3200.0	0.4	0.3	..

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 7: 184–187; World Bank WDI 2015.

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Table 8 Adult health and health expenditures

		Adult mortality rate		Age-standardized death rates		Age-standardised obesity among adults	HIV prevalence rate, adults	Life expectancy			Physicians	Health expenditure	
		female	male	from alcohol use	from drug use	(% of population aged 20 years and older)	(% aged 15–49)	at age 60	Health-adjusted (years)		(per 10,000 people)	Total	Out of pocket
		(per 1000 people)		(per 100,000 people)				years	female	male		(as % of GDP)	(% of total health expenditure)
HDI rank	Country	2011–2012	2011–2012	2008	2008	2008	2012–2013	2010–2015	2010	2010	2003–2012	2011–2012	2011–2012
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
31	Qatar	49	65	..	0.0	33.1	..	21.2	67.4	66.2	77.4	2.2	8.5
34	Saudi Arabia	67	89	0.4	0.2	35.2	..	19.2	66.6	63.9	9.4	3.2	18.7
40	United Arab Emirates	59	84	1.1	0.3	33.7	..	19.8	66.2	64.7	19.3	2.8	20.4
44	Bahrain	61	74	0.5	0.5	32.6	..	19.5	65.2	64.3	9.1	3.9	16.5
46	Kuwait	60	96	0.1	..	42.8	..	17.6	67.0	65.3	17.9	2.5	15.8
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
55	Libya	80	117	0.0	6.9	30.8	..	19.7	63.6	62.2	19.0	3.9	22.7
56	Oman	73	116	0.4	0.2	22.0	..	20.5	66.4	63.6	22.2	2.6	12.0
65	Lebanon	46	70	2.0	4.6	28.2	..	22.7	67.5	65.9	32.0	7.6	44.8
77	Jordan	96	131	0.7	1.7	34.3	..	19.0	63.2	64.8	25.6	9.8	28.5
90	Tunisia	69	118	1.6	4.6	23.8	0.1	20.2	67.5	64.6	12.2	7.0	35.5
93	Algeria	121	164	0.5	0.2	17.5	0.1	17.9	64.6	63.8	12.1	5.2	15.0
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
107	Palestine, State of	100	137	..	..	..	..	18.7	64.0	60.5	..	..	..
110	Egypt	117	193	0.4	13.5	34.6	0.1	17.5	60.8	57.5	28.3	5.0	59.6
118	Syrian Arab Republic	74	145	0.6	2.9	31.6	..	19.9	67.5	64.6	15.0	3.4	53.9
120	Iraq	112	230	0.3	6.9	29.4	..	17.5	60.9	60.8	6.1	3.6	46.4
129	Morocco	121	170	0.8	8.0	17.3	0.2	17.9	61.9	60.3	6.2	6.4	58.8
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT													
154	Yemen	211	255	0.5	13.1	16.7	0.1	16.2	55.3	55.3	2.0	5.5	71.7
159	Comoros	234	281	0.6	0.3	4.4	2.1	15.9	54.6	53.4	..	4.5	44.1
161	Mauritania	187	234	0.8	0.3	14.0	0.4	16.4	55.0	53.5	1.3	6.4	34.1
166	Sudan	213	277	1.3	3.5	6.6	0.2	17.4	58.1	55.9	2.8	7.2	73.7
170	Djibouti	235	281	0.1	14.9	10.4	0.9	17.5	54.1	52.9	2.3	8.8	40.0
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES													
	Somalia	291	350	2.1	6.4	5.3	0.5	16.1	48.2	46.8	0.4	..	..
	Human Development Groups												
	Very high human development	59	109	1.9	1.0	22.0	..	23.0	70.9	66.9	27.8	12.2	13.7
	High human development	89	152	1.6	0.9	12.5	..	19.9	68.6	63.6	17.2	6.0	33.8
	Medium human development	157	230	1.3	2.3	5.9	..	18.5	59.5	56.3	7.4	4.6	44.7
	Low human development	270	313	0.9	2.9	5.4	..	16.2	53.0	50.7	2.8	5.2	52.7
	Regions												
	Arab States	125	176	0.7	6.6	25.5	..	19.0	61.8	60.0	13.8	3.9	32.9
	East Asia and the Pacific	88	131	1.0	0.4	5.6	..	18.5	68.2	63.5	16.3	7.1	24.2
	Europe and Central Asia	..	..	2.3	1.4	23.1	..	18.7	64.8	58.9	33.4	9.5	16.2
	Latin America and the Caribbean	99	184	3.4	0.8	23.6	0.5	21.2	66.8	62.0	19.5	7.7	32.7
	South Asia	155	225	1.1	3.2	3.2	0.3	18.6	58.3	55.5	6.7	4.0	58.2
	Sub-Saharan Africa	306	345	0.9	0.6	7.6	4.5	16.6	51.6	49.4	2.0	6.4	32.1
	Least developed countries	230	269	1.0	2.7	3.6	1.9	16.8	53.7	51.3	1.9	5.2	47.9
	Small island developing states	155	206	3.0	0.3	18.6	..	19.3	57.1	52.5	25.5	5.6	33.6
	World	138	194	1.4	1.7	11.6	0.8	20.7	63.7	59.8	15.2	10.2	17.9

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 8: 188–191; World Bank WDI 2015.

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Table 9 Education

		Literacy rates		Population with at least some secondary education	Gross enrollment ratios				Primary school dropout rates	Education quality					Expenditure on education
		Adult	Youth		Pre-primary	Primary	Secondary	Tertiary		Primary school teachers who are trained	Performance of 15 year old students			Pupil-teacher ratio	
		(% aged 15 and above)	(% aged 15–24)	(% aged 25 and above)	(% of children of pre-school age)	(% of primary school-age population)	(% of secondary school-age population)	(% of tertiary school-age population)	(% of primary school cohort)	(%)	Mathematics	Reading	Science	(number of pupils per teacher)	(% of GDP)
HDI rank	Country	2005–2013	2005–2013	2005–2012	2003–2014	2003–2014	2003–2012	2003–2013	2003–2012	2004–2013	2012	2012	2012	2003–2012	2005–2012
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
31	Qatar	96.7	99.1	60.5	58	103	112	14	6.4	58	376	388	384	10	2.5
34	Saudi Arabia	94.4	99.2	66.5	13	106	116	58	1.3	91	..	..	..	11	5.1
40	United Arab Emirates	90.0	95.0	62.7	79	108	..	108	15.6	100	434	442	448	18	..
44	Bahrain	94.6	99.2	78.0	50	..	96	47	2.2	82	..	..	..	12	2.6
46	Kuwait	95.5	98.8	56.0	81	106	100	28	5.9	..	..	..	..	9	3.8
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
55	Libya	89.9	99.9	49.6	10	114	104	61	6.4	..	..	..	..	..	..
56	Oman	86.9	99.2	53.9	52	109	94	28	1.3	..	..	..	..	20	4.3
65	Lebanon	89.6	99.2	54.2	102	107	74	48	15.6	91	..	..	..	14	2.2
77	Jordan	97.9	99.1	74.1	34	98	88	47	2.2	..	386	399	409	20	..
90	Tunisia	79.7	99.2	39.3	40	110	91	35	5.9	100	388	404	398	17	6.2
93	Algeria	72.6	91.8	24.1	79	117	98	31	7.2	99	..	..	..	23	4.3
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
107	Palestine, State of	95.9	99.3	56.7	48	94	83	46	0.7	100	..	..	..	24	..
110	Egypt	73.9	89.3	51.2	27	113	86	30	1.1	..	..	..	..	28	3.8
118	Syrian Arab Republic	85.1	95.6	34.1	6	122	74	26	6.8	..	..	..	..	..	5.1
120	Iraq	79.0	82.2	32.4	7	107	53	16	..	100	..	..	..	17	..
129	Morocco	67.1	99.2	28.0	62	117	69	16	8.4	..	..	..	..	26	5.4
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
154	Yemen	66.4	87.4	16.0	1	97	47	10	..	..	..	..	..	30	5.2
159	Comoros	75.9	86.4	..	22	117	73	10	..	75	..	..	..	28	7.6
161	Mauritania	45.5	99.2	14.2	2	97	27	5	18.8	100	..	..	..	40	3.7
166	Sudan	73.4	87.9	15.5	38	70	41	17	9.1	68	..	..	..	38	..
170	Djibouti	..	..	..	4	68	44	5	..	96	..	..	..	35	8.4
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES															
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	29	7	..	..	..	..	..	..	36	..
	Human Development Groups														
	Very high human development	..	..	86.9	85	103	101	76	3.6	..	–	–	–	..	5.3
	High human development	94.2	98.9	64.9	67	118	87	35	8.1	..	–	–	–	..	4.6
	Medium human development	71.7	85.9	47.5	51	111	70	23	18.3	..	–	–	–	..	3.7
	Low human development	58.2	70.2	22.1	24	98	39	8	42.7	..	–	–	–	..	3.7
	Regions														
	Arab States	76.9	89.7	41.1	25	101	72	25	5.8	..	–	–	–	..	4.3
	East Asia and the Pacific	94.7	98.9	..	68	117	85	31	..	..	–	–	–	..	5.2
	Europe and Central Asia	99.0	99.0	75.6	78	102	99	63	4.1	..	–	–	–	..	5.2
	Latin America and the Caribbean	91.6	97.8	54.7	74	109	88	43	14.6	..	–	–	–	..	4.5
	South Asia	62.8	61.4	38.4	55	111	63	21	21.2	..	–	–	–	..	2.1
	Sub-Saharan Africa	59.1	68.8	28.1	20	100	41	8	37.7	74.8	–	–	–	..	4.3
	Least developed countries	58.7	58.7	..	16	106	41	9	39.9	..	–	–	–	..	4.2
	Small island developing states	..	..	..	67	96	79	..	15.8	..	–	–	–	..	..
	World	84.0	89.4	63.6	54	108	73	32	17.1	..	–	–	–	..	4.9

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 9: 192–195; World Bank WDI 2015; UNESCO UIS database 2015.

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Table 10 Command over and allocation of resources

		Gross domestic Product (GDP)		Gross fixed capital formation	General government final consumption expenditure		Taxes on incomes, profits and capital gain	Research and development expenditure	Shares of agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries	Debts			Prices		
		(2011 PPP$)								Domestic credit provided by financial sector	External debt stock	Total debt service	Consumer Price Index	Domestic food	
		(billions)	per capita	(% of GDP)	(% of GDP)	annual growth (%)	(% of total tax revenue)	(% of GDP)	(% of GDP)	(% of GDP)	(% of GNI)	(% of GNI)	(2010=100)	Price level index	Price level volatility index
HDI rank	Country	2012–2013	2012–2013	2005–2013	2005–2013	2005–2013	2005–2012	2005–2012	2012	2012–2013	2005–2013	2012–2013	2012–2013	2013	2013
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
31	Qatar	276.6	127,562	..	12.9	10.1	40.2	..	0.1	73.9	..	..	107	0.8	52.1
34	Saudi Arabia	1,501.1	52,068	23.2	22.1	9.2	..	0.1	1.9	-7.9	..	..	113	1.2	34.7
40	United Arab Emirates	525.1	57,045	22.0	6.8	4.2	..	0.5	0.7	76.5	..	..	103	..	..
44	Bahrain	56.5	42,428	19.2	14.4	10.7	0.7	..	0.3	78.6	..	..	106	1.2	17.2
46	Kuwait	273.7	84,188	17.6	16.7	15.0	0.6	0.1	0.3	47.9	..	..	111	0.9	25.3
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
55	Libya	126.3	20,371	27.9	9.3	..	..	..	2.3	-51.1	..	..	126	..	..
56	Oman	154.9	42,649	22.3	19.2	10.0	2.6	0.1	1.1	35.7	..	..	108	1.1	39.4
65	Lebanon	74.3	16,623	27.9	14.7	23.2	19.0	..	5.0	187.6	68.9	7.80	112	..	..
77	Jordan	73.7	11,407	27.2	19.7	-11.4	13.6	0.4	3.0	111.9	71.9	3.01	115	1.3	20.5
90	Tunisia	117.2	10,768	20.2	19.0	2.8	26.7	1.1	8.9	83.4	55.5	5.92	116	1.8	19.3
93	Algeria	505.5	12,893	33.8	18.9	80.4	60.2	0.1	8.8	3.0	2.5	0.26	118	..	..
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
107	Palestine, State of	18.7	4,484	22.2	27.7	-9.0	2.1	..	5.6	..	..	..	..	..	..
110	Egypt	880.8	10,733	13.8	11.7	3.4	26.2	0.4	14.8	86.2	16.7	1.30	129	2.0	102.7
118	Syrian Arab Republic	..	..	20.4	12.3	23.6	30.2	..	21.0	..	..	1.09	143	1.5	44.0
120	Iraq	483.6	14,471	16.7	21.3	..	..	0.0	4.1	-1.4	..	..	114	1.6	47.2
129	Morocco	233.9	6,967	30.2	19.0	3.7	26.2	0.7	13.7	115.5	38.7	5.02	104	1.6	19.8
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT															
154	Yemen	93.5	3,832	16.4	13.8	..	..	..	14.6	33.9	22.1	0.78	146	1.6	49.6
159	Comoros	1.0	1,400	17.8	16.2	2.2	..	..	50.9	26.9	22.3	0.08	106	..	..
161	Mauritania	11.5	2,945	38.0	17.0	2.8	..	..	23.6	39.1	91.7	4.24	115	2.2	20.7
166	Sudan	123.9	3,265	20.0	7.5	20.9	..	..	41.8	24.0	47.9	0.46	218	..	..
170	Djibouti	2.5	2,903	37.5	25.1	8.0	..	..	3.7	33.9	62.5	..	112	..	..
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES															
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	60.2	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Groups														
	Very high human development	45,473.5	40,397	18.2	19.2	0.7	37.2	2.5	1.5	203.4	..	..	–	–	–
	High human development	31,426.4	12,920	33.0	14.9	21.9	23.5	..	7.8	109.5	20.7	2.74	–	–	–
	Medium human development	12,959.8	5,875	27.4	12.0	6.3	..	..	14.4	72.5	23.8	2.17	–	–	–
	Low human development	3,010.1	2,830	17.1	12.6	6.3	..	..	28.1	32.8	23.4	1.17	–	–	–
	Regions														
	Arab States	5,714.7	15,455	23.6	16.4	9.0	27.6	..	8.1	30.0	..	..	–	–	–
	East Asia and the Pacific	30,043.8	13,361	28.8	17.1	3.9	36.3	2.6	10.7	204.9	..	..	–	–	–
	Europe and Central Asia	24,626.4	27,395	19.5	20.5	0.6	15.9	2.0	9.0	131.7	..	9.19	–	–	–
	Latin America and the Caribbean	8,983.7	14,600	20.0	15.7	2.7	24.8	0.8	5.6	74.1	..	3.56	–	–	–
	South Asia	8,137.2	4,870	26.6	11.3	4.3	18.0	0.8	18.1	72.2	23.2	2.24	–	–	–
	Sub-Saharan Africa	3,069.8	3,277	20.3	16.5	3.3	22.2	0.6	18.4	61.2	..	1.90	–	–	–
	Least developed countries	1,822.6	2,029	25.2	10.5	9.6	21.2	..	24.6	30.1	..	1.50	–	–	–
	Small island developing states	286.4	6,736	..	..	..	..	..	8.7	..	..	..	–	–	–
	World	99,446.8	13,958	21.9	17.6	1.2	21.7	2.1	4.4	166.6	..	..	–	–	–

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 10: 196–199; World Bank WDI 2015.

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Table 11 Social competencies

		Employment and vulnerabilities							Birth regis-tration	Old age pension recipient			Suicide rates	
		Employment to population ratio	Vulnerable employment	Youth unem-ployment	Unemployment rate	Child labour	Share of work-ing poor	Length of mandatory paid maternity leave	(% aged under 5)	(% of statutory pension age population)			(per 100,000)	
		(% aged 25 and above)	(% of total employ-ment)	(% aged 15–24)	(% aged 15 years and older)	(% aged 5–14 years)	(% of total employ-ment)	(days)		Total	Female	Male	Female	Male
HDI rank	Country	2012	2003–2012	2008–2013	2004–2014	2005–2012	2003–2010	2013	2005–2012	2004–2013	2004–2013	2004–2013	2003–2009	2003–2009
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
31	Qatar	89.8	0.4	1.3	0.4	..	..	..	..	7.9	..	..	..	..
34	Saudi Arabia	60.4	..	30.4	5.9	..	..	70	..	..	..	..	..	..
40	United Arab Emirates	84.4	1.0	12.1	4.2	..	..	45	100.0	..	..	..	..	..
44	Bahrain	72.5	2.0	5.3	3.9	4.6	..	..	..	40.1	..	..	3.5	4.0
46	Kuwait	76.3	2.2	14.6	3.6	..	..	70	..	27.3	..	..	1.7	1.9
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
55	Libya	55.4	..	48.7	19.0	..	..	..	..	43.3	..	..	..	..
56	Oman	67.6	..	..	..	..	..	42	..	24.7	..	..	..	..
65	Lebanon	50.0	33.9	16.8	9.0	1.9	..	49	99.5	0.0	..	..	..	..
77	Jordan	44.3	9.7	28.8	12.6	1.9	2.8	70	99.1	42.2	11.8	82.3	0.0	0.2
90	Tunisia	47.1	28.8	34.9	15.8	2.1	..	30	99.2	68.8	..	..	..	..
93	Algeria	45.4	29.5	24.8	9.8	4.7	..	98	99.3	63.6	..	..	..	..
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
107	Palestine, State of	40.3	26.7	41.0	26.9	5.7	..	70	99.3	8.0	..	..	..	..
110	Egypt	51.2	23.1	34.2	13.2	9.3	14.4	90	99.0	32.7	8.0	61.7	0.0	0.1
118	Syrian Arab Republic	47.0	32.9	35.8	14.9	4.0	12.9	120	96.0	16.7	..	..	..	..
120	Iraq	44.0	..	..	11.9	4.7	16.6	..	99.2	56.0	..	..	..	..
129	Morocco	51.5	50.7	19.3	9.7	8.3	13.0	98	94.0	39.8	..	..	..	..
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
154	Yemen	50.0	..	33.7	17.8	22.7	33.5	70	17.0	8.5	..	..	..	..
159	Comoros	62.4	..	..	..	27.1	61.2	..	88.0	..	..	..	..	..
161	Mauritania	44.5	..	..	10.1	14.6	..	98	58.8	9.3	..	..	..	..
166	Sudan	55.1	..	22.9	19.8	..	..	56	59.3	4.6	..	..	..	..
170	Djibouti	..	..	..	..	7.7	..	..	92.0	12.0	..	..	..	..
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES														
	Somalia	59.2	..	..	..	49.0	74.5	..	3.0	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Groups													
	Very high human development	58.7	..	18.3	7.9	..	..	–	99.9	..	87.5	97.5	6.6	20.5
	High human development	68.1	..	16.2	5.4	..	..	–	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Medium human development	63.7	..	..	8.3	11.8	60.5	–	57.2	..	..	..	..	..
	Low human development	72.2	..	..	..	25.2	74.9	–	40.3	..	..	..	..	..
	Regions													
	Arab States	52.7	..	24.6	10.4	..	..	–	80.8	..	..	..	..	..
	East Asia and the Pacific	72.8	..	..	..	..	..	–	79.0	..	..	..	..	..
	Europe and Central Asia	56.5	..	19.2	8.3	4.7	19.7	–	96.5	..	..	..	5.5	23.9
	Latin America and the Caribbean	67.3	..	14.0	6.6	11.1	..	–	92.5	..	..	..	2.0	8.1
	South Asia	60.9	..	..	8.6	12.3	74.2	–	41.3	..	..	..	..	..
	Sub-Saharan Africa	75.0	..	..	..	26.2	71.1	–	43.5	..	..	..	..	..
	Least developed countries	77.8	..	..	..	23.5	77.8	–	38.1	..	..	..	..	..
	Small island developing states	65.7	..	..	..	..	..	–	..	..	..	..	..	..
	World	65.4	..	..	7.5	..	..	–	62.3	..	..	..	..	..

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 11: 200–203; ILO ILOSTAT database 2015.

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Table 12 Personal Insecurity

		Vulnerable groups							Attitudes	
		Registered refugees by country of origin	Internally displaced persons	Homeless persons	Prison population	Long term unemployed	Depth of food deficit	Homicide rate	Justification of wife beating	
		(thousands)	(thousands)	(% of population)	(per 100,000 people)	(% of the labour force)	(kilocalories per person per day)	(per 100,000)	(% of females aged 15–49)	(% males aged 15–49)
HDI rank	Country	2012–2013	2012–2013	2009	2002–2013	2005–2012	2011–2013	2008–2012	2005–2012	2005–2012
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
31	Qatar	0.0	..	0.0	60	0.1	..	1.1	..	..
34	Saudi Arabia	0.6	..	0.0	162	..	12	0.8	..	..
40	United Arab Emirates	0.1	..	0.0	238	..	25	2.6	..	..
44	Bahrain	0.3	..	0.0	275	..	..	0.5	..	..
46	Kuwait	1.0	..	..	137	..	11	0.4	..	..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
55	Libya	3.4	64	0.0	81	..	8	1.7	..	..
56	Oman	0.0	..	0.0	61	..	..	1.1	..	..
65	Lebanon	4.2	..	0.1	118	..	20	2.2	9.7	..
77	Jordan	1.6	..	0.0	95	..	20	2.0	90.0	..
90	Tunisia	1.4	..	0.0	199	..	6	2.2	30.3	..
93	Algeria	3.7	..	0.8	162	7.1	15	0.7	67.9	..
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
107	Palestine, State of	5,030.0	144.5	..	..	..	211	7.4	..	..
110	Egypt	13.1	..	0.1	80	7.7	8	3.4	39.3	..
118	Syrian Arab Republic	3,029.5	6,521	0.0	58	..	38	2.2	..	..
120	Iraq	426.1	1,904	0.0	110	..	217	8.0	51.2	..
129	Morocco	1.3	..	0.0	220	5.8	31	2.2	63.9	..
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT										
154	Yemen	2.5	335	1.2	55	4.0	188	4.8	..	..
159	Comoros	0.5	..	0.1	16	..	655	10.0	..	..
161	Mauritania	34.3	..	2.2	45	..	46	5.0	37.9	..
166	Sudan	670.3	2,089	1.3	56	..	..	11.2	47.0	..
170	Djibouti	0.8	..	3.1	83	..	143	10.1	..	..
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES										
	Somalia	1,080.8	1,133	6.8	..	..	..	8.0	75.7	..
	Human Development Groups									
	Very high human development	86.9	–	..	283	3.1	..	2.3	..	..
	High human development	1,136.6	–	3.2	186	..	62	6.4	..	..
	Medium human development	7,369.0	–	1.1	63	..	104	4.7	46.8	..
	Low human development	5,085.4	–	1.6	71	..	157	14.1	53.8	..
	Regions									
	Arab States	10,305.6	–	0.5	116	..	56	4.9	..	..
	East Asia and the Pacific	1,031.9	–	3.6	123	..	76	1.5	..	..
	Europe and Central Asia	339.8	–	..	220	..	..	3.1	26.8	..
	Latin America and the Caribbean	497.0	–	0.7	230	..	57	24.5	..	..
	South Asia	2,788.9	–	1.7	46	..	119	3.9	51.9	..
	Sub-Saharan Africa	3,702.7	–	0.7	91	..	149	14.5	54.7	..
	Least developed countries	6,458.6	–	1.3	77	..	187	10.3	52.0	..
	Small island developing states	54.1	–	1.8	231	..	152	14.2	..	..
	World	13,041.4	–	2.1	145	..	..	8.4	..	..

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 12: 204–207; World Bank WDI 2015; UNHCR statistical database; UNRWA in figures 2015.

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Table 13 International integration

		Trade		Financial flows				Total reserves minus gold	Human mobility			Communication		
		Remoteness	International trade	Foreign direct investment, net inflows	Private capital flows	Net official development assistance received	Remittances, inflows		Net migration rate	Stock of immigrants	International inbound tourists	Internet users	International telephone traffic (minutes per person)	
		(kilometers)	(% of GDP)	(% of GDP)	(% of GDP)	(% of GNI)	(% of GDP)	(% of GDP)	(per 1,000 people)	(% of population)	(thousands)	(% of population)	Incoming	Outgoing
HDI rank	Country	2012	2012	2012–2013	2012	2011–2012	2011	2012	2010–2015	2013	2011	2012	2006–2011	2006–2011
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
31	Qatar	7,409	96.5	-0.4	14.6	..	0.33	1.8	48.8	73.8	2,527	88.1	427.4	..
34	Saudi Arabia	7,423	86.4	1.2	-0.6	..	0.04	1.1	2.1	31.4	17,498	54.0	106.6	632.4
40	United Arab Emirates	7,526	169.6	2.6	..	..	..	0.8	11.4	83.7	..	85.0	313.3	654.5
44	Bahrain	7,323	123.7	3.0	-18.8	0.1	..	5.2	3.4	54.7	6,732	88.0	285.7	1,585.8
46	Kuwait	7,114	95.7	1.0	9.6	..	..	1.5	18.3	60.2	269	79.2	..	..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
55	Libya	6,566	94.8	0.9	5.0	..	..	3.5	-7.7	12.2	34	19.9	..	..
56	Oman	7,626	94.5	2.0	0.8	..	0.06	..	59.2	30.6	1,048	60.0	247.9	215.8
65	Lebanon	6,677	72.9	6.8	-2.8	1.6	18.26	..	21.3	17.6	1,655	61.2	314.6	86.3
77	Jordan	6,784	119.1	5.3	-5.7	4.6	11.97	2.2	11.3	40.2	3,975	41.0	108.0	143.4
90	Tunisia	6,323	106.6	2.3	-3.4	2.4	4.32	1.2	-0.6	0.3	4,785	41.4	57.2	15.9
93	Algeria	6,359	52.4	0.8	-1.0	0.1	0.10	0.7	-0.3	0.7	2,395	15.2	57.9	25.5
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
107	Palestine, State of	..	..	1.6	..	16.5	..	1.0	-2.0	5.9	449	..	..	..
110	Egypt	6,859	44.8	2.0	-0.2	0.7	6.07	1.0	-0.5	0.4	9,497	44.1	69.8	6.9
118	Syrian Arab Republic	6,710	71.1	..	-2.2	..	2.74	..	-13.7	6.4	8,546	24.3	81.1	22.2
120	Iraq	6,848	..	1.2	1.3	0.6	0.21	1.2	2.7	0.3	1,518	7.1	..	..
129	Morocco	6,601	86.6	3.2	-2.6	1.6	7.31	0.0	-2.7	0.2	9,342	55.0	123.3	23.9
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
154	Yemen	7,912	65.1	-0.4	1.9	2.3	4.43	5.4	-1.1	1.3	1,025	17.4	80.9	4.8
159	Comoros	9,758	67.1	2.3	..	12.1	..	4.5	-2.8	1.7	11	6.0	..	..
161	Mauritania	7,690	152.3	27.1	..	10.8	..	3.0	-1.0	2.3	..	5.4	38.4	15.2
166	Sudan	7,763	34.8	3.3	-4.2	1.6	2.22	4.7	-4.3	1.2	536	21.0	34.7	12.6
170	Djibouti	..	..	19.6	..	..	..	..	-3.7	14.2	53	8.3	43.6	222.0
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES														
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	-2.9	0.2	..	1.4	..	
	Human Development Index groups													
	Very high human development	7,825	63.1	1.9	0.4	-0.3	0.26	..	2.5	12.5	581,506	77.1	..	174.8
	High human development	8,536	60.0	2.8	-3.0	0.1	0.82	..	-0.1	1.8	282,225	42.5	21.2	13.1
	Medium human development	8,741	63.3	2.2	-1.9	0.5	3.67	2.7	-0.9	0.7	84,432	17.6	..	..
	Low human development	8,360	66.1	2.5	..	5.1	5.03	2.4	-0.8	1.6	19,970	12.3	..	10.3
	Regions													
	Arab States	7,037	91.9	1.7	1.0	0.5	..	1.3	0.4	8.3	71,884	34.2	92.0	106.3
	East Asia and the Pacific	8,809	66.2	3.1	..	0.0	0.93	0.9	-0.3	0.4	125,944	36.7	..	..
	Europe and Central Asia	6,364	77.0	1.8	-4.5	0.0	2.06	..	-0.6	6.7	74,011	41.1	79.3	34.1
	Latin America and the Caribbean	10,621	45.8	3.5	-3.8	0.2	1.11	1.5	-1.0	1.3	70,256	43.4	39.9	25.4
	South Asia	7,845	53.5	1.4	-1.1	0.6	3.57	2.7	-0.9	0.9	13,462	12.3	34.1	..
	Sub-Saharan Africa	9,496	76.9	2.5	..	3.1	2.73	2.2	-0.1	1.8	30,695	15.2	..	9.7
	Least developed countries	8,646	74.3	2.7	..	5.9	4.67	2.4	-1.1	1.2	18,701	6.8	..	..
	Small island developing states	9,133	69.2	2.5	-9.6	3.3	5.79	..	-2.8	1.9	16,456	25.1	..	..
	World	8,078	62.4	2.3	-0.7	0.2	0.71	2.9	0.0	3.2	968,591	35.5	..	42.4

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 13: 208–211; World Bank WDI 2015.

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Table 14 Environment

		Primary energy supply		Electrification rate	Carbon dioxide emissions per capita		Natural Resources				Effects of environmental threats					
		Fossil fuels	Renewable sources	(% of population)	(tonnes)	Average annual growth	Natural resource depletion	Forest area		Fresh water withdrawals	Deaths of children under age 5 due to			Population living on degraded land	Impact of natural disasters	
		(% of total)				(%)	(% of GNI)	(% of total land area)	(% change)	(% of total renewable water resources)	Outdoor air pollution	Indoor air pollution	Unsafe water, unimproved sanitation or poor hygiene	(%)	Number of deaths	Population affected
											(per 100,000 children under age 5)				(per year per million people)	(per million people)
HDI rank	Country	2012	2012	2010	2010	1970–2010	2010–2012	2011–2012	1990–2012	2007–2011	2008	2004	2004	2010	2005–2012	2005–2012
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT																
31	Qatar	100.0	0.0	98.7	40.3	7.8	..	0.0	..	381.0	1	0	6	0.1	..	..
34	Saudi Arabia	100.0	0.0	99.0	17.0	5.5	36.0	0.5	0.0	936.2	2	0	..	4.3	1	63
40	United Arab Emirates	101.0	0.1	100.0	19.9	5.9	..	3.8	30.4	1,867.0	1	0	10	1.9	..	..
44	Bahrain	99.9	0.0	99.4	19.3	5.8	18.1	0.7	154.2	205.8	0	0	..	..	..	..
46	Kuwait	100.0	0.0	100.0	31.3	7.1	29.3	0.4	86.6	2,075.0	1	0	..	0.6	..	..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT																
55	Libya	98.7	1.3	99.8	9.8	4.0	29.0	0.1	0.0	615.4	3	2	..	8.5	..	..
56	Oman	100.0	0.0	98.0	20.4	6.0	31.1	0.0	0.0	86.6	1	0	..	5.8	3	2,528
65	Lebanon	95.5	3.3	99.9	4.7	2.2	0.0	13.4	4.6	18.6	1	0	40	1.2	0	4
77	Jordan	96.0	2.0	99.4	3.4	1.4	1.7	1.1	-0.6	99.4	3	0	59	22.0	0	..
90	Tunisia	85.3	14.8	99.5	2.5	0.5	5.2	6.7	61.6	61.7	1	3	64	36.7	0	312
93	Algeria	99.9	0.1	99.3	3.3	1.3	18.4	0.6	-11.6	48.9	1	5	101	28.8	1	433
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT																
107	Palestine, State of	..	..	..	0.6	..	..	1.5	1.0	49.9	..	..	..	..	0	979
110	Egypt	96.5	3.7	99.6	2.6	0.7	9.1	0.1	61.8	96.6	2	2	86	25.3	0	18
118	Syrian Arab Republic	98.7	1.4	92.7	2.9	0.9	13.3	2.7	35.3	86.4	2	12	54	33.3	0	30,906
120	Iraq	97.5	1.0	98.0	3.7	1.6	50.6	1.9	3.3	73.4	12	12	383	4.5	0	337
129	Morocco	93.6	4.1	98.9	1.6	-0.6	2.6	11.5	2.0	43.5	6	8	114	39.1	0	619
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT																
154	Yemen	98.5	1.5	39.6	1.0	-1.8	15.6	1.0	0.0	168.6	5	174	377	32.4	2	239
159	Comoros	..	..	..	0.2	-5.5	1.1	1.2	-81.7	0.8	2	108	177	..	5	106,714
161	Mauritania	..	..	..	0.6	-2.9	39.2	0.2	-44.1	11.8	16	220	390	23.8	2	77,339
166	Sudan	29.5	70.5	35.9	0.3	-4.5	9.8	23.2	-27.9	42.8	11	181	255	39.9	8	31,574
170	Djibouti	..	..	..	0.6	-2.8	0.3	0.2	0.0	6.3	31	41	454	7.5	1	223,142
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES																
	Somalia	..	..	..	0.1	-8.3	..	10.5	-20.4	22.4	19	710	885	26.3	16	145,928
	Human Development Index groups															
	Very high human development	82.0	17.9	..	11.2	..	2.4	27.6	1.7	8.5	0	0	..	3.3	3	2,989
	High human development	87.2	12.8	..	5.8	..	7.8	36.6	-1.0	4.6	2	10	61	8.8	8	42,653
	Medium human development	74.9	25.3	..	1.8	..	7.7	27.6	-8.7	13.9	4	106	261	10.3	3	14,518
	Low human development	..	..	..	0.4	..	12.1	26.3	-13.9	6.5	10	396	542	20.2	48	24,030
	Regions															
	Arab States	96.8	3.2	87.8	4.6	..	24.7	1.6	-77.0	71.1	6	73	214	24.3	2	10,933
	East Asia and the Pacific	..	..	..	4.9	..	..	27.1	0.9	..	2	28	90	..	15	54,689
	Europe and Central Asia	89.4	10.5	..	5.4	..	7.2	37.7	1.7	34.8	2	63	169	10.7	1	5,389
	Latin America and the Caribbean	74.2	25.8	..	2.9	..	6.9	46.9	-9.5	1.5	1	22	80	5.3	44	12,252
	South Asia	76.3	23.7	72.0	1.7	..	6.1	17.2	3.1	26.8	7	153	328	10.0	7	14,621
	Sub-Saharan Africa	..	..	..	0.9	..	14.8	27.7	-11.4	1.6	8	428	576	22.3	4	22,382
	Least developed countries	..	..	..	0.3	..	8.7	29.5	-9.9	3.1	7	431	590	23.5	51	28,158
	Small island developing states	..	..	..	2.7	..	4.9	63.0	-3.6	..	2	123	218	..	479	33,638
	World	81.4	18.6	..	4.6	..	5.3	31.0	-3.4	7.6	5	140	258	10.2	12	24,203

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 14: 212–215; World Bank WDI 2015.

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Table 15 Population trends

		Population								Dependency ratio		Total fertility rate		Sex ratio at birth
		Total		Under age 5	Ages 65 and older	Average annual growth rate		Urban	Median age	Young age (ages 0–14)	Old age (ages 65 and older)	(births per woman)		(male to female births)
		(millions)				(%)		(% of population)	(years)	per 100 people ages 15–64				
HDI rank	Country	2013	2030	2013	2013	2000–2005	2010–2015	2013	2015	2015	2015	2000–2005	2010–2015	2010–2015
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
31	Qatar	2.2	2.8	0.1	0.0	6.5	5.9	99.1	31.7	15.9	1.1	3.0	2.1	1.05
34	Saudi Arabia	28.8	35.6	2.9	0.8	4.1	1.8	82.7	28.4	41.2	4.4	3.5	2.7	1.03
40	United Arab Emirates	9.3	12.3	0.7	0.0	6.3	2.5	84.9	31.4	19.4	0.6	2.4	1.8	1.05
44	Bahrain	1.3	1.6	0.1	0.0	5.5	1.7	88.8	30.2	28.3	3.0	2.7	2.1	1.04
46	Kuwait	3.4	4.8	0.3	0.1	3.7	3.6	98.3	29.7	33.6	3.3	2.6	2.6	1.04
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
55	Libya	6.2	7.5	0.6	0.3	1.6	0.9	78.1	27.2	44.7	7.6	2.9	2.4	1.06
56	Oman	3.6	4.9	0.4	0.1	2.8	7.9	73.9	27.1	29.2	4.0	3.2	2.9	1.05
65	Lebanon	4.8	5.2	0.3	0.4	4.2	3.0	87.5	30.7	27.1	12.3	2.0	1.5	1.05
77	Jordan	7.3	9.4	1.0	0.3	1.9	3.5	83.2	24.0	53.0	5.8	3.9	3.3	1.05
90	Tunisia	11.0	12.6	0.9	0.8	1.0	1.1	66.7	31.2	33.4	10.8	2.0	2.0	1.05
93	Algeria	39.2	48.6	4.6	1.8	1.4	1.8	74.7	27.5	42.4	7.0	2.4	2.8	1.05
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
107	Palestine, State of	4.3	6.4	0.6	0.1	2.1	2.5	74.8	19.7	67.3	5.3	5.0	4.1	1.05
110	Egypt	82.1	102.6	9.3	4.7	1.6	1.6	43.8	25.8	48.8	9.4	3.2	2.8	1.05
118	Syrian Arab Republic	21.9	29.9	2.6	0.9	2.1	0.7	56.9	22.7	56.4	7.1	3.7	3.0	1.05
120	Iraq	33.8	51.0	4.9	1.1	2.8	2.9	66.4	20.0	68.1	5.5	4.8	4.1	1.07
129	Morocco	33.0	39.2	3.4	1.6	1.0	1.4	57.8	27.5	41.7	7.6	2.5	2.8	1.06
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
154	Yemen	24.4	34.0	3.4	0.7	2.8	2.3	33.5	19.7	67.5	5.1	5.9	4.2	1.05
159	Comoros	0.7	1.1	0.1	0.0	2.6	2.4	28.2	19.1	75.1	5.1	5.3	4.7	1.05
161	Mauritania	3.9	5.6	0.6	0.1	3.0	2.5	42.0	20.0	69.4	5.6	5.2	4.7	1.05
166	Sudan	38.0	55.1	5.7	1.2	2.6	2.1	33.5	19.4	72.1	5.9	5.3	4.5	1.04
170	Djibouti	0.9	1.1	0.1	0.0	1.4	1.5	77.2	23.4	53.9	6.6	4.2	3.4	1.04
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES														
	Somalia	10.5	16.9	2.0	0.3	2.7	2.9	38.7	16.5	92.6	5.6	7.4	6.6	1.03
	Human Development Groups													
	Very high human development	1,189.7	1,276.5	69.4	193.9	0.7	0.6	81.6	40.2	26.1	25.7	1.7	1.8	1.05
	High human development	2,485.5	2,662.3	176.8	215.9	0.7	0.7	61.4	34.2	28.7	12.9	1.8	1.8	1.06
	Medium human development	2,262.1	2,716.0	228.7	115.9	1.6	1.3	38.3	26.5	44.6	8.1	3.0	2.6	1.05
	Low human development	1,145.6	1,675.6	176.9	38.0	2.5	2.4	34.5	19.5	72.6	6.0	5.3	4.6	1.04
	Regions													
	Arab States	366.0	481.3	43.9	15.4	2.2	2.0	57.8	24.6	50.8	6.8	3.6	3.2	1.05
	East Asia and the Pacific	2,035.9	2,211.9	149.2	160.7	0.8	0.8	50.8	33.7	29.5	11.8	1.8	1.9	1.05
	Europe and Central Asia	233.4	251.0	18.9	21.2	0.4	0.7	60.5	32.2	33.4	13.4	2.0	2.0	1.07
	Latin America and the Caribbean	611.3	711.1	53.6	44.0	1.3	1.1	79.5	29.0	39.4	11.4	2.5	2.2	1.05
	South Asia	1,749.0	2,085.5	175.1	89.6	1.6	1.3	33.4	26.4	44.2	8.1	3.1	2.6	1.06
	Sub-Saharan Africa	888.2	1,348.9	146.6	27.6	2.6	2.7	37.4	18.5	78.9	5.8	5.7	5.1	1.03
	Least developed countries	898.4	1,287.0	132.1	31.7	2.4	2.3	29.4	19.9	69.1	6.2	4.9	4.2	1.04
	Small island developing states	54.3	63.4	5.4	3.7	1.3	1.1	53.0	27.9	45.4	11.0	3.1	2.7	1.06
	World	7,162.1	8,424.9	659.0	570.5	1.2	1.1	53.0	29.6	39.5	12.5	2.6	2.5	1.07

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 15: 216–219.

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Table 16 Supplementary Indicators: Perceptions of well-being

		Perceptions of individual well-being							Perceptions about community			Perceptions about government		
		Education quality	Health care quality	Standard of living	Job	Safety	Freedom of choice	Overall life satisfaction index	Local labour market	Trust in other people	Community	Efforts to deal with the poor	Actions to preserve the environment	Trust in national government
		(% satisfied)	(% satisfied)	(% satisfied)	(% satisfied)	(% answering yes)	(% satisfied)	(0, least satisfied, 10, most satisfied)	(% answering good)	(% answering can be trusted)	(% answering yes)	(% satisfied)	(% satisfied)	(% answering yes)
HDI rank	Country	2012	2008–2012	2007–2013	2007–2012	2007–2012	2007–2012	2007–2012	2007–2012	2009–2011	2007–2012	2007–2013	2007–2013	2007–2012
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
31	Qatar	72	90	84	88	92	90	6.7	66	23	92	91	91	89
34	Saudi Arabia	65	56	77	90	77	59	6.5	73	36	93	80	56	..
40	United Arab Emirates	83	82	87	87	90	88	7.2	47	18	93	85	89	..
44	Bahrain	82	70	66	77	60	63	5.0	44	11	90	57	57	..
46	Kuwait	65	62	88	93	..	93	6.2	69	11	93	89	78	..
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
55	Libya	33	41	57	74	91	68	5.8	49	..	72	56	37	..
56	Oman	..	78	87	86	..	91	6.9	69	..	90	..	..	..
65	Lebanon	63	46	45	63	62	61	4.6	13	7	81	19	27	37
77	Jordan	61	72	46	69	81	65	5.1	13	9	74	51	47	77
90	Tunisia	44	32	54	63	59	53	4.5	22	15	71	30	38	44
93	Algeria	64	52	66	72	53	56	5.6	53	16	83	41	48	53
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
107	Palestine, State of	67	62	47	64	63	53	4.6	8	9	76	39	40	47
110	Egypt	40	35	63	71	57	44	4.2	10	25	63	31	20	60
118	Syrian Arab Republic	43	30	38	53	49	40	3.2	17	9	35	47	44	..
120	Iraq	50	30	45	60	41	29	4.7	40	15	64	8	15	34
129	Morocco	41	25	74	68	56	72	5.0	21	58	77	48	51	45
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT														
154	Yemen	35	19	47	53	65	67	4.1	12	27	71	27	21	60
159	Comoros	49	24	38	61	72	53	4.0	30	35	75	17	39	46
161	Mauritania	30	30	43	56	63	48	4.7	32	30	64	26	37	38
166	Sudan	38	28	44	48	68	40	4.6	17	31	63	22	26	54
170	Djibouti	..	49	63	70	72	74	4.4	55	55	75	55	58	68
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES														
	Somalia	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
	Human Development Groups													
	Very high human development	63	72	–	84	72	77	6.6	–	31	86	41	53	36
	High human development	60	58	–	74	68	73	5.5	–	..	79	55	60	48
	Medium human development	71	54	–	71	65	62	4.8	–	..	78	41	46	59
	Low human development	..	42	–	64	55	56	4.6	–	..	70	24	39	40
	Regions													
	Arab States	48	39	–	68	60	53	4.8	–	25	71	39	36	..
	East Asia and the Pacific	..	..	–	..	..	..	..	–	..	..	..	..	..
	Europe and Central Asia	57	50	–	71	60	56	5.3	–	21	79	33	43	47
	Latin America and the Caribbean	..	47	–	80	47	77	6.6	–	..	78	41	49	42
	South Asia	69	49	–	70	60	55	4.6	–	20	77	39	41	52
	Sub-Saharan Africa	..	42	–	59	53	63	4.6	–	..	65	24	44	44
	Least developed countries	..	45	–	67	62	62	4.3	–	..	74	37	49	55
	Small island developing states	..	..	–	..	..	..	..	–	..	..	..	..	..
	World	64	57	–	74	66	68	5.3	–	30	78	44	51	48

Source: UNDP HDR 2014, Table 16: 220–223.

Annex 2

Additional figures and tables

Figure A.1 Terrorist attacks and their victims, 1970–2014 (world total and Arab total)



Source: START 2015.

Figure A.2 Terrorist attacks and their victims, 1970–2014 (% of Arab total)



Source: START 2015.

Figure A.3 Global share of forcibly displaced population originating from the Arab region



Source: UNHCR 2015.

Note: Forcibly displaced includes refugees, asylum-seekers, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees (refugees and IDPs), stateless persons, and others of concern to UNHCR.

Figure A.4 FDI inflows by sector and related job creation, Arab region, 2003–2011



Source: ILO 2012.

Figure A.5 Trends in average annual household income (US$ PPP), 2008–2012



Source: Report team calculations based on Gallup 2013. Average income (US$/year PPP 2010 adjusted) is computed for the poorest households (bottom 20%) and the richest households (upper 20%). Country groupings include Arab countries and comparator MICs. More details on the statistics are in the Statistical Appendix.

Figure A.6 Human Development Index by gender, 2013



Source: UNDP 2014b.

Figure A.7 School-to-work transitions among men and women in selected Arab countries, 2012–2013



Source: ILO 2014.

Figure A.8 **Length of traineeship and unemployment rate, Morocco**



Source: Boudarbat and Egel 2014.

Figure A.9 **Distribution of deaths, by type of road user, WHO Eastern Mediterranean Region**



Source: WHO 2013a.

Figure A.10 **Prevalence of overweight and obesity, adolescents (15–18 age-group), seven Arab cities**



Source: Musaiger and others 2012.

Figure A.11 **Prevalence of female genital mutilation among women who have ever been married and women's attitude towards the practice, Arab countries**



Source: UNICEF 2013.

Figure A.12 **Life expectancy at birth for young men and women of ages 15–19 in war-torn Arab countries**



Source: IHME various years.

Figure A.13 **Life expectancy at birth for young men and women of ages 20–24 in war-torn Arab countries**



Source: IHME various years.

Figure A.14 **Life expectancy at birth for young men and women of ages 25–29 in war-torn Arab countries**



Source: IHME various years.

Figure A.15 **Altruism towards strangers in war-torn Arab countries in perspective**



Source: Report team calculations based on Gallup 2015.

Figure A.16 **Tertiary educated among young migrants in OECD countries, selected Arab countries, around 2011**



Source: OECD 2014.

Figure A.17 **Tertiary educated among young migrants, by OECD region, selected Arab countries, around 2011**



Source: OECD 2014.

Figure A.18 **Comparison of the share of graduates of tertiary education among Arab migrants in OECD countries by age category, around 2011**



Source: OECD 2014.

Table A.1 Bilateral remittance estimates for selected countries, 2012 ($ million)

	Remittance-receiving country					
Remittance-sending country	Egypt	Jordan	Lebanon	Syria	Yemen	Total
Bahrain	188	2	67	3	2	262
Kuwait	2,181	0	135	348	0	2,664
Libya	2,080	0	0	70	0	2,150
Oman	231	65	67	0	0	363
Qatar	698	0	405	0	0	1,103
Saudi Arabia	5,667	948	809	255	1,142	8,822
UAE	931	0	944	0	102	1,977
Subtotal from GCC	11,977	1,014	2,428	676	1,246	17,341
Total Remittances	20,515	3,643	7,472	2,079	1,487	35,196
Share (%)	**58%**	**28%**	**32%**	**33%**	**84%**	**49%**

Source: World Bank 2013b.

Table A.2 Percentage of population dissatisfied with the standard of living

	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Arab States	31	35	40	41	35	32
Egypt	18	27	36	37	40	30
Tunisia	26	22	41	45	33	39
Yemen	47	53	66	53	51	48
East Asia and the Pacific	37	32	28	27	26	23
South Asia	40	35	38	48	36	39
Latin America and the Caribbean	29	25	27	26	26	28
Sub-Saharan Africa	62	59	60	58	60	60

Source: Report team calculations based on Gallup 2015.

Table A.3 **Opinions on life satisfaction, connectivity, self-expression, piety, authority, and gender equality, by individual and country characteristics, Arab countries and other selected countries**

	Total effect (%)		Individual effects				Country effects	
	Global gap	Time trend	Youth	Education	Women	Income	Democracy	GDP per capita
Electronic connectivity	0	-1	+/+	+/+	--/-	+/+	+	+
Self-expression	-11	4/-8	+/++	+/+	-/-	+/+	+	+
Life satisfaction	-15	0/0	-/+	+/0	-/0	++/+	+	+
Piety	31	0/0	-/+	-/--	+/+	0/0	0	-
Obedience to authority	11	0/-13	-/0	-/--	0/0	0/0	+	0
Gender equality	-30	0/0	+/+	+/+	++/+-	0 /0	+	+

Source: Report team calculations based on WVS 2014.

Notes: All variables are defined in the statistical annex. Results from OLS panel regressions using data from the WVS – see Akin and Diwan (2014) for details. The data covers 11 Arab countries in 2013 and 76 other countries, and includes responses by about 80,000 people in Arab countries and 140,000 people in middle-income countries. Global gap is the percentage point deficit or surplus of the Arab opinions relative to global opinions, expressed as a share of the global standard deviation in the global responses; all other entries that take the form x/y refers to Arab and Global slopes respectively between opinions and individual (youth, educated, women, income level), or country (level of democracy, GDP per capita) characteristics; (++) refers to a quantity larger than (+), and similarly, (--) is smaller than (-). Arab region effects based on 11 countries; Arab time trend based on average trend in 5 countries only, between 2008 and 2013.

Table A.4 **Inequality in educational attainment (years of schooling) among the 25–29 age-group**

	Average	Standard Deviation	Gini index
Egypt	8.2	6.1	0.39
Iraq	8.9	4.3	0.27
Jordan	11.8	3.5	0.16
Palestine	11.3	3.8	0.19
Syria	7.4	3.9	0.27
Tunisia	8.9	4.6	0.26
Yemen	5.7	5.8	0.56
Arab Countries	...	...	0.33
Developing World	...	...	0.29
East Asia and the Pacific	...	...	0.17
Latin America	...	...	0.21

Source: ERF Various years.

Note: Years of data are: Egypt, 2009; Iraq, 2007; Jordan, 2010; Palestine, 2009; Syria, 2004; Tunisia, 2005; Yemen, 2006.

Table A.5 Reasons for stopping education/training for youth aged 15–29, 2012–2013 (%)

	Tunisia			Egypt			Jordan			Palestine		
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
Failed examinations	33.0	34.7	31.1	35.3	45.3	23.9	34.0	33.7	34.4	27.3	31.0	22.1
Not interested in education	23.9	23.9	24.0	19.6	20.2	18.9	35.7	39.2	30.7	28.6	35.2	19.5
Wanted to start working	10.9	13.9	7.5	2.5	3.8	0.9	9.0	14.8	0.6	9.2	14.4	1.9
To get married	2.4	0.1	5.1	2.0	0.0	4.3	8.3	0.0	20.3	18.3	0.6	43.0
Parents did not want	2.7	1.2	4.5	2.9	1.9	4.1	2.3	0.9	4.3	2.0	1.1	3.2
Economic reasons	21.6	21.1	22.1	28.1	25.5	31.2	6.6	8.2	4.4	10.3	12.6	7.1
Other reasons	5.4	5.1	5.7	9.6	3.4	16.8	4.1	3.2	5.4	4.3	5.1	3.3

Source: ILO 2014.

Table A.6 Desired employment sector, 2012–2013 (%)

		Egypt (%)	Jordan (%)	Palestine (%)	Tunisia (%)
Enrolled youth	**Self-employment**	6.0	7.0	11.0	10.0
	Public sector	76.0	64.0	51.0	66.0
	Private sector	18.0	29.0	36.0	24.0
	Family business/farm	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1
Unemployed youth	**Self-employment**	1.0	6.0	8.0	11.0
	Public sector	81.0	64.0	33.0	49.0
	Private sector	18.0	30.0	54.0	40.0
	Family business/farm	0.2	0.0	0.5	0.4

Source: ILO 2014.

Table A.7 Unemployment duration and barriers to employment (unemployed youth), 2012–2013

	Egypt			Jordan			Palestine			Tunisia		
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
Unemployment duration												
Less than a month	4.9	7.2	3.8	6.9	8.1	5.2	9.2	9.3	8.8	9.9	7.2	13.7
1 month to less than 6 months	12.5	19.8	9.2	20.5	21.3	19.4	24.5	24.6	24.4	13.8	14.3	13.2
6 months to less than 1 year	10.6	18.0	7.3	17.1	15.1	20.1	9.6	9.5	9.8	18.2	19.9	15.8
1 year or more	72.1	55.0	79.8	55.4	55.5	55.3	56.7	56.7	56.9	58.1	58.6	57.4
Barriers to employment												
Requirements for job higher than own education/ training	2.9	3.2	2.7	14.4	18.3	8.9	10.3	9.7	11.9	18.3	20.8	15.0
Not enough work experience	8.4	12.5	6.6	15.4	14.1	17.3	9.8	7.8	14.5	10.9	11.4	10.1
Not enough jobs available	64.0	55.3	67.9	42.0	39.0	46.3	55.4	55.8	54.4	40.4	42.2	37.9
Discriminatory prejudice	3.1	1.9	3.6	4.0	3.0	5.3	0.7	0.9	0.0	4.3	4.6	3.8
Low wages in available jobs, poor working conditions	12.0	16.5	10.0	14.6	14.7	14.6	12.0	13.3	9.0	13.1	11.4	15.4
Other	9.6	10.6	9.1	9.6	11.0	7.7	11.9	12.6	10.3	13.1	9.7	17.8

Source: ILO 2014.

Table A.8 Job search methods, employed and unemployed youth, four Arab countries, 2012–2013 (%)

Method used to find the current job		Egypt	Jordan	Palestine	Tunisia
Employed Youth	**Friends, relatives**	76	46	71	48
	Visit institutions and place of works	8	41	10	32
	Employment agency	3	15	6	7
Unemployed Youth	**Didn't receive any assistance /help /advice from an employment office in the last 12 months**	96	96	97	88

Source: ILO 2014.

Table A.9 Political representation of women in representative assemblies, Arab countries

Country	Lower or single House				Upper House or Senate				Quota
	Elections	Seats[a]	Women (Number)	Women (%)	Elections	Seats[a]	Women (Number)	Women (%)	
Qatar	July 2013	35	0	0.0%	...	...	...	...	No
Yemen	April 2003	301	1	0.3%	April 2001	111	2	1.8%	Women are appointed to the upper house.
Oman	October 2011	84	1	1.2%	October 2011	83	15	18.1%	Women are appointed to the upper house.
Kuwait	July 2013	65	1	1.5%	...	...	...	...	No
Comoros	December 2009	33	1	3.0%	...	...	...	...	...
Lebanon	June 2009	128	4	3.1%	...	...	...	...	No
Bahrain	October 2010	40	4	10.0%	November 2010	40	11	27.5%	Women are appointed to the upper Chamber
Jordan	January 2013	150	18	12.0%	October 2013	75	9	12.0%	Yes (12 Reserved Seats for women)
Syria	May 2012	250	30	12.0%	...	...	...	...	No
Djibouti	February 2013	55	7	12.7%	...	...	...	...	Yes
Somalia	August 2012	275	38	13.8%	...	...	...	...	...
Libya	July 2012	200	33	16.5%	...	...	...	...	Yes (10%)
Morocco	November 2011	395	67	17.0%	October 2009	270	6	2.2%	Voluntary party quota. The socialist union of popular forces has 20% quota for party lists.
UAE	September 2011	40	7	17.5%	...	...	...	...	Yes
Saudi Arabia	January 2013	151	30	19.9%	...	...	...	...	Yes (20%)
Sudan	April 2010	354	86	24.3%	May 2010	29	5	17.2%	Yes (25%)
Mauritania	November 2013	147	37	25.2%	November 2009	56	8	14.3%	20 seats are reserved for women candidates running in a single nationwide list.
Iraq	April 2014	328	83	25.3%	...	...	...	...	1 out of first 3 candidates on a list must be a woman.
Tunisia	October 2011	217	61	28.1%	...	...	...	...	...
Algeria	May 2012	462	146	31.6%	December 2012	144	10	6.9%	Yes (31%)
Palestine	2006	414	17	4.1%	...	...	...	...	No
Egypt	November 2011	508	10	2.0%	January 2012	270	12	4.4%	No

Source: IPU 2014a.

a. Figures correspond to the number of seats currently filled in Parliament and are for August 2014 and previous years. Egypt's data are for June 2013.

Note: "..." Not available or not applicable.

Table A.10 Mean age at first marriage, 17 Arab countries

Country	Year	Source	Mean Age at First Marriage					
			Total Population		Urban		Rural	
			Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Libya	2004	census	33	31	...	...	...	...
Kuwait	2005	census	29	28	...	...	...	...
Lebanon	2009	survey	...	28	...	...	...	...
Tunisia	2011	Administrative Records	33	28	...	...	...	...
Morocco	2010	census	31	27	33	27	30	26
Jordan	2012	survey	30	26	...	...	...	...
Oman	2010	census	28	26	...	...	...	...
Qatar	2010	census	28	25	...	...	...	...
Syria	2009	survey	29	25	29	25	29	26
UAE	2005	census	27	25	27	25	27	25
Egypt	2011	survey	29	24	...	...	...	...
Bahrain	2010	Administrative Records	27	23	...	...	...	...
Sudan	2008	census	28	23	31	25	27	22
Yemen	2004	census	25	22	26	23	25	22
Palestine	2007	census	25	20	25	20	24	20
Saudi Arabia	2007	survey	25	20	...	...	...	...

Source: UN-ESCWA 2013b.

Table A.11 Minimum age of marriage, Arab countries

Age Group*	Females	Males
Below 15	Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen	Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen
15–17	Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon, Palestine, Qatar, Syria	Kuwait, Palestine
18 and above	Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Oman, Tunisia, UAE	Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Syria, Tunisia, UAE

Source: Equality Now 2013.

** In Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Lebanon and Syria, a marriage below the minimum age can be conducted with a judge's authorization.*

Table A.12 Women with unmet contraceptive needs, by background characteristics (%)

	Number of living children				Educational level [a]			Wealth quintile [b]		
Country	None	1–2	3–4	5+	Limited	Basic	Secondary+	Poorest	Middle	Richest
Egypt	2	10	9	14	11	9	8	13	9	6
Jordan	0	2	21	24	29	16	10	13	9	10
Lebanon	10	19	19	20	19	21	20	14	23	19
Libya	32	34	24	24	29	28	27	29	27	25
Morocco	8	11	12	14	12	9	9	14	10	10
Palestine	8	25	18	19	21	20	17	23	20	15
Syria	14	15	19	30	30	19	15	28	20	14
Tunisia	1	6	11	16	10	9	10	10	8	9
Yemen	22	39	40	42	40	32	33	40	44	28

Source: DHS various years (1988–2012) and PAPFAM 2014.

a. Limited education ranges from no schooling to less than six years of school attendance. Basic education is defined as six to nine years of school attendance. Secondary+ includes high school graduates with 12 or more years of education.

b. Wealth quintiles (five groups of equal population size) are based on an index of surveyed household assets. Data are shown for the first (poorest), third and fifth (richest) quintiles.

Table A.13 Data on younger versus older adolescents globally

Data type and age range	Sources
Health-specific data on individuals aged 13–15 years	Global School–Based Student Health Survey (GSHS).[1]
	Health Behavior in School Children Survey (HBSC).[2]
	Global Youth Tobacco Survey (GYTS).[3]
Health-specific data that include those aged 15–29 years	The Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME)[4] Unit at Washington University
	WHO's Global Adult Tobacco Survey (GATS).[5]
	WHO's STEPwise approach to surveillance (STEPS), 25+ years.[8]
General data on individuals aged 15–29 years.[6]	UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster survey (MICS).[7]
	USAIDS Demographic and Health Surveys.[9]

Source: The report Team.

1.http://www.who.int/chp/gshs/en/.

2. http://www.hbsc.org/.

3. http://www.who.int/tobacco/surveillance/gyts/en/.

4. http://www.healthdata.org/.

5. http://www.who.int/tobacco/surveillance/survey/gats/en/.

6. The data are not health specific, but some items relate to health.

7. http://www.unicef.org/statistics/index_24302.html.

8. http://www.who.int/chp/steps/en/.

9. http://www.dhsprogram.com/.

Table A.14 Causes and consequences of health-related concerns among youth

Health-related concerns	Causes	Consequences
Deteriorating health status of women	Early marriage; patriarchal societies; norms and cultural practices; lack of awareness and guidance; dearth of women in leadership positions in ministries and other decision-making bodies	Increases in maternal and infant mortality; deterioration of the health status of children; deterioration of the family and of socioeconomic status; lack of development
Lack of awareness of health risks	Lack of targeted surveys; weak policies; cultural practices; lack of health care education at school; dominance of private economic interests; lack of awareness campaigns, especially in rural areas; lack of fit of these campaign with local norms	Increasing prevalence of communicable and non-communicable diseases in rural areas; negative impact on well-being and mental health; increase in direct and indirect health costs; wasted public funds; indirect impact on productivity
Differential health service provision between the public and private sectors	Lack of government spending on public health services; poor management of public health clinics; lack of confidence in public health services, leading to lack of utilization; conflicting interests of physicians involved in both public and private clinics and services; concentration of health services in cities rather than rural areas	Deteriorating health status; poverty, lack of development; concentration of skilled workforce in the private sector

Source: The report team.

Note: Data based on two forums organized by the report team with youth from Arab countries in the 18–29 age-group. The first, held in Amman in May 2014, brought together 24 young men and women representing 16 countries across the region. The second, also held in Amman, in September 2014, brought together 32 young men and women representing 17 countries from across the region. Participants were chosen by UNDP from a list of applicants who had expressed interest in contributing to discussions for the report. The selection process was gender and geographically balanced

Table A.15 Causes of death and disability-adjusted life years, 15–29 age-group

Country category	Main cause of death	Disability-adjusted life years
Low income	Diarrhoea; lower respiratory infections and other infectious diseases; unintentional injuries; neglected tropical diseases/ malaria; maternal disorders; transport injuries; HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis	Mental and behavioural disorders; diarrhoea
Middle income	Cardiovascular and circulatory diseases; transport injuries; unintentional injuries	Mental and behavioural disorders; musculoskeletal disorders; transport injuries; cardiovascular and circulatory disorders
High income	Transport injuries	Mental and behavioural disorders; musculoskeletal disorders; transport injuries

Source: Mokdad and others 2014.

Note: High-income countries: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. Low-income countries: Comoros, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia and Yemen. Middle-income countries: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Syria and Tunisia.

Table A.16 Migration to and from Arab countries, estimates, 2010–2014

Country of origin / destination		Outflow of migrants		Inflow of migrants	
		Total (estimates)	Share in total population (%)	Total (estimates)	Share in total resident population (%)
Algeria		1,369,200	3.5	161,400	0.4
Bahrain		7,600	1.3	666,300	54.0
Comoros		109,440	12.0	0	0.0
Djibouti		7,700	0.9	25,000	2.8
Egypt		5,411,100	6.0	326,900	0.4
Iraq		1,072,000	3.0	411,200	1.2
Jordan		601,600	9.2	1,375,000	18.8
Kuwait		57,600	4.4	2,722,600	68.7
Lebanon		740,000	14.4	1,210,000	21.6
Libya		1,078,900	17.8	1,504,500	23.1
Mauritania		198,000	5.2	99,000	2.7
Morocco		2,801,100	7.8	66,800	0.2
Palestine		1,327,800	24.1	216,200	4.9
Oman		22,640	1.0	1,683,000	43.7
Qatar		3,220	0.8	1,592,608	90.0
Saudi Arabia		202,000	1.2	13,230,700	44.1
Somalia		1,211,500	10.4	16,900	0.2
Sudan		873,800	2.5	291,000	0.9
Syria		3,486,000	13.8	189,000	0.9
Tunisia		580,000	5.2	335,100	3.1
UAE		21,300	2.2	7,316,000	88.5
Yemen		887,800	3.4	267,000	1.1
Total (a)		**22,070,300**	**6.1**	**33,706,208**	**9.1**

Red mostly-emigration country; **Green** mostly-immigration country.

Source: Estimates are from receiving country statistics in general and unless stated otherwise. Receiving country statistics do not usually include foreign residents in an "irregular situation."

Data include figures for refugees (registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR]).

a. The total provides the sum of population numbers at different dates over 2010–2014. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates. A migrant is defined as a resident in a given country who was born outside that country, as a foreigner. The migrant can still be a foreigner in the residence country or be naturalized. In GCC countries, second- and third-generation migrants born in their country of residence cannot be identified in statistics. Figures for migrants in GCC countries thus include an unknown share of Gulf-born foreigners or stateless persons, who do not conform to the definition of "migrant" adopted here, that is, a person born abroad as a non-national of his or her current country of residence. The percentage of emigrants is obtained by comparing the emigration stocks to the total number of people born in the home country; that of immigrants by comparing the immigration stocks to the total number of people residing in the country.

Table A.17 Arab outward migration by region of destination, 2010–2014

Country of origin	Arab countries	Europe	North America	Non-Arab African countries	Oceania	Non-Arab Asian countries (a)	Total (estimates)
Algeria	11,200	1,284,000	51,000	...		23,000	**1,369,200**
Bahrain	Few	4,000	3,000	...	600	...	**7,600**
Comoros	(b) 6,900	(b) 36,300	(b) 140	(b) 66,000	(b) 100	...	**109,440**
Djibouti	(b) 2,300	4,800	600	...	...	...	**7,700**
Egypt	4,783,000	224,100	204,000			200,000	**5,411,100**
Iraq	(c) 500,000	(c) 270,000	105,000	...	52,000	(c) 145,000	**1,072,000**
Jordan	480,000	33,100	82,000			6,500	**601,600**
Kuwait	Few	18,000	35,000	...	4,600	...	**57,600**
Lebanon	300,000	149,000	200,000	16,100		74,900	**740,000**
Libya	1,000,000	66,400	11,000	...	1,500	...	**1,078,900**
Mauritania	24,000	24,500	4,000	145,500	...	...	**198,000**
Morocco	214,000	2,320,000	109,000			158,100	**2,801,100**
Palestine	(d) 1,300,000	14,600	9,700			3,500	**1,327,800**
Oman	20,000	1,400	1,100	...	140	...	**22,640**
Qatar	Few	1,100	2,000	...	120	...	**3,220**
Saudi Arabia	29,000	42,000	100,000			31,000	**202,000**
Somalia	(c) 316,000	(c) 130,000	(c) 44,400	717,200	3,900	...	**1,211,500**
Sudan	785,000	38,000	50,800	...	...	...	**873,800**
Syria	2,229,000	131,000	91,000		35,000	(c) 1,000,000	**3,486,000**
Tunisia	154,900	414,000	8,200			2,900	**580,000**
UAE	Few	12,000	8,300	...	1,000	...	**21,300**
Yemen	850,000	20,000	17,800	...	...	...	**887,800**
Total (e)	**13,005,300**	**5,238,300**	**1,138,040**	**2,688,660**			**22,070,300**

Source: Estimates are from receiving country statistics, in general and unless stated otherwise:

- *Europe, North America and Oceania: receiving country statistics (population censuses, population registers, registers of foreigners, etc.) as compiled in OECD 2014; MPC various Years.*
- *Arab countries: receiving country statistics (population censuses, population registers, residency and labour permits records) compiled in Gulf Migration various years; CARIM various years; MPC various years;*
- *Other countries and refugee figures: Online UNHCR registration figures for registered refugees and asylum seekers.*

a. Mostly refers to Turkey and Iran.

b. Estimates retrieved from UN-DESA 2013.

c. Among whom refugees registered with UNHCR as of June 2014.

d. The figure is probably overestimated due to its comprising a large share of Palestinians settled in GCC countries for decades, among whom some are nonmigrants (i.e., Gulf-born second- and third-generation Palestinians).

e. The total provides the sum of population numbers at different dates over 2010–2014. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates.

Note: Latest data refer to August 2014. A migrant is defined as a resident in a given country who was born outside that country, as a foreigner. The migrant can still be a foreigner in the country of residence or can be naturalized.

Receiving country statistics do not usually include foreign residents in an "irregular situation."

Data include figures for refugees (registered by UNHCR).

"...": Not available or not applicable.

Table A.18 Inward migration to Arab countries by region of origin, 2010–2014

Region of origin / Country of destination	Arab countries	Africa	Asia	Europe	North America	Oceania	Total
Algeria	(a) 147,600	7,200	1,600	5,000	...	...	**161,400**
Bahrain	67,000	20,000	562,000	11,800	4,200	1,300	**666,300**
Djibouti	21,000	4,000	...	...	...	...	**25,000**
Egypt	(b) 250,000	9,000	6,000	58,100	3,800		**326,900**
Iraq	(c) 351,200	...	60,000	...	...	...	**411,200**
Jordan	1,275,000	...	100,000	...	...	...	**1,375,000**
Kuwait	1,106,600	76,700	1,500,000	14,600		24,700	**2,722,600**
Lebanon	(c) 1,010,000	200,000		...	...	...	**(d) 1,210,000**
Libya	1,500,000	4,500	...	...	...	...	**1,504,500**
Mauritania	(e) 1,700	(e) 90,000				(e) 7300	**99,000**
Morocco	15,000	17,300	1,300	31,500	1,700	...	**66,800**
Palestine	216,200	...	...	...	...	...	**(f) 216,200**
Oman	...	...	...	...	...	...	**1,683,000**
Qatar	(g) 282,000	...	(h) 1,207,400	...	...	...	**(i) 1,592,608**
Saudi Arabia	4,180,000	...	9,050,700	...	...	...	**(j) 13,230,700**
Somalia	...	16,900	...	...	...	...	**16,900**
Sudan	30,000	228,700	10,000			22,300	**(k) 291,000**
Syria	89,000	...	100,000	...	...	...	**189,000**
Tunisia	(l) 322,000	3,000	400	9,700	...	...	**335,100**
UAE	...	...	...	...	...	...	**7,316,000**
Yemen	(c) 252,000	(c) 15,000	...	...	...	...	**267,000**
Total (m)							**33,706,208**

Source: Estimates are from receiving country statistics, in general and unless stated otherwise.

– Europe, North America and Oceania: receiving country statistics (population censuses, population registers, registers of foreigners, etc.) as compiled in OECD 2014; MPC various years.

– Arab countries: receiving country statistics (population censuses, population registers, residency and labour permits records) compiled in Gulf Migration various years; CARIM various years; MPC various years;

– Other countries and refugee figures: Online UNHCR registration figures for registered refugees and asylum seekers.

a. Includes 90,000 Sahraouian refugees from Tindouf camps.

b. In view of the lack of reliable estimates available, Item 1 under Arab countries above include only the 30,000 Sudanese registered as refugees by UNHCR. Figures for Sudanese migrants in Egypt usually span from 750,000 to 4 million and cannot be verified; Item 2 does not include Libyan migrants in Egypt. Figures usually quoted (up to 1 million as of mid-2014) could not be assessed.

c. Figures for refugees registered with UNHCR as of June 2014.

d. UNHCR plus other Lebanese sources. Does not include Palestinian refugees (not born abroad); does not include Syrian, Arab and Asian workers (stocks unknown). The figure of 200,000 Asians and Africans is the estimate of domestic workers commonly used by researchers (http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/23/lebanon-stop-abuse-domestic-workers).

e. Estimates retrieved from UN-DESA 2013

f. Does not comprise the Jewish/Israeli settlers in the West Bank (536,932 in 2011). (http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Palestine.pdf).

g. Qatar Ministry of Labour data for August 2013 (Babar 2014).

h. Four main Asian nationalities only (Indians, Bangladeshis, Filipinos and Nepalese) (press sources October 2013, quoting Ministry of Interior figures) (http://gulfmigration.eu/estimates-of-non-nationals-by-country-of-citizenship-and-migration-status-selected-nationalities-qatar-26-30092013/).
i. Estimate of foreign nationals ages 15 and older in Qatar as of December 2013; figures for the total resident nonnational population are unavailable in Qatari statistics. Annual Bulletin of Labour Force Survey 2013. (http://www.qsa.gov.qa/eng/GeneralStatistics.htm).
j. Estimate released in press in November, 2013. Official estimate for 2013 is 9.7 million and breakdown of figure by citizenship or nationality group is unavailable. See respectively Saudi press source (http://gulfmigration.eu/estimates-of-non-nationals-by-country-of-citizenship-saudi-arabia-november-3-2013/) and official sources (http://gulfmigration.eu/population-estimates-by-nationality-saudi-non-saudi-mid-year-estimates-1974-2013/).
k. Includes refugees but does not take into account displaced persons from South Sudan.
l. The figure includes 300,000 Libyans reported as residing in Tunisia as of mid-2014 (ICG 2014).
m. Total provides the sum of population numbers at different dates for the period 2010–2014. It is not exactly the total population at any of these dates.
Note: A migrant is defined as a resident in a given country who was born outside that country, as a foreigner. The migrant can still be a foreigner in the residence country, or be naturalized. In GCC countries, second- and third-generation migrants born in their country of residence cannot be identified in statistics. Figures for migrants in the Gulf thus include an unknown share of Gulf-born foreigners or stateless persons, who do not conform to the definition of "migrant" adopted here, that is, a person born abroad as a non-national of his or her current country of residence. Receiving country statistics do not usually include foreign residents in an "irregular situation."
Data include figures for refugees (registered by UNHCR).
"...": Not available or not applicable.

Notes

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