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**Convention sur la lutte  
contre la Désertification**

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**ATTÉNUER LA PAUVRETÉ EN APPLIQUANT RAPIDEMENT ET  
DE MANIÈRE EFFICACE LA CONVENTION DES NATIONS UNIES  
SUR LA LUTTE CONTRE LA DÉSSERTIFICATION**

**Réunion spéciale - Débat interactif**

**9 octobre 2001**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

1. Ces dernières années, les organismes des Nations Unies, les organisations internationales compétentes, la communauté des donateurs et diverses organisations représentant la société civile ont prêté de plus en plus attention aux liens entre les efforts d'atténuation de la pauvreté et la lutte contre la désertification.
2. Dans son préambule, la Convention des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre la désertification reconnaît que «la désertification et la sécheresse compromettent le développement durable en raison de la corrélation qui existe entre ces phénomènes et d'importants problèmes sociaux comme la pauvreté, une mauvaise situation sanitaire et nutritionnelle et l'insécurité alimentaire, ainsi que ceux qui découlent des migrations, des déplacements de population et de la dynamique démographique».
3. La Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification est la seule convention relative à l'environnement qui traite expressément des terres arides, mais en outre c'est un instrument qui peut grandement contribuer à la lutte contre la pauvreté à condition que l'on applique mieux ses dispositions et que l'on établisse une coordination avec les instruments connexes traitant du développement durable. L'évolution observée au cours de la période récente nous conduit à envisager une stratégie commune de lutte contre la pauvreté et contre la désertification, dont les pays, qui en auraient la maîtrise, assureraient la mise en œuvre grâce à une série d'instruments et de politiques coordonnées.
4. À la quatrième session de la Conférence des Parties à la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification en décembre 2000, les Parties ont adopté la Déclaration sur les engagements visant à renforcer l'exécution des obligations énoncées dans la Convention. Dans cette déclaration, elles ont réaffirmé qu'il leur faudrait adopter notamment une approche intégrant les aspects physiques, biologiques et socioéconomiques des processus de désertification et de sécheresse. Elles ont également reconnu la nécessité de veiller à ce qu'il soit dûment donné suite aux initiatives découlant de la Convention pour lutter contre la pauvreté en vue de parvenir à un développement durable dans les zones touchées.

## II. DÉFIS À RELEVER ET PROBLÈMES À SURMONTER POUR ATTÉNUER LA PAUVRETÉ DANS LES PAYS EN DÉVELOPPEMENT TOUCHÉS

5. Dans le passé, pour lutter contre la désertification, on a le plus souvent cherché à agir surtout sur les facteurs biophysiques à l'origine de la dégradation des sols sans tenir pleinement compte des causes socioéconomiques profondes du phénomène. Cette approche s'est révélée inadaptée.
6. Des études récentes sur les liens entre la lutte contre la pauvreté et la dégradation des sols confirment que, dans les zones arides, les populations ont du mal à améliorer leurs conditions de vie en entreprenant des activités propres à conduire à l'instauration d'un développement durable en raison de toute une série de problèmes qui sont d'ordre environnemental, technologique, socioculturel, économique et institutionnel.

### **Problèmes environnementaux**

7. Selon le Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement (PNUE), sur l'ensemble du globe les terres arides couvrent au total plus de 6,1 milliards d'hectares. D'après les estimations, 73 % du continent africain seraient plus ou moins touchés par la désertification. En Asie, où les zones arides ou semi-arides et subhumides sèches représentent au total 4,3 milliards d'hectares, le phénomène touche plus de 1,7 milliard d'hectares. Dans la région de l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes, les zones arides et les déserts couvrent environ un quart du territoire.

8. La communauté scientifique internationale a confirmé que l'accélération des changements climatiques, qui s'accompagnait d'une aggravation des épisodes de sécheresse et d'irrégularités dans le régime des précipitations, était perçue comme une menace grandissante pour les pays touchés par la désertification. En conséquence, dans ces pays, beaucoup de gens, en particulier dans les zones rurales, deviennent plus vulnérables, tandis que les besoins nutritionnels de la population mondiale, en constante augmentation, continuent de croître.

### **Problèmes technologiques**

9. Pour la plupart, les pays en développement touchés n'ont pas accès aux technologies et aux méthodologies voulues, notamment pour déterminer précisément le degré de dégradation des terres et en mesurer les incidences. Les pays en développement ont mis en évidence des problèmes particuliers dans divers rapports soumis à la Conférence des Parties ainsi qu'à l'occasion de plusieurs manifestations organisées récemment dans le cadre de la Convention, en particulier lors de la réunion intersessions du Groupe de travail spécial qui s'est tenue en mars-avril 2001. Parmi ces problèmes on peut citer les carences du système de prévisions météorologiques (systèmes d'alerte précoce); le manque de données relatives aux ressources en eau et de données socioéconomiques de qualité; la faible diffusion des technologies appropriées auprès des utilisateurs finals; le fait que les universités participent peu à des programmes de recherche et de vulgarisation; et le manque de personnel dûment qualifié.

### **Problèmes socioculturels**

10. Le savoir acquis par les communautés autochtones locales n'est pas pleinement pris en compte dans les politiques de lutte contre la désertification. Dans beaucoup de pays, du fait du régime foncier en vigueur, l'accès à la terre reste difficile et la sécurité de jouissance restreinte. Le rôle et les responsabilités des femmes dans les zones rurales ne sont pas suffisamment reconnus dans les politiques et programmes de développement.

### **Problèmes économiques**

11. Nombre des pays pauvres lourdement endettés sont touchés par la désertification. Selon le PNUE, le manque à gagner dans les zones directement touchées par la désertification à travers le monde se chiffre chaque année à 42 milliards de dollars des États-Unis. Les conséquences de la désertification coûtent quelque 9 milliards de dollars des États-Unis à l'Afrique, 21 milliards de dollars à l'Asie et 3 milliards de dollars à l'Amérique latine.

12. Dans les pays en développement touchés par la désertification, les produits de l'activité rurale demeurent peu compétitifs sur les marchés d'exportation. En outre, ces pays ont toujours du mal à obtenir des financements et des crédits à des conditions abordables. Il leur est de ce fait

difficile d'investir des sommes importantes dans des activités de lutte contre la désertification. Aucun mécanisme de financement prévisible n'ayant encore été mis en place dans le cadre de la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification, ces pays demeurent fortement tributaires de l'aide publique au développement et l'évolution des flux d'APD, qui ont tendance à diminuer, a donc un impact négatif sur l'exécution des obligations découlant de la Convention dans les pays en développement parties touchés par la désertification.

### **Problèmes institutionnels**

13. Les questions relatives à la désertification sont souvent confiées au Ministère de l'environnement. Dans les pays où la coordination transsectorielle et intersectorielle des mesures de lutte contre la désertification laisse à désirer, le programme d'action national est rarement intégré dans les activités de base entreprises en application des stratégies nationales de développement.

14. En outre, l'absence d'un cadre législatif et institutionnel adapté dans des domaines particuliers comme la gestion de l'eau, l'aménagement des parcours et l'utilisation des terres compromet la bonne application de la Convention.

### **III. ÉLÉMENTS PROPOSÉS POUR LA DÉFINITION D'ORIENTATIONS GÉNÉRALES**

15. Vu l'approche intégrée retenue dans la Convention, il est nécessaire de chercher à mieux articuler les politiques de l'environnement et les politiques socioéconomiques. Dans beaucoup de pays en développement touchés, des mesures ont été prises pour définir des stratégies intégrées de développement durable tenant compte des domaines prioritaires identifiés dans les programmes d'action nationaux établis aux fins de la lutte contre la désertification.

16. Lors de la réunion du Groupe de travail spécial, de nombreux pays en développement touchés ont fait état des succès qu'ils avaient obtenus, en particulier au niveau des organisations communautaires. Des progrès ont été réalisés dans différents domaines pertinents - gestion rationnelle des maigres ressources en eau disponibles, régénération des terres, aménagement des parcours, conservation des sols, etc.

17. En ce qui concerne le financement des mesures d'application de la Convention, nombre des participants à la réunion du Groupe de travail spécial ont noté que la mobilisation de fonds demeurerait un problème majeur. Toute stratégie de lutte contre la pauvreté et la désertification doit reposer sur un mécanisme de financement prévisible qui non seulement permette de dégager des ressources financières nouvelles et additionnelles mais également conduise les organismes de financement multilatéraux à coordonner leurs démarches programmatiques en reconnaissant que la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification est un instrument de première importance non seulement pour protéger l'environnement à l'échelle planétaire mais aussi pour lutter contre la pauvreté.

18. À la dernière réunion du Groupe de travail spécial, plusieurs Parties ont fait valoir qu'il faudrait envisager des solutions novatrices pour appuyer les activités de lutte contre la désertification, et par exemple offrir des débouchés aux produits du secteur privé. Les entreprises privées ont un rôle important à jouer en particulier dans l'agro-industrie durable, qui peut contribuer au développement d'activités rémunératrices dans les zones arides.

19. Les possibilités d'investissement privé dans des secteurs tels que la production de plantes médicinales et de matériel génétique pour l'industrie pharmaceutique ou l'écotourisme sont bien connues. Mais des mesures doivent être prises pour encourager les sociétés à utiliser les ressources foncières de façon durable.

20. À la dernière réunion du Groupe de travail spécial, il a également été fait observer que l'importance des crédits budgétaires que les pays parties touchés consacraient au développement durable ou à la lutte contre la désertification donnaient une bonne indication de leur volonté de s'acquitter des obligations que leur imposait la Convention.

21. En outre, les Parties ont reconnu qu'il était nécessaire d'intensifier le processus consultatif entre les pays développés et les pays en développement afin qu'un véritable partenariat puisse se substituer à la relation classique donateur-bénéficiaire. À cet égard, il faudra, dans le cadre de la mise en place d'un mécanisme piloté par le pays et destiné à faciliter la conclusion d'accords de partenariat, définir plus précisément le rôle des partenaires bilatéraux. Les Parties devraient par exemple réfléchir de façon concertée et en nouant de solides relations de travail à l'utilité des fonctions du «chef de file».

22. En ce qui concerne le problème posé par les liens étroits qui existent entre les changements climatiques, la diversité biologique et la désertification, la convergence des objectifs des trois Conventions de Rio a été clairement démontrée, d'où la nécessité de définir une approche stratégique commune en particulier au niveau national. La mise en route, sous l'impulsion du pays, d'un processus destiné à permettre aux responsables politiques et autres acteurs de s'efforcer de créer une synergie entre les diverses activités menées sur le terrain demeure l'objectif principal.

23. Un certain nombre d'initiatives ont déjà été prises pour promouvoir l'intégration des démarches suivies dans le cadre des trois Conventions de Rio (Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification, Convention-cadre sur les changements climatiques et Convention sur la diversité biologique). À cet égard, la mise au point d'un programme de travail commun entre la Convention sur la diversité biologique et la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification pourra aider les pays en développement touchés à coordonner les activités complémentaires menées dans les zones arides.

### **Mesures prioritaires**

24. Dans la Déclaration sur les engagements pris au titre de la Convention, il est recommandé que les pays touchés concentrent leurs efforts sur un certain nombre de domaines essentiels, parmi lesquels l'utilisation durable des terres, la gestion intégrée des ressources en eau, la mise en valeur de sources d'énergie nouvelles, la mise en place d'une agriculture viable et la gestion durable des parcours.

25. Compte tenu de ce qui précède et des recommandations faites par les pays à l'occasion de plusieurs réunions organisées récemment à différents niveaux dans le cadre de la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification, priorité pourrait être donnée aux mesures suivantes:

### A. Utilisation durable des terres (agroforesterie et conservation des sols)

26. Pour promouvoir l'utilisation durable des terres, qui est de première importance pour les populations rurales et qui, dans certains pays, est déjà une priorité au niveau local, il faudra élaborer une méthodologie conforme à la Convention et fondée sur des approches communautaires locales et intégrées afin de favoriser l'initiative dans la communauté agricole. Parmi les mesures prioritaires pourraient figurer la décentralisation et le renforcement des collectivités rurales, l'adoption de politiques qui garantissent la sécurité de jouissance à ceux qui exploitent la terre, le développement des activités de renforcement des capacités et l'instauration de conditions propices à l'investissement afin de consolider les organisations communautaires et d'assurer à la population locale de meilleurs revenus, et la facilitation de l'adaptation des technologies et pratiques. Dans ce domaine d'activité, on pourrait, pour commencer, s'efforcer de renforcer les processus de fixation du carbone.

### B. Gestion intégrée des ressources en eau

27. L'utilisation durable des ressources en eau est essentielle dans les régions arides et semi-arides pour prévenir la dégradation des sols ou y mettre fin. La dynamique de la population et les moyens de subsistance limités qui s'offrent à elles peuvent entraîner une dépendance excessive à l'égard des terres et une surexploitation des ressources en eau peu abondantes. Il faudrait notamment entreprendre les mesures suivantes:

- Une évaluation des ressources en eau disponibles et un renforcement du système d'information sur les ressources en eau;
- Un renforcement/utilisation des capacités, une consolidation des institutions et une coopération technique et scientifique;
- Des réformes institutionnelles, législatives, réglementaires et économiques si nécessaire;
- Une coopération sur la gestion intégrée des ressources en eau dans les bassins versants, lacustres et hydrogéologiques internationaux;
- Des infrastructures d'approvisionnement en eau et d'assainissement durables dans les zones arides.

### C. Développement de sources d'énergie nouvelles et renouvelables

28. Il existe un lien étroit entre l'énergie et la dégradation des sols dans les zones arides. L'identification et l'utilisation de sources d'énergie de substitution renouvelables autres que le bois de feu offrent une possibilité qui devrait être explorée d'améliorer les modes de subsistance.

29. Les zones arides ont un potentiel d'énergie solaire considérable et dans certaines régions jouissent de conditions propices à l'exploitation de l'énergie éolienne et de la biomasse à des fins de production d'énergie. Compte tenu de ces potentiels, cinq types importants de sources d'énergie nouvelles et renouvelables peuvent être développés:

- Énergie solaire photovoltaïque: transformation de la lumière du soleil en électricité. Cette formule a des applications variées telles que l'éclairage, la réfrigération et le pompage de l'eau;
- Énergie solaire thermique: utilisation du rayonnement solaire pour produire de l'énergie à des fins domestiques (alimentation en combustible, cuisson et production d'électricité);
- Énergie éolienne: exploitation de la force du vent pour alimenter les pompes à eau et produire de l'électricité;
- Biomasse: utilisation du bois et des déchets végétaux et animaux à des fins de production d'énergie. Il existe également de multiples technologies permettant d'exploiter la biomasse: fours traditionnels, fours améliorés, biogaz;
- Microcentrales hydrauliques: production d'énergie en envoyant de l'eau stockée sur des turbines dans des microbarrages.

#### D. Développement de l'agriculture durable

30. Les stratégies de développement agricole tendent à accroître la productivité, mettant l'accent sur la rentabilité à court terme aux dépens du développement à long terme. Dans le cas des pays en développement touchés par la désertification, il faudrait accorder la priorité à une approche programmatique qui pourrait comporter les éléments suivants:

- Resserrer les liens entre la recherche et le développement. Le développement et la recherche agricoles auraient tous deux à gagner d'une interaction plus étroite. Des méthodes participatives faisant intervenir exploitants, associations d'exploitants, vulgarisateurs, spécialistes des programmes de développement, membres d'ONG, décideurs, négociants et scientifiques devraient être adoptés lors de la fixation de priorités pour la recherche-développement;
- Encourager des technologies adaptables et appropriées pour favoriser les systèmes d'exploitation agricole durables;
- Recourir aux systèmes d'alerte rapide pour soutenir les systèmes de production et de commercialisation des denrées alimentaires;
- Promouvoir des mesures d'incitation adéquates, notamment l'accès à des systèmes de financement et de crédit abordables. Ces mesures faciliteraient l'accès des producteurs aux intrants agricoles;
- Favoriser les intérêts des pays concernés en offrant plus de débouchés à leurs exportations.



### E. Utilisation rationnelle des parcours

31. L'utilisation rationnelle des parcours dans les pays en développement touchés nécessite autant d'efforts de la part des autorités centrales et des partenaires que des sociétés rurales. Il faudrait donc prendre en considération dans les activités qu'on prévoit d'entreprendre certains besoins fondamentaux en fonction du contexte. Les recommandations suivantes ont donc été formulées lors des réunions organisées dans le cadre de la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification:

- Encourager la recherche-développement en vue de l'utilisation durable des parcours, y compris la production fourragère, l'élevage et la fixation des dunes de sable;
- Étendre les programmes de surveillance écologique aux zones arides;
- Créer des services de vulgarisation ou les renforcer, et prévoir une éducation des adultes dans les zones pastorales;
- Établir ou consolider des instances encourageant le dialogue et la promotion de nouveaux modes de subsistance et diffuser plus largement les connaissances traditionnelles des communautés pastorales;
- Définir non seulement le cadre et les procédures législatifs qui permettraient aux populations locales touchées de participer à l'élaboration d'une législation appropriée mais aussi assurer la cohérence, l'efficacité et l'équité des propositions formulées par ces populations;
- Revoir le cadre institutionnel de manière à garantir un niveau de décentralisation dans l'application du programme régissant les activités des exploitants agricoles et des éleveurs;
- Élaborer des approches participatives de la gestion des parcours afin d'accélérer la régénération du couvert végétal, offrant ainsi des possibilités supplémentaires de développement économique et social aux communautés locales des zones touchées;
- Entreprendre des recherches afin d'améliorer la valeur nutritionnelle des aliments pour animaux et la productivité fourragère, en recourant à des espèces locales et exotiques;
- Faciliter le transport du bétail jusqu'aux marchés et réduire les obstacles entravant le commerce du bétail.

## IV. CONCLUSIONS

32. L'évaluation des tendances et politiques récentes se rapportant aux liens critiques entre la pauvreté et l'environnement fait apparaître un regain d'intérêt pour les interdépendances entre la dégradation des sols et l'atténuation de la pauvreté. Les principaux partenaires considèrent la lutte contre la pauvreté comme étant un objectif primordial de la coopération internationale en faveur du développement et reconnaissent les liens étroits entre la pauvreté et la désertification.

33. En outre, il est admis que la réduction de la pauvreté et la lutte contre la désertification passent par une approche intégrée qui tient compte des diverses contraintes écologiques, technologiques, socioculturelles, économiques et institutionnelles que connaissent les pays en développement touchés. Si d'importantes mesures sont prises dans cette perspective grâce à la formulation de stratégies nationales de développement durable ainsi qu'au renforcement des synergies et de la coopération entre les différents instruments se rapportant au développement durable, il reste à accomplir une tâche majeure, à savoir mobiliser des ressources financières suffisantes par le biais d'un véritable partenariat.
34. En ce qui concerne son mandat, sa démarche et ses méthodes de travail, la Convention des Nations Unies sur la lutte contre la désertification constitue un instrument stratégique de lutte contre la pauvreté dans les écosystèmes arides. La Convention occupe une importante position d'intermédiaire entre les objectifs de développement et les préoccupations environnementales au sein de la communauté internationale et constitue une passerelle entre les dimensions mondiales des deux questions. Pour atteindre les objectifs de la Convention, le rôle des programmes de lutte contre la désertification dans les pays en développement doit être encore renforcé en mobilisant les moyens politiques et financiers nécessaires pour assurer la mise en œuvre efficace des mesures prioritaires figurant dans ces programmes.
35. La réunion de haut niveau de la cinquième session de la Conférence des Parties à la Convention souhaitera peut-être formuler des recommandations sur les moyens de renforcer davantage la coopération bilatérale et multilatérale en vue de favoriser la mise en œuvre de la Convention et de promouvoir un développement durable dans les pays parties touchés.
36. Le Sommet mondial sur le développement durable qui se tiendra en 2002 offrira également une excellente occasion de mieux intégrer les initiatives axées sur la pauvreté pour lutter contre la désertification. À cet égard, la réunion de haut niveau de la Conférence des Parties souhaitera peut-être déclarer que la Convention constitue le principal outil pour éradiquer la pauvreté dans les zones rurales des régions arides et transmettre ce message au Sommet mondial de Johannesburg.

### **Questions à approfondir**

Comment la Convention sur la lutte contre la désertification peut-elle encourager une application conjointe des instruments portant sur l'environnement et la pauvreté aux niveaux national et régional?

Comment la Convention pourrait-elle contribuer à une amélioration de la coordination de sa mise en œuvre avec celle d'autres conventions au niveau national?

Quelles devraient être les priorités de la Convention s'agissant du renforcement des capacités? Quelles devraient être les priorités dans les domaines du transfert de technologie, de la recherche scientifique, du développement institutionnel et de l'échange d'informations?

Comment les parties développées pourraient-elles appuyer davantage le processus de mise en œuvre?

Comment la Convention peut-elle améliorer sa collaboration avec les organisations du secteur privé?

Quelles stratégies de financement novatrices pourraient être mises en œuvre? De quelle manière les fondations et organisations du secteur privé pourraient-elles contribuer le plus efficacement au financement de la Convention?

Quelles orientations stratégiques les organisations de développement et les institutions financières devraient-elles adopter pour renforcer leur appui à la mise en œuvre de la Convention?

Comment les ressources consacrées à l'atténuation de la pauvreté peuvent-elles contribuer à la mise en œuvre de la Convention?

## Annex I

### **SUBMISSIONS FROM CANADA**

#### **A. The Global Drylands Partnership**

#### **What is the Global Drylands Partnership?**

The Global Drylands Partnership (GDP) is a recent collaboration of organizations involved in drylands development. This partnership includes: The Canadian International Development Agency, The United Nations Development Programme's Office to Combat Desertification and Drought (UNSO), UNDP/Global Environmental Facility, the International Institute for Environment and Development, the World Wildlife Fund, The World Conservation Union and the Near East Foundation. It is a growing partnership that is dedicated to addressing drylands issues and increasing the awareness of their importance, particularly in the context of UNCCD implementation.

#### **Challenge Papers**

The GDP has recently developed a series of Challenge Papers on four thematic areas:

1. Poverty and the Drylands
2. Strategies for the Sustainable Development of Dryland Areas
3. Biodiversity in the Drylands
4. Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Drylands

These topics were chosen to emphasize the recent urgency in addressing poverty and climate change issues within the international development agenda, as well as the need to build on the synergies between the major global conventions. As organizations dedicated to drylands development it is necessary that we explain where drylands issues lie in these emerging themes.

The purpose of these papers is to challenge existing myths and current presumptions of dryland areas, thereby changing the conventional perceptions of the drylands and providing a reliable source of information for decision-makers to refer to.

Most of the discourse on drylands development is pessimistic, yet there is overwhelming evidence that drylands can be productive and are great sources of biodiversity. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought (CCD) was formulated to increase attention and support to the drylands of the world. Unfortunately, since its adoption, its implementation has been generally poor. These challenge papers are intended to cast a new insight into how we view and work in the drylands. They are meant to question many of the underlying assumptions (some of which are incorrect) that frequently inform programme designs and interventions in the drylands. By highlighting these critical challenges in discussions and CCD implementation, we hope to contribute to revitalizing national efforts in addressing drylands development.

The Challenge Papers are a work in progress and will be updated as they are revised. The summary articles for the papers were prepared by UNSO with editorial assistance from Eugene Linden. The articles were written, utilizing the information from the papers, therefore the sources for the information within the articles can be found in the papers.

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All of the articles and papers listed below can be downloaded in MS Word. Other papers and articles will be posted as they are developed.

### Summary Articles

1. Poverty and the Drylands
2. Strategies for the Sustainable Development of Dryland Areas
3. Biodiversity in the Drylands
4. Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Drylands

### Challenge Papers

1. Poverty and the Drylands
2. Strategies for the Sustainable Development of Dryland Areas
3. Biodiversity in the Drylands
4. Vulnerability and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Drylands

#### B. Poverty in the drylands

Think of the war on poverty in developing nations as an analogue of World War I. In this fanciful construct, big irrigation projects in areas of high agricultural potential would be the equivalent of trench warfare in France, the battles that consumed vast resources (and accounted for huge losses). In the minds of the high command, however, the fight to alleviate poverty in the drylands would be more like a minor skirmish in a faraway continent -- a sideshow of only peripheral interest. For a variety of reasons, the issue of poverty in the drylands has been treated as a marginal phenomenon, isolated from the main thrust of development.

This is a tragic misunderstanding based upon a number of assumptions about the paucity of dryland rural populations and their remoteness from the pressing concerns of emerging nations. These assumptions fall apart upon close scrutiny. In fact the tendency to isolate dryland concerns undercuts anti-poverty initiatives. A major challenge facing the development community will be to put drylands development where it belongs: at the heart of development and poverty alleviation for nations that contain significant amounts of arid and semi-arid lands.

In poor countries, the very poorest of the poor tend to be rural dryland peoples. When things go bad in the hinterland, problems quickly transmit to the more humid areas. Cities lose the benefit of dryland production, while they gain a surge of migrants, often without the skills and education to successfully integrate into urban life. And if drylands contribute in unexpected ways to national poverty problems, they also hold the promise to be part of the solution. Well documented case studies such as the Machakos in Kenya have shown that dryland peoples such as the Akamba can bootstrap their incomes, husband soils, and reduce migratory pressures on cities with just a modicum of outside help.

Drylands cover 40% of earth's terrestrial surface and house two billion people, but the figure is misleading as it includes urban and suburban populations in rich and poor countries as well as affluent dryland residents in Europe, Australia, and, notably, the U.S. (half of whose territory falls into the category). The population that contributes disproportionately to poverty figures comes from the approximately 800 million to one billion rural people who live in the hotter dryland areas. In largely rural nations such as Mali and Eritrea, the issue of integrating dryland issues is moot since virtually all agriculture takes place against a backdrop of water scarcity.

In countries with both humid and dry regions, poverty tends to increase as moisture decreases. Cameroon's northern drier region contains 31% of the nation's population, but 50% of its poor. In the driest regions of Kenya as much as 84% of the population is impoverished. While the average life expectancy for residents of Nairobi is 66 years, the figure for Wajir in the northeast is 53. While the distance from Nairobi to Wajir is not that great, in terms of the Human Development Index, it is the difference between Thailand and Tanzania.

While there are moral arguments to reducing these discrepancies in Kenya and elsewhere, there are powerful self-interested economic arguments as well. Nations pay the costs for rural poverty and environmental degradation one way or another. The incidence of stunted children in West Africa correlates highly to environmental degradation. Allowed to continue unchecked, the vicious circle of rural poverty and environmental decline will transfer both people and unwelcome costs to the more affluent areas.

In Mexico, for instance, the migratory pull factor of better wages is increasingly supplemented by the push of desertification linked to unbearable pressures on the land, particularly in states like Oaxaca whose rural districts have among the highest birth rates in Mexico<sup>1</sup>. Population pressures force families to reduce fallow periods and overgraze existing lands and push into steep erodable areas and forestlands, further eroding already stressed soils. Salinization and desertification lead to a dramatic decline in agricultural productivity, and in some cases the outright abandonment of land that in some cases had been farmed for thousands of years.

At this tipping point, migration offers the only alternative to economic ruin according to Leighton. Most of Mexico's cities already strain to deliver water, electricity and other basic

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<sup>1</sup> Leighton, M. (1999). *Environmental degradation and Poverty in Drylands, Development and Poverty Proceedings of the June 15 & 16, 1999 World Bank Round Table*. World Bank, Washington D.C.

services. Without the "safety valve" of migration to the United States, the threat of political instability would increase dramatically.

Even without migration, rural poverty can impose large, unexpected costs. So China discovered in 1998 when deforestation in upland areas amplified El Nino related floods into monster inundations that killed 3,600, left millions homeless and inflicted billions of dollars in damage on the economy in Southern China. Given these huge hidden costs of dryland poverty, investments in appropriate agriculture and family planning seem nothing less than common sense.

Any drylands strategy, however, should be sensitive to the interconnections between dry and humid regions in emerging nations. In Nigeria, for instance, 42.6 million people live in the drier part of the country, and contribute significantly to agriculture, which accounted for 39% of GDP in 1998. Grazing livestock during the short rainy season, dryland pastoralists move south following the rains retreat, avoiding the Tsetse fly and moving the animals closer to markets in the wetter areas. On their return, herders carry with them maize, yams and other root crops grown in the south. In this ancient rhythm dryland peoples contribute both as producers and consumers. Modernity has had its impacts on this traditional pattern, but it illustrates one way in which dryland and other economies intermingle in emerging nations. Programmes blind to these interconnections risk disrupting the complex ties that bind dry and wet regions.

Investment in the drylands still must be justified against the many competing claims for scarce development dollars. Drylands might well be the loser in a fair triage if drylands peoples were content to be passive victims of events. The evidence, however, suggests that this is not the case and sometimes small changes can produce dramatic results. Drylands populations are excellent at coping, display great innovative abilities given the opportunity, and are extremely responsive to economic signals and opportunities.

In the Sahel, farmers and herders quickly responded to the devaluation of the CFA franc by raising livestock and cereal exports to take advantage of a more favorable competitive position. In the Machakos in Kenya, the people themselves dealt with water management, soil erosion and crop fertility problems once they had secure property rights, the ability to implement their own decisions and access to markets. Mostly on their own initiative, the Akamba have devised ways to capture every drop of rain, including road run-off. Since the 1930s the regions population has increased by a factor of six, but these innovations have increased output tenfold (although at the cost of crowding out many rare indigenous species). Mali's drylands peoples, widely regarded as a lost cause in the 1980s, are still there and agricultural production has improved dramatically even as the number of aid workers has diminished.

As societal values change, new opportunities arise in the drylands. As the example of wildlife tourism has shown in Kenya, Botswana, Tanzania, Namibia and elsewhere, the drylands have value far beyond their agricultural and mineral production. Unfortunately, as in the case of mining, this wealth rarely trickles down to the local residents. The tableau of urbanites getting rich off the drylands while the local residents struggle with poverty and overtax their environment, mutely and eloquently illustrates the folly of segregating dryland issues from national planning.

At the policy level, an essential first step will be to dovetail now separate strategies for poverty reduction with dryland programs such as National Action Programmes to Combat Desertification and Drought. Governments should also seek ways to unlock the innovative abilities and energies of dryland peoples. By shifting development focus from welfare to productivity and sustainable growth, and by eliminating trade rules and market problems that discourage local initiative and investment, a good number of now impoverished drylands might become a boon to urban areas and national economies rather than exporters of poverty and social problems.

### C. Challenge paper: Poverty in drylands

#### **POVERTY AND THE DRYLANDS**

**Philip Dobie (UNDP)**

**Director of the United Nations Development Programme's  
Office to Combat Desertification and Drought  
Nairobi, Kenya**

#### **Introduction**

Since the negotiation of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and Drought (CCD) there have been numerous attempts to estimate the number of people living in the world's drylands, and obtain an idea of the scale of the problems at stake and argue for greater attention to their needs. Unfortunately the figures that are quoted are usually consolidated from many different sources. Thus, it is very difficult to deduce exactly who the poor are, where they live and what they do.

Global statistics need careful handling. Skepticism may be raised when very high figures are quoted with no attempt made to disaggregate them. Equally, by quoting large numbers of people at risk and associating these figures with images of starving people living in hostile arid places, many observers simply conclude that there is little hope for the world's drylands. Instead, they would opt to invest in higher potential areas leaving drylands problems to be dealt with by welfare and crisis management programmes. A third problem is that focusing on drylands peoples ignores the dynamics of movement and trade taking place between the drylands and other areas. The economic opportunities for drylands will not be understood simply by counting the people who are there at any time, but by understanding the ways that other areas rely on the produce and labour provided by the drylands, and how the drylands in turn import goods and services from outside.

This paper takes as its initial premise the assumption that there are important and significant populations in the world's drylands who, given the right conditions and incentives, can achieve good livelihoods, accumulate assets to reduce vulnerability and escape from poverty. However, to make a convincing case it is necessary to challenge current wisdom on the distribution and condition of drylands populations, and build more realistic scenarios that decision makers can take seriously. This is a major task, and this paper will only set the challenge and introduce some of the new evidence that is required.



### Commonly quoted statistics

Two recent publications provide the most comprehensive up-to-date statistics on drylands populations available<sup>2</sup>. They tabulate the extent of arid regions in Africa, South Asia and Latin America, and their respective human populations. Based on the definitions agreed within the CCD, it is shown that about 40% of the earth's surface is made up of drylands. The percentage of the world's population living in these drylands was calculated to be about 38%, equivalent to 2.3 billion of today's global population of 6 billion.

These are startling figures for the number of people living in the arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid parts of the world, and should be better known to policy makers. Indeed, one of the original purposes of the research that led to these figures being published was to draw attention to the very significant numbers of people living in and deriving their livelihoods from the drylands. Closer analysis is needed, however, to understand their full importance.

### Challenging the figures

The first challenge in interpreting these data is to get a better understanding of drylands livelihoods. It would be a mistake to assume that all 2.3 billion are poor, rural dwellers. Indeed, the arid, semi arid and dry sub-humid parts of the world contain many of the world's great cities. New Delhi (1993 population 8.96 million<sup>3</sup>) and Mexico City (1990 population 9.8 million<sup>4</sup>) are just two examples of mega cities that happen to be in the drylands. In 1995, the level of urbanization in the world was as follows: Africa 34%, Europe 74%, North and Central America 68%, South America 78%, Asia 35%, and Oceania 70%.<sup>5</sup> By applying these proportions to the number of people living in the drylands, it can be estimated that 800 - 900 million of the world's drylands population live in cities. While this is a very crude estimate, it does serve to emphasize that development can only be tackled through a clear understanding of the regional dynamics in drylands areas containing both urban and rural populations. Therefore, the number of rural dwellers directly suffering from desertification and land degradation are considerably fewer than the figure of 2.3 billion. However, even more importantly, the figures point to the overall economic vitality of the drylands, with modern cities as well as more traditional agriculturalists.

A second adjustment that needs to be made to global figures is to separate them into developed and developing regions. Again, the data to do so are not readily available. Half of the surface area of the United States of America is classified as drylands. However, most people

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<sup>2</sup> *Aridity zones and drylands populations*, United Nations development Programme Office to Combat Desertification and Drought and World Resources Institute (1997). *Drylands population assessment II (draft)* United Nations development Programme Office to Combat Desertification and Drought and World Resources Institute [www.undp.org/seed/unso](http://www.undp.org/seed/unso) (1999).

<sup>3</sup> *World Resources 1996 - 1997*, Oxford University Press, published World Resources Institute, ISBN 0-19-521160-X.

<sup>4</sup> [www.xist.org](http://www.xist.org)

<sup>5</sup> *World Resources 1996 - 1997*, Oxford University Press, published World Resources Institute, ISBN 0-19-521160-X.

would argue in favour of excluding the US populating (276 million) and that of Australia (19 million) from the estimate of those at risk of impoverishment from desertification<sup>6</sup>.

There are clearly many types of drylands country, facing very different challenges and requiring very different policy responses, as shown below.

	Land area (thousands Km <sup>2</sup> )	Population on productive lands (million)	Population on drylands	Drylands population as % of pop. on productive lands
India	3,275	919	410	45
Nigeria	913	111.7	42.6	38
Botswana	580	1.4	1.4	100
Mali	1,254	10.7	10.3	96
Eritrea	121	3.1	3.1	100

India and Nigeria are examples of large, populous countries that have significant dryland areas and the total numbers of people living in these areas are 410 million and 42.6 million respectively (although many will be urban dwellers and not reliant on livelihoods directly from the land)<sup>7</sup>. However, the proportion of people living in the drylands in each country is less than half their total population. Countries of this size have the advantage of considerable diversity within the country, so far as the climate is concerned. There are many other opportunities for alternative livelihoods, and substantial trade in goods and services. India has a highly diversified economy, with a strong industrial sector (26.3% GDP in 1999, including 15.9% manufacturing). (All economic data are *World Bank*<sup>8</sup>). However, agriculture continues to be a prominent sector (27.7% of GDP). Much of this is dryland agriculture, comprising about 50% of India's agricultural land. The country has made extensive use of irrigation and other forms of water management, and can trade commodities and services between the drylands and other regions.

The ability to benefit from different ecosystems within a single country is also very clear in the case of Nigeria, where agriculture is the dominant sector (39% of GDP in 1998, a figure that has increased over the last twenty years). Nigeria stretches from the humid south coast to the semi-arid lands of the North. Rains that are plentiful in the South extend northwards seasonally, touching the northern regions for only a short period. Thus rainfall is lower and the rainy season shorter the further north one travels. Over centuries, the north has been used for rearing of livestock and growing millet and sorghum – well adapted to low rainfall. Nomadic pastoralists drive animals through the arid and semi arid zones, which can be productive, with good management. The animals are driven south during the dry season, when tsetse fly is absent, to be sold in urban markets in the humid coastal region. In turn, produce from the humid lands (maize, yams and other root crops etc.) is carried north. Obviously, this traditional pattern has become less dominant as a way of life over recent decades, but Nigeria nevertheless provides a good example of how drylands can be used to their best comparative advantage within a national

<sup>6</sup> [www.unfpa.org/swp/1999/Swp\\_search\\_C.cfm](http://www.unfpa.org/swp/1999/Swp_search_C.cfm).

<sup>7</sup> [www.unfpa.org/swp/1999/Swp\\_search\\_C.cfm](http://www.unfpa.org/swp/1999/Swp_search_C.cfm).

<sup>8</sup> [www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html](http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html).

economy. Clearly, simply counting the people in the dry areas reveals little of this complex trading economy.

Mali, by contrast, is a huge West African country, which is almost all dryland and hyper arid desert. Only the valleys of the Niger river system provide opportunities for water management and irrigation. As a result, 96% of Mali's population lives in the drylands, and the economy of the country reflects this. Mali is a predominantly agricultural country, this accounting for 46.5% of the economy in 1999. Apart from intensive rice production schemes on the Niger, most rural Malians are engaged in pastoralism or the production of dryland crops, especially millet and sorghum. Since colonial times, Mali has been growing cotton. More recently, such production has expanded greatly. In 1999 exports of cotton were worth \$244 million, more than 40% of Mali's total exports, and exceeding even gold, Mali's former export leader. Within an international trading context, Mali has been able to make use of the comparative advantage conferred by its drylands. Unlike Nigeria, Mali's north-south trade routes must cross national boundaries and hence makes trading opportunities dependent on trade policies in the broader region - a topic that will be returned to later in this paper. Equally, many Malian farming families depend on migrants' remittances from travel to Côte d'Ivoire and elsewhere. Were such opportunities to be shut down, there would be great impoverishment.

Botswana is an example of a dryland country whose economy has shifted completely from agricultural production, which contributed only 3.6% of GDP in 1999. Industry, especially the mining of diamonds, copper and nickel, dominates the economy. However, Botswana still has many poor people employed in pastoralism and small-scale crop production. The challenge for countries like Botswana is to establish the means by which dryland farmers can trade profitably within a rapidly modernizing economy. The opportunities established under agreements to export beef to the European Union under concessionary terms exemplifies the shifts that are taking place in traditional dryland economies. While minerals, beef and other exports make major contributions to the national economies of some drylands countries, they do not necessarily bring incomes to poor rural dwellers, who may be unable to assert claims on the resources in question. Indeed, exploitation of resources may even lead to the shifting of people from their land.

### **The poverty dimension**

It is clear from the above discussion that while global figures provide insight into the need for support to drylands development, they can only be the first step in understanding how to address poverty reduction. There are strong grounds to believe that the drylands are home to great numbers of very poor people. Four years ago, Nelson et al<sup>9</sup> estimated that of the world's poor, about 325 million lived on favoured lands, while 630 million lived on marginal agricultural lands, forested areas and drylands. The effects of increasing populations on marginal lands which leads to increased impoverishment have been commented on by many authors. *The most*

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<sup>9</sup> Nelson, M., R. Dudal, H. Gregerson, N. Johda, D. Nyamai, J.P. Groenewold, F. Torres, A. Kassam. (1997) *Report on the studies of the CGIAR research priorities for marginal lands*. Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research, TAC working document, Technical Advisory Committee Working Group, Food and Agriculture Organization, Rome.

*important contributing factor towards degradation of fragile lands in Sub-Saharan Africa is a nexus of poverty, rapid population growth and inadequate progress in increasing crop yields. Poor people in their quest for food and other livelihood needs are increasingly expanding cultivation into forests, steep hillsides and other fragile areas ... reducing fallow periods to the point where soils are inadequately rejuvenated, pursuing land management practices that deplete soil nutrients ... overgrazing pasture ... cutting trees for fuelwood ...*<sup>10</sup>. When studying the location of poor people in different parts of the world, there is a clear correlation between those living in degraded areas and high levels of impoverishment.

Take Cameroon for example, which is characterized by a fairly moist southern region and progressively dryer conditions further north, with the Northern Region being extensively dryland. In 1987 31% of all Cameroonians lived in the Northern Region, and 50% of the country's poor population lived there. Poverty increases from the coastal region northwards. It is below 25% in the urban centres of the south west yet 50% in the dry rural north. Illiteracy and housing conditions are worst in the north, while the highest rate of maternal mortality was recorded in Maroua in the far north. School enrollment rates are lowest in the northern provinces and the enrollment gap between boys and girls widest there<sup>11</sup>. A similar pattern can be discerned in Kenya<sup>12</sup>. *The highest incidence of poverty (68 – 84% in 1994) is found to be in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) districts in Northern Kenya.* There is also a great disparity between the most favoured regions and the dry north. Life expectancy in Nairobi is about 66 years, but 53 in Wajir (in the arid lands of North-East Kenya). Adult literacy in Nairobi is around 93% while it is 12% in Wajir. Secondary school enrollment in Nairobi is 55%, and 5% in Wajir. The Human Development Index in Nairobi is 0.72 and 0.26 in Wajir, a level of disparity similar to the difference in HDI between Thailand and Tanzania.

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Data from Kenya 1989 census

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Number of arid and semi arid districts	19
Range of proportion of national population of drylands districts	0.3 – 6.5%
Total people in arid and semi-arid lands	8.6 million
Arid and semi-arid population as proportion of national population	40.1%

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(The analysis is based on current district boundaries. There have been considerable changes since 1989, and as a result the analysis misses about one quarter of the population who live in new districts. However, the distribution of new districts will tend to make the figures for total arid and semi-arid populations conservative estimates. New census data will be available soon, and it will be interesting to compare today's data with those presented above, especially in terms of population movement in and out of the dry districts).

Given the competing demands for investment in all parts of Kenya, does it make sense to invest in these dry, fragile areas? Recent research of the Machakos, shows the enormous improvements in productivity, incomes and sustainability that can be achieved when the

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<sup>10</sup> Babu and Hazell.

<sup>11</sup> Cameroon National Human Development Report 1998, Pub. United Nations development Programme.

<sup>12</sup> Kenya Human Development Report 1999. Pub. United Nations Development Programme.

conditions are right. This semi-arid part of Kenya, once plagued by drought, severe soil erosion and endemic poverty, is now referred to as the “Machakos Miracle”. Governance changes have been at the centre of changes that have led farmers to invest their own energies and funds in soil and water conservation, leading to vastly improved fertility and highly profitable agriculture<sup>13</sup>. Much of the story of the transformation of Machakos - including where the transformation has still to touch all poor people - is summarized in *World Resources, 2000 – 2001*<sup>14</sup>). The lesson from Machakos is that farmers with secure rights to their land, a system of governance that permits them to make decisions and access to good marketing opportunities can make even semi-arid lands green and productive.

There are many opportunities for investment in the drylands. Farmers for centuries have been investing their time and limited capital in responding to new options. In many places, cash crop production can be intensified, by focusing on high-value crops, such as fruit and vegetables. Livestock keepers have always kept a close eye on changing prices in near and distant markets and adapted accordingly. Tourism can flourish in the wildlife reserves of Africa, almost all of which fall in dryland areas. Governments need to see how their own investment can add value to the effort provided by local people.

The alternative to investing in the drylands is bleak. Drylands populations are robust, but very vulnerable to drought and other shocks. If the conditions for development in those regions are not improved, even more drylands people will be driven into extreme poverty, and join those who have already left and are adding to the pressures on the cities of both the developing and developed world. Seasonal migration from drylands areas has always been a normal feature of their economies, with export of labour being a fundamental means of improving livelihoods. But, in recent decades the phenomenon has grown with more people migrating permanently, and more escaping civil conflict and serious drought. As more working age men spend more time away from their homes seeking work, it can be expected that there will be a weakening of the capacities of remaining communities to be productive, and an increase in the numbers of female-headed households.

The difficulties and threats of migration must be set against the opportunities that are created. The modern world is very much a creation of migration of people seeking better opportunities. Millions of people migrated from poverty in Europe to seek new opportunities in the Americas, Australia and elsewhere. It is unrealistic to believe that a similar phenomenon will not take place in the drylands. A major difference, however, is that increasingly labor markets are becoming saturated or closed, and there is a risk of people exchanging one form of poverty and isolation for another. They will also contribute to the pressures on cities and developed countries where they end up. Much more information is needed on land degradation as a driver of migration, and whether migration results more from people seeking a better income. Two

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<sup>13</sup> Tiffen, M., M. Mortimore and F. Gichuki, (1994) *More people, less soil erosion, environmental recovery in Kenya*. Pub. John Wiley and Sons. Tiffen, M. and M. Mortimer (1992) Environment, population growth and productivity. A case study of Machakos District. *Development Policy Review*, **10**:358-387.

<sup>14</sup> *World Resources 2000 - 2001 People and ecosystems, the fraying web of life*. Pub. World Resources Institute.

studies can be cited. In describing a four-year investigation of migration from Mexico to the United States, Michael Leighton reported that *Although the United States will no doubt continue to attract a large number of migrants from Mexico for a number of economic reasons It is becoming increasingly apparent that the degradation of agricultural lands as a result of preventable, human-induced factors is a major determinant of the migration phenomenon*<sup>15</sup>. Following other studies, the United States National Intelligence Council considered that migration from Sahelian countries played a significant role in the recent political destabilization of Côte d'Ivoire<sup>16</sup>.

Despite the additional pressures placed on the drylands by increased population, there are signs that previous development assistance has worked. The author of this paper remembers that during the 1980s, aid workers in Mali were seriously discussing the long-term viability of supporting its drylands peoples, and whether it would be better to move them into more productive areas. Today, Mali's dependence on food imports has been dramatically reduced, its institutions are greatly improved, its agricultural exports have increased, it is moving into the information age by planning to link communities through the internet, and most of those aid workers are long gone.

### **Drylands countries and trade**

The final part of the jigsaw that helps to describe the poverty-environment nexus in the drylands is trade. Drylands populations are not passive victims of their environment, but have excellent coping capacities, are innovative, and extremely responsive to economic signals and opportunities. *Prices and markets play a major role in fashioning the strategies pursued by different [drylands-dwelling] people in the face of changing economic opportunities. The responses of Sahelian farmers and herders to better market conditions generated by devaluation of the CFA franc bear witness to this creativity, as shown by increased livestock exports, and rising cereal prices*<sup>17</sup>. It is unfortunate that while there have been many examples of worthwhile projects to make technical improvements to agriculture in the drylands, there are few examples of the drylands being systematically incorporated into economic and trade policies, either nationally or regionally. An excellent discussion of the significance of trade in drylands economies is given in Snrech (1995)<sup>18</sup>. This shows that urban growth can be a good thing. The growth in West African cities generates demand for a range of rural produce on their hinterland areas, thereby spurring a process of agricultural investment and intensification.

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<sup>15</sup> Leighton, M. (1999). *Environmental degradation and poverty in Drylands, development and poverty, proceedings of the June 15 and 16, 1999 World Bank Round Table*. Pub. World Bank.

<sup>16</sup> National Intelligence Council Press release.

<sup>17</sup> Toulmin, C. (1999). *Environmental degradation and poverty in Drylands, development and poverty, proceedings of the June 15 and 16, 1999 World Bank Round Table*. Pub. World Bank.

<sup>18</sup> Snrech, S. (1995). *Preparing for the future: a vision of west Africa in the year 2020*. Pub. Organization for Economic Cooperation, African Development Bank and the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel.

We need to integrate not only the *needs* but also the *productive potential* of dryland peoples into economic and trade strategies. Taking the Sahel as an example, this region has much to offer trading partners within West Africa and the rest of the world. Instead of focusing on 1 or 2 billion mouths to feed in the drylands, we should remember this implies 1 or 2 billion pairs of hands to work. Unfortunately, where countries have valuable trading assets in their drylands, the poor seldom benefit from them. This applies equally to minerals, cash crops and the extensive wildlife in Africa that brings in valuable tourist revenues. Poverty alleviation is above all an issue of ensuring opportunities, and drylands strategies must ensure the equitable access of drylands populations to opportunities.

The development business is increasingly shifting to "integrated", "comprehensive", "programmatic" forms of development assistance. We need to put drylands development policy where it belongs - right at the heart of macro-economic, social, political and environmental policy. **First we must show how National Action Plans to Combat Desertification and Drought can be dovetailed with other strategy processes, such as Poverty Reduction Strategies. We also need to see a clear demonstration by donors that they will support the CCD and drylands development, not with an attitude of reluctant welfarism, but with an avowed intention to raise productivity and bring the drylands into the modern economy. Lets see how trade rules might positively favour dryland economies.**

### Round-up

- Ø Drylands cover more than 40% of the earth's surface.
- Ø There are in excess of 2 billion people living in the drylands.
- Ø But, not all of these people are either primarily dependent upon the land, nor are all of them rural dwellers. The absolute number of poor rural drylands people may be nearer to one billion.
- Ø However, this "numbers game" distracts from the real issues. The absolute numbers of people in the drylands are great, and poverty is particularly associated with dry areas.
- Ø But, the condition of poverty in the drylands is not absolute, and there are many examples that demonstrate the potential of people in the drylands to pursue good livelihoods. The secrets are not in welfare and crisis management, but in establishing the right systems of governance and markets that will provide incentives for people to invest and work.
- Ø Markets and trade are of great importance to drylands farmers and herders. The most important helping action for any of them will be for policy makers to understand the productive capacities of those peoples, and the benefits to be derived through full integration of the drylands into national and regional economic policy.

- Ø The development cooperation community now has a great opportunity to put drylands development where it belongs - at the heart of development policy, especially through integration into poverty alleviation strategies.
- Ø While much progress has been made in the development of drylands, the needs continue to increase. In a modern world where goods, services and labour are increasingly traded in a global market, the tendency for large numbers of people to abandon the drylands will increase. This will not be an altogether bad process if educated, capable people choose to seek their future elsewhere. But if societies are left to collapse, there will be a steady attrition of population, placing huge burdens on the places they go to, and leaving increasing numbers of people - predominantly the elderly, women and children - who will require continued and expensive help both from donors and their own nations coffers. However, migration is a continuing phenomenon that has shaped today's world. Migration to escape poverty has created today's economic powerhouses. The purpose of development must not be to keep people in poor circumstances on the land, but to open opportunities to them, and migration to cities and beyond will always be part of this.
- Ø And when the economics of the drylands are regenerated, whether through agriculture, tourism or mining, the poor people must be beneficiaries, and benefits should not continue to be siphoned off into capital cities.

#### D. Biodiversity in drylands

Since the word biodiversity metamorphosized from a term of scientific discourse to a popular code word for environmental crisis, it has also come to be equated with the tropical rainforest, earth's great engine of species creation. While less diverse (and less studied), the world's drylands contain significant numbers of species, including several of the largest land animals on the planet. Humanity itself is a product of the drylands, as are many of the things we eat.

Of most immediate interest are the genetic reservoirs of crucial staple crops such as maize, wheat, and barley, upon which a good portion of earth's 6 billion people depend for sustenance. Within various land races of these staple crops are adaptations to disease and drought that will prove vital as threats to wheat, corn and other endemic dryland crops emerge. If overall dryland species diversity is not as great as the rainforest, within species diversity is far greater as flora and fauna adapt to widely diverse dryland habitats with steep ecological gradients. The genes of species in very arid lands contain myriad ingenious adaptations to harsh conditions ranging from water deprivation to extreme heat, which may prove increasingly important should climate continue to warm.

What the drylands lack in species diversity they make up for in their ability to support animal biomass. Some of these water-deprived regions such as the Great Plains in the United States and the Serengeti Plain in Africa have supported the greatest tonnage of animal life assembled on earth. Studies in India and Africa suggest that there is much that livestock stakeholders can learn from the ecosystem's ability to support vast numbers of animals in a harsh climate with sparse and intermittent ground cover.



Some of these lessons have already been acquired by the pastoralists of dryland areas who are forever on the lookout for adaptations in livestock that give them an edge against disease or drought. Herders in Africa graze as many as 150 varieties of cattle, 60 different strains of sheep, and 50 different goats in various habitats. Many of these animals are the product of breeding efforts to amplify adaptations to a harsh habitat.<sup>19</sup> In eastern and southern Africa, the Sanga family of cattle has been bred for resistance to East Coast Fever, while in West Africa, farmers have bred dwarf breeds of cattle, sheep and goat that resist sleeping sickness.

For all their vast sweep, and the hardiness of their endemic species, drylands remain extraordinarily vulnerable to human impacts. Around the world, grasslands are under pressure from conversion to agriculture, urbanization, and the introduction of harmful non-native species. As grasslands become fragmented, they lose their capacity to support biodiversity. In other cases, the biodiversity itself is the target, literally. In many sub-Saharan nations, poaching has virtually eliminated populations of large mammals. Even in protected areas, animals are being poached. Apart from immediate threats, drylands live under threat from afar; as richer, populated areas dam or divert rivers and overexploit aquifers, further stressing the dryland's precarious water budget.

The challenge facing policy makers in the near term will be to adjust the imbalance of funds available for biodiversity so that the dryland's biodiversity issue begins to receive resources commensurate with its importance to humanity and the biosphere. Research has been underfunded for decades with the result that there are vast gaps in knowledge, not only on the interplay of human activities and dryland ecologies, but also concerning species distribution and ecosystem dynamics.

Another pressing concern is the integrity of the food supply. It should be a priority to explore ways to protect wild dryland regions that are home to the ancestral strains of staple crops and provide incentives for the continued cultivation of the land races of these staples. There is no laboratory substitute for a crop adapting in its native habitat.

Biodiversity issues should be integrated into development planning wherever possible. Where environmental appraisals are required, impacts on biodiversity as well as soil and water should be addressed. Indeed, given the scope of degradation in drylands, environmental impact appraisals, including impacts on biodiversity, should be mandatory on all development assistance.

Environmental review is standard procedure on almost all large infrastructure projects, but small projects often pass without such appraisals despite the fact that minor projects can have major impacts. The varied ways in which seemingly innocuous projects can impact the environment were well illustrated in Malawi. In the mid 1990s, the World Bank approved an education project in which the bank funded the costs of teachers while local communities provided school buildings. School buildings require bricks, and a huge spike in demand for fuel

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<sup>19</sup> Mc Corkle, M.C. 1999. *Africans Manage Livestock Diversity*. *Compas Newsletter for Endogenous Development* : 14 – 17

wood to fire brick-making kilns added significantly to the depletion of already over-exploited trees.

In general, biodiversity needs to move towards the center from its current position on the periphery of development planning in the drylands. Arid region farmers and pastoralists recognize the value of diversity in their hedging strategies by planting an array of crops adapted to different stresses and grazing an array of animals. This provides an intuitive basis for understanding the resilience that biodiversity contributes to the dryland ecosystems. Research and outreach programmes can help identify and publicize ecosystem services provided by dryland biodiversity, starting with fundamentals such as soil and water conservation, providing a first line of genetic defense for crops and livestock, and providing the code for natural solutions to the challenge of living in extreme conditions. To merit the term sustainable, development decisions must integrate the benefits of such environmental services and recognize the costs that come with the loss of biodiversity.

#### E. Climate change

Even without climate change, the drylands face a daunting array of threats. Population pressures, social changes such as the settlement of formerly nomadic peoples, exploitive agricultural and grazing practices that foster deforestation, soil erosion, salinization and water depletion, and a host of political and institutional problems have conspired to degrade 20% of the world's drylands, including 22% of Asia's susceptible drylands, and 25% of Africa's.

Changing climate might benefit some drylands. One climate model that has been discussed suggests that the more arid regions of the Sahel (Mauritania, Mali and Niger) may actually get wetter, whilst sub-humid zones of Burkina Faso, Mali & Ghana will get drier. However, other models suggest that the majority of drylands will be adversely impacted. Where there is diminishing rainfall and an increase in droughts the pace of dryland degradation will increase, as ordinarily tolerable activities such as grazing and firewood collection place an untenable burden on the land. In nations struggling to build infrastructure, extreme weather events could wipe out years of development and hobble a nation's capacity to cope with new emergencies. The world had a preview of these costs of climate change when in 1998 in Mozambique a few weeks of floods related to a strong El Nino wiped out the equivalent of a decade of economic growth.

In the past, one reaction to drought has been migration, particularly of young men. Families do not uproot their lives except in extreme circumstances, but the effects of climate change might well produce a surge of migration out of drylands. While migration can result in a healthy redistribution of humanity as people seek more viable lands and new opportunities, more and more migrants find themselves pushed by famine or drought towards havens that are already occupied.

What can be done? A useful and sobering first step would be to review the record of past efforts to help the dryland regions. Most of the predicted impacts that climate change will bring to the arid regions involve an increase in frequency and severity of problems that dryland residents have been coping with for millennia. Dryland problems have been studied intensively for decades, and, indeed, around the world's scientists and engineers have developed drought resistant cultivars, water efficiency techniques, as well as an understanding of the dynamics of

grazing and desertification that have produced some remarkable successes in the preservation and restoration of drylands. The contribution of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) in food production through varietal improvements in dry marginal areas is notable in this regard.

Unfortunately, such success stories are more the exception than the norm. All too often, even where knowledge is available, it is not used; or where it is available and used, it is not deployed effectively. Or, knowledge will be applied in good faith but still produce contrary results because some innovation works at cross purposes with ingrained traditions or produces some unintended consequence. Small-scale irrigation development in valley bottoms of dryland areas contributed to food and cash crop production, but also tended to take over dry season growing reserves of pastoralists.

Even where governments, communities and individuals make a concerted effort to control destructive practices, there is often a frustrating time lag before dryland residents see some benefit from their efforts. If remedial measures do not produce results in a timely fashion, the pace of the slide towards desertification can overwhelm the best efforts of alarmed and highly motivated people.

Many other factors, including corruption and simple incompetence have muted the impact of numerous national and international efforts to halt the decline of the world's drylands. In recent years, a number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), including the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biodiversity have included or adopted initiatives to benefit the drylands. As yet, however, efforts at the level of MEAs have produced little more than the comforting and misleading appearance that the problem is being addressed. All too often the dialogue and resources originate in multilateral agreements and then dissipate before reaching the landscape and its peoples.

It would be most unfortunate if this frustrating pattern continues with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The UNFCCC, for instance, calls for the poor arid nations to prepare inventories of their greenhouse gas emissions, a bureaucratic burden in regions with some of the lowest per capita emissions on earth. In these countries, resources might be better directed towards bolstering the capacity to adapt to climate change. (During the latest Conference of the Parties for UNFCCC, in Bonn, the parties acknowledged the need to consider adaptive measures).

Despite these cautionary words, the dryland regions have some strong advantages as their governments and peoples prepare for climate change. More than most of the world's climactic regions, the drylands have a running start in such preparations if only because the threat of climate change is a more intense and frequent version of climate variation that arid regions have contended with since the dawn of history. The past decades have also produced an arsenal of technical and social tools that could prove vital if institutions and governments ever crack the code as to how to effectively deploy these weapons. Programmes to adapt to climate change can integrate activities designed to respond to drought and desertification. By pushing ahead now, governments will be much better prepared to adapt should precipitation patterns change for the worse in the coming decades. Since need vastly outstrips resources today, there is no downside risk for governments that assume a proactive stance.

A major underutilized resource resides in the knowledge and initiative of the dryland peoples themselves. If multilateral initiatives are to actually produce results on the ground, they must be palatable and appropriate to a great variety of dryland cultures, all of which at some point embodied adaptations to the rigours of scarce and uncertain supplies of water. In Kenya, attempts to provide water to pastoralists during migration south by drilling boreholes backfired because they produced such a convergence of livestock that they caused massive destruction of ground cover. One lesson of the past has been that development efforts have relied too much on prescriptions applied without sufficient understanding and sensitivity to the drylands communities.

This time around, stakeholder involvement, transparency and openness should be guiding principles in the development of dryland programmes. At the national level, governments should consider coordinating various initiatives on biodiversity and desertification that are now fragmented in different ministries. This consolidation – encouraged by the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction – could eliminate redundant efforts.

Looming over any bureaucratic tinkering, remains the larger question of the commitment of governments to fulfill their end of the social contract. Over time, nations thrive or fail to the degree a people and their government honour this mutual understanding of rights and responsibilities, whether the social contract is enshrined in a constitution, or exists as an unwritten code. A fundamental prerequisite for success in dealing with such major threats to the survival of societies is good governance.

This same question of legitimacy and good governance will also play a role in the success or failure of international environmental and development agreements. As the global community struggles to address environmental problems that ignore national borders, it has become clear that something akin to a global social contract must emerge in which those nations that contribute most to climate change or environmental degradation and those that suffer the economic and social consequences recognize their rights and obligations. The issue of legitimacy lurks behind as yet unresolved issues in the Kyoto agreement. Achieving some sort of understanding of the rights and responsibilities of rich and poor nations, as the world attempts to come to grips with global issues, will be an overarching challenge in this new century.

#### F. Vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in the drylands

Written by Ian Burton

### **1. The Challenges**

How can adaptation to climate change be made more effective and integrated with activities linked to other multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Convention to Combat Desertification and the Convention on Biodiversity? This integration is needed at international and national levels, but especially at the local level.

How can we agree on a global social contract that reconciles the need to address jointly global environmental change, national development objectives, and local priorities?

## 2. The Nature of Climate Risks and Vulnerability

Recent reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2001) confirm without doubt that climate change is now occurring, and they suggest a larger and more rapid rate of change than was thought likely only five years ago (IPCC 1996). While uncertainties still persist about the changes likely to occur in any particular place, the general direction of global change is no longer in serious dispute. The global climatic patterns within which human activity has adjusted over hundreds of years are showing increased disruption at a rate not experienced before (IPCC 2001). Average temperatures are increasing, and higher associated rates of evaporation will bring drier conditions, especially in the interior of major continents (IPCC 2001). Total rainfall amounts may increase in some regions, but variability is likely to increase so that droughts will become more frequent and intense, while rainfall will be concentrated in shorter and more severe storms (Karl, Knight, and Plummer 1995).

What will be the impacts of broader global climate change on dryland areas? Such predictions are difficult because they depend on the assumptions and models used. In the case of West Africa, for example, recent research presents a range of possible rainfall scenarios. The first suggests a considerable drop in rainfall, rise in temperature and increased rainfall variability, especially at the start of the rainy season. The second, by contrast, indicates that the more arid regions of Mauritania, Mali and Niger may actually get higher levels of rainfall, although less rain is forecast for the sub-humid zones of Burkina Faso, Mali and Ghana (Haramata 2001).

It has proved particularly difficult to include in predictive models the effects of the El Niño variation, and role of dust levels in the atmosphere (Hulme 2001). In the circumstances, given the considerable uncertainty attached to rainfall predictions, it may be more productive to emphasize monitoring weather patterns, to ensure effective early warning systems, so that countries are well-prepared in the event of a drought or flood. Equally, given the possibility of more intense rainfall events, greater encouragement is needed at field level for long-term investment by farmers in soil conservation measures, to reduce runoff and erosion, and to maintain a good level of ground cover.

Developed countries in the higher latitudes are expected to experience a greater change in climate than those in tropical developing countries. Yet the vulnerability of tropical developing countries is likely to be much greater, due to their lower level of adaptive capacity (IPCC 2001). Where people have financial resources, access to technology, high levels of education and training, good health, security, strong institutions and effective organizations, they can more adequately cope with exogenous changes, shocks, and impacts. Where these attributes of adaptive capacity are low, vulnerability is correspondingly greater.

This observation applies at all levels of society, from the individual and family group to the community, nation and region. The world's hot drylands constitute one of the planet's most vulnerable regions (World Bank 1999). They suffer from a rainy season lasting just a few months, and a significant shortage of water resources for most of the year. This is compounded by the unreliability of rainfall, and the threat of recurrent drought. Traditional practices to help cope with drought include the accumulation of a surplus in good years, in cash or assets such as cattle, and the use of this surplus in order to survive the bad years. Other strategies include

mobility, the use of diverse crop and livestock varieties, the pursuit of off-farm activities, and migration to earn cash during the long dry season.

Where drought increases in frequency and intensity with climate change, it becomes harder to accumulate a surplus in the good years, and the bad years come more frequently. The first to feel the impact are the poor with the least adaptive capacity, but no social group, and no nation can consider itself immune from the threat of progressive desiccation. In international debates about climate change, the vulnerability of small island states has been dramatically described. The very existence of some island nations is threatened by rising sea levels. If the worst case rainfall scenarios are borne out, the circumstances faced by some dryland countries may be no less extreme. While small islands may be drowned beneath the waves, if rainfall declines substantially, some dryland nations will find themselves unable to cope.

### **3. Growing Vulnerability**

Even without climate change, many people in the drylands are becoming more vulnerable, especially those living in rural and dispersed communities. This is a result of various processes which include the impacts of macro-economic developments which are reducing the value of agricultural commodities, making competition more intense, and increasing the cost of inputs, limited access to markets, and a large burden of debt. It has been estimated that one billion people now live in poverty as a result of land degradation (Johnson 1999), and the number is growing. Many of these people practice semi-subsistence agriculture or pastoralism, producing a small surplus in good years to sell or barter for needed goods and services (US Famine Early Warning System 1992).

Typical coping strategies are usually described in relation to the degree of vulnerability and impacts on livelihoods. These strategies tend to amplify and extend normal ways of making ends meet. Where vulnerability is slight or moderate, coping strategies include selling less important assets, husbanding resources, drawing down food stores, reducing the amount of food consumed, and the sale of smaller livestock (goats and sheep). Where vulnerability is higher the process of liquidation is extended to more important assets (cattle, bicycles, jewelry), and alternatives are sought such as daily wage labor often away from the community, and more intensive harvesting of wild resources, such as selling firewood or charcoal. Other strategies include borrowing from local merchants (often at very high rates of interest), and more or less permanent migration of younger people in search of employment elsewhere.

Depending upon the degree of vulnerability, various forms of intervention are possible. The best is to find ways of strengthening local people's own coping strategies, and help minimize losses of wealth and productive assets. Governments and donors can also try to mitigate drought impacts by provision of emergency water supplies, the release of food stocks, relief and asset support (food-for-work and cash-for-work programmes), food relief, provision of seed packs and the like. In cases of severe drought, there may be little that outsiders can do little except provide emergency relief (food, shelter, medicines). However, such measures do not address the root causes and, if poorly judged, merely create conditions that increase the risk of a new disaster (Downing, 1999, Miletti, 2000).

This litany of shortcomings provides evidence of the many constraints which make dryland people vulnerable to risk. Two lessons might be drawn at this stage. The first is that short-term piecemeal palliatives will not solve the problem of vulnerability in the drylands and can easily make things worse. The second is that present efforts are too fragmented and that a much broader, more powerful integrated strategy is required. Such a strategy needs to place drylands within a larger global setting and which understands the dynamic relations linking people, goods, livestock and market opportunities in dryland and higher potential areas. Reports repeatedly affirm that there is much potential promise in the world's drylands, on which governments should build. But there may also be some areas, which have become so degraded that long-term measures are needed to help rehabilitate the resource base. These will require a mix of technical, institutional and economic elements, including support to alternative means of livelihood, either in situ or elsewhere.

#### **4. What is Meant by Adaptation to Climate Change?**

Adaptation refers to "adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities" (IPCC 2001. p. 982)

Virtually all human economic activities are influenced by present climate patterns. This applies not only to such obviously climate dependent sectors as agriculture, pastoralism, forestry, and the use of water resources, but also to human health (the distribution of many disease vectors is climate dependent) and all infrastructure, including housing, communications and transmission lines, roads, bridges, harbors and the like. Ideally, the design of these facilities should be determined not so much by normal or average climatic conditions, but by climate variability and extremes. Bridges and buildings in developed countries are commonly designed with a safety factor to withstand at least a 100 year event. In poorer developing countries, the design standards are often much lower, or not enforced. Climate change is likely to bring an increased incidence of extreme events, with for example 100 year floods occurring every 20 to 30 years.

Viewed from a global perspective the present level of human adaptation to climate is high. It has enabled people to occupy and make a satisfactory livelihood in most climatic zones on the planet. But not all regions and peoples are equally able to cope with our increasingly disrupted climate. The rapidly increasing losses (both insured and uninsured) from extreme climatic events such as floods, droughts, and tropical storms shows that vulnerability is increasing most notably in the poorer developing countries and especially among the low income people in these countries. The dryland regions are recognized as being among the most vulnerable.

This increase in current vulnerability is partly related to the expansion of human settlement into more hazardous areas, such as flood plains, steep and unstable hill slopes, low lying coastal zones, and areas of lower and more uncertain rainfall. Other factors include low quality of construction, and the increase in quantity and value of property and material goods. While the damage in monetary terms from climate variability and extremes is also increasing in developed countries, the level of losses appears to be a more or less a constant proportion of gross national product. In other words, losses are increasing in proportion to the increase in wealth (Burton, Kates and White 1993). In many developing countries, however, losses are increasing more rapidly than the increase in national wealth. In the case of some recently reported extreme climate events (hurricanes in Central America, floods in Mozambique), the losses recorded in a

few days are equal in value to a decade or more of economic growth (ISDR 2001, Munich Re 1999). Even without climate change, current extreme events can be a significant setback to development. This has long been a well recognized phenomenon in drought prone regions, and is now coming to be recognized for other types of climatic hazard as well.

Under the terms of the UNFCCC, developed countries have agreed to “assist the developing country parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of adaptation to those adverse effects” (Article 4.4). In negotiating the text of this agreement the developed countries made it clear that assistance is to help meet the additional or incremental costs of adapting to climate change, and does not apply to the costs of mitigating natural disasters, or that component of disaster losses, which may be attributed to ‘normal’ climate variability. Since the scientific basis for making this distinction does not exist, the required level of adaptation assistance remains a matter for negotiation, as does the distribution of such assistance among vulnerable countries, and the manner in which vulnerability and adaptation priorities are to be assessed.

Nevertheless, there is a commitment in principle from developed countries to provide assistance to help meet the costs of adaptation to climate change, which goes beyond normal development assistance, and perhaps carries additional moral weight than promises to help combat desertification or loss of biodiversity. This is because climate change is clearly linked to the much higher level of greenhouse gases emitted by developed countries. As such, they have a responsibility to help mitigate the impacts on vulnerable developing countries. Such evident and directly attributable links between the actions of developed country and the vulnerability of developing country are much less apparent in the case of desertification and biodiversity loss.

There is a growing divergence between the priorities determined in global negotiation of multilateral environmental agreements and the priorities of specific countries, especially poor developing countries (Burton, 2000). This conflict presents a major challenge to the international community, and requires a policy regime that can reconcile this divergence in an equitable and sustainable manner.

## **5. Climate Change and Development**

For the world’s drylands, the threat of climate change is not something completely new. It adds to the current problems of drought and desertification, and compounds their poor development prospects. Hence a major priority for countries in the arid and semi-arid zones is to strengthen their ability to adapt to the potential threats of climate change (Apuuli, Wright, Elias and Burton 2000). This priority diverges significantly from the underlying objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) which is stated to be “to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2).

Under the UNFCCC, the poorer and least developed countries, many of which are in water deficit regions, have been asked to prepare inventories of their emissions of greenhouse gasses, despite these being very low in both absolute and per capita terms. By contrast, their need to strengthen adaptive capacity has received scant attention (IPCC 2001). Recent decisions at the 6th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (Bonn, July 16-27 2001) on the need to support adaptation are a sign that this situation may be changing. But, this shift in priorities could well



prove a false dawn, unless adaptation to climate change is effectively integrated into national economic development plans, and these plans receive adequate support.

Most research carried out on climate change in the drylands has concentrated on the potential impacts, especially on physical and biological systems. The consequences for socio-economic development have barely been considered beyond the listing of possible adaptation measures. Those most often proposed to deal with climate change bear a remarkable similarity to measures frequently proposed for responding to drought and desertification. This confirms the views of IPCC (IPCC 2001) and others that adaptation to climate change should not be seen as something requiring an entirely new approach. The task is to make sure climate change is taken into account in programmes and activities already underway. The risks of climate change add further weight in favour of addressing the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable countries and communities, which are finding it difficult to cope with current conditions.

## **6. An Intractable and Deteriorating Situation**

Even without climate change vulnerability in many drylands countries is increasing. The failure of development to keep pace with population growth is serving to increase the number of people living in conditions of poverty. Where the margin of accumulated surplus is small and diminishing, there is little prospect of being able to adapt to the additional threat of climate change. National governments commonly have insufficient capacity to address current needs and priorities. Hence, the notion that national resources can be diverted to cope with climate change, is unrealistic. Recognition of the climate change threat serves to emphasize the need for policies that put long-term sustainable development at the core. In extreme circumstances, some regions may become so dry that attempting to maintain population levels at present density in these regions is likely to prove to be an exercise in futility in the long run. In such circumstances, a combination of policies would be required to promote new forms of adaptation, including support to non-farm occupations, encouraging mobility and migration, as well as increasing access to education as a means to 'escape' to better opportunities elsewhere. Such changes would be difficult to manage and would be likely to have other serious impacts, such as an ageing of the demographic structure of rural communities, as younger people leave for jobs elsewhere

Numerous observers note that many of the poorer developing countries are experiencing a rapid degradation of their natural environment. This is often presented to be both a result and a cause of poverty, in the form of a vicious cycle. In recognition of this situation, a number of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) have been negotiated. The Conventions on Biodiversity and Climate Change were signed at the Earth Summit, in 1992. At the same time, agreement was reached to start negotiating a Convention to Combat Desertification that was signed in 1994. In the case of the CBD and CCD, parties have been committed to prepare National Action Programmes, but little action has resulted from these, as yet. Under the terms of the Climate Convention, calls are now being made for the preparation of NAPAs (National Adaptation Programmes of Action) for climate change.

Will the additional threat of climate change make any substantial difference to the management of these and other environmental problems? Will the urgent need to adapt to climate change generate commitment from governments, or suffer the same fate as plans for combating land degradation, desertification, and loss of biodiversity? And how might this be achieved in ways that meet the needs of different countries?

## **7. The Paths to Improvement**

Proposed efforts to combat desertification, reduce biodiversity loss, and adapt to climate change, as outlined by the various multilateral environmental agreements concerned, do not always respond to the policy priorities of the countries most at risk. The former (MEAs) tend to focus on the technical and social constraints associated with specific problems. These include such proposals as the improved management of recurrent crises, emergency preparedness, and the difficult process of reducing vulnerability by incremental improvements in natural resource management, the efficiency of production and the like. At the policy level, attention focuses on the macro economic conditions of poverty, adverse trade balances and so forth. The latter tend to focus on sustainable development activities, especially at the community level.

The following six questions may be used to attempt a better diagnosis of the issue of growing vulnerability in the face of climate change and identify the policy issues and initiatives needed at local and national levels with appropriate international assistance.

1. Is knowledge lacking and if so in what areas?
2. Is knowledge available but not used?
3. Is knowledge available and used, but not deployed effectively or with contrary results?
4. Is knowledge available and used effectively, but simply requires time to take effect?  
Is there in words a time lag?
5. Are the best efforts in the application of knowledge simply overwhelmed by the growth of vulnerability and the pace of environmental change?
6. Is the context in which knowledge is used inappropriate or ineffective?

## **8. Lack of Knowledge?**

The problems faced by dryland areas have been intensively studied for decades. Considerable understanding now exists of the sources and character of vulnerability. The processes of environmental degradation are also well understood, as well as the conditions that can lead to environmental improvement. Appropriate science and technology have been developed to improve the efficiency of water use, to develop drought resistant cultivars, and to manage rangelands and grazing densities. There has been considerable progress in understanding the policies needed to underlie investment by local people in dryland areas, which require a combination of factors:

**Institutional:** whereby farmers feel secure in their rights of access to and control over land.

**Technical:** ensuring that farmers have at their disposal techniques for improving the productivity of their soils and farming system.

**Economic:** providing farmers with both the means and incentive to invest in improved land husbandry.

Uncertainty persists about the possible extent and rate of climate change, and about what the most effective adaptation responses might be. While more research and development on

these and related questions have potential value, lack of knowledge is not a primary constraint. The broad direction to be taken is clear. This does not mean that the search for new knowledge and technology should slacken since, in the long run, greater understanding and better technology are essential. However, investment in research is not by itself a sufficient response.

#### **9. Is the Available Knowledge Not Used?**

More knowledge about the problems of drylands exists amongst scientific experts, and in the schools of resource management (including the health and engineering professions) than is put to good use. There are many reasons for this. Knowledge is not well distributed and, even when it is theoretically available, it is often not in a form that is useable by those in need. When these constraints are overcome, new knowledge often runs into conflict with traditional practices, social and legal conventions, and the existing power structure within communities and nations. Knowledge is often seen in isolation, as a technical fix, rather than being discussed, evaluated and “married” to local skills and perceptions. When and if these constraints can be overcome, the lack of financial resources or accumulated surpluses even for small incremental investments often prevents improvements in the desired direction. Improved access to micro-finance loans can make a big difference here, so long as there is also an economic incentive and market access from which such investment can benefit.

The more widespread use of available knowledge would certainly be helpful in many instances. This suggests the need for better information and extension services, and for community and stakeholder participation in the development and choice of adaptation options. Neither of these measures will be of much avail unless there is a real prospect of access to financial resources, such as small loans, which can be of great help in fostering innovation.

#### **10. Can Knowledge be Deployed More Effectively?**

The dangers of outside intervention are well known. The prospect of donor support is disturbing to community power structures, and can distort priorities. Self-reliance and sustainability can be strengthened, but where development initiatives fail or are only partially successful greater dependence can be created. Perverse and contrary results are not unknown. New wealth, even in small amounts can be misallocated in ways that increase rather than reduce vulnerability. Knowledge can be deployed more effectively but diligence is required if this is to be achieved, and processes should be open and transparent. It should be recognized that ‘knowledge’ is not an abstract commodity that can be inserted into dryland systems. There is also local knowledge – successful drylands management has usually been the result of careful fusion between local knowledge and selective use of external ideas.

There are grounds for concern about current proposals to create new international funds or “windows” for adaptation to climate change. Where measures are not carefully integrated into national economic development planning, there is greater chance they will be used ineffectively. The causes of vulnerability need to be recognized and reasons for the lack of success in achieving significant reductions over the past 3 or 4 decades of effort need to be analyzed. As noted above, there has often been too much reliance on prescriptions and not enough understanding of local processes, priorities and the dynamic of local communities; including

relations between the landed and landless, men and women, and different sub-groups or cultures. Sensitivity to local conditions, their variability and dynamics is crucial.

In the case of climate change, much emphasis has been placed on quantitative modeling studies based on climate change scenarios that provide projections of future climate. Modeling impacts of climate change on dryland agriculture by the year 2050, and assessing adaptation options may help to compare the impacts of climate change with costs of reducing greenhouse gas emission. But, this form of analysis has little relevance for policy makers in situations where vulnerability is already high and adaptation measures are insufficient for current needs (Burton and Lim 2001).

### **11. Is there a Time Lag?**

The fact that development efforts can fail to achieve positive results in good time is often attributed to the complex processes of social change and innovation. Even where knowledge is available and deployed widely, results may be a long time coming. On the other hand, efforts to prevent desertification, reduce biodiversity loss, and adapt to climatic variability have been underway for decades, and yet vulnerability continues to increase in many areas. Certainly, there is a time lag, and persistence is required. But the evidence suggests that continuing simply to do more of the same will not suffice to achieve more sustainable livelihoods for the world's dryland peoples.

### **12. The Growth of Vulnerability and the Pace of Environmental Degradation**

There is another more powerful explanation for the continued growth in vulnerability, despite the efforts of governments, development agencies, civil society and the private sector. The strength and momentum of the forces that drive the cycle of poverty and environmental degradation are overwhelming in relation to the magnitude of resources that have can be deployed against them.

Taken together, the five points outlined above help explain the growing vulnerability faced by many peoples. The new focus provided by discussions within the FCCC and the need to adapt to climate change offer both opportunities and risks. It is probable that new and additional financial resources will be made available to vulnerable countries to adapt to climate change. Prominent among such vulnerable countries are those in arid and semi-arid regions with considerable areas of dryland. If additional funds are to be used more effectively, we need to keep in mind the importance of generating new knowledge; better diffusion and deployment of knowledge; more effective use of knowledge; stakeholder involvement; transparency and openness; and patience in the face of slow progress. Other conditions include access to micro-credit, greater public awareness, more training, and easier access to technology. However, even if all these requirements can be met, broader macro-economic factors are clearly critical in providing the wider context within which dryland peoples must make choices regarding production and investment.

### **13. The Context of Development Initiatives.**

Recent experience with multilateral environmental agreements has encouraged a fragmentation of efforts in dealing with global environmental change and development. In many countries there now exist separate offices responsible for desertification, biodiversity and climate change. These may be housed in different ministries, and pursue independent, poorly coordinated, and even conflicting objectives. Although there is no international convention on natural disasters and their prevention, a similar set of institutional arrangements has been encouraged by the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (1991-2000), and its successor activity the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction.

Activities related to these Conventions have focused on the constraints described above. Often the suggested remedies have been at the technical level, as found within national action plans. But their results so far have been modest. The confirmation of global climate change, and need for adaptation measures have brought added impetus to other multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention to Combat Desertification. Proposals for National Adaptation Plans of Action to be drawn up under the Climate Convention should be examined with caution. How can these avoid becoming yet another displacement activity, which absorbs energy and diverts attention from the real issues?

### **14. The Real Issues**

The real issues concern the possibility of reaching fair and sustainable agreements about tackling global environmental change in a highly diverse and unequal world. At the level of the nation state, disputes between different actors can be managed through the political process, by which the winners can compensate the losers. Citizens accept the authority of government under the terms of a social contract that specifies the mutual rights and duties of citizens and government. Since the days of Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, we take for granted this unwritten social contract that provides the glue which holds society together.

By contrast, the emergence of a few truly global environmental problems in the late 20th century has focused attention on the lack of a social contract at global level. The contentious nature of the issues, divergence of interests among countries and absence of an agreed system to redistribute benefits and costs between winner and losers have jointly served to prevent effective action. At the same time, debate on environmental change has been caught up in long-standing tensions between different country groups and associated disputes regarding trade, debt, and aid. Thus, while globalization proceeds rapidly in communications, trade, and financial realms, the resolution of global environmental issues remains far more intractable.

Efforts to overcome these difficulties follow two different pathways. The first involves more technical, practical "bottom up" approaches that seek to address specific issues at local level, but often in isolated or poorly coordinated ways. This has led to fragmented efforts which can claim some modest success but which have not spread on a sufficient scale to prevent growing vulnerability. The second route has taken a macro level "top down" approach. Major international conferences, such as the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, or Earth Summit, held in Rio in 1992, have generated ambitious plans on paper, most notably Agenda 21. But, despite the enthusiastic rhetoric employed, and the momentum created for a short time, such conferences and plans have proved disappointing in the longer term. Similarly high level commissions have studied the issues and made far reaching

recommendations, such as the World Commission on Environment and Development. Their report, *Our Common Future*, was given a positive reception internationally, and helped to launch the concept of sustainable development. But progress in such a direction has proved painfully slow.

Meanwhile, the rapid globalization of the world economy is adding further strains to the unbalanced relationship between rich and poor countries, their opportunities for economic development, and the need to protect the global environment. Such inequities cannot be sustained indefinitely. The challenges posed by climate change and urgent need to reduce vulnerability and strengthen adaptive capacity, demand that multilateral environmental agreements be more strongly integrated and harmonized. The activities, policies, and measures proposed by such agreements can only be addressed by being set within broader national and global development policies. This means integrating environmental issues within the agenda of trade, debt and global poverty.

## **15. Summary of Challenges**

The joint challenges of climate change, biodiversity loss and dryland degradation require an integrated approach. Particular attention is need for the points discussed above, and outlined below:

Greater knowledge is needed in many areas. But what should be the balance between more technical research on the one hand, and better understanding of the social, economic and institutional barriers to change? What can research contribute to removing obstacles?

Why is available knowledge not used as effectively as it should be, and what steps should be taken to ensure that knowledge reaches those who need it in a form that can be acted upon? How can a more effective union of local and external knowledge be achieved?

Why is there such a large gap between the top down prescriptions made at national and international levels, and the bottom up needs as seen from the local and community level? What can be done to change this?

Why do results take so long to achieve? Why is there such a time lag between ideas and implementation and what can be done to reduce it?

Why is the national and international effort so small in relation to the size of the task? Are current efforts being misdirected towards short term palliative measures rather than addressing the longer-term root causes?

Is the fragmentation of policies (desertification, climate change, biodiversity, natural disasters etc.) a major cause of ineffectiveness? How can these policies be better integrated locally, nationally, and internationally?

These are some of the challenges facing people and decision-makers working to encourage more sustainable livelihoods for the world's dryland peoples. This is a collective global responsibility, which needs a shared response. The ever-growing impacts of climate change add a further urgency to this global challenge.

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Annex II

**SUBMISSION BY SWEDEN**

**Desertification and land use  
19.9.01**

**The Challenge**

**Rational land use as a sustainability goal**

Investment in commercial marketing, changed consumption patterns and growing pressure on pasture lands have led to widespread commoditization of land in arid and semi-arid areas. Land use turns towards ranching systems through privatisation. This means lowering productivity.

The issue of land use has led to a situation with constant uncertainty about land rights for dryland inhabitants. The challenge for sustainability is to find land use forms that build on existing skills in order not to decline into ranching systems. The access to land then has to become a major issue.

**The need for good governance**

Uncertain ownership conditions cause rapid deterioration of lands when the occupier tries to squeeze out a maximum during a short period. This observation is valid also for drylands, although being complicated through extensive livestock rearing practices (pastoralism). Resource care under range conditions becomes oriented towards livestock and not towards land. In contrast to farmers, pastoralists hold the view that land access is not the sole basis for food security in drylands. Their security perspective is connected with the family enterprise of pastoral production. It involves balancing land use, livestock production and local social institutions.

The challenge is to place land use into its socio-political frame. Openness and long-term solutions are in the interest of sustainable development also when implications are major changes in land use. By avoiding conflicting interests all long-term planning is blocked, and short-term destructive land use becomes more prevalent. This means:

1. Desertification is in part a symptom of mal-functioning land use systems. Good governance is required for balancing the interests of different stakeholders, all the way from community level to national level.
2. Customary land use do not have the capacity to meet growing pressures on land in the form of more people, more claims and less available pastures. Existing local institutions for land use need to be reinforced or supplemented.
3. For historic reasons many political boundaries cut through drylands, calling for regional approaches and international co-operation.
4. Expanding alternative land use forms, particularly farming, into drylands has brought increased vulnerability into livestock production. Poverty issues for drylands need to be connected with new land use forms and alternative sources of income rather than being directly linked with land degradation.



5. In modern legislation loan security is tied to land and not to livestock. In drylands private investment is commonly made in livestock while pasture access is seen as a public good. New security forms are needed that are not entirely land use based.

Policy formation on land use need to be pro-active towards sustainable resource use practices. This means not merely conserving drylands but rather encouraging sustainable systems change. Good governance is called for in order to balance stakeholder interests. Mass education at local community level is important. Planning includes the involvement in market economies and globalisation. Issues that are dryland specific must be taken into consideration in order to launch pro-active policy.

### **Key issues for discussion**

1. How can open access to drylands be avoided? For instance: What constraints can be (need to be) placed on settlement in, and use of, drylands? How are the interests of various stakeholders accounted for? Can customary use rights be balanced with democratic rights to live anywhere in one's country? Is good governance capable of balancing interests in a sustainable manner?
2. What kind of developing country policies are needed to put into place security of land use for poor people? For instance: What use rights can be associated with land rights in pasture, water, wildlife, landscape/tourism, energy, mining? When is a principle of subsidiarity applicable? Are corporate land use forms compatible with society's needs for economic security for loans and investment? What are the constraints and capacity of community-based use? What collaborative mechanisms are needed to be promoted among poor people in order to generate reasonable productivity?
3. How can long-term reliability be secured for vulnerable social groups? For instance: Can the general association between poverty and life in drylands be scrutinised? How can the situation of socially vulnerable categories (women, children, poor strata) be improved through policy formation?
4. What should donors do to promote such a desirable redirection of policies and strengthening of institutions?

### **Meeting the challenge**

#### **Modify production forms**

Land use in drylands has been associated with collective customary rights. The common livestock based economy relies on extensive grazing or browsing. Mobility and flexibility have brought high productivity to such pastoral systems. Elaborate local social institutions have managed decision-making about land use, and user rights have been associated with social groups. When operating within local contexts such systems have proved highly effective in productivity terms, and seemingly also with upheld sustainability. These local social institutions have, however, collapsed under growing constraints through pressure on land, livestock populations and demography.

These constraints have led to a poverty situation in instances where communities lack capacity to secure food access. The equity issues have for long been concerned not with land but with livestock and livestock products. Pasture lands have been seen as a common good, with cultural restrictions such as tribal lands, reserve pasture lands or the like. But as such systems have come under increasing pressure, through extension of farm areas, through the introduction of new technology for livestock production, and through involvement in a global market economy, vulnerability has increased. Customary use rights have not been able to meet growing pressure on land; more people have claims on land at the same time as the cultural local institutions become less effective and conflict with national and regional authority systems.

Two schools of thought have emerged out of the acute land use situation for drylands, especially in Africa. One suggests privatization of land, and the other collective use rights associated with legally defined user groups. The first line means fencing and declining the flexibility of customary practices. The second line means transforming customary use rights into more limited co-operative or corporate groups. Boards take over Elders' decision-making and the option of upheld productivity can be combined with market involvement. Yet:

Policy needs for pastoral production involve designing enterprises for livestock production that are both suitable for the changed circumstances and draw on existing competence.

### **Build support systems**

Drylands are more often than not located in politically disputed areas. Inhabitants are only marginally involved in national development processes. The circumstances have caused a common perception of drylands as filled with poverty. This is a simplistic picture as poverty is connected with both an expansion of activities like tourism, energy production or mining into drylands and of collapse by local redistribution systems of livestock (rather than land). The conditions for upheld adaptive livestock production need to be maintained both as a minority right and as poverty combat.

The search for resilience of community based production systems needs to be supported through regional, international or national insurance policy that can host compensation funds for climatic variability. At present extra livestock are commonly kept as buffers against evil times. There is a need for food stores or even cash bank accounts to place the surplus in during good years.

In a monetary world the logical dryland production insurance is with banking or insurance companies. These must be designed so that both local inhabitants and policy makers can feel trust and see long-term resilience in them. Even if the community perspective may be oriented towards livestock as capital, land has to provide the safety for the insurance companies: Land use needs to be properly established. Land as commodity, not merely usufruct rights of it, can provide security for insurance or loan agreements.

**Resolve stakeholder interests**

There is a general assumption of drylands as poverty pockets due to low production capacity. However, in reality there is no automatic link between poverty and drylands.

Many modified land use practices have been tried, also with positive results. A host of experience from livestock production exists, so that bottlenecks for sustainable development can be specified. The orientation is towards poverty eradication, normally with a production focus. A prime issue is proper management, again signaling the need for good governance.

Sorting out the various stakeholder interests is a major field for long-term resilience when combating desertification. Once these the needs of community social groups along with those of regional and other stakeholders. have been identified, the conflicting areas can be specified and addressed either through modified land use practices or through political processes towards conflict resolutions. New conditions for community-based systems have to be laid down. The forms may vary, for instance between the African and Latin American continents, but in all areas the long term principles need to be established, so that stakeholders know what options are available.

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